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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

PERMANENT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

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FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 9:33 a.m. in room SD-342, under authority of S. Res. 80, Section 13, dated January 28, 1987, Hon. Sam Nunn, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Members of the subcommittee present: Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat, Georgia; Senator Jim Sasser, Democrat, Tennessee; Senator William V. Roth, Jr., Republican, Delaware; and Senator William S. Cohen, Republican, Maine.

Members of the professional staff present: Eleanore J. Hill, Chief Counsel and Staff Director; John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel; Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk; Kathleen A. Dias, Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel; David B. Buckley, Investigator; Cynthia Comstock, Staff Assistant; David Munson, Investigator; Harriet J. McFaul, Counsel; Harold Lippman, Investigator; Daniel F. Rinzel, Chief Counsel to the Minority; Mary K. Vinson, Staff Investigator to the Minority; Marilyn Munson, Secretary; Declan Cashman, Secretary; Evelyn Boyd (Senator Sasser); Rick Goodman (Senator Pryor); Allie Giles (Senator Levin); Natalie Bocock (Senator Cohen); Jeff Landry (Senator Stevens); Lori Beth Feld (Senator Trible); Marianne McGettigan (Senator Rudman); Jim Dykstra (Intelligence Committee); and Richard Dill.

[Senators present at convening of hearing: Senators Nunn and Cohen.]

[The letter of authority follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
Washington, DC.

Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, permission is hereby granted for the Chairman, or any Member of the Subcommittee as designated by the Chairman, to conduct open and/or executive session hearings without a quorum of two members for the administration of oaths and the taking of testimony in connection with hearings on the Federal Government's Handling of Soviet and Communist Bloc Defectors, to be held on October 8, 9 and 21, 1987.

SAM NUNN,
Chairman.
WILLIAM V. ROTH, Jr.,
Ranking Minority Member.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR NUNN

Senator NUNN. I have had a rather rough bout of something in the last few days, so my voice is not very strong this morning. But we will begin the hearings, and Senator Cohen, we welcome you here this morning. Senator Roth is going to be here in a few minutes; but he told us to begin in his absence.

This morning, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations begins three days of hearings on the Government's Handling of Soviet and Communist bloc defectors. With these hearings, Congress will be conducting its first comprehensive public overview of the handling of defectors.

I think it is fitting that these hearings occur during our Nation's celebration of the Bicentennial of our Constitution. Supported by our Constitution, our country has stood for 200 years as a safe haven for defectors, whether from religious, political or economic persecution; whether from Communist or Fascist dictatorships; and regardless of backgrounds.

Today, we focus on a small but important portion of the many political refugees who seek safe haven on our shores, namely, those who flee communist totalitarianism.

This phenomena is as old as the Russian revolution. Since 1917, people have fled the USSR in violation of Soviet law and against the wishes of the Soviet government.

In their flight for freedom, they have crossed borders, jumped ship or failed to return from a trip abroad. Whatever the circumstances of their escape, they share a desire for political asylum in the West, and they also share a common dissatisfaction with the Soviet and other Communist governments they have left behind.

I have had the honor and pleasure of talking to some of these freedom seekers in the course of this and other investigations. Most tell a similar story of facing the irrefutable fact that they could no longer live under the totalitarian regimes of their homelands.

One defector who will testify before us this week is Dr. Alexander Ushakov, formerly a professor at the Odessa Maritime Institute. Because of his criticisms of the communist system, he was arrested by the KGB in 1984. Briefly released from jail pending formal charges and trial, Dr. Ushakov evaded KGB surveillance and fled Odessa. Arriving at the Caucasus mountains, he spent the next 20 days hiking over this perilous mountain range to the Turkish border. He literally walked his way to freedom over a very dangerous terrain.

One of the most sobering aspects of Dr. Ushakov's flight to freedom was his own shock when he arrived at the Soviet-Turkish border. As I believe you will hear when he testifies tomorrow, Dr. Ushakov was both outraged and saddened to find out that the tops of fences and other border obstacles faced inward, toward Russia not outward, toward Turkey. This sight finally cystallized in his mind the nature of the system he was attempting to escape—a system more concerned with keeping its citizens in than with keeping foreigners out.

Although I cite Dr. Ushakov's remarkable escape to show to what lengths individuals will go to defect, the main focus of these hearings is not on how they escape, but on what happens to Dr. Ushakov and others like him once they arrive in the United States.

The subcommittee will examine the opportunities, in this case, the lack thereof, for these individuals to fulfill their expectations here in the United States as well as to significantly contribute to our society.

We will look at the substantial difficulties they routinely face in their adjustment to the new and very different culture that they encounter in the West. Finally, we are determined to find out whether we as a society are mining the most of their valuable talents and their unique insights into what otherwise remains to us a closed society.

Specifically, our subcommittee will try to answer the following questions: How can we as a country better utilize the unique talents, skills and insights of East Bloc defectors? And also: Is the government's current resettlement program for such defectors adequate and, if not, how can it be improved?

We will also be looking at non-governmental efforts, and there are considerable non-governmental efforts, helping to take on this challenge and opportunity for our country.

It is important to note that the defector offers our country a rare insight into the Soviet Union and other communist regimes. Unlike other countries, the communist bloc closely guards even some of the most innocuous facts and figures behind an all-encompassing veil of its state security apparatus.

Defectors offer us a tool to pierce that veil. Some have held important positions in the military, in government, and in the party apparatus. Almost all of them have spent their entire lives in these closed societies.

Moreover, they come to us of their own volition; in order to learn what they have to teach, we need not launch a satellite or devise some complex covert operation. We need only listen and afford them opportunities to lead productive and hospitable lives.

The major conclusion of the subcommittee's exhaustive staff study, which will be presented here this morning, is that our society is not fully and productively integrating these individuals into the mainstream of American life. Nor, as a result, are we fully utilizing their talents and analytical skills.

It is a case of "lost opportunities." Unfortunately, the West, and particularly the United States, has not shown enough interest in much of the non-intelligence knowledge concerning the Soviet system which these individuals offers us. Outside of the intelligence community, which, obviously, has its own unique and specialized priorities, I believe the testimony will show that the defectors' knowledge of Soviet and East European foreign and domestic policy, political-military doctrine and strategy, as well as their instinctive anticipation of future communist behavior, have been, to a large extend, ignored.

The subcommittee will hear from a number of witnesses, including Director Webster and General Odom today, on the importance of the information and analysis these defectors possess and how we as a society could better utilize them. We also expect to hear from military and academic witnesses on the last day of the hearings concerning several programs that have been successfully adapted to benefit from their talents.

Equally troubling is the absence of a comprehensive program to address the variety of resettlement programs faced by defectors. Fleeing from a totalitarian culture, sometimes with little more than the shirt on their backs, these newcomers to our country face a myriad of problems adjusting to the freedom of the West.

Most people fail to recognize that when we deal with the defectors, we are dealing with individuals who have spent their entire lives under a dictatorial regime, a regime which told them from birth what to do, where to work and how to live. By contrast, they suddenly arrive in a free and open society where individuals routinely make decision after decision every day of their lives, from finding a job or buying a house to opening a bank account or choosing a credit card. To a defector, the transition between these two cultures is obviously going to be a very painful one.

Given all these difficulties, it is surprising that defectors are able to cope with resettlement as well as many of them do. I expect we will hear during these hearings of many individuals who have overcome these transitional hurdles to achieve success and prosperity in the West. Others have not been so lucky. And, in the latter cases, our society has been equally unlucky: we have been deprived of the insights they could have given us, had they been given the chance.

In these hearings, we will have the opportunity to listen to some of those who have risked their lives to reach our shores. At the same time, I hope that those behind the Iron Curtain will also somehow have the opportunity to hear their former comrades who have made that great leap of faith to the West. It is important that they know that life is different here, that it is hard to make it. But most importantly, they should also know that they can and will make it if they try. Most defectors do, as attested to by the defectors who will testify over the next three days.

Moreover, those listening to us in Communist countries should realize that these hearings are the start of making a good system work much better. I expect that as a result of the subcommittee's work, needed reforms of the resettlement process will come about that will make the life of these freedom seekers much better than it has been in the past.

In closing, I want to thank Senator Roth and the minority staff for their cooperation and support during the course of this investigation. With his full support, I initiated this investigation when Senator Roth was chairman. It is another example of the bipartisan nature of this issue. Defector handling and resettlement is not a Republican problem nor a Democratic problem; it is an American problem that affects our Nation's security.

Senator Cohen.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COHEN

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. On behalf of Senator Roth, who will be here shortly, I would like to express my appreciation to you and to the subcommittee staff, as well. Senator Boren and I serve along with you on the Intelligence Committee. I want to say on behalf of the Intelligence Committee that we particularly appreciate the sensitivity with which the subcommittee has dealt with us. We are bordering on classified information, and the subcommittee has handled it with great sensitivity. On behalf of Senator Boren and myself, I would like to express that appreciation.

Senator NUNN. We are going to be very careful in questions raised during this hearing, too, and we are going to tell our witnesses beginning with Director Webster and General Odom that if any questions in any way get beyond what should be answered in public session that they inform us and we can have a private session later, and we have enjoyed the complete support of the Intelligence Committee, and we thank you and Senator Boren for that.

Senator COHEN. Last fall, the Intelligence Committee issued a public report concerning the handling of Soviet defectors, and I quoted from portions of that in my opening statement, which I ask that you include in the record. Without repeating it right now, I would like to point out that Vitaly Yurchenko perhaps was the force that galvanized the Commitee's attention to look into how the United States handled the defector problem.

The Yurchenko case was, to say the least, an embarrassment to the United States. But it also had a positive effect, because it forced us to look at how we handle Soviet defectors, in this case, or emigres who come here fulfilled with expectations that are perhaps too high. Perhaps they are false expectations, but nonetheless, I think that we have been very deficient in how we have looked at the psychological traumas, the needs that have to be extended to those who come from a country such as the Soviet Union or East Bloc countries. I think we have been totally deficient in that regard.

The Yurchenko case has been positive in the sense that we have now made some significant changes which I think that the Director will testify to here later today. General Odom will also offer that in testimony, so I look forward to seeing what steps can be taken, what amenities can be extended, what psychological assistance can be provided to make the lives of those who come to this country fulfilling.

There may be some, no matter what we do, who will still be dissatisfied with life in the United States, and who will want to return to the Soviet Union, but I think that we can take significant steps to provide a better way of life and to fulfill some of those expectations by making important changes.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Cohen. Your full statement will be part of the record without objection.

Senator Glenn also would like to have a statement submitted for the record. It will be submitted and entered without objection. And also, Senator Humphrey will have a statement which will be admitted without objection,[1] although he is going to testify before us later on today.

[The statements of Senators Cohen and Glenn follow:]

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[1] See p. 244.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR COHEN

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, Senator Roth, and the staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for your close cooperation with the Senate Intelligence Committee in planning these public hearings on the subject of defectors. Senator Boren and I, as chairman and vice chairman of the Intelligence Committee, appreciate the care with which this subcommittee has handled a sensitive matter that borders on classified U.S. Government activities.

This was, of course, made easier by the fact that both of you are both senior members of the Intelligence Committee and thus appreciate the sensitivities in this area. I am also pleased that the Director of Central Intelligence, Judge Webster, and the Director of the National Security Agency, General Odom, have been given this opportunity to testify at the hearing today.

Last fall, the Intelligence Committee issued a public report on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs that discussed our committee's concerns growing out of the case of Vitaly Yurchenko, the Soviet KGB officer who defected to this country and then returned to the Soviet Union. The Yurchenko case was, at the very least, a serious embarrassment. But it had the positive effect of focusing the attention of senior policymakers and the Congress on some broader issues. It forced us to look at our treatment, as a nation, of those who escape from Soviet bloc countries and bring their talents and experience to our society.

In light of the Yurchenko re-defection, the Intelligence Committee has examined carefully the Government's classified program for debriefing and resettling defectors who provide unique information that directly benefits U.S. national security. Improvements have been made in that program, and the Intelligence Committee continues to monitor it closely. I would like to offer for the record the section from the Intelligence Committee's 1986 report, "Meeting the Espionage Challenge," that discusses the CIA's actions to upgrade the classified program and respond to the lessons of the Yurchenko case.

The Intelligence Committee's report emphasizes the importance of going beyond narrowly defined national security interests and praises this subcommittee's initiative. Let me quote:

"The [Intelligence] Committee considers it of the utmost importance that our Nation's goals in welcoming and assisting defectors be more clearly enunciated and boldly implemented. * * *

"The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs has begun a major study of the U.S. Government's handling of defectors and other refugees from the Soviet bloc. This study will focus particular attention on the contributions that defectors can and do make to American society and on the need to encourage that process. The Intelligence Committee supports this PSI study and is cooperating with the subcommittee in its effort to inform the public regarding the needs of defectors and of the agencies that assist them."

One of the main lessons both this subcommittee and the Intelligence Committee have learned is the limit on what can be done by a classified program. Public Law 110, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, provides for the admission into the United States without regard to the immigration laws of up to 100 aliens per year whose admission is determined by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration to be "in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission." This is the statutory basis for the classified program. The effective administration of that program is vital to our national security, but it may not be enough.

I am pleased, therefore, that these hearings will look at the need to supplement the Classified Defector Program with an overt program to deal with those persons who do not fit within the narrow limits of Public Law 110. These hearings should also remind the public of the importance of helping Soviet bloc defectors, refugees, and emigres cope with the adjustment to life in this country.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR GLENN

Mr. Chairman, first of all I wish to commend you for taking the initiative to explore the treatment and resettlement problems of defectors from the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

Soviet bloc defectors face unique problems in resettlement. Essentially they are leaving behind all of their worldly possessions, not to mention their families and friends, pursuing the dream of a better way of life, not knowing for sure if it truly exists.

Past redefections among defectors our Government considers so important that they are deemed "essential aliens", have caused Congress and the responsible Government agencies to question and review the Government's resettlement practices. The redefection of former KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko pointed out the need for improvement in the treatment of key defectors.

In addition there are other defectors who, though they are not deemed to be "essential aliens", have been allowed to defect but whose utility has been virtually untapped. Within this group of defectors exists a wealth of information which could provide useful insights into the closed Soviet system. We must question why this information is being ignored.

We as a Nation must ask ourselves what are the consequences of not improving our current practices for handling defectors. Granted there are certain risks involved, but we must weigh those risks with the possibility of losing valuable information or creating additional hardships which lead to redefecting. Without taking some action, new defections are less likely to occur.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing the testimony and your recommendations.

Senator NUNN. Our first witness this morning is going to be John Sopko. He has been our staff lead on this investigation, and we will hear from him before we hear from Director Webster this morning.

I understand Director Webster will be here in a few minutes. We will hear from him as our second witness.

Mr. Sopko, we swear all our witnesses before the subcommittee. Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. SOPKO. I do

Senator NUNN. We have your whole statement, and I know it is a very long and detailed statement, and I know it is difficult to summarize, but in the interest of time, we will ask you to summarize and start by giving us your background, length of time with the subcommittee, what you have done before that, and make that part of the record here.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. SOPKO, DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL, PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS [1]

Mr. SOPKO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is John F. Sopko. I am the Deputy Chief Counsel of the subcommittee. Since 1982, I have been employed as counsel for the subcommittee. Prior to 1982, I was a Special Attorney with the Department of Justice's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section. I have been assigned to conduct this subcommittee investigation since its inception.

As previously alluded to by Senator Cohen, on the evening of Saturday, November 2, 1985 KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko walked out of the Georgetown Restaurant "Au Pied De Cochon" and into the annals of defector history.

The publicity surrounding Mr. Yurchenko's last supper in Georgetown continues to this day both in the controlled Soviet press as well as in the Western media. Particularly in the Soviet Union and behind the Iron Curtain, the events surrounding his alleged escape and handling have been expounded to illustrate the treatment that can be expected of any fugitive to the West.

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[1] See p. 161 for Mr. Sopko's prepared statement.

However, not far from Yurchenko's memorable repast, just six months before, another event occurred which is just as relevant to the scope of this inquiry today. It was the defection of a senior diplomat from an Eastern Bloc country. Although the diplomat neither knew Yurchenko nor anything about him, his treatment as a non-intelligence agent defector is just as important as Yurchenko's to our understanding of the importance of defection and the problems inherent to the resettlement of fugitives from totalitarianism.

Little publicity surrounded that diplomat's leap to freedom because of security reasons, as well as the desires of the diplomat in question. Although in possession of highly useful information, he did not defect to give us state secrets. This Soviet Bloc defector left solely for the chance to live and work in a state of freedom that we in the West too easily take for granted.

As the Yurchenko case caused the American people to reassess the CIA's handling of intelligence officers who defect and brought about needed improvements, the handling, or more accurately, the lack thereof, of the diplomat-defector who still resides in the United States appears to call for needed reforms.

The staff found that defectors are not "squeezed like a lemon and thrown away" as commonly alleged in the Soviet press. Instead, most defectors seem to wish they had been "squeezed a little more." Not constrained by stringent physical security requirements, the non-intelligence service defector could more easily enhance our nation's understanding of the closed Soviet and Communist Bloc society which, for the foreseeable future, will be our country's primary protagonist in foreign and military affairs.

Yet our record so far with the handling of these defectors indicates the opposite.

For example, Dr. Peter Nicholae, a high-ranking economist for the Romanian government attached to COMECON, spent over five years in New York running a laundromat and selling ice cream before he came to the attention of the Jamestown Foundation and others who are now attempting to find a way to put his storehouse of information on the East European economy to better use through writing, lecturing and research.

Alexandra Costra, who will testify tomorrow, the former wife of a senior Soviet diplomat, was initially urged by a government representative to become a clerical work employee. Fourtunately, due to her perseverance and the personal interest of a number of government officials, she was able to graduate from the Wharton School and start a successful life as a businesswoman here in the United States. Eight years after her defection, her insights into the Soviet society is now a bestseller here in the United States.

As Chairman Nunn has previously alluded to, Aleksandr Ushakov, a Professor of Marxism, will testify tomorrow. He hiked for 19 days over the Caucusus Mountains to reach the West. He had been arrested for writing articles allegedly slandering the Soviet state. Fortunately, he was released by the KGB in hopes that he would lead them to other "co-conspirators".

Additionally, due to a quirk in Soviet law, the Soviets would not charge him until he had been stripped of his Communist Party membership. This pecularity allowed Ushakov to escape. Ironically, once here in the United States, the fact that Dr. Ushakov had been a member of the Communist Party now bars him for an additional five years from becoming eligible for American citizenship.

Another example is that of Andrey Sorokun, who has submitted a statement for the record. He was a Japanese area studies student from Moscow State University when he defected in 1983 while studying in Japan. Although proficient in three languages, Russian, English and Japanese, he wound up washing dishes in a New York restaurant for three years until discovered by the Jamestown Foundation and assisted in employment.

Tadeusz Kucharski, who defected in 1983 after serving five years as the Polish Commercial Attache in Angola, was never even debriefed by the United States government concerning Soviet and Polish military and commercial affairs in that troubled part of Africa.

Since his defection, he and his wife have found successful employment and are assisting other Polish emigres to adjust to their new life here in America.

Others have not been as persistent as these individuals, or as lucky. Within the last few months, two promising defectors returned home. Vladimir Kovnat, a prominent Soviet television correspondent, photojournalist and filmmaker who had worked extensively in the Middle East and Southeast Asia returned with his wife on July 31st to the Soviet Union.

In addition, Bronius Venclova, a former Soviet interpreter who defected in 1985, could not withstand the pressure of the propaganda campaign engineered by the Soviets to secure his return. This August, he returned after complaining that he could no longer take the constant telephone calls and harassment engineered by the Soviet government.

As stated before, at the direction of Chairman Nunn, the subcommittee staff has conducted an extensive investigation of the handling of defectors by the government. The inquiry included interviews of a large number of defectors, government officials, former intelligence officers, non-governmental agencies and volunteer organizations.

Based upon these interviews and the significant body of work by both Intelligence Committees of Congress, it became apparent early in the investigation that a vacuum exists in current government programs for the systematic identification and productive integration of a significant group of defectors into U.S. public life.

The staff found that while a government system is in place for dealing with a very discreet type of defector who falls within the purview of the U.S. intelligence community which has been generally very successful over the years, there is no comparable system in existence for the bulk of defectors who do not meet their stringent and unique requirements.

The vast majority of defectors to the United States from totalitarian regimes, the subcommittee staff found to be covered by programs supplied by the various voluntary agencies that handle the over 60,000 refugees per year that gain entry to our country. These programs are generally geared to the resettlement of vast numbers of people of various ethnic and social backgrounds, most of whom arrive here as legal emigres.

The staff found those programs generally inadequate to handle the special, higher-level defector from the Soviet Bloc whose past close association with the totalitarian government he fled from often impedes his acceptance in the U.S. emigree community and the community at large.

Let me just pause at this point, Senators. It should be clearly noted that nothing in this statement or nothing that the staff of the subcommittee is stating should imply any criticism whatsoever toward these or the other voluntary refugee agencies. With very little government assistance, they have tirelessly performed excellent work successfully resettling thousands of refugees.

[At this point Senator Sasser entered the hearing room.]

Mr. SOPKO. But even these voluntary agencies acknowledged the need for greater assistance for those refugees from totalitarian regimes due to the additional problems they face here in the West. In focusing on this latter group, which is the focus of this committee hearing and based upon our investigation, the staff made the following conclusions:

First of all, these individuals could make a useful contribution to our society and our national security by helping to fill important gaps in our knowledge of the Soviet Bloc as well as in projecting future actions of the Soviet Bloc leadership in the political, economic and military arenas.

Second, the subcommittee staff found that this unique resource remains for the most part untapped by both government and society in any long-term and systematic way.

Third, that government assistance to defectors is limited to a very small group.

Fourth, that these defectors face unique problems in resettlement and integration into our society that are not currently being adequately addressed by the government and voluntary private organizations, sometimes leading to their return to the Soviet Bloc.

Due to the defectors' prior experience of position within the Soviet Bloc, the staff found that these individuals tend to find acceptance to be difficult within those emigre groups that have already settled in the United States. Thus, the normal support mechanism for emigres and for these individuals, in particular, among previously established ethnic communities does not exist.

The sixth point that the staff found was that a concerted, sophisticated and intense program of harassment and intimidation meant to force the defector to return to the Soviet Bloc exists and appears to be expanding in the United States.

[At this point, Senator Roth entered the hearing room.]

Mr. SOPKO. Although it does not approach the violence, intensity or overtness of the efforts in the 1950s and 1960s, its novel psychological methods for playing upon the defectors initial adjustment period is a continuing problem.

All of the above, directly and adversely affects our national security, given the underutilization of the defectors' unique talents, the negative impact upon future defection, and the propaganda use that the Soviet Bloc makes of these failings.

These problems affect not only the number of future non-intelligence defectors, but also the critically important defection of the intelligence officer or other essential alien, since the treatment of all is inexorably intertwined in the eyes of the would-be defector residing behind the Iron Curtain.

Turning to the close of my statement, Senators, the net result of all of these issues, practical as well as emotional, has been mixed. Some defectors have overcome these hurdles and successfully integrated themselves into the professional world, even when, as in most cases, this was done without the assistance of the U.S. government or other volunteer agencies, but was due to their over perseverance and plain luck.

But many others have had inordinate trouble finding jobs, homes and careers, in some cases leading to their return. It is the staff's conclusion that many of the most successful cases of resettlement have been due to the efforts of individual Americans who have taken it upon themselves to assist the defector.

Mark Wyatt, a former intelligence officer, has done probably as much as any other individual private citizen in the United States to help defectors. On his own time and with his own funds, he has arranged job interviews, found housing, made introductions and paid for their travel and lodging. Yet even Mr. Wyatt acknowledged to the staff that this important responsibility should not rely for its success upon the "action of a few highly-motivated individuals."

He, as well as others who have acted above and beyond the call of duty for a private citizen, feel that a government system should be set up in order to take the luck out of successful defection and resettlement.

Just as with the question of the utility of an individual defector, it is difficult to judge the specific consequences of a defector who does not teach or an emigre scientist who drives a cab instead of working in his true profession.

Moreover, it is even harder to determine the cost to our society of unnecessarily delaying or even preventing the use of a defector's unique insight into the public domain.

As stated before, the most apparent result of such action seems to be the adverse impact upon future potential defectors from the Soviet Union. As University of Kansas Vice-Chancellor Dr. Jerry Hutchenson comments in his statement that is submitted for the record today, "If those who come to the United States find the assimilation process to be a salutory one, then others will be encouraged to follow. If the experience is a negative one, highly-educated Soviet citizens may reconsider defection or choose to emmigrate to other countries. Thus, from a political viewpoint, it is in the best interests of the United States to make the transition to the American culture an expeditious and positive experience."

In sum, the costs to our society can best be described as Chairman Nunn has done in his opening statement that of lost opportunities. Although totally unquantifiable, since we will never know who would have defected but for the news of Yurchenko, et cetera, it seems obvious that a system that ignores their unique talents as well as their unique problems bears a serious cost in terms of our national self-interest.

In closing, I would just like to indicate that the staff has prepared and would like to offer at this time a number of exhibits for insertion into the record. It includes probably the single largest compilation of the statements by defectors; as well as basically, the only public research that has been done on defectors by Etienne Huygens, the former Research Director for the Jamestown Foundation, and the work of Professor Vladislav Krasnov. I would ask at this time that we offer into the record these exhibits.

Senator Nunn. Without objection, that will be entered into the record and numbered appropriately.

[The documents referred to were marked Exhibit Nos. 1-25. See Contents starting on p. 401 for title and disposition of the Exhibits.]

Senator Nunn. We will have a few questions for you in a moment, Mr. Sopko, although we are going to get to our next witness, Director Casey, as soon as possible. But before that—I'm sorry, Director Webster. [Laughter.]

Senator Cohen. That has really got an impact.

Senator Nunn. I have been reading too much. [Laughter.]

Senator Roth, you were not here when I mentioned that this investigation started under your purview as chairman and has continued under mine as chairman. I think that denotes the bipartisan nature of our subcommittee. We appreciate your splendid cooperation both as Chairman and as Ranking Republican.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR ROTH

Senator Roth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am appreciative of the fact that this subcommittee does work in a bipartisan way. I think it goes very much to the heart of the effectiveness of PSI. I want to particularly applaud your interest in the sensitive subject of defectors.

As you say, this is not the first time that PSI has heard from defector witnesses. As I recall, at both the Security Clearance and the Foreign Missions Act hearings, we gained unique insights from the testimony of various defectors.

This hearing, I think, is a natural outgrowth of our experience with defectors as subcommittee witnesses. We have learned firsthand that defectors can be a valuable resource. Our Nation has always welcomed those who flee oppression. The Statue of Liberty stands in silent but eloquent testimony to that fact.

I think we all agree a welcoming spirit is not enough to keep the defector afloat during the always difficult adjustment to his newly-adopted home.

More often than not, these persons want to be of service to their new country but can have difficulty finding the proper niche. Given a guiding hand, generally, a suitable match can be made. Finding this proper match, the purpose of these hearings, can only enrich and strengthen the fabric of American society.

When one considers many of the persons who have defected to the United States during the last 60 years, it is easy to see that we have attracted some of the best and the brightest from the nations of the world. This is a fact of which we can be very proud.

Mr. Chairman, you know the issue of defector raises many difficult questions that have no easy answers. Defection is, by its very nature, a traumatic event in the lives of the individuals; the very fact that they choose to leave shows that the defector has a different mindset than the average person of his or her society. They are, in the literal sense of the word, extraordinary people.

Clearly, these people require very careful treatment during the first few months of their new country. One vexing issue surrounding the defection is a concern about a false defector. Within the defector community itself, this a source of consternation.

There are certain people in our government who believe that no defector can ever be trusted. This is obviously an extreme, unproductive viewpoint, as well. While unproductive to cultivate an attitude that all defectors are suspect, it would be naive to wave aside all security concerns even with the highest level of defectors.

So we look forward to these hearings, Mr. Chairman. I regret that I am only going to be here part of the time, as I have commitments on the Senate floor as well as another committee meeting. But I thank you, again, for holding these hearings.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Roth.

I just have a couple of questions. You have talked about the problems and the lost opportunities. You have mentioned that the government itself should get more involved. But you also mentioned that the narrow slot of intelligence defectors are generally given more attention and care than the broader group of defectors who don't fit that slot but who may very well also be important officials, former officials in totalitarian regimes.

Do you have any recommendation for our consideration as to how we go about, as a government, dealing with those individuals that fall into that slot? In other words, what agency of government, if any particular agency, or who should assume the responsibility?

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, a number of recommendations will be made throughout the hearing; and we will hear some today from a number of the witnesses. Some of the recommendations—and I can't say that the staff accepts every one of them—but one that we have heard is to utilize the current funding mechanism of Title VIII of the State Department Authorization Act, which currently gives funding for research in the Soviet area, just to set up a separate category of funding for those non-intelligence defectors in order to get their input. Another recommendation is to fund a number of them as "itenerate scholars" for maybe one to three years at various institutions where they get an opportunity to research and write about their experiences.

In this way they are being paid to do the research that they were doing before, but they get an opportunity also to meet American scholars, to learn more about the American system and they can acquire American academic credentials. Although they may have degrees, Ph.D. degrees from behind the Soviet Union, it is against the law to bring out your diploma with you. So they can't prove that they have a degree. So many of them have to go back to school here and get American credentials in order to compete.

That is one of the most popular recommendation being made, to use the current funding mechanism through the State Department, which then gives money out through, I believe it is called, the National Counsel for Soviet and European research. We will have a member from that organization testifying on the third day. That is one recommendation.

Another recommendation is merely to increase the funding for voluntary refugee agencies. Currently, the voluntary agencies only get $650 dollars per refugee resettled. Just to increase the funding to the volunatry agencies, which have been in existence since the thirties helping refugees, utilizing them as a potential area for assisting the defector is another recommendation.

There are numerous recommendations, but those are two of the most prominent ones that we have heard in our staff investigation.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Before I call on Senator Roth for questions, Senator Sasser, we are delighted to have you with us. Did you have any opening statement you would like to make?

Senator SASSER. No. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you and Senator Roth for holding these hearings here today. I look forward to hearing from the witnesses. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Senator ROTH. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. In the record you filed, you indicated there is a distinction between a defector and a refugee. Perhaps you could articulate this just briefly in terms of how we draw such a distinction.

For example, should a defector or must a defector have some direction to having intelligence about the Soviet Union or one of the Eastern Bloc countries in order to qualify as a "defector" as opposed to a "refugee"?

Mr. SOPKO. Senator, to explain this, I first would have to say that technically, the term "defector" is not legally defined anywhere in the Code. Basically, they fall under INS requirements as either a political refugee, asylee, et cetera. The defector term has a unique definition to the intelligence community, and I believe Director Webster can probably explain it better than I do.

We have used the term defector to cover those who illegally leave the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc or illegally fail to return to the Soviet Bloc. That is how we define the term defector. I don't know if that answers your question, Senator.

Senator COHEN. For example, I know Cuba is not covered under the committee's investigation or at least the analysis about defection and redefectors.

Second, we don't deal with countries such as China, which present other types of problems for resettlement in this country.

Third, if you were dealing with Vietnamese, and for example, you had a boatload of people leave Vietnam and amongst that boatlaod of people were one or two former intelligence officers with the Vietnamese government, would they be defectors, or would they be part of the refugees who were seeking to leave Vietnam?

I just think we need a little bit more explanation about the refugees versus defectors distinction.

Mr. SOPKO. As a basis of the investigation, Senator, we basically focused on European Bloc defectors. Our analysis, from what people told us, would be equally apt for those coming from China, those coming from Vietnam, those coming from Cuba or other countries.

The insights they may give us, some Vietnamese give us tremendous insights and so the analogy, although we focused in our investigations and basically, it was because of our access to people to talk to, has been in that group. It could equally be, and many of the people who will be testifying will say it should, equally be applied to those people from Vietnam and other countries like that.

Senator COHEN. It becomes important, because, as you pointed out, it was Mr. Kucharski, I think, who was not really associated with Polish intelligence but nonetheless had valuable information, and was completely overlooked.

So is it something within our own institutional mind frame that leads us to believe that we deal with defectors who are associated with intelligence activities and disregard the others?

Mr. SOPKO. Many of the defectors are talked to, even if they have no intelligence are not intelligence agents. The Kucharski case, I think, is just an example that sometimes people slip through, and there have been a number of cases. Unfortunately, the examples that we know of all seem to be the Kucharski types. The Jameston Foundation has advised us there were a number of Ethiopian officials who ended up in the United States, and no one had ever talked to them about Ethiopia.

I can't say why that occurred. It doesn't seem that the mechanism we have to talk to people is 100 percent successful.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. We will be hearing from you again during the course of these hearings.

Director Webster, we are delighted to have you here this morning. We swear in all the witnesses bofore our subcommittee. So if you would hold up your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Director WEBSTER. I do.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Director, we appreciate you being here this morning. We know that you haven't been in your new position long enough to be held responsible for everything that has or has not happened in the past, but we also know that you were very familiar with these sensitive areas, as the Director of the FBI. So we are, I suppose, going to be looking to you for your past experience as well as your present position, but we will be delighted to have your opening statement.

I mentioned, I believe, before you came in, we know there are sensitive areas here, and we respect that. We are going to be very careful about our questions, but if any of the questions go over into those areas, if you will simply indicate you prefer to answer that in a private hearing, we will be glad to respect that.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Director WEBSTER. Fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I am pleased to be here today and to share with you my thoughts on what we all recognize is an important subject: Persons who flee from the Communist Bloc to the United States and how our country might better take advantage of all that they have to offer.

Let me begin by discussing briefly the one area to which I can speak officially as the Director of Central Intelligence: The very small fraction of these people who are of intelligence interest to the United States government. The intelligence community, over which I as Director preside, has a system to identify and select intelligence information and to address other intelligence concerns with respect to these persons.

The system is comprehensive, very active and highly successful. The nature and extent of our work is, of course, as you pointed out, classified and cannot be discussed in specifics in this forum. I can say, though, that I am satisfied that my community is working very hard and, indeed, has made improvements in existing efforts.

Today, however, the subcommittee focuses not on these few individuals, but on the larger group, those persons not of special intelligence interest to the United States government.

The Director of Central Intelligence is not officially charged with the responsibility for dealing with this larger group. Nonetheless, I am pleased to share my thoughts with you, and I shall do so. I shall refer to this larger category of persons as resettlement cases rather than as defectors, due to the fact that for us in the intelligence community, the word "defector" is a term with a very limited, specific meaning.

Resettlement cases have chosen to come here of their own will and initiative, just as have so many millions of immigrants throughout our history. Being human, their motivations, their ambitions and their capabilities vary widely. There are, however, two characteristics which all seem to share.

On the one hand, they are dissatisfied with the restrictive societies from which they have come and look forward to enjoying the liberties that we take for granted, perhaps yearning to be free. On the other hand, they have to deal with the difficulties of readjustment to life in a new society in which the mores, the customs, the language, the rules and regulations are different from those to which they are accustomed.

The latter point may seem apparent, but I think it deserves some emphasis. Americans who have changed their residences within the United States are aware of the simple frustrations involved: different systems of trash collection; different ways of calculating state income taxes; variances in whether rentals normally include refrigerators and stoves and so on. This, in our own country. Think how difficult it is for individuals and families who are attempting to build a new life under circumstances in which all the rules have changed and the language is difficult to speak and to understand.

Also, I note that on occasion, those who come here have unrealistic expectations and plans that just simply don't materialize.

The government subsidizes routinely and to a very modest extent the initial resettlement expenses of many resettlement cases. These funds are distributed by the government to the voluntary agency which sponsored the individual. Beyond this assistance, which covers only the first weeks following arrival in the United States, there is no organized system through which the government offers assistance to such individuals.

For helping to smooth the transition and adjustment for so many of the resettlement cases and their families, much credit and praise is due to the voluntary agencies who assume the overwhelming task of resettling many thousands of these individuals each year. I understand that the subcommittee will hear from some of their representatives tomorrow. Given the relatively limited resources available to them, they accomplish a very great deal.

Beyond these, there is also a role for individual Americans to play here. Any of us may, at some point, have occasion to encounter these persons in a wide variety of settings, as neighbors, as colleagues in the work place or as fellow members of religious congregations.

In such instances, we should take the initiative and offer assistance, suggestions and guidance on dealing with American life. While this may seem a small thing, it can mean a great deal to a person coming from a closed, highly structured, repressive system to one whose openness, breadth and freedom offer a sense of liberation, but also a sometimes bewildering range of choices.

Looking beyond the early stages of resettlement, these individuals have a potential to contribute to our society in a variety of ways. They possess a personal knowledge and understanding of their former cultures and political systems which they could provide to interested parties were the effort made to reach out to them.

Some possess unique language skills, a point which I believe General Odom may address in more specific detail in his testimony. Potential recipients of these benefits include: academic institutions, scholars, civic groups, universitites and high school classes and, in certain cases, the government.

Sometimes, however, there is a problem in matching these individuals with potential recipients. Again, the voluntary agencies perform an important function here. These agencies, however, cannot be everywhere and in touch with all the people at once.

Individual initiatives by the potential recipients to seek out such people and offer them the opportunity to make their personal contributions would simultaneously provide them with a sense of satisfaction and enrich our society. This is obviously an area on which the subcommittee may wish to focus.

I note that the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, as the primary United States government agencies responsible for the movement of persons from overseas to this country, have important roles to play here, and I would assume that the subcommittee plans on consulting them.

In these brief opening remarks, I have been able to touch only in the most general terms on this very important topic. The problems and the opportunities are as varied and as individual as you might expect with persons of widely differing ages, educational backgrounds, experience and family circumstances.

So at this point, I believe, it would probably be more appropriate to conclude my general comments and respond to specific questions that may be of particular interest to you.

I appreciate the chairman's remarks about some of the work that you do with our own defector programs, but to the extent that I can be helpful in sharing experience gleaned there, I will be glad to do so.

Senator NUNN. Director Webster, we appreciate you being here this morning, and you mentioned that your definition of defector is a narrow definition. We are using the term defector to cover a much broader group that you are. By your very definition, you are interested as an agency in what you call a defector; is that right?

Director WEBSTER. That is certainly true, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. There are a large number of people that don't meet that definition, and you call those resettlement cases.

Director WEBSTER. For purposes of this discussion, I do.

Senator NUNN. How do you go about drawing the line between those, and how much screening do you do of the resettlement cases to determine if, indeed, they meet the definition of defector?

Director WEBSTER. I think we have a kind of working definition of defectors, partly influenced by the statutes which permit us to take special action with respect to getting permanent status for them.

It is more a process, I think, of elimination. We are interested in those who have potential intelligence value to the United States. We are interested in those whose information may be important to us in national security terms and to a lesser but, nevertheless, important degree, we are interested in identifying and processing those who have a potential political value to the United States government.

It may not be our responsibility to exploit that, but at least in the process of identifying those individuals, we look for such things. Beyond that and at the other extreme are the large numbers of emigres who are over here simply to lead private lives, who had no special information, who are of no particular individual political view, and for whom we have no charter of responsibility.

Senator NUNN. What I guess I am getting at, is there a sifting process so that on one end comes out a few people you are interested in, but in terms of looking for those people, you sift through an awful lot of information about thousands of others?

Director WEBSTER. We do sift, but we don't undertake or represent that we start at the other extreme and that we screen each individual emigre coming to this country. I think that's outside our charter or outside our resources and our capability.

To the extent that we have identified those we are interested in, of course, they get very special attention. The entire intelligence community is alerted in various ways to identify those coming in.

Whether or not that sifting process can be improved, I can't say at the present time. It depends a lot upon resources and our ability to function with other agencies. I suspect there is room for improvement.

Senator NUNN. For example, we have heard in the staff statement that there was a Polish commercial attaché in Angola that had never been interviewed by the government. If that is accurate—and you may want to reflect on your records and come back to us with your own records of that—but if that is accurate, you would think that at least that individual would have been put through some sifting process before a decision was made that that individual was not, indeed, what you would call a defector.

Director WEBSTER. I can't comment on that in this forum, Mr. Chairman, but I will certainly agree that likely candidates should be carefully sifted or vetted before they come to the United States or in the process of their coming.

Senator NUNN. We also heard about Ethiopian Ambassadors not having been interviewed, former Ethiopian Ambassadors, by anybody in government. It seems to me just on the face of it, those would be the type people that you want to at least make some deliberate decision about.

Director WEBSTER. I would be very much surprised to hear that an ambassador from an important country that we were very much interested in was not interviewed. Certainly, it should be done.

Senator NUNN. What we will do is furnish you with some of the information we have for you to cross check it and get back to us, and we will keep classified wherever these are classified.

Director WEBSTER. Fine.

Senator NUNN. But I would like to know more about your process and, for instance, if 100 people are deemed defectors a year, how many people would have been put in that category of resettlement cases and how many of those resettlement cases would have been given at least preliminary screening to determine if some of them appropriately fitted in the definition of defector.

Can you tell us without going into any details or particulars of the case what has come about after the Yurchenko case within the CIA?

Director WEBSTER. Yes, I think I can, Mr. Chairman. Much of what I say is covered by, would ordinarily be covered by classified restrictions, so I have to say only in the most broadest terms. There were a number of inquiries, both internal and external, within the Executive Branch and of course, the questions were asked and responded to in the Congress.

There has been a substantial increase in the numbers of officials, officers, intelligence officers assigned to this work, a shift in emphasis and attitude that I think is positive and constructive, and I can assure you that I will be watching this very carefuly in the future because the defectors that we are able to recruit can be of enormous value to us, and any loss of them is a potential major loss to American security.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe that the subcommittee staff has testified this morning that outside this what you would call the narrow category of defectors, that there is a vacuum that exists in terms of governmental assistance for this program through private agencies or governmental direct involvement? Do you perceive a vacuum here?

Director WEBSTER. There certainly appears to be one.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any particular thoughts on the subject as to what the U.S. Government should do, if anything, in this area?

Director WEBSTER. I think your staff has tendered up some pretty good suggestions. Clearly, we know from our own experience in dealing withour own defectors that contact and caring are not intermittent, but, rather, constant, as indicated. Self-respect and self-esteem are very important to gifted people who come to this country, and for them to be shut out from the professional level of their society simply because no one is paying attention is a potential loss to our country in not having the information, the insights and the intelligence that they can bring to bear in our behalf.

Senator **Nunn**. So you believe there is a more vigorous role for the government in this respect?

Director **Webster**. I think that is a policy issue that you have to confront in how much government is involved here, but these private agencies are doing heroic work on very limited resources. This is sort of like the difference between raising money in a university for the medical school and the dental school. Very few people die of toothaches.

I think the same problem is present in private funding for defectors. It is not a universally-understood problem that results in their getting sufficient resources, coordination or even access to information from the government that would help them in their work. So I think better coordination and funding it to the extent it can be made available is in order.

Senator **Nunn**. Senator Roth?

Senator **Roth**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Later on in these hearings, it is my understanding that we will hear testimony from witnesses about incidents of harassment of defectors.

I wonder how great a problem this is and to what extent it depends on the country of origin.

Director **Webster**. It is a problem. I am trying, I am groping to answer the question about from where they come. We do know that there is a considerable amount of this coming from Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries, particularly directed to those emigres who leave family members behind.

Unlike our society, we can stand up to someone deciding to leave home and go somewhere else, those family members can be, in turn, subjected to considerable harassment. Their pensions can be suspended; their jobs may not be available to them. They may lose various types of seniority.

They may not be able to stay in particular housing that had been made available to them, and the emigre over here is painfully aware of all of these techniques that can be brought to bear against their family members, so that these letters, communications, and even people within the emigre community who have somehow aligned themselves back home for reasons of their own, can bring a great deal of pressure to bear on them.

Senator **Roth**. Is part of the harassment with the individual residing in America? Do the Soviets harass directly the people here, or is it primarily, would you say, treatment directed to the defector's family back home?

Director **Webster**. I think with the Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries, it is my recollection that that system does far more subtly than through official harassment, but official harassment is possible in various ways, and I guess I probably just can't talk about it in detail here.

Senator **Roth**. Could you comment as to what the purpose of the harassment is?

Director **Webster**. In some cases, it is to assure that they do not become of value to the United States. In other cases, it is to discourage movement. This is hard for us to understand in this country, where the right to move, the right to travel is a very treasured right, and it is one of the reasons why we react so violently to terrorist attacks around the world; it interferes with our right to leave and to travel.

When you see the defenses along the border between East and West Germany with the barbed wire pointing in to keep their own people in, you understand we are dealing with a different kind of culture than we have in this country.

And they simply do not like to have their people, as a general principle, leave.

Senator ROTH. I would assume perhaps another purpose is to try to get them to redefect back to the homeland.

Director WEBSTER. Certainly. That is a major political propaganda victory whenever people return home. There is also something I think I could mention in general terms but can't discuss in detail here. It is an avenue for recruting intelligence services from those who are unable to resist the pressure of what may happen back home.

Senator ROTH. Do you have any recommendations about what we might do to try to reduce or minimize the number of redefectors?

Director WEBSTER. I think some of the suggestions that the staff report contained are worthy ones. I think we need, perhaps, better means of assuring that the emigres, the resettlement people, find their way into the American world—I am talking about the melting pot of this country—instead of having to rely exclusively on the little clusters of settlements of people who speak their language and who can talk to them but may not be of much help to them, because they often share the same problems and, occasionally, the same disillusionment.

We need more people with language skills who can get in there and be helpful to them; ways in which they can find their way out into our society. I mentioned a few areas where better educated people can find their way more quickly into our society and make useful contributions.

There are other people who are here without those skills that, nonetheless, could make good citizens if they have the means to become Americans instead of emigres living in America.

Senator ROTH. My last question, Mr. Chairman. I understand that sometimes defectors are not debriefed by our government. Why is this? Are we failing to utilize an untapped source of intelligence because of such failures?

Director WEBSTER. Senator Roth, if you are referring to the broader group of people rather than the intelligence-oriented defectors——

Senator ROTH. I was.

Director WEBSTER [continuing]. Who were very carefully briefed and extensively and over long periods of time, the only thing I can say is that the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service have their rules and procedures and also their cost limitations on what they can do. There may be shortfalls and gaps in that area; I am not prepared to comment on them.

We try to maintain an interface so that any individuals who may not have come through us but have come through in other ways become identified by those agencies who have the primary responsibility for immigrants. They find that they do contact us and let us get into the picture or the FBI, whichever is an appropriate agency.

Senator Roth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Nunn. Thank you.

Senator Sasser?

Senator Sasser. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Director, we are dealing a little bit with semantics. As I understand it, we in the subcommittee are using the term "defector" broadly, and as far as the agency is concerned, there is a difference between a resettlement case and a defector.

[At this point, Senator Roth withdrew from the hearing room.]

Senator Sasser. Let me ask you this, for purposes of my own information. Let's take the case of a famous ballerina who leaves the troupe in New York. Would she be classified as a defector or a resettlement case?

Director Webster. Well, for the purpose of our providing fast or expedited relief under the statutes that we have, the two particular statutes, I doubt very much that she would be considered a defector for purposes of those statutes unless she also had some intelligence value to us.

On the other hand, if there is a major artistic star of world renown, her reasons for defecting are of obvious interest to us and have great potential value for sending a signal to the rest of the world about the differences between our free society and their closed society.

So that I am confident that she would be and should be given very close and supportive attention by the proper agencies. It probably would not be the FBI or the CIA.

Senator Sasser. A fair characterization, I suppose, would be if an ambassador from an Eastern Bloc country left, he would be classified as a defector.

Director Webster. I think that is certainly true, because there is an obvious person who is a representative of that government who is now choosing.

Senator Sasser. That would have sensitive information.

Director Webster. That is right.

Senator Sasser. Then a Jewish refusenik, who came out under legal procedures, will certainly be a resettlement case.

Director Webster. I think that is true. He may or may not have information, and if he did, depending on his background and work history, he could be brought within the category of defectors.

Senator Sasser. And a determination would be made at that time as to whether he would fall into a category in which he would be interviewed and debriefed to a certain extent?

Director Webster. That is right.

Senator Sasser. Using the term "defector" generically, as we are using it here in the subcommittee, and in so doing, we lump in both defectors with sensitive political information and those who come out and who had a more mundane career in the Soviet Union. What is the biggest problem that these defectors here in the United States, in your judgment?

Director Webster. I mentioned a number of others, a number of them in my earlier statements. This is my own personal opinion, and you can treat it that way, but I think the main problem, strangely enough, is freedom.

Senator **Sasser**. Yes. I am interested in hearing you say that, because I well remember when a number of Soviet defectors or resettlement cases or whatever we want to call them went back to the Soviet Union almost en mass, and in the interviews that some of them gave to the media, it was clear that they were having a real problem contending here with a free society and the freedom of choice that was available to them and trying to compete economically in our society.

Director **Webster**. Senator, I heard on the radio this morning that a man stole a car and drove to the police station and demanded to be arrested and put back in jail in time for mealtime this morning. We don't have that very often in this country, but it is reflective of people who are not used to making choices and dealing with individual opportunity.

Senator **Sasser**. You have outlined for Senator Roth some of the means by which the Soviets and the Eastern Bloc countries will seek to induce an individual to redefect. Can you tell us here, in an open session, first, do we have any means by which we seek to induce an individual not to redefect or to try to neutralize the redefection measures that the Soviets or the Eastern Bloc uses? Do we utilize such means?

Director **Webster**. I want to emphasize that everyone in this country, including resettlement people, are protected by our Constitution, and therefore, the courts and our laws protect their rights to leave, just as they do an American citizen's right to leave, if that's their choice.

We do, if we get indications early on that someone is unhappy about something, we try to see whether it is possible to resolve that unhappiness or to clarify an issue that is causing them trouble and to give them support if they are feeling nobody cares about them, to provide that kind of support.

We have had some obvious failures in the past. I think it would be wrong for us to assume that nobody redefects unless they had their arm twisted by the Soviet or the Soviet Bloc countries. That is not the case. Obviously, some of them reach that decision all by themselves simply because they are unhappy with their situation in this country.

Those are the areas in which I think if we find, if we are on top of the situation, we can do a great deal to correct and minimize the number of people who call it quits and go back.

There is an enormous pull, especially in Soviet Russia, to the homeland. It has nothing to do, so far as I can determine from fairly thorough study of it, has nothing to do with their loyalty to the Soviet regime or Communism, but simply homeland, and if they are homesick, they may want to go home, and that happens.

Senator **Sasser**. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Director, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Nunn**. Senator Cohen?

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In response to Senator Sasser's question about the ballerina, I think that the implication was, well, since they have no real intelligence association that perhaps they would not fall within the purview of the CIA or the FBI.

But I think that perhaps is a generalized statement which we have to recognize there are exceptions to.

Director **Webster**. That is right.

Senator **Cohen**. For example, as I recall, there were two Korean movie stars who were favorites of Kim Yung Sun's son, Kim Jong Ill, as I recall, who, in fact, provided very valuable information about one of the most closed societies on earth.

So to simply have dismissed them as movie stars would have been inappropriate under the circumstances, because they did provide valuable intelligence information. Similarly, I suppose that if we knew whether the ballerina had performed before Andropov two weeks before he died, that might have been of some intelligence value in trying to determine what the state of health of Andropov was.

Director **Webster**. Absolutely, and my responses to Senator Sasser were really directed to whether, because they were famous, they were automatically defectors. I am trying to say it is not because they were famous.

Senator **Cohen**. But you would make a determination as to what their activities were, would you not?

Director **Webster**. That is right.

Senator **Cohen**. Or would you simply say these are stars, but not intelligence stars.

Director **Webster**. No. We would want to know about the individual.

Senator **Cohen**. Do the Soviets harass those who are of little intelligence or political significance?

Director **Webster**. I don't know that I should try to answer that question in this forum. Obviously, their greatest interest is in those who can do them the most harm, but there are times, I believe, when they have tried to reach a group as a whole, even though the people in the group are not important.

Senator **Cohen**. The point I am trying to make is, on the one hand, we spend very little attention and devote very little activity to those who have little intelligence or political significance. I was wondering whether the Soviets take the same attitude, whether they can either apply pressure to a large number of the disaffected and see if they can't encourage them to return en mass back to the Soviet Union for the propaganda effect that might have.

The question was: Do they turn their attention to the individuals in the hope that they might have a collective return to the Soviet Union for propaganda purposes, or do they tend to concentrate their activities on those intelligence officers or people who might have access to intelligence in that state?

Director **Webster**. I think they do whatever is useful, whatever they think is useful to the Soviet Union, and I am sure it is carefully prioritized.

Senator **Cohen**. On the second question, in which you responded to Senator Roth, that they harass individuals perhaps for the purpose of trying to encourage them to become double agents, for the Soviet Union. The question occurred to me whether that creates additional pressures upon the CIA and other agencies in our government to constantly re-evaluate the legitimacy or reliability to those who have defected, and if we are constantly re-evaluating them, does that, in turn, have the effect of causing those individuals to become disenchanted, disaffected with the United States—the purpose is then achieved that they turn away from the United States?

Director **Webster**. I know that I can answer the last part of the question. Certainly, it does put additional burdens, particularly, on the FBI. I hate to recall old wounds, but it was that particular undertaking to keep abreast of what was going on in the Soviet emigre society in San Francisco or Los Angeles, rather, that the FBI Agent Miller was assigned to do. You have to do it without being harassing; you have to do it in a way that that elicits cooperation but it is a big job, and it is one that doesn't produce an awful lot in and of itself.

Senator **Cohen**. You mentioned in one of your responses about gifted people who come to the United States, don't have employment opportunities, lose their self-respect and, therefore, are inclined to want to return to their motherland.

I was struck by that, because we have a number of journalists, television journalists in the audience today. On occasion, I have had the opportunity to go on various programs out of New York. On Sunday morning, for example, I have always been struck by the fact that most of the limo drivers are all from the Soviet Union. I have inquired about that, and I had one individual who said he was in the Soviet opera—Moscow Opera, I think. He indicated he was now driving a limosine.

There a lot of cab drivers who like to sing, but there are very few opera singers, obviously, who like to drive a cab. I didn't have any way of checking out his diploma, because we were told they don't bring their diplomas here as to whether or not that was, in fact, true. But, it seems to me that is a particular problem that we have. Talented people don't have, really, any opportunity to channel those talents into something productive and are reduced to either driving cabs or limos or whatever.

Is that a problem that you have found with defectors, those who call themselves or are classified as defectors?

Director **Webster**. I think in some cases, although in those that are classified defectors, including, effort is put into not letting that happen.

Senator **Cohen**. Mr. Chairman, I have just one other thing to raise here with the Director, and it is from a statement that has been submitted to the committee. I don't know that he will appear as a witness, but I would like to read what one of the defectors had to say about the problems that he encountered. I think it gives you some insights into what is, perhaps, wrong or deficient in the way in which we approach the problem.

> The ingenuous American respect for the privacy of others may be read as a lack of attention or interest or profound heartlessness. Similarly—

And this is kind of key,

> The refusal of an American to participate in a heavy drinking session with a defector may be interpreted as an indication of dishonest intentions. Finally, the meritorious American straightforwardness is usually taken for either stupidity or utter cunningness.

> Russian and American concepts of friendship also differ dramatically. In America, a friend is a very loose term. Americans may have hundreds of friends, many of whom could be people they have met only several times in their lives. In the hostile environment of the Soviet Union, a friend means a close, intimate friend who is willing to cover your back or, in extreme circumstances, even sacrifice his life for you.
>
> In the USSR, one can have only one, two, or at a maximum, three true friends—

I am not sure that doesn't apply here, as well, but anyway,

> And that those are earned through loyalty shown during the years of mutual troubles and hardships. The defector desperately needs a Russian-style friend, particularly after the debriefing is over. He is left on his own.

I think that those words should be taken to heart.

Director **Webster**. I think those are very good statements and very good observations. If I could make one comment about that, that is the kind of attention that is particularly important in the early stages of defection. But I think it would be a mistake if we tried to create and preserve that kind of environment without introducing and helping the defector shift cultures and to become a part of the American scene.

We can't keep him in a bottle forever, and so there has to be a transition forward with which those friends, you call, can be very helpful.

Senator **Cohen**. What he points out is at precisely the time he has finished his debriefing, he is sort of cut loose from these loose friends he has accumulated in the intelligence service. He says this is very unfortunate, because his mistrust of people at this point is still very high. His English language abilities are still very poor. He does not accept many American social values. He hates "receptions, football, baseball, hamburgers, American women, suburban life," and so on. [Laughter.]

Director **Webster**. Very common, very common.

Senator **Nunn**. You said you can't keep them in a bottle forever. I guess you mean that literally and figuratively. [Laughter.]

Two questions I have before we go to our next witness. One is: How do you distinguish here in general terms between the role of the CIA and the FBI in dealing with defectors, and I would say, also, in dealing with the second category, people who don't fit the definition of defector?

Director **Webster**. CIA and FBI have worked very well together over the years in encouraging defections, depending on what part of the world this is taking place in. Often, the defections, as you know, Mr. Chairman, occur in other parts of the world, and then it becomes primarily the job of the Central Intelligence Agency to be sure that that person gets safely to the United States and is still of a desire to defect.

Historically, the care and feeding of defectors—and I don't mean that in any sense of disrespect—but the responsibility for nurturing them has fallen to the CIA with on-going liaison with the FBI. The FBI has legitimate reasons for wanting to interview, debrief, get information from these defectors and supply information to be useful to the Agency. That is the way it has worked in the past.

We have been looking for ways to improve it in the future, including other agencies who were skilled in relocation and other services after the basic debriefing period has taken place. We have no real role with respect to the masses of aliens coming to the United States, other than to work in liaison with the Immigration and Naturalization Service and the State Department to be sure that they are aware of our interest, helping them to be alert to persons of defection that can be followed up on by the appropriate agency, depending on where it is. I think that is the best general answer I can give you.

Senator NUNN. Who is responsible for counterintelligence among the defectors?

Director WEBSTER. Among the defectors?

Senator NUNN. Is that CIA or FBI or is it a combination?

Director WEBSTER. It is a combination in the sense that many defectors who have worked in this country or who have worked with espionage agents who are in this country have information of value in the counterintelligence in this country. And that is the FBI's role, to find space here.

They also are well aware of activities around the world in which the Central Intelligence has a specific counterintelligence responsibilty. So it is a level of coordination.

Senator NUNN. What about the defectors themselves in terms of their legitimacy or whether they, indeed, have been sent for intelligence purposes rather than true defection purposes?

Director WEBSTER. That is joint.

Senator NUNN. How big a problem is that?

Director WEBSTER. I equate it with the same problem that intelligence services face with double agents. One must always be alert to have the best possible sense of the bona fides of the person you are working with, and the same thing is true of the defectors, but that has to be very skillfully and professionally done.

If they are treated as potential double agents, they are not going to be very good defectors.

Senator NUNN. So it has to be balanced very carefully?

Director WEBSTER. Absolutely.

Senator NUNN. Any other questions, Senator Cohen or Senator Sasser?

Senator SASSER. No, no further questions.

Senator NUNN. Director, we appreciate you being with us, and we will have other questions for the record. We may need to get into some private testimony. We may have to do that or do it in connection with an intelligence hearing at some point on some of these questions, but the information we ask at the beginning we would appreciate your furnishing.

Director WEBSTER. All right. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you so much.

Our next witness is Lieutenant General William E. Odom, Director of the National Security Agency.

General Odom has not only a tremendous intelligence background, but he has a very broad background that contains a great deal of exposure to Russian studies and Russian history. General Odom, we welcome you here today. I hate to have to get you to stand, but our rules before this committee require that all of our witnesses be sworn, even Senators, so we ask you to hold up your hand.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

General Odom. I do.

Senator Nunn. General Odom, we are delighted to have you with us. I know you have very carefully prepared an opening statement, which I have had a chance to glance over, and I found it very, very interesting. I really think you hit some points here that commonly are not thought of. We would delighted to have you present it in whatever fashion you choose.

General Odom. Mr. Chairman, I thought that I would not try to go down the whole statement—the talk is very lengthy—but encourage who are interested in detail to do that and merely to say that I think the sum or the bottom line of it is that first, the whole range of topics that you are dealing with, from the emigre to the defector, in the narrow sense that Director Webster defined it, is an extremely difficult and complex one.

Senator Nunn. Let me suggest to you, General Odem; I know we always run short of time. We always are looking for witnesses that can summarize, and this is no precedent, but if you would like to go through your statement, I think it is enormously important, and we welcome it. I think it will take 20 or 30 minutes, but what do you estimate?

General Odom. I have 18 pages, sir, two minutes a page; ready to go.

Senator Nunn. It is a good statement. I think it is the heart of what we are talking about, and you put the focus on balancing in a unique way, because you have a unique background.

General Odom. If you have the patience, I have the energy to do it.

Senator Nunn. We would like to hear from you.

TESTIMONY OF LT. GEN. WILLIAM E. ODOM, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

General Odom. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, while it is a pleasure to appear before you today, it is also a challenge of a most delicate sort. The subject of your interest, Soviet emigres, how they might better be used to support government and educational activities in the United States, is complex, fraught with ambiguities, permeated with emotional and political sensitivities, yet fascinating both for the potential which Soviet emigres bring and the difficulties they encounter in our use of it.

I would like to begin with some background observations and then turn to the practical problem you raise of how we can take better advantage of the new wave of Soviet emigration.

Emigres, particularly political emigres from the territory now controlled by the USSR, have been coming to the West for a very long time. Alexander Herzen and Mikhail Bakunin, two of the greatest Russian revolutionary writers of the last century, were emigres. Lenin and Trotsky, of course, were emigres, as well, two of the better known of a very large community of Russian intelligentsia that found it necessary to come to the West if they were going to carry on the intellectual and political activities they desired.

Let me clarify two technical points here. First, I will use the word Russian to label many emigres who are not Russian and who are adamant about the distinction between Russian and other nationalities within the old empire. Let me state clearly that if I use the term Russian when, in fact, the person or group covered are Ukrainian, Jewish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Estonian, Georgian, Armenian or some other ethnic identity, it is not because I favor Russification or Sovietization of these peoples. I do not, and if I were one of them, I, too, would insist on the distinction.

For the discussion today, however, matters might become too complicated if these ethnic facts were clarified in every detail. The best way to handle the issue, I would agree, is to acknowledge it now as the first problem in dealing with Soviet emigres, that they are not all Russians; that many of them do not accept the political legitimacy of either the Soviet Union or the Russian empire as the government of their nations.

Now, second, my comments this morning are on the broader problem of Soviet emigres and not limited to the issue of defectors alone. In my view, the latter group is a subset of the former, bearing the same potential and facing the same difficulties. We have already covered those with Director Webster.

The United States is more entangled in this problem than most of us realize. Both Woodrow Wilson and Lenin called for self-determination of all nations in 1919. Wilson's principle was seized by many groups to escape the re-establishment of the Russian, Hapsburg, German and Ottoman empires: Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Yugoslavia, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Georgia and Azerbaidzhan are examples.

While Lenin promised self-determination vis-a-vis the old empire, he opposed it within the fledgling socialist camp. During and after World War II, the USSR reincorporated several of these states into the Soviet Union and imposed a political and military hegemony over most of the others which remains more or less intact today.

We cannot deal effectively with the emigre problem without keen sensitivity to this nationality issue. While the Soviet Union has spoken abundantly about national liberation from imperialism, or more abundantly than the United States, the United States has done abundandly more to help the cause of national self-determination, not only in the creation of succession states in East Europe after World War I, but also in the decolonization on a global basis after World War II.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has expanded imperial rule over non-Russian and Russian peoples. That, in large part, explains why we have experienced three waves of immigration from the Soviet Union while the Soviet Union has not enjoyed a stream of immigration to its territories, except, of course, the forced repatriation after World War II.

This excursion into history is not academic. The fate of Soviet emigres in the United States is inextricably entwined with United States policy and Soviet policy on the nationality question. In those quarters in the West, both in government and the universities, where the Wilson's principle of self-determination is not welcome when applied to the last remaining large territorial empire—some would, of course, also include China, particularly for its actions in Tibet—emigre views are frequently unwelcome.

Many emigres remain interested in the decolonization of the USSR. Some of us in the West do not. Thus, the nationality issue, with all its historical baggage, permeates the topic you are addressing in this hearing.

In my own experience with emigres, I see today three general patterns of behavior among them. Bear in mind, though, that these patterns are enduring ones, also visible in preceding waves of Russian and Soviet emigration which span a century and a half.

First, there are those who, although forced to the West, do not ignore the West but adapt to become Americans and Europeans. They include illustrious names such as Joseph Conrad, Vladimir Nabakov and others. I hesitate to continue the list because I might overlook many who have so successfully adapted that you would not recognize them as emigres.

Most of this group are ordinary people. The large Jewish emigration to the United States after the turn of the century included many of this type of emigrant. Large numbers of Poles, Baltic peoples, Ukranians and Russians also fit the pattern.

Many of the more illustrious among them did not try to educate us on Russia or the Soviet Union because they perceived the gap between East and West as hopeless to bridge. Conrad, who left the Russian-ruled Poland to escape induction into the Russian army, refused to write about his native empire for many years.

At the turn of the century, however, he could no longer resist. He gave us a novel, "Under Western Eyes," intended to bridge the gap of understanding, to try to let us grasp something of the divide between us and Russia in political, emotional and social terms. I commend it to you as just as valid today as it was at the time, particularly in light of the apparent winds of change blowing in the USSR. It will give you a sense of the climate that probably prevails within the emigre communities today, not precisely, but certainly a reference point for understanding the cross-pressures emigres experience. Overall, however, emigres in the first pattern shift their life focus and energy to the West, abandoning the political struggle for the future of Russia.

The second group comes to the West not because they want to become Americans, but because they want our freedom to pursue their own concerns about the future of the USSR. They adjust to the West only insofar as they must. They learn little or nothing about the West. Sometimes they scorn the West, reject it culturally and politically, while they focus their emigre energies on the USSR.

Herzen, Bakunin, Plekhanov, Lenin, Trotsky and most of the revolutionaires followed this pattern. Today, one only has to read the literature of the recent emigres to see their obsession with changing the USSR or predicting change there. Not surprisingly, they differ among themselves about the future they would like to see in the USSR. As they have more and more time to debate the complex question of "whither the USSR?" they will become more fragmented, more contentious in their assessment of Soviet affairs and given to factions and political struggle among themselves.

A third group, probably much smaller, follows a pattern not unlike that set up by Russian intellectuals in the 19th century who become wholly disillusioned with the West, convinced of Russia's moral superiority and then evolved into proponent of Russian imperialism. Dostoevsky, for example, began as a young radical, was arrested, sentenced to be hanged, given a reprieve, and later became very anti-Western and pro-Soviet autocracy.

You should not be surprised, therefore, to see occasional cases where individuals return to the USSR very disillusioned by the West. I mention these patterns in order that you better understand the heterogeneity of the emigre community. Those who have the most to contribute to the purpose you have in mind, naturally, are the ones most likely to fit into the second and third patterns.

Those in the first pattern find a new life and make their way as Americans. They are not likely to trade on their knowledge about the USSR, although they include many who are able to help us understand that society. Some of them, who choose an academic career, particularly in the social sciences, economics, political science, sociology, psychology and history, may eventually, after they "made it" in their disciplines, turn to the Soviet area for research. They will make great contributions. Their predecessors have done so. The "first wave" of emigrants after the Russian revolution gave us Karpovich and Florinsky, great historians. Kuznets and Leontiev come to mind in economics. There are many others.

It is important to dwell a bit more on the difficulties the new or third wave faces in adjusting to the United States. Language is the first problem. Men and women who climb to lofty positions in their chosen fields in the USSR and then arrive in the United States in mid-life are faced with being functional illiterate in English. Until they can speak, and, more importantly, write in English, their contributions are greatly restricted.

Yet they arrive without the funds and means to spend four or five years studying English. They arrive with a feeling that they know a great deal they could tell us, yet they are insufficiently articulate in English, either to offer their insights or, in some cases, to realize that their insights are not so new to us. In both cases, they are naturally put off, embittered with a feeling of being unappreciated.

Second, they come with a grounding in Marxism-Leninism and Soviet categories of analysis, modes of thought that turn out to be obstacles to understanding, both for us and for them. In economics, in law, and in history, the barriers are particularly strong. In academic circumstances, where there is strong expertise in these categories, they can be understood, but there are few jobs and professional opportunities there. In circles where such expertise does not reside, they are faced with becoming Americanized so that they can communicate about non-Soviet subject matter.

Third, there is the problem of adjusting to an internal new sociology of life: How to find an apartment; how to find a job; how to move about; how to deal with local government. In the Soviet Union, positions and connections are the currency for dealing with these problems.

In the United States, the currency is dollars. Money is of little concern for most Soviet intelligentsia. Friends, influence, connections, et cetera, count for everything. In the United States things seem upside down for them. They do not find reorientation easy as they face the burdens which American freedoms impose: choice and opportunity, coupled with responsibility for one's self. Their lot is not easy, and we will do well to empathize with it.

Perhaps equally complex and difficult in this matter are the differences among Americans in dealing with emigres. The first wave of emigrants, in the 1920s, does not seem to have made a big impression in American government circles. Most were anti-Soviet and pro-Tsarist, although some were merely anti-Bolshevik and others were pro-revolution but anti-Marxist. The lack of deep U.S. involvement in the affairs of Europe gave our government, academic and intelligence circles little sustained and disciplined interest in the USSR.

Therefore, the first wave was left to fend for itself. Those in the second wave, after World War II, had quite another experience. They were anti-Stalinist and largely out of touch with the several political aternatives that had inspired hope in 1917. They were welcomed for their views as well as their expertise.

They were, however, not as sophisticated as the third wave which followed. Of course, there were great expectations, but many were simply displaced persons with little education and those with education from Stalinist times knew their Marxist-Leninist catechism extremely well but not much more. While many did not necessarily favor a capitalist road for the USSR, they joined the consensus in the United States that the USSR was a major threat, politically and militarily.

This allowed the matter of alternatives for the future in the USSR to be glossed over in our dealings with them. That consensus is less strong today, particularly after Vietnam. And it has dissolved in our policy toward competition with the USSR in the Third World, even, to some degree, in our policy toward Europe.

This change in the political climate coincides with the arrival of the third wave of emigres, which includes very sophiticated and very well-educated people. They are not victims of war and upheaval, but people who have tried to change the USSR from within, people who have begun to rethink the basic and age-old questions facing their former country: What is Russia's purpose? Whither the USSR? Can a totalitarian regime evolve toward a liberal and human regime?

They have come to the West not merely to survive Stalin and the fate of the war, as did the second wave; they have come from relative privilege, in many cases, from positions of status, with keen and energetic minds. They have come with basically different aims and hopes and purposes than did their predecessor. They are more akin to their 19th century predecessors than to the first and second waves.

Can we take better advantage of the talents and knowledge they bring? The answer is yes, but the ways to do that are not easy to find.

I would like to cite one example of a very successful use of Soviet emigres. The U.S. Army's Russian Studies Institute or USARI, in Germany has traditionally been staffed almost wholly by Soviet emigres as the teaching faculty. The idea of the Institute originated at the end of World War II when it was realized that the Army would need a small cadre of officers fluent in Russian and highly knowledgeable of Soviet affairs.

The program included a year of Russian language study at Monterey, a year of graduate study at a university and then two years at the USARI in Germany, where courses are taught in Russian, exams are written in Russian and the subject matter taught from an ethnocentric Soviet viewpoint. These last two years were originally intend to be in Moscow, but as relations soured in 1946, it became evident we could not arrange a two-year study program in Soviet schools.

As a substitute, a number of Soviet emigres were selected to establish a school in Germany. That site was chosen because some of the faculty had difficulty with U.S. immigration authorities over their Marxist beliefs and Communist Party backgrounds.

The faculty included several former Red Army colonels, a lawyer who helped Vyshinsky run the purge trials, and a former high-ranging party official who taught at the Institute of Red Professors, heard lectures by Stalin and was eventually imprisoned as a Bukharinite.

Others had worked in the economic planning apparatus, in propaganda, and in two NKVD supervising concentration camps. They gave a lecture course about those institutions and topics on which there were expert from experience and study. They did not understand the United States. They had never been here except for short visits. They were in mid-life or older, in some cases. But they were extraordinary teachers. While then tended to be vigorously anti-Soviet, some were outspoken opponents of U.S. foreign policy. Some remained convinced Marxists.

Needless to say, studying with these people helped give people a view of the USSR from within, not through an American academic prism. The officer-graduates of this program have been the core of the Defense Department's cadre of Soviet area experts. The return on our dollar in that program is probably greater, dollar-for-dollar, than most any I know.

Senator NUNN. I am just curious on that point. This was in the forties and early fifties we had this?

General ODOM. We still have it.

Senator NUNN. We still have it.

General ODOM. It exists.

Senator NUNN. I know, but that is when we set it up?

General ODOM. That is when we set it up.

Senator NUNN. We had Marxists teaching American officers in Germany during the McCarthy era?

General ODOM. Very distinguished.

Senator NUNN. Did that ever come up during the McCarthy hearings? [Laughter.]

General ODOM. Not to my knowledge.

Senator NUNN. I think it escaped. [Laughter.]

General ODOM. Your branch of the government.

Senator NUNN. This is a covert operation we have been carrying on all these years. [Laughter.]

General ODOM. That is what we call in the Army "off the shelf".

Senator NUNN. Off the shelf, huh? [Laughter.]

General ODOM. USARI today employs 15 individuals who have defected or emigrated from the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries. The Institute provides these individuals with the opportunity to make an enormous contribution, to pursue their own academic work and to enjoy status and self-respect.

However, employment on the professional teaching staff at USARI creates a nettlesome "Catch-22" type problem for some of these individuals with regard to their status as international legal persons and their desire to become U.S. citizens. I would like to address these issues in the question-and-answer portion if you want to pursue them.

Perhaps similar schemes could be worked out for other agencies. In the area of military affairs, we have been able to make bettter use of a select number of emigres who have served with the Soviet armed forces, not for intelligence purposes, but for interpreting and using a lot of Soviet military press. A wealth of professional articles appear in the Soviet journals, but the Soviet approach to military affairs, conventional force tactics and operations, is quite different from ours, making it difficult for non-Soviet specialists to grasp it or to avoid being bored by it. For the uninitiated, it is, indeed, boring.

Another example of how the Defense Department has used emigres well is the Defense Language Institutes. Keeping a native Russian-speaking faculty there is imperative. We began to slip from that standard in the 1970s. Things have improved, but DLI needs to keep a fresh flow of new emigres into its ranks in order to stay abreast of current Russian idiomatic speech in the USSR.

In passing, I would like to pay my respects to the many dedicated and able Russian instructors at Monterey who, over the four postwar decades, have done more to help Soviet studies than any other single group in the United States. In the days of the military draft in the United States, many young college graduates entered the Army, were selected for study at Monterey, and came away with a rather solid foundation in the language. Several of those people became professors in Soviet area studies in many of our universities. Others became diplomats. Seldom have the emigres of the first and second waves who taught at Monterey received the praise they deserve for the effect they have had through their students, not only on the academic community, but also on the Foreign Service, the Intelligence Community and the military services.

Today, the third wave has made its appearance at DLI in a few cases, and in time, it must take the torch of language teaching almost wholly into its own hands. Its influence may not be as broad as when the military draft made it imperative for a wide cross-section of our society to study there. However, it will still have a large influence, and a very important one.

Another example of good use of the third wave by the Department of Defense is Mr. Andrew Marshall's Net Assessment Office. A number of projects are funded by Mr. Marshall, small studies by individual Soviet emigres. I have found several of them fascinating, providing written accounts of activities and institutional arrangements in the USSR which do not make the grade in project selection for academic grants.

The authors cannot meet the same rigorous standards of evidence for methods of analysis or simply for interest among university circles that others do. Yet they have very important things to record for us, to explain to us. Many of these papers are uneven, particularly when the author is unread in the Western literature, but they frequently contain genuinely new evidence and insights if one is willing to fish for them.

I do not know with great confidence how well the third wave has been used in the academic world over the past few years, but I can share some tentative impressions. On the one hand, I have seen a growing number of monographs and books published by emigre scholars. A small number of new emigres have managed to secure teaching positions in spite of a dearth of opportunities in the last couple of decades. Perhaps the most encouraging thing I see is a small number who have come to the United States young enough to learn English well and earn a graduate degree, and yet able to remember their experiences in the Soviet Union. They are sufficiently bicultural to succeed as American academicians and to study the Soviet area.

On the other hand, I sense a genuine hostility to the views of many of these emigres. Many American scholars have a much more benign view of the USSR than do most emigres. Some emigres trim their views to meet American preferences. Others do not. At the same time, there is a tendency in some American scholarship to treat emigre and dissident views and writings as biased, evidence to be used with care, if used at all. There is no doubt that biases exist in emigre views, but there is occasionally a kind of lofty pomposity masquerading as detached objectivity among American scholars that brings an equal bias to analysis of Soviet affairs.

I mentioned earlier that the politics of the emigres have been diverse, bringing several strains of politics from pre- and post-revolutionary Russia to the West. Those strains meet head-on with an equally diverse set of political biases in the West. Depending on what one thinks of U.S. policy toward the USSR ought to be, one will find emigre views more or less congenial.

We like the emigres who buttress our prejudices. We ignore those who do not, or we snub them if they are sufficiently articulate to make us hear their views in any case.

I emphasize this point because your hearing can easily convey the impression that there are thousands of emigres just waiting to divest themselves of the unvarnished truth about the USSR, an accurate impression, and that U.S. policy would become much more effective by a large degree if we simply listened to that unvarnished truth and took it to heart, a most inaccurate impression.

Some emigres arrive with a kind of naivete, convinced that if they could tell the right people about the inequities of the USSR, U.S. policy would change at once for the better. They slowly become wiser or disillusioned.

Some Americans are equally possessed of a conviction that any thing emigres say about the USSR is to be discounted. Those who maintain extensive contact with Soviet officials and value assurance that they will always be welcome in the USSR are sometimes given to this view.

Soviet officials know this well, and they play to the American concern, they feed it, and they do what they can to limit emigre influence. I do not believe we can get rid of these biases, pro and anti, about emigre views. There is truth on both sides, and there is gross distortion on both sides. I readily confess my own bias, one that has shifted over the years. Living among emigres during my language and area training, I found their interminable debates hard to bear. I was particularly impatient with their lack of knowledge about what has been written in the West about the USSR. In the mid- and early 1960s, I believe we understood a lot more than eimgres were willing to concede.

As our foreign policy consensus broke down and we launched into polarizing debates about the nature of Soviet politics, refracting them through the prisms of the radical movement on U.S. university campuses in the late 1960s and the 1970s, I noticed more Western scholarship about the USSR that seemed to abuse the facts dramatically.

As I saw more of the third wave of emigres, I came to the conclusion that their biases are a much overdue corrective. Our experts exaggerated the prospects for liberalization in the USSR. Once Khrushchev denounced the malignancy of Stalinism and began to exorcize it, we tended to believe the USSR would soon lose its uniqueness, its totalitarian structure and become just an ordinary authoritarian system likely to evolve as authoritarian systems were doing in Portugal, Spain and some Latin American countries.

Thirty years after the initiation of de-Salinization, we find the Soviet emigres still using the term "totalitarianism," a term believed long irrelevant to an understanding of the USSR in most Western circles.

In the mid-1970s, I found myself more sympathetic to the general line heard from the emigres, less sympathetic to some American academic circles.

Now, I suppose you might get a better perspective on what the third wave of emigration can do if you imagine an American immigration to the Soviet Union, scholars, lawyers, teachers, economists, and picture an analogous debate in Soviet official circles about how to understand America from these newly arrived Americans.

Could those American emigres explain American politics and society to Soviet officialdom? They would certainly believe so, adamantly. Which ones should be taken seriously? The economists who studied under Milton Friedman or whose who internalized the teachings of John Kenneth Galbraith? Should they believe the opponents of detente or the proponents of detente? Both groups would speak with equal vigor and confidence that they alone possessed the truth. Actually, both groups could tell the Soviet officials a great deal, and it would be more accurate than what most Soviet scholars and experts know about us.

The same is true of Soviet emigres. We can learn a lot. It would be interesting to see a close analysis done on what emigres from all three waves have told us over the past seven decades and compare it with some of what our own pundits have reported, including more than a few scholars.

Their biases notwithstanding, the emigres generally have been right about more. I believe the record would show that Americans who travel a great deal to the USSR have tended to exaggerate change and liberal trends while the emigres have not.

American scholars who have traveled less, listened to the emigres and carefully studied the evidence available from written sources have done much better in understanding the USSR. This is only a hunch. There are exceptions among travelers. Tocquevilles do appear occasionally, but only occasionally.

In closing, I want to emphasize that the new Soviet emigres are a great resource. We already have learned a lot from them, and we can learn more. Given the great numbers, however, I doubt that we can use them all; we shall always find some cases of neglected emigres with much to offer us. At the same time, we should not expect vast new insights that alter our policies and basic understanding. The practical task is loosening our own biases sufficiently to accept the truths they bring.

The most important ones are not good news. Are we willing to accept the bad news? I am inclined to skepticism after watching Americans go to the USSR, mix eagerly with Soviet dissidents, champion their views and causes, and then drop them once they have emigrated because their views are troubling. While they are in the USSR, they are treated as great sources of insights. Once they arrive in the West and express doubts about the good will toward the West of the incumbent General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, their views lose cogency for these Americans.

Solzhenitsyn was a hero of our media before he was expelled. He came here, told us unflattering things about both the United States and the USSR, and the media discounted his views on both. I find Solzhenitsyn an extraordinary observer of Soviet society, and I listen to him for what he knows about the USSR, not for his views on the United States.

Rare is the emigre who can deal with both topics, but we have one right here in Washington, the most distinguished novelist of his generation, Vasilii Aksyonov. His most recent book, "In Search of Melancholy Baby," opens with a vignette about this very problem with Western intellectuals concerned with the Soviet Union.

In his novel, the "Island of Crimea," he satirizes Westerners' fascination with Soviet politics, yet their inability to handle the truths of that politics once back in the West. Are we really ready, as we assert, to recognize these truths?

There are many things we could do to take much better advantage of the new emigres, and I hope the Committee finds ways to do them. It will not be easy, however, because of the enduring prejudices both we and the emigres bring to the dialogue. The dialogue is important, nonetheless, more important than our dialogue with those Soviet citizens who have not emigrated, insofar as we are intent on seeing the Soviet phenomenon clearly.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your long patience.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, General, for an excellent statement. I think you brought out a lot of points that bring a degree of consideration and balance to this overall question. It is important to the subcommittee and also to the overall subject.

You mentioned the U.S. Army and the way you have used Soviet defectors over the years in Germany. Are there a number of these kinds of scholars that could teach in similar Russian study institutes, or are you using most of them? In other words, if you have 15 over there now, are there many of the those people available, or is there a limited supply?

General ODOM. I think you can find three or four or five or six or ten times that many who would be competent to do that. There are a surprising number of people with the talents that could be used in that kind of teaching environment.

Senator NUNN. So if universities in the country were interested in expanding an existing Russian studies program, would this kind of individual coming in, perhaps full-time or part-time, you think the supply of these kinds of individuals is pretty wide?

General ODOM. The supply is wide, but the problem in the universities is that quite rightly, they have academic standards and boards appearing to judge and select who will be allowed to teach, and many of these people who can do a first-rate job in the Army Russian Institute do not have the academic credentials to be accepted on faculties in our universities.

That seems to be the major problem in that regard.

Senator NUNN. So you don't have those requirements in the Army history?

General ODOM. There are no academic requirements. In other words, you do not have to have a Master's degree or a Ph.D. to teach. You have to be a native Russian speaker, Soviet Russian, and you have to have some general experience in the Soviet Union.

Senator NUNN. Could universities utilize these talents by part-time or consultant-type activities?

General ODOM. There are ways, I am sure, that can be done. I have not considered in depth how one might structure programs in that regard, but if funds were not constrained, I am sure they would find ways to use them in research projects and research assistance; in language instructions; in coaching or teaching certain subjects outside the classroom.

Senator NUNN. Do you agree with the staff finding that we have a vacuum in the way we really treat so many of these people that have talents that aren't fully utilized? If you agree with it, do you have any suggestions yourself about what we, we being both the United States government and the private sector, can do?

General ODOM. I agree with that. As I was going to sum up, I think the answer to that question is in what I was going to say before you had me read my own statement. I think that the statement, you realize there is a great diversity of people out there who will want the advantage of any program that is set up, and they will have a lot to offer.

But the difficulties in dealing with it are enormous: resources, and a sophisticated staff to handle the social and political tensions that go along with bringing them in.

The projects or the recommendations that Mr. Sopko offered here strike me as good ones. I think we can improve considerably the opportunities for these people. I am less sanguine about being able to take care of everyone in every case, but it seems to me there is such a space between what we are doing now and what we could do that with some fairly modest rsesources and some new institutional responsibilities, perhaps—I haven't thought about that in detail—a considerable stride forward in the exploitation of what they have to offer is possible.

Senator NUNN. Putting on your intelligence cap, now, I think we have heard from Russian scholar capacity, which is considerable. What about the defectors? Do you have the same definition of defector that we heard from Director Webster in the terms of the limited definition of only those that could basically be of intelligence assistance?

General ODOM. Speaking as the Director of my Agency, we don't deal with them. Therefore, it is not a technical problem for us, but as a member of the intelligence community and former head of Army Intelligence, I think there is a process of evaluating across-the-board anyone, and as Director Webster said, who comes to our attention, trying to assess whether to bring him under the umbrella of intelligence or defector status and then spend the resources that are essential to carry that program through successfully.

That number is very, very small, and as was made clear, I think, by some of the members of the subcommittee and by the answers of Mr. Sopko and the Director, there is a large ambiguous category which is very close to having something that is worth the intelligence community's attention but being outside the range of what we might have resources or intense interest in going after, and yet, could benefit enormously both general and open intelligence activities—I say open; that is unclassified knowledge and materials and resources about the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact area—that is not fully or even marginally exploited.

Senator NUNN. As a member of the intelligence community, not being CIA but a member of the intelligence community, are you involved in decisions as to how to improve the way the intelligence community handles the ones that truly are defectors in Director Webster's definition? Or is that strictly CIA?

General ODOM. It is primarily CIA. If I chose to become involved, I am sure Director Webster would welcome that participation. We have a free exchange of discussions and cooperation on those kinds of points as we feel the need for them. I have not taken up that initiative. I have not made any overtures in his direction on this point.

Senator NUNN. You haven't gotten involved after the Yurchenko case or any of that?

General ODOM. I have not.

Senator NUNN. You mentioned the Catch-22 situation regarding the emigres who are teaching in the Army Institute in Germany. Could you tell us a little bit more about that and whether there is any change in the law that could alleviate that?

General ODOM. My technical knowledge of this may be inadequate to get it right legally, but the practical consequence is as follows: A member of the faculty may serve very well for several years, do good service for the United States, and have a considerable exposure to Americans who are students and the managers of the Institute. They don't have citizenship; they gain no years residence in the United States which are required to achieve citizenship or be qualified for citizenship.

It puts them in a difficult position. They have to give up their job to come to the United States if they want to meet those citizenship requirements. That is the Catch-22. We don't want them to come to the states and leave their jobs; we would rather have them there. I think the concern is whether a dispensation in law could be provided to take care of a very specific and very small number of individuals who have done long and faithful service and performed greatly for us, whether they could be allowed to get credit for residency without living here.

Senator COHEN. Did you talk to the FBI about this?

General ODOM. I would be glad to do so, but I have not.

Senator NUNN. Do they spend a long number of years there? I mean, are you talking about a useful life in that particular job that is limited because of being away from the Soviet Union, or is there an unlimited period of tenure that they can be effective?

General ODOM. When the institute started, we had no idea where it would go. We just kept people as long as they wanted to stay or were healthy enough to work. My memory may be a little inaccurate, but I think the last member or the staff member who dates back to the early fifties or the late forties has either died or retired, but the group under which I studied, almost all had joined the Institute between 1946 and 1953, and they remained for a decade or two afterwards. There was little turnover for a considerable period.

Then as they passed on, we had to reestablish a new staff there.

Senator NUNN. Is this Russian study course something that is sought after by people in the Army? Is it part of a career progression or is it a very narrow type slot for more academic types?

General ODOM. It is under the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program, which as you may know, covers area specialty training for regions not only in the Soviet Union but for the rest of the world. This is a fairly large program. If you are familiar with the specialty codes that officers have in the Army, it is specialty code 48.

This program is the in-country or area equivalent exposure for preparation to become a fully qualified speciality code 48 officer. The Soviet is a fairly significant number of people when one considers all areas of specialty. That it is part of the total Foreign Area Program. It is a fairly small set of officers when one considers them in the context of the whole Army.

The competition to get into school has varied over decades. Today, I think it is more sought after than it was in earlier times, and I think in past decades the overall quality of the officer recuited there has gone up.

Senator NUNN. Senator Cohen?

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much.

General Odom, would you reach the same conclusion about pre-Bolshevik emigres coming to this country? Would they have had the same types of problems that recent emigres have?

General ODOM. They did have, and, I think, would have a lot of the same problems with regard to adjustment, particularly the example you gave of finding Russian kinds of friends in the United States. Those kinds of sociological differences were there earlier.

I think the big difference for the pre-revolutionary period was that they just, they knew—the U.S. government wasn't interested.

We weren't interested seriously and centrally in the Executive Branch or the Legislative Branch in Russia, so it never came up in the same way that it has come up in the post-war period.

Senator COHEN. I was curious, because we have, for example, Asian refugees who come from similarly repressive types of societies, and yet they tend to congregate together in specific locations. They have perhaps a greater sense of community and reliance upon families and friends and do rather well economically and do rather well in terms of their academic accomplishment overcoming the language barriers and so forth.

Is there something that is peculiarly indigneous to the Russian mind, as such, that separates Russian emigres and defectors from others?

General ODOM. I can only give you a very tenative answer on that. One, I draw from some limited knowledge of American emigration history. There is a fair amount of work on the emigration patterns of various groups that come in, and indeed, the Russians have been a special case, and they have their own dynamics.

The Poles, of course, have their own communities in the United States. They do look after themselves. You talk about the driver, the limo driver. Remember, the Italians, for a long time, dominated the sanitation department in New York City. The Swedes came in and were in charge of the construction business. The Irish had a pattern of getting ahold of city hall. It has been my observation, and I saw these patterns when I look at the third wave because like you, I have the same experience. I practice my Russian and conversational abilities not with the cab drivers in New York City, but in Boston. I notice they have really come to monopolize the cab driver industry in both Boston and in New York.

The Asian emigrant does bring with him social, cultural support system. The nationality problem, fragmented and of somewhat centrifugal nature in terms of both Russian and Soviet politics, does seem to me to beset the emigration community here.

From my first experiences with emigres, almost without exception, they told me, "Don't trust any other emigres." They don't trust each other, and I commend to you "Under Western Eyes" and you can see why. But one has to find a way to get on with the orderly business of life and transact the passage of knowledge from one to the other, in spite of these peculiarities that come from that region of the world.

Senator COHEN. Would it be a fair statement on my part to say that we tend to concentrate on military intelligence information that comes from either defectors or emigres without being interested in affecting policy other than through the threat of force or confrontation?

General ODOM. I am glad you asked the question, because in my statement, I probably did not give enough very fair attention to a lot of the good scholarship that is being done in American universities based on questionnairs, interviews with emigres as a new source of evidence.

There is a very healthy and broad awareness in the academic community of the information available from emigres which would affect our views not only on military policy, in fact, least of all military policy, but on all other aspects of Soviet internal politics and their attitudes toward Soviet foreign policy.

So my remarks about the difficulties emigres have in universities should not be taken to overlook that good work. Some of the best understanding——

Senator COHEN. I am talking about from a governmental point of view, not from an academic point of view. I am talking about from the government's point of view.

For example, I am always intrigued to see the so-called new "Russian" or Soviet—let me use them synonymously for the time being—diplomat who might come here. One who strikes me that comes to mind is Vitali Churkin, I believe is his name, not cut from the old mold, not with the baggy suit, not with the heavy accent, but rather dresses like, looks like, sounds like, speaks like, uses the same idioms, the same jokes that any American might use. He is on "Nightline" more than we are. [Laughter.]

That has a significant political dimension to it, namely, that you have these bright young people who are able to utilize our words and our techniques in order to convey a political message, thereby influencing and helping to shape American policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union.

That was the context in which I mentioned it. We don't seem to have a Barthoff, a USA-Canada Institute, for example. We don't seem to be as concerned about looking into the mind of the Soviet or the Russian soul, as such, as they are in ours and trying to affect policy.

We tend to do it through arms control, confrontation, and assertion of superpower status, without seeking other ways in which to influence public behavior and thus influencing their policies.

General ODOM. I think that falls under 12333 as special activities. If you are Vitaly Yurchenko at the bottom line, the problem there is that you can't travel in the Soviet Union and get on public television there. So that kind of gambit is not open to us. There are other kinds of gambits that are open to us.

Senator COHEN. Some of that is changing. For example, we can, in fact, exact reciprocity saying, "Look, we have had your folks on television. We would like to have the same opportunity under glasnost." I think it is pehaps an opportunity to do that.

General ODOM. True, yes.

Senator COHEN. Shouldn't we, in fact, be concentrating on trying to understand more about the Soviet mind, as much to influence their public behavior, as well as their public policy.

General ODOM. I share that sentiment fully, that we should understand. I mean, the military can only be a small sector of it, In fact, in the army program, we don't go to the military early. That is the last part of the program. In fact, it is politics, history, sociology, economics before we deal with the military at all.

I would also like to make a point which you reminded my or provoked me to think about, with Soviets appearing on television here in the United States. Why can't some of our more illustrious emigres be their counterparts? I have often wondered why the networks do not seek them rather than someone who does not understand the Soviet mindset to debate with them, and it would be interesting to see if the Vitali Churkin's of the world had the courage to face those kinds of interlockings before the American public.

Senator COHEN. You mentioned also, I think on page 11 of one of those pages of your testimony, about the need to perhaps look at some of the study, the open literature in military journals and so forth. Do they have the equivalent of "Aviation Week"?

General ODOM. They take a different approach. They don't put out the technical information. "Aviation Week" puts out lots of technical information, just detail.

The things that are really important to learn from the Soviet journals are the way they think about military affairs, the way they plan to employ their forces, the way they plan to organize and field and train their troops.

When you turn to technical details, they generally cite Western examples and in their own press as surrogates for a particular kind of technical capability they want to talk about as being used in their own doctrine context.

Senator COHEN. One final question.

General ODOM. But they have—I have gained a very grudging respect for the professional quality of the abundant Soviet military literature. It is higher quality across-the-board, particularly in its historical perspective, than most U.S. military literature.

Senator COHEN. Final question, Mr. Chairman. Should we be more concerned about the potential impact of redefection, such as that of Yurchenko and the significance that has in the Soviet Union as far as discouraging others, the blow to our "prestige" in allowing that to take place and not taking measures to make defectors' lives more rewarding and satisfying?

General ODOM. The Yurchenko case is special. It had, I think, a very adverse result of the kind you are talking about. Of course, I would be enormously enthusiastic to prevent the duplication of that kind of defection. We are inevitably going to face cases, Soviets, of emigres going back. The people who suffer in those cases are not Americans but, I think, the Soviet defectors who go back. We never follow up and discover that many of them try to redefect to the United States.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

Senator Sasser.

Senator SASSER. Well, thank you. General Odom, I want to thank you for a very cogent and compelling statement and Mr. Chairman, I am compelled to observe that is just the kind of statement we expect from an officer from Tocqueville, Tennessee. I was pleased to hear it and receive it today.

General, in your prepared statement, you compared what the emigres, defectors have been telling us over the past seven decades with what our own scholars had been telling us about the Soviet Union, and you come to the conclusion that the biases of the emigres notwithstanding, they have been right much more often about the Soviet Union than our own scholars have been that study the Soviet Union.

[At this point, Senator Cohen withdrew from the hearing room.]

Senator Sasser. If that is correct, and I suspect it is correct, aren't we being badly served in not having a better method of debriefing these emigres?

For example, there is the example of Mr. Peter Nicholae, a high-ranking Romanian government official who was attached to the Communist economic community who defected, spent five years in New York running a laundromat and selling ice cream before he came to the attention of a non-profit organization dealing with emigres.

It occurs to me that this individual ought to have significant insights into priorities and policies in the Soviet Bloc.

I mean, there are accusations being made now that current Romanian economic policies are being used to virtually starve some people in that unfortunate country, and yet this man seemed to slip through the cracks, and nobody even debriefed him or talked to him for five years.

How can we do a better job of that, or do we need to do a better job? I think your statement might have reflected some doubt as to whether we do need to do a better job.

General Odom. My statement, I did not mean in my statement to imply that we don't need to do a better job.

Quite the contrary, I would repeat one of the points I made to Senator Nunn's question.

Clearly, the kind of individual you are talking about in one whom we should debrief and learn more about. There will always be some we will miss.

I think the really important point that the subcommittee, at least as I understand your orientation and goal here, is to expand the number of these kinds of cases that we do exploit.

And as I said earlier, I think there are a considerable number we are missing and probably can do much better on, but there will always be an occasional exception out there.

But it is certainly the case that we could learn a great deal more from a broad number of these people.

Senator Sasser. And I take it, then, it is your view this morning that we do need to tighten up our means of determining which of these emigres have valuable information for us and which, perhaps, do not.

General Odom. It is.

Senator Sasser. Is that a fair assessment of your view?

General Odom. That is my view, and I also added, as an amplification to that view, that it has resource implications, not only money, but also sophisticated, sufficiently sophisticated staff, personnel, to conduct this kind of exploitation of defector or emigre resources, and an ability or a capability of dealing with the social and political tensions that go along with interaction with emigres.

Senator Sasser. You made the point, also, in your statement, General, that policy-makers and academicians in this country are unwilling to accept bad news that the emigres bring us on occasion. Could you be more specific about that? What are some examples?

General Odom. Well, if you—I think if you sample the emigre opinion today, if you could poll the emigres in this country, their optimism about what Glasnost and perestrojka in the Soviet Union would bring would not be nearly as high as a poll within the American policy here. That is an example.

Senator SASSER. So there is a tendency on the part of American policy-makers and American academicians, perhaps, to see Soviet behavior through rose-colored glasses? The emigres would perhaps be a little—I don't mean to put words in your mouth—but perhaps be a little more unrealistic perhaps than the average emigre; is that a fair assessment?

General ODOM. I would like to state it a slightly different way. Maybe it is politically appropriate that we remain excessively optimistic. I don't know. I am not offering a judgment on that; I am merely stating what I think would be the results of taking emigre views more seriously. It may be politically inappropriate to be pessimistic or it might be more politically appropriate to be pessimistic and vice versa. I just think that the emigres give us more reason for a negative view of Soviet politics.

I will give you another example that not only concerns the United States, but one that concerns France. The French, for a long, long time, were reluctant to be as hard-nosed as many of the U.S. scholars were about the Stalinist period. Then, large numbers of people returned from camps, but not until Solzhenitsyn arrived on the scene in 1974, 1975 in Paris, did they accept the full truth about the camps. The impact he made in bringing that issue up and forcing the French intellectuals to deal with it is still visible in French public opinion today.

But French scholars for years had an enormous amount of evidence from many defectors coming to the West who told them stories with equally disturbing facts, details, specificity that one finds in the "Gulag Archipelago." They simply did not have the literary talent and genius that Solzhenitsyn had and was thereby able to bring it to such attention that it could not be sloughed off as an emigre bias and ignored.

Senator SASSER. General, thank you very much.

Senator NUNN. General, thank you for your very helpful testimony. We continue to stay in touch with you as we work our way through with this. In particular, when we get down to making recommendations, which may be weeks in the future. We appreciate your testimony. We appreciate your splendid service for our nation, both in the Army and in your current role.

General ODOM. Thank you very much, sir, for the opportunity to be here.

Senator NUNN. We have two more witnesses. We also have five minutes left on a roll call vote. So Senator Sasser and Cohen and myself will have to take about a ten-minute break. Then we will hear from Senator Gordon Humphrey, a colleague here in the Senate and our final witness will be Dr. Lawrence Martin-Bittman, who is a former Czechoslovakian intelligence officer who is a professor now at Boston University. We will take a ten-minute break.

[At this point, Senators Nunn and Sasser withdrew from the hearing room.]

[Short recess.]

[At this point, Senator Nunn entered the hearing room.]

Senator NUNN. The subcommittee will come to order. As we said on many occasions, we swear in all witnesses before the subcommittee. Senator Humphrey, we are delighted to have you here.

Do you swear the testimony you give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Senator HUMPHREY. I do.

Senator NUNN. Senator Humphrey, we are delighted to have you and would be pleased to take your statement.

TESTIMONY OF HON. GORDON J. HUMPHREY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE [1]

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with your statement, Mr. Chairman, that we must learn to better assist and utilize the genuine defector who usually arrives at our doorstep in his flight for freedom with nothing more than the shirt on his back.

We have not done enough in this country. That we are not doing enough was never more evident than the case of Miroslav Medvid, and it is worth noting in connection with this hearing that the report of investigation which the Helsinki Commission conducted found that not only were laws violated by minor officials, but laws were violated by officials at the highest levels of our government in connection with that case.

However, the matter on which I wish to focus this morning is our effort or perhaps I should say non effort with regards to Soviet defectors from the Army in Afghanistan. The administration's policy on Afghanistan was outlined in the State Department's latest annual assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, to wit, "It is clear that only steadily increasing pressure on our fronts, military, political, diplomatic, will induce the Soviets to make the political decisions to negotiate the withdrawal of their forces."

Surely, a powerful way to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union is through an active program to accommodate defectors from the Soviet army in Afghanistan. We have failed miserably and abjectly in this regard.

Let me outline three major reasons why we should increase our efforts: First, it is an issue of humanitarian importance. The war in Afghanistan has brought untold suffering to the people of that country. At the same time, the war has also been a tragedy for those young men who are sent to fight in Afghanistan.

How deeply disturbing it must be for young Soviet soldiers to be forced by their government to wage a brutal, indeed, genocidal war against an innocent civilian population. An estimated several hundred such Soviet soldiers have joined the Afghan resistance. Many have requested asylum in the west, yet only a handful, a pitiful handful have been accommodated.

Senator NUNN. Senator Humphrey, we have a good many of them which are fighting with the Afghan resistance?

Senator HUMPHREY. That is correct, an estimated several hundred.

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[1] See p. 244 for Senator Humphrey's prepared statement.

Second, such a policy could significantly undermine the morale of the Soviet army and hasten the day when the Soviets will be truly willing to withdraw under conditions of a just peace. There is no question that the Soviets are taking a substantial beating in Afghanistan, and increasingly so. Two years ago, the Afghan resistance was in serious jeopardy.

Today, the situation is dramatically reversed. The Soviets no longer enjoy the air superiority that once permitted them to devastate resistance bases and supply docks, and this past summer, the resistance scored a series of military victories, not only against the puppet forces, but indeed against units of the Red Army. The cost to the Soviets in lives and Rubles for their occupation of Afghanistan has soared.

We have heard for years that morale of the Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan is low and that many resort to the use of drugs. Imagine the effect if many Soviet soldiers learned that they simply had to cross over to the resistance in order to achieve political asylum in the west.

Third, such a policy could greatly heighten international awareness in the war that, for the most part, has been hidden from the world. The few Soviet defectors that have left Afghanistan have provided invaluable information about Soviet policies and tactics in this war.

Moreover, the Voice of America Radio Free Afghanistan and Radio Liberty could all carry routine interviews with Soviet defectors.

Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, one such defector, Nicolay Movchan, a Soviet soldier who joined the Afghan resistance and was granted asylum in the United States, testified before the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan. His testimony provided important insights into the strain Soviet barbarities against Afghan civilians and has placed on the conscience of the individual Soviet soldier.

An extraordinary woman named Ludmilla Thorne of the organization Freedom House in New York, has single handedly led the way on the issue of asylum for Soviet soldiers defecting in Afghanistan. She has traveled inside Afghanistan on four separate occasions and has interviewed 22 Soviet prisoners of war.

Nine of the Soviet defectors that have been brought to the West owe their freedom to the dedication and perseverance of Ms. Thorne. Were not for she, we would have no information about Soviet soldiers wanting to come to the West.

In May of last year, Mr. Chairman, I personally visited with President Reagan and discussed this issue. During the meeting, I handed the President five letters addressed to him by name from Soviet soldiers seeking asylum in the West.

These are letters which were brought out by Ludmilla Thorne and entrusted to me and which I, in turn, gave to the President. I might add that he took a great personal interest in these cases, and as a result of his interest, those soldiers were extracted from Afghanistan are now enjoying asylum in Canada.

Despite the pressing humanitarian need, despite the valuable strategic opportunity to shorten the war, I regret to say the Administration has no program whatsoever to accommodate Soviet defectors from the Afghan war.

Only six have been accommodated in the United States, the last in 1984, three years ago. The few efforts that have been made have been ad hoc and sporadic, resulting from extraordinary stimuli such as the meeting I had with President Reagan. Were it not for determined activists like Ludmilla Thorne, this issue would have been entirely ignored by the Executive Branch.

There is no one in charge of this matter within our government; no agency or Department has the lead. So I urge the subcommittee to examine the tragic failure of the administration in the important area of Soviet defectors in Afghanistan. I urge the committee to recommend the administration place someone in charge and to develop an aggressive program to accommodate defections from Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that you include in the record two news articles about two individual Soviet defectors, one who testified before the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, just yesterday.

[The newspaper articles were marked Exhibit No. 26 and Exhibit No. 27. Exhibit No. 26 starts on p. 948 and Exhibit No. 27 on p. 949.]

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Humphrey. We might also call to your attention—we have put a series of exhibits in the record this morning, and one of the exhibits was information from Ludmilla Thorne.

Senator HUMPHREY. Good.

Senator NUNN. And a statement from her.

Senator HUMPHREY. Excellent.

Senator NUNN. We also have a good bit of information here that I am sure you are familiar with on this.

Senator HUMPHREY. Yes. Yes.

Senator NUNN. I had not realized that there were Soviet soldiers actually fighting on the side of the Mujahadeen now. Do you know whether those defections would have anything to do with religion? Are they brother Moslems, or is this independent of religion?

Senator HUMPHREY. I think the common thread is moral objection to what the Soviet forces are doing in Afghanistan. I don't know for sure about the religion of the soldiers. I do know that with respect to nationality, Mr. Movchan, who testified before the Congressional Task Force before us yesterday, is a Ukrainian, and so it isn't just a case of soldiers from the Moslem republics of the Soviet Union, but I think it is a pretty diverse and representative cross-section who are going over to the side of the insurgents.

Senator NUNN. Do you know whether, when Soviet soldiers do defect, are they received with hostility or with hospitality by the Mujahadeen, or does it vary from group-to-group?

Senator HUMPHREY. Information is hard to come by, of course, reliable information. I think that the reception varies from group-to-group, and it depends substantially on the resources of the receiving unit, military unit. If they are short on food, as they often are, then it is a real problem.

Therefore, it is all the more important that we make it clear, through our policy and our action, to these resistance units that we will accommodate those who wish asylum and therefore, these defectors will be no burden on them in terms of upkeep.

Senator NUNN. Could international organizations play a role here, like Red Cross?

Senator HUMPHREY. I am just not in a position to say. There are some political sensitivities, and the more that these matters are dealt with discreetly, the better, especially the removal of these people through friendly countries, third countries.

Senator NUNN. And you are saying right now that there is no agency in our government who really has jurisdiction over this, as best you can tell?

Senator HUMPHREY. I have been deeply immersed in this Afghan issue for three years, and as a general statement, there is nobody; there is no clear authority; there is nobody really in charge. There is no high-level person in our executive government that has full-time responsibility in this area. Authority and responsibility are pretty diverse and distributed throughout the agencies.

With respect to prisoners of war, I am not aware that there is anyone in charge, but what I can say with assurance is that there is no on-going effort; there is no on-going program. What little effort we have made in past years has been ad hoc and sporadic.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any recommendations as to which agency should be in charge of this kind of both problem and opportunity?

Senator HUMPHREY. I have no such recommendation. My recommendation is that we have a program, an aggressive program, with someone in charge who works full time to make a maximum effort along these lines.

Senator NUNN. Senator Humphrey, we thank you very much for being here and for your testimony. It will be very helpful. We will try to follow up on it, and we will try to stay in touch with you and your staff.

Also, of course, I thank you for your continued good service on the Armed Services Committee.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. May I say just finally that Ms. Thorne will visit the White House tomorrow to discuss several more cases of Soviet soldiers in the hands of the resistance who have asked for asylum in this country. These are requests of considerably long standing about which nothing has been done as far as I can tell, and the point I want to make——

Senator NUNN. That is a State Department judgment, isn't it?

Senator HUMPHREY. I think you are right in that. But there is a generic, systemic problem in the Executive about what to do in these matters, and as a result, nothing is being done.

The point I wanted to make with regards to Ms. Thorne's visit to the White House today is that she knows of several more soldiers, by name, who are in the hands of known units who have agreed to release these men and yet nothing is being done about it.

Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Well, I think we need to take a look at this, and we appreciate you bringing it to our attention.

Our final witness is Dr. Lawrence Martin-Bittman, a Professor at Boston University. Doctor, we appreciate you being here. We swear in all our witnesses.

Do you swear the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. I do.

Senator NUNN. Thank you. Dr. Bittman, we appreciate you being here. We appreciate your patience in waiting to testify this morning. We have been interuppted by one roll call vote, and some of the testimony took a little longer than we anticipated, but we very much are looking foward to your testimony, and we welcome you.

TESTIMONY OF LAWRENCE MARTIN-BITTMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, BOSTON UNIVERSITY (FORMER CZECHOSLOVAKIAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER)

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I prepared a lengthy statement, about 48 pages, that I would like to be inserted in the record,[1] and then I will make a shorter statement about some major issues concerned with defectors.

Senator NUNN. Your full statement will be part of the record without objection.

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Mr. Chairman, members of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, I am a defector. The word in American perception has a clearly negative connotation. During the last 19 years, I have met many Americans who felt embarrassed to say the word "defector" in my presence, because they didn't want to offend me.

They thought it was not polite to put that label on me. I don't agree. Defection, according to Webster's dictionary, means abandonment of principle, abandonment of loyalty or desertion. I think that is what I did, but I abandoned the system of deceit and secrecy. I deserted the system that suppresses the most elementary human rights.

Regardless of what people think of me, I cannot think of myself as a traitor. On August 21, 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, crushed the movement for democratic socialism and destroyed every principle of human decency and international law.

I defected because of the Soviet invaders. I abandoned my loyalty to the Communist system whether Soviet or Czechoslovak style. I am glad that I defected. It was the only acceptable choice I had, unless I wanted to cooperate with the Soviet occupation forces.

I don't have a problem with the word defector, and I don't hide my past in front of my colleagues or students. I spent six years under the authoritarian Nazi regime, 20 years as a member of a Communist society and the last 19 years as a resident and citizen of the libertarian American society. I have learned that for a journalism professor concerned with communication barriers and complexities of the communication environment around the world, my life experience is an asset rather than a liability.

In the last 15 years, I have helped to educate some 3,000 students who work now as journalists in Asia, Africa, Western Europe,

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[1] See p. 247.

Latin America, and here in the United States. Many of them are still in touch, sharing their successes and failures with me.

One thing that I would like to add; one of them is living here in Washington and he is the recipient of the Pulitzer Prize, my former student, and I am very proud of it.

Why is it important to discuss the subject of defectors and resolve the basic problems and mistakes of the past? In the on-going competition and struggle between the first world and the second world or, more specifically, between the United States and the Soviet Union, defectors play quite an important role.

Communist countries consider propaganda, covert action and intelligence operations important foreign policy tools. When we compare the two largest intelligence services in the world, the KGB and the CIA, it is quite obvious that the Soviets dominate the field of human intelligence. I do not believe that we will ever match the number of secret agents they command in various parts of the world. But in comparison with the Soviets, we have one great advantage: defectors.

Every year, a number of prominent Communist officials, artists, journalists, military officers, and intelligence operatives defect. They bring with them a large volume of important political, military, economic and national security information vital for our defense.

Our knowledge of the decision-making process in the Soviet Bloc depends largely on information obtained from defectors. The Soviet superiority in human intelligence is outweighed by vital information brought in by defectors. There are many potential defectors in the Soviet Union, in Czechoslovakia, in Poland, East Germany and other Communist countries.

If we allow more cases like the Yurchenko case to happen, we will only hurt ourselves. Many potential defectors will abandon their plans because they will be afraid that they may eventually end up back in the Soviet Union, as Yurchenko did.

Most Americans—including government officials—have a difficult time understanding the problems of defectors, their fears, culture shock symptoms, and feeling of guilt, as well as their problems of adjustment to the highly competitive American Society.

I have made available to the U.S. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations part of the research materials and notes concerned with my book "The Treatment of Defectors, Psychological Trauma of Defection, Debriefing, and the Process of Adjustment to American Society." To finish this project will require a few more years and the materials I sent to you reflect it. I have also sent to the Subcommittee my recommendations and suggestions on how to resolve some of the most urgent problems of defectors. These are based on my own experience, and discussions with other defectors and extensive study of literature by and about defectors.

I think it is important that after this inquiry by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, we establish a system that will eliminate the basic mistakes in the treatment of defectors, a system that will smooth, rather than complicate the process of their adjustment to American society.

Defectors from Communist military and intelligence services, for example, should be debriefed and handled by individuals who are not only experts in their fields, but also experts in human psychology, capable of handling defectors' trauma on a professional level.

A defector from a Communist country comes to the United States because of serious political, religious, moral and economic conflicts with the values and practices of his own culture and political environment. The conflict and its resolution, that is, defection, is followed by an inevitable process of abandoning his only value system and accepting the value system of the new country. It is a very painful process, accompanied by an intense feeling of loneliness and isolation.

The individual realizes only after the defection how strong the bond to his native country is. The emotional turmoil is further aggravated by a sense of the permanent loss of family members, friends, and familiar surroundings.

In Eastern Europe, friendship is very important, and many defectors and political refugees complain about what they call superficiality and the lack of deep bonds among Americans. Back there, they say, one can be very open with close friends and immediate family members. Without this supportive circle of trusted individuals, the defector feels lonely and abandoned in a confusing, hostile world.

The psychological trauma of defection is accompanied by feelings of guilt, nightmares and suicidal thoughts and tendencies. The defector is concerned about what his closest friends and family members will think about his defection. He worries about his public image when the news about his defection appears in the press. He has to fight a major battle with himself to overcome the feeling of guilt.

If he is unable to rationalize and accept his defection as the right decision and sees himself as a traitor, his trauma will develop into a serious, long-lasting crisis. In that case, he becomes a candidate for suicide, drug or alcohol addiction or eventually may decide to go back and face the ultimate punishment which, unconsciously, he thinks he deserves.

Very few intelligence operatives turned defectors are able to find suitable jobs in professions where they can use their educational, analytical and language skills.

Academic institutions, think tanks and research centers which could benefit from the intellectual and professional talents among prominent defectors do not easily accept somebody who is recommended by the CIA.

Most American academics, even those with conservative political leanings, do not like governmental intrusions into their fields. A request to put an unknown, untested defector on the payroll of an academic institution at a time when there are not many jobs available for American applicants is perceived as risky business, both financially and politically.

In the spring of 1986, I prepard a proposal to establish a fellowship at Boston University that would be awarded to a political refugee or a defector from a Communist country or from a authoritarian Third World country. Boston University's academic officials and the administration supported the idea and encouraged me to proceed. The proposal focused on two major objectives:

One, to create a vehicle for talented researchers and political writers among defectors for their smoother integration into American society; and the second objective, to collect information about media manipulation, about propaganda, disinformation from refugees and defectors from Communist countries, people who were directly involved in anti-American activities, just like I was 20, 25, 30 years ago.

This summer, the idea became a reality when the J.M. Olin Foundation decided to support this proposal with a $20,000 grant. A month ago, the first J.M. Olin Fellow for the Study of International Propaganda and Disinformation came to Boston. He will spend twelve months at Boston University working on a study concerned with current Soviet communication policies.

This is my small contribution to the resolution of problems of defectors, and I would like to encourage other universities to establish similar vehicles for helping talented researchers, writers, and teachers from among defectors.

I want to thank the chairman and all members of the subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to share with them my experience and recommendations on a subject of great importance to our national security.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Bittman, for your very helpful and sightful testimony.

You already alluded to it in your statement to some extent, but could you summarize for us the primary psychological problems, the problems that occur with a defector in the first few months or a year or two after he or she defects?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Yes. Well, several witnesses mentioned the physical drama of defection, but it is, I think, nothing in comparison with the psychological drama that starts when the individual lands in the United States, when he realizes all consequences of his action; when he has to accept defection as a permanent solution. The individual goes into a very serious psychological crisis. He has to abandon the whole value system that had meaning in his life. In my case, for example, I was educated in a Communist society. For many years I sincerely believed in the ideology of the Communist society, Marxism/Leninism, in party directives.

The defector has to abandon the old value system and create a new one, but that cannot be done from one day to another; it is a very long, very traumatic process. Then, of course, the feeling of guilt. Most defectors have very strong feelings of guilt and doubts whether this was the right thing to do or not. This is something that they had to fight inside themselves and resolve, and again, it can not be resolved in a few weeks or months.

I would say it took me probably about four years to find myself and become more or less a normal member of this society.

Senator NUNN. What year was it that you came to the United States?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. I came in 1968, shortly after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.

Senator NUNN. What was the main reason you decided to come to the United States?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. The first few days, I didn't know where to go.

Senator NUNN. Why did you decide to come?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Yes; well, I decided, when I finally made this decision, I realized this was the only country that could use the knowledge I had about Soviet Bloc intelligence operations around the world and could do something about the Soviet penetration of the West. This was the major reason for me, why I came to the United States.

Senator NUNN. Why did you decide to leave Czechoslovakia?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. The ultimate, the most important reason was the fact of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. It was a political shock for me when I woke up on the morning of August 21, 1968. At the time, I was stationed in Austria under diplomatic cover as a press attaché of the Czechoslovak Embassy. I woke up and realized that Czechoslovakia was invaded. The same day, I made a statement on Austrian television against the invasion, and I stayed for another three weeks or so working, trying to communicate with liberal elements in Prague, supplying them with information, and so forth, but then, of course, I realized that this was——

Senator NUNN. When you left, did you believe in Marxism at that stage; is that right?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. I wouldn't say that in August 1968 I was a Marxist or Leninist. I was not, no. Realistically, I would categorize my political thinking as a social democrat. I wouldn't admit it then at a party meeting, but I was not a Marxist/Leninist anymore.

Senator NUNN. Before the invasion, you had already stopped that belief?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. That's right.

Senator NUNN. What were the major problems that you encountered when you came to the United States in your own experience?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Insecurity of the future; how to start; where to go; how to start a new career; because I didn't know anybody.

Senator NUNN. Did you speak English then?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. No. I think that was a very important help that I received from the CIA during the debriefing period that they provided me with a tutor, and three years later, I was able to start teaching at a prominent American university.

Senator NUNN. Did you get help in getting your job at the university?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. No. I was lucky enought to meet a gentleman who had the courage to provide me with the first opportunity, the chairman of the Journalism Department at Boston University, with whom I drove for three and a half hours in a car and told him about myself and he said, "Well, okay, why don't I give you an opportunity. Next semester, you can start teaching on a part-time basis, one course dealing with international press problems."

He didn't call the CIA. He didn't call the FBI. It was just a gesture of an American who cared. I will be grateful to this individual for the rest of my life, that he had the courage to do that, and this is another side of what I call Americanism. You know, many people say Americans are naive, politically naive. Yes, many are, but this is the other side, to believe, to give a chance to a newcomer who comes under very difficult circumstances and conditions.

Senator NUNN. What do you teach at Boston University?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. The first ten years, everything far away from my previous specialization. Courses like History and Principles of American Journalism; Methodology of Journalism Research; Public Opinion Formation; International Press Problems. It was in 1980 that the University asked me to offer a course on Disinformation of the Press, something that I was involved in for nearly 14 years, including two years as a deputy commander of the Czechoslovakian disinformation department. I have been teaching that course for the last five years, and I think that now it is a very popular course now among journalism students.

Senator NUNN. What is the name of that course?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Disinformation in the Press, dealing with the techniques of mass media manipulation.

Senator NUNN. That is what you were charged with? That was your responsibility before you defected?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. That's correct, yes.

Senator NUNN. You were head of the disinformation desk of the Czechoslovakian intelligence?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Yes, yes. Deputy Commander of the Department.

Senator NUNN. So you now teach a course in that. That is an unusual course, isn't it?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Well, a little unusual, but I want to emphasize, in order to prevent any misinformation——

Senator NUNN. About disinformation——[Laughter.]

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. We are not offering a course teaching young American journalism students how to deceive anybody. This is a course designed to help them realize how mass media are being manipulated, what are the objectives, what are the mechanisms of these games, because we believe that solid, broad knowledge is the best protection of press freedom in the United States against foreign manipulators.

Senator NUNN. What do you suggest to the United States government, if anything, about the way we handle defectors now, both those who have intelligence backgrounds and those who would have governmental backgrounds that would not be of particular interest to the intelligence community?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. There are a number of things that I would recommend. First of all, I think that people who are involved in handling defectors, should be experts not only in their field, intelligence, counterintelligence and so on, but also, I think, well educated in the field of human psychology.

They have to realize that the individual they are dealing with goes through the most traumatic experience of his life and that he may suddenly, his crisis may become a tragic crisis. So the field of human psychology is one thing that the people should be educated in.

Second, we should establish a system that would help the defectors to find suitable jobs in the United States. I know that it is a complex problem, but one of the solutions, and that is what I am trying to do, is to establish a system of fellowships across the country with various research institutions, think tanks, universities, and so forth.

If we establish, let us say, ten, fifteen or twenty fellowships for talented writers, researchers, it would help very much, and also work study programs with various business companies, institutions where the individual would work let us say, for three years, learn this new job, and then, after three years, the company could say, yes, we are happy with his performance, and we will keep him. Or the defector would say, "I will try something new." I know how to live in this open, competitive society, and he would be on his own.

But what is necessary is to keep him in the transition period. The first three or four years are very, very difficult for defectors.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any words of advice relating to the Yurchenko case, the way that was handled? Do you have any particular insights into that?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Of course, I haven't had access to any secret information, but from what I learned from the press, I am very convinced that Yurchenko wasn't sent here as an agent with some kind of a special mission.

Senator NUNN. Was not?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Was not, no. No. He is an individual who went through a very deep personal crisis and he couldn't handle it, and he went home knowing that he would be severely punished. He knew that this was a very, very difficult decision, and he would be severely punished, but he went home to something he knew. That is, he knew how they would treat him; he knew that he would be either executed or sentenced to a long prison term.

Let us not think that because he has been seen in Moscow a few times after his defection that they are not going to punish him. The KGB knows that he defected, that he betrayed the Soviet Union. What we have seen, the press conferences, for example is the propaganda show, but Mr. Yurchenko will be put before the military trial and sentenced as a defector sooner or later.

Obviously, the crisis was so deep for him here in the United States that he couldn't handle it and he went back to what he, what were for him the known elements, familiarities of behavior. He knew how he would be handled. I think it is a very tragic case, because obviously, we could have learned much more from Mr. Yurchenko. He could have been much more useful than he was.

There is another aspect of this case; namely, his return to the Soviet Union discouraged quite a few potential defectors. Very many people in the Soviet Union think about defecting, but a case like the Yurchenko case has a reverse impact, "Well, if I do, maybe it will end like him."

So this was, I think, this really turned against our interests.

Senator NUNN. Has there been any real changes in the way the Sovet Union handles defectors over the last few years?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Yes. I think that there is a visible change in strategy, in Soviet handling of defectors. Until about 1984, 1983-84, all emigrants from the Soviet Union, Soviet Jews, everybody who left the Soviet Union, Soviet Bloc countries were considered basically traitors. There were a few Russian Jews who wanted to go back ten years ago, twelve years ago, but they were rejected. The Soviets didn't want to let them in.

And it was in the last two years that they changed their strategy. They opened the door for individuals who left the Soviet Union or even defected, like Oleg Bitov, a writer for Literaturnaya Gazeta. Now the Soviets say, "Well, the door is open for you. Now you can come home."

Of course, this creates great opportunities for Soviet propaganda, for using this new situation for intelligence purposes, propagandistic purposes. They are much more skillful in misusing the phenomenon for their own purposes.

Senator NUNN. Do you believe those people are going to be punished down the road when they come back, or is this for real, that they aren't going to be punished?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. That depends on the position of that individual, what kind of job, what kind of position he had before defecting. An intelligence officer, there's no doubt, will be severely punished. An individual, regular Soviet Jew who left the Soviet Union and then realized that he couldn't adjust to the American society and goes back, I don't think that they will put him in jail, but certainly there will be some stigma attached to him for the rest of his life. But I don't think that they will send him to prison.

Senator NUNN. What are the major differences, if any, between the Soviet KGB operation intelligence-wise and eastern European country intelligence operations? You were in the Czechoslovakian intelligence. You probably had close liaison with the KGB.

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Should the United States consider both of them to be one in the same?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Well, all socialist intelligence services are, of course, under the supervision and command of the Soviet intelligence operatives. There is not a single operation that would be unnoticed by the Soviets. They control the whole process of initiating, conducting intelligence operations, and getting the results.

As far as handling defectors is concerned, there are certain differences. Hungary, for example, for years has been much more flexible in dealing with defectors, actually opening the door before the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia established a policy that was mainly designed not only to use or misuse defectors or refugees for political purposes, but also to get western currency from them because they encourage refugees to normalize their relations with the mother country.

The refugees have to pay something between $2,000 and $10,000 for the education they received in Czechoslovakia, and for that, they get the permission to travel freely to Czechoslovakia, visit their relatives and eventually come back to the United States.

It means that Czechoslovakia receives millions and millions of dollars from former refugees, now American or Canadian citizens, who pay $8,000, $10,000 for the permission to travel to visit their relatives at home. There is another condition attached; if the refugees want to belong to the category of individuals who can travel to Communist countries, they shouldn't get involved in any anti-Soviet or anti-Communist activities. That means political restriction on their activities in the United States and Canada or in other countries.

Senator NUNN. Dr. Bittman, do you have any other suggestions for the subcommittee or for the U.S. government that you would like to give us at this time?

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Well, I have a number of very specific suggestions that I would like to make available to the agencies or individuals who in the future will be involved in debriefing and handling defectors. I prepared a very comprehensive material, something around 80 or 90 pages. I don't intend to talk about it now in detail, because some of it is confidential, but I would like to share my experience with people who are going to handle defectors in the future.

Senator NUNN. I know that would be very helpful. We would like for you to stay in touch with us as we go through the hearings. We are going to have a series of recommendations to make at the end, and we welcome your views as we go along if you have any additional views to supplement your testimony. Thank you.

Dr. MARTIN-BITTMAN. Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much. We appreciate you being here.

This completes our witnesses for the first day of what will be at least three days of hearings on this subject. Tomorrow morning at 9:30, we will be back in this room. The first witness will be Leo Cherne, chairman of the International Rescue Committee. I have known Leo Cherne for a long time. He wears many hats. He is going to be a very fine witness for us in this particular area of his expertise. We will then have a panel. We will have two Soviet defectors, Alexandra Costa and Aleksandr Ushakov. So we will have those two witnesses on the panel.

We may have other witnesses depending on the time. We have alerted a couple of other witnesses we may be able to hear from them, but it depends on the length of time for those two different witness groups.

I thank everyone for attending today, and we will be in this room tomorrow morning at 9:30.

[Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed to reconvene the following day.]

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1987

U.S. SENATE,
PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS,
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:45 a.m., in room SD-320, Dirksen Senate Office Building, under authority of S. Res. 80, Section 13, dated January 28, 1987, Hon. Sam Nunn, chairman of the subcommittee presiding.

Members of the subcommittee present: Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat, Georgia; Senator Jim Sasser, Democrat, Tennessee; and Senator William Cohen, Republican, Maine.

Members of the professional staff present: Eleanore J. Hill, Chief Counsel and Staff Director; Daniel F. Rinzel, Chief Counsel to the Minority; Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk; John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel; Cynthia Comstock, Staff Assistant; Mary K. Vinson, Staff Investigator for the Minority; Rick Goodman (Senator Pryor); Marianne McGettigan (Senator Rudman); Natalie Bocock (Senator Cohen); Jim Dykstra (Intelligence Committee); Laurie Beth Feld (Senator Trible), Evelyn Boyd (Senator Sasser); Kathleen A. Dias, Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel; David B. Buckley, Investigator; and Marilyn Munson, Secretary.

[Senators present at convening of hearing: Senators Nunn and Cohen.]

Senator NUNN. The subcommittee will come to order.

I apologize for not being able to start on time. We had a roll call vote in the Senate. I also had two urgent phone calls I had to take on the way over here.

We are pleased to have the second day of our hearings.

Senator Cohen, we welcome you this morning. We appreciate your participation yesterday and today.

It is a great asset to have Senator Cohen on this subcommittee because he is also the co-chairman of the Intelligence Committee, and we have a very definite overlap on this subject and on many subjects with the Intelligence Committee. It makes for a very smooth transition with his great leadership.

Our first witness today is Mr. Leo Cherne, who is the Chairman of the International Rescue Committee. Mr. Cherne is an individual I have known for a long time. He wears many different hats. He has been an outstanding leader in the national security field. He was on the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for many years. I believe he was the chairman under President Ford. He is an outstanding leader in our country.

Leo, we are delighted to have you here today.

Mr. CHERNE. I can't tell you how delighted I am to be here and to express to you my appreciation, Mr. Chairman, and to a Senator I admire greatly, Senator Cohen. It is an opportunity I value for particular reasons at this point, which I will state.

Senator NUNN. We swear all witnesses before our subcommittee, with no exceptions, so we will ask you to hold up your right hand. Do you swear the testimony you will give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. CHERNE. I do.

Senator NUNN. Why don't you proceed with your statement, and then we will have questions.

TESTIMONY OF LEO CHERNE, CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, INC., ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT DE VECCHI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, IRC

Mr. CHERNE. Let me say at the outset that I don't intend to read all of my statement. I have cut out portions of the full statement, which will be entered into the record,[1] and those I have kept state with less use of time what would otherwise take more time if I extemporized.

Before I start the statement, I would like to make two very different points.

There is a misunderstanding and, to be perfectly frank, it exists among some Members of the House and Senate, that those voluntary agencies which assist refugees to resettle in the United States, or to resettle in other parts of the world, but particularly in the United States, are costing the taxpayer an enormous sum of money, and who needs the refugees anyway.

It is with great pride that I say that as regards the International Rescue Committee, which started within three months of the time Hitler came to power in 1933, every dollar of revenue contributed by private citizens, or in some cases by the government, six cents of that dollar is spent, in total, some years as high as seven, for all administration, fund raising, and non-program activities. The balance, 93 cents, is spent directly for assistance to those whom it is our obligation, we feel, to help. We are very proud of that record.

Senator COHEN. How would you like to come to work for the OMB?

Mr. CHERNE. Unfortunately, the OMB, and I say this not in criticism, but the OMB is one of the forces which results in a constant attrition of the number of refugees we are resettling in the United States. I don't blame the OMB for that, I blame the problem of the budget, to which I am very sensitive.

Senator NUNN. If I could interrupt for just a moment. I think that it is important for people to understand your background a little bit more. You, of course, are chairman of what is known as the International Rescue Committee, and that is what you were just referring to.

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[1] See p. 294.

Mr. CHERNE. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. You are also a member of the Board of Directors of Freedom House.

Mr. CHERNE. That is correct.

Senator NUNN. Is Freedom House a part of the International Rescue Committee?

Mr. CHERNE. No.

Senator NUNN. It that a separate organization totally?

Mr. CHERNE. We are entirely separate.

Senator NUNN. Maybe you could give us a little bit on background on that. I think the public would also be interested in knowing that you are a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

Mr. CHERNE. I am a member of the Presdient's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and at the same time a member of these two other voluntary, private organizations. There is not only no link between the two organizations but there never has been a link between the two. They have different ways of expressing a kind of addiction to freedom, and each performs very differently.

In the case of Freedom House, it came into existence when Britain was under siege in 1940, at the very beginning of World War II. The country at that point, and certainly these Houses of the Congress, were overwhelmingly isolationist, didn't think that the United States had any responsibility to in any way become involved with the European troubles.

Freedom House, at first organized by William Allen White and other distinguished American citizens, was formed as an organization to advance the notion of freedom, hence the reason for the choice of the name. It was in contrast to Hitler's Brown House. Ours was Freedom House, and Freedom House has remained throughout these years a voice for the expansion of freedom in the United States and outside. It has not limited its activities.

It is in that connection, incidentally, that Ludmilla Thorne, as a key member of the staff of Freedom House, has a number of times gone to Afghanistan in order to determine what we at Freedom House felt we ought to know both about the efforts of the Mujahedeen, as well as the situation of those Russian soldiers we knew had defected, a group almost impossible to be precise about, but they are in the several hundreds.

May I take this opportunity to correct what may have been a mistake or misundertanding yesterday. These defecting Russian soldiers in Afghanistan are in the hands of the Mujahedeen. They are not, except for a very small minority, joining the Mujahedeen to fight their former colleagues.

As a matter of fact, they are lucky to be alive, because, if one takes a look at that war, the Mujahedeen do not have a culture of taking prisoners, assuming that the circumstances under which they are operating even made that possible.

In the circumstances under which they operate, hiding and travelling through the mountains, always on the move, do, in fact, make it a remarkably and generous unexpected activity on their part to even shelter these young Russian defecting soldiers.

I won't elaborate on that further, except to add one additional point. In the instance of the Russian soldiers who have been resettled in the United States, a very small number regrettably, it should be a much larger number, they are likely to be identified for us as a result of the efforts of Ludmilla Thorne.

Once the International Rescue Committee can gain access to them outside of Afghanistan, IRC then undertakes to resettle them. IRC is the resettling agency, and Freedom House's function is to throw the spotlight on their existence, their plight.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Mr. CHERNE. There was some confusion, and there is bound to be, that flows from the word "defector." It is used rather loosely to cover all kinds of characters. I, if you wish it, will submit for the record some definitional material about the defector to distinguish him from the expellee, the emigre, the political refugee.

In addition to which some very interesting and not specially selected cases of defectors within the last two years so that we see the enormous range of backgrounds and capabilities of these defectors, what other countries do with defectors, which varies, including, for the most part, nothing. If it is of any value, I will submit this document.[1]

Senator NUNN. We will include that in the record, without objection.

Mr. CHERNE. What these defectors, expellees, emigres, and escapees, those are essentially the four groups—Before I proceed any further with that sentence, let me say that defectors are of two characters. There are those who are important for national security purposes.

CIA Director Webster, yesterday, referred to them, but for understandable reasons did not go further than his identification of the fact that the CIA does have an interest in what is essentially a limited number who do potentially have information, judgments of importance to the intelligence community.

There is a larger group of defectors who are defectors simply because their employment, usually for the Soviet Union, has taken them outside the Soviet Union. When they make the decision to break with the Soviet Union and seek asylum in the United States, those who are outside of the Soviet Union are properly considered defectors. They are very different in character for the most part from those who are in the PL110, which is the category that the CIA handles.

The defectors, the emigres, the political refugees have in common their opposition to the oppressive social and political conditions they are leaving behind. In some cases, their decision to defect is quite a spontaneous event. We heard yesterday from a very able witness, I think Colonel Bittman, that in his case it was the entry of tanks into Prague in 1968, and that undoubtedly crystallized what had already been building, consciously or unconsciously, in his resistance to the Marxist government he was serving.

It is very important that we recognize the emigres or defectors who are totally opposed to the Soviet Union, nevertheless, having lived all of their lives within the Soviet Union, are significantly affected by their knowledge of the world in terms of what it is they have experienced.

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[1] See p. 1 of Mr. Cherne's prepared statement on p. 294.

Even their parents now, as a result of the passage of time, are unable to pass to them a sense of what the world was like in Russia prior to the Bolshevik revolution. It is also important to recognize that Russia, prior to the Bolshevik revolution, was not one of the garden spots of freedom.

Therefore, these are people who are not coming from a culture which has had very much experience with freedom before or after 1917.

Now, the defector has a problem that is different from and greater than the emigres. He has not only been deformed by his life in a totalitarian society, but also his views of the world, his views of the way governments and societies work have been similarly deformed. When he makes the decision to defect, if he is given asylum, he does not come to a community of people like himself.

As a matter of fact, he comes to a community of Russians now living in the United States, emigres, who are suspicious of him. In addition he has his own sense of guilt which was referred to several times earlier. He also is now entering a community which is suspicious of him because of his association with the Soviet Union's apparatus in one form or another.

The emigres benefits to a certain extent by the fact that in some cases there are family members already here. In all cases, there is a community of Soviet emigres, which is here and which can provide a certain amount of emotional support and guidance in this absolutely bewildering society. It is impossible for us to understand what a shock a credit card means to a Soviet emigre.

Now, on arrival in the United States, the emigre does, in fact, count on a certain amount of help from those like him who have preceded him. The defector cannot count on any help. Among other things, he doesn't share in a certain amount of luster that flows from the fact that they have been refuseniks, dissidents, of whom they are very proud. The defector is not of that community and cannot feel that same sense of pride.

Now, it is tempting to approach the real or perceived problems that these hearings are dealing with by emphasizing their financial aspects, and some references were made to money yesterday. To seek solutions by seeking more money, public or private, or both. Social issues, to be sure, have their cash nexus, and refugees and related problems are no exception.

For reasons briefly touched on, defectors coming into our midst require more attention, often a great deal more attention, more services, more and longer support than the average refugee, and all of this costs money. The $650 the government provides for the resettlement of refugees on a per capita basis covers just a small part of the cost that their resettlement entails.

Still, money is not the nub of the problem, and I think that it would be a mistake to leave that mistaken judgment, especially at this time when there is an understandable concentration on the fact that we are in such horrendous debt.

No person can be considered successfully resettled unless he is employed. That is true for financial, but even more for psychological reasons. Employed in a position for which he or she derives a modicum of satisfaction and enough income to pay the rent, and to cover daily needs.

Public assistance is definitely not the answer. One of the acute problems that confronts the Soviet emigre, defector or refugee is to sustain a sense of self-worth. A mixture of guilt, nostalgic concern for having left the homeland, family abroad, various efforts which the KGB and other Soviet entities apply to exacerbate his guilt in an effort to secure his return to the Soviet Union, all of these whittle away at what is already very feeble, and that is a sense of self-worth.

Entering this society, for a Russian, is not exactly the recommended treatment to improve one's ego. Therefore, public assistance further complicates the problem. At times, it is indispensable, but it is not the answer.

Senator COHEN. May I ask a question right here, Mr. Chairman?

Senator NUNN. Certainly.

Senator COHEN. If the defector or emigre comes from a society in which he is on a form of public assistance, why is another form of public assistance so degrading?

Mr. CHERNE. Because his shock of leaving the Soviet Union, his guilt about leaving. Bear in mind the defector has committed a crime in doing what he did. He now comes here to an altogether foreign environment.

In the Soviet Union, he has been accustomed to fighting with authority for everything he ever got. This carries over. It takes him a long time to learn that you do not advance in the United States by fighting with authority.

Often, he will be a "pain in the neck" to the International Rescue Committee or the other voluntary agencies taking care of him. It is difficult for him at first to understand that we are not part of the United States Government.

It is not unusual for a Russian defector, for example, who, with considerable effort, is placed in a comfortable apartment in Brighton Beach, New York, which happens to be the enclave of the Soviet emigres in New York City, to say: "Why did you send me to Brighton Beach? I understand the apartments are better in Queens."

This is part of his continuous Soviet learned struggle with authority. In addition to which, he comes to a society which, in the first months or years of his being here, exacerbates his sense of deficiency—his deficiency in language, the great difficulty, in many cases, of finding employment appropriate to his past employment, let alone equal to it, but appropriate to it.

These are very destructive, particularly in periods of depression, and they all go through periods of depression. These are destructive to his sense of self-worth. There is a complaint among even the highest level defectors that the United States is not making adequate use of them. There was one quick reference to this in the testimony yesterday.

It is unfortunately true, I have learned, that high level national security defectors will, in fact, provide very valuable information to the United States Government, but when they have completed doing so, there is not an adequate effort to continue in the years that follow to get his unique insight of the way the Soviet system works.

We tend to drop things. One of the worst things that can happen to a refugee is to be prominent enough to receive press and television attention. In some cases, with which I have had experience, they have even received invitations to speak before business groups, other groups, social groups, women's groups. This is extremely flattering and, in fact, it does provide that sense of utility, but then, all of a sudden, he is nobody, because this comes to an end. It never comes to an end gradually, it comes to an end abruptly.

Senator COHEN. Politicians suffer the same fate.

Mr. CHERNE. I know that. I admire the courage which leads you to do what you are doing.

Now understandably, the focus of this subcommittee, and it is an essential focus, what is it that the government can do?

What I have been trying to convey is not the idea of the government's becoming an employer of last resourt. That, in my opinion, would not be useful. This is not a governmental function. One hopes, however, that the government can learn the means or create the mechanism by which to stimulate and support the planned creation of opportunities in academic teaching, research and production facilities which will offer employment to qualified scientists, artists, professionals, and some of less learned skills.

I do know that the International Rescue Committee has an employment service which we ourselves administer. We do it in cooperation with the business community. It is very heartening to realize that a concerted effort in this direction does, in fact, produce jobs. It is even more heartening to see how, within a period of a very few years, these people do advance. However out of place it would seem their first job is, they finally do wind up very significant citizens in the American economy.

Let me digress at this point and put forth, and I should have said so upfront, what may be a bizarre view, I thought the Bork Hearings, whatever one thinks of Judge Bork, were the most appropriate celebration of the 200th Anniversary of the Constitution.

I do not think that the events, desirable as they were, which took place in Washington and Philadelphia, did a fraction of what those hearings did to make of that document a living instrument, and illustrate, in fact, what that document does. I have the same feeling about these hearings. You could not, in my opinion, have timed them more appropriately.

I regard it as virtually certain that there will be an arms agreement. I see many evidences, and I am sure you see many more, of the speed with which segments of the American community, given the glimmer of Glasnost and Peristroiko, and especially with the Soviet Union, believes peace has come. We have traditionally jumped at every meager sign of absent hostility to persuade ourselves that this is it, the long struggle is over, the costs are coming to an end.

I know one very ugly antidote. One must recall that in the midst of Glasnost, the Soviet Union is conducting an active propaganda campaign, within the Soviet Union and throughout Africa, to persuade both populations that AIDS is a chemical warfare contribution the United States Government has made to the world.

Therefore, I have a lingering suspicion that we are not at the dawn of peace. We may be achieving a very desirable result, but the contest and the struggle remains.

For that reason, this subcommittee, in two ways, first of all, by focusing on a persistent reality, the reality of this urgent need of people who love their homeland, but nevertheless leave family behind, as many do, leave careers behind, rip up their roots and come to the United States, does at a minimum suggest that something is wrong. There aren't too many Americans fleeing to the Soviet Union.

Secondly, it is my hope that as a result of these hearings, there will be an increased concern with and attention paid to this community, because this community is urgently needed in the United States in order to correct our shortcomings of simply not having the vaguest idea of what the Soviet Union is like, let alone what the Russian culture is like.

We have a very regrettable tendency—it is not limited to the United States, but I think we are the leading specialist in it—when we wish to understand the foreign policy of another nation, or what the foreign policy propects may be in our relationships with other nations, to look in the mirror. We are quick to see everybody in that mirror.

I had a conversation some years ago with Golda Meir, after the Yom Kippur War. It was a purely accidental one, we were both flying on a plane to the coast. I asked her how was it possible, with the exceptional intelligence which the United States has, especially intelligence which is able to photograph objects from space, and the unusual intelligence which Israel has and so closely, how could we have missed it?

You don't prepare a landing across the Suez in one night or surreptitiously.

She said: "I absolutely agree with you, we should not have missed it."

I said: "How do you explain the fact that we missed it?"

She said: "I am afraid that we mirror imaged the problem."

Interestingly enough, she used that phrase. I said: "What do you mean?"

We could not imagine that they would be stupid enough to do it. We wouldn't be if we were in their shoes. She reflected this tendency of which I talk.

I was a very unlikely acting chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on International Education and Agricultural Affairs, serving that bureau in the State Department. I say, unlikely, because I simply could not persuade myself that if two people get to know each other better, the chances of peace are greater. Nor was I able to persuade myself with that older notion that Tom Watson Sr., advanced, "world trade is world peace," because if either of those propositions were true, then the two friendliest nations on the face of the earth should have been France and Germany.

Believe me, they knew each other thoroughly. They did not require conferences to enlarge their knowledge. Yet, they were, with greater frequency than other nations on the Continent of Europe, at each other's throats.

The antidote to these misconceptions is to have people within our own community give us a sense of the reality that is their life. The average American does not know how meager is the size of a room in which an entire family lives in the Soviet Union. It comes as a great shock when they learn it.

Unfortunately, those who do have the opportunity to go overseas seem, more often than not, to check their critical capacity back home before they leave, and entirely unconsciously, they regard it as their function to be as friendly, as uncritical, as unabrasive as possible.

I can assure you that the groups who come here from the Soviet Union are not similarly oriented and do not do that. I rather suspect that some in those groups who come to the United States are, as a matter of fact, trained for the purpose of their coming to the United States. This is not true of those who come from this country.

One of the urgent things that the government must do in relation to the Soviet emigre, defector, refugee, whatever you wish to call him, is to speed the process by which he is given an opportunity to enter the United States, an opportunity to apply for citizenship, with the availability of the services that are accorded to other refugees. This is not the case with those who come from the Soviet Bloc.

[At this point, Senator Sasser entered the hearing room.]

Mr. CHERNE. Let me not suggest that there is some kind of a special disadvantage that the Soviet emigre suffers. No, it is shared, oddly enough, by some other Communist groups, most notably, I would say, the one group that suffers the most is the Cuban group.

On the one hand, we have the most active hostility toward Cuba, made all the larger by events in Nicaragua. On the other hand, we could not possibly throw more stones in the path of those few Cubans who might come to the United States, or who are resident temporarily in some South American country.

We have a provision which permits refugees in South America to seek resettlement in the United States. Oddly enough that regulation has only one exeption—Cubans. I would be hard put to give you an explanation for that fact.

A similar fact. About three years ago, the President of the United States indicated that we would be eager to provide asylum for all of the Cuban political prisoners, a fact which reflects the best in our tradition. Here we are dealing with a group of people who could convey a reality on any level that is otherwise not available.

As a result of the break down of the Mariel Agreement, somewhere in the State Department, that presidential commitment was altered. As it now reads, we will provide asylum for Cuban political prisoners providing that they have spent at least ten years in a political prison.

If one simply visualizes, and the best way I can describe it is the Bridge on the River Kwai, solitary confinement, which is a regular part of the treatment of political prisoners in Cuba, what that hotbox is in the climate of Cuba, it is incredible to me that the

United States should put a requirement that they be subjected to ten years of this before they are even eligible to come here as a political prisoner. That is a fact.

A number of us have been making efforts, not notably successful thus far, to change that. I commend it to your attention. It does us a terrible disservice. I don't know how we figure out that we are hurting Castro by doing this.

The blunt fact is that even if that proviso were not in, there would be no flood of political prisoners that Castro would be letting out of his jails in order to resettle in the United States. The number would be greater. But we give the world a skewed understanding of our own psyche when we impose a restraint of that kind.

There is much more that I would like to add, but if I leave you with nothing else, I suppose being in a particualr activity, or job, or carrying a particular responsibility, after a while inures you, if that responsibility contains any humane or compassionate attributes, to feeling the pain the people you are dealing with feel. It is a survival mechanism. It is very hard to sustain a level of indignation or compassion.

I wish there was some way that legislatively, or otherwise, one could inject some sense of deeper compassion in the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Of all of the outreach aspects of the American Government, this one has for many years been a serious impediment to our conveying the very best that is in our nature.

Let me just conclude with that and spell it out, because I think I may here disagree with one observation, Senator Nunn, that you made when you opened these hearings. You referred to the fact of this country being a traditional country of asylum. We have been more generous than any other country, other than several of the very small Scandinavian countries, but we go through an ebb and flow of generosity. We close our door tight during certain intervals, and then open them, sometimes open them very wide, and then close them tight again.

We are now going through, and have been for the last several years, a growing xenophobia in this country. It's background is understandable. First of all, there is, in a phrase I used in a press conference in Thailand, compassion fatigue, because we have been at this now a long time, this most recent wave of worldwide refugee flow.

In addition, we have been struggling for a number of years, and we still have a very serious problem on our hands, with unemployment. There is a too easy assumption that those people are going to take the jobs that otherwise would be filled by Americans. The reality is that refugees will take jobs that would not be filled by Americans.

I don't think that there is one in 100 Americans who has the realization that during the eight years which followed the rise of Hitler in Germany, the United States had no refugee policy whatsoever, which is a polite way of saying, no mechanism to permit the entry of refugees during that entire period of time. Those who did come here, including some extraordinary scientists, came here through the regular quota system, often with a little pressure from some people on the Hill, but our doors were closed.

One of the more shocking episodes was the episode of the S.S. *St. Louis,* which was a very clever plan, attributed to Adolph Hitler personally. He permitted one ship, an attractive oceanliner, to be filled with Jews covering the entire spectrum of Jewish life in Germany at that time. This was June, 1939.

He secured for them permission to land in Cuba. They had to pay double the fare because, you see, they would be left in Cuba, and that ship would be traveling back empty. The ship contained a fair percentage of concentration camp victims as well, because it was a spectrum. What Hitler was relying on, part of his own mania, and it turned out to be prophetic in this instance, was that nobody would take them.

The ship went to Cuba and Cuba didn't take them. They hung around the Harbor of Havana for four weeks, and it finally had to move on because it was running out of fuel and water. It went over to the Florida shore in the hopes that the United States would take them. President Roosevelt personally issued an order that that ship could not come within 12 miles of the United States.

It went back to Europe. The European countries were not eager—the non-German European countries were not eager to give sanctuary to this group. Finally, in desperation, they did, but the time lost was so critical that, unfortunately, of the 460-some odd passengers on that ship—a film has been made of it, incidentally, "Voyage of the Damned"— four-fifths of that group died in concentration camps, because they entered the countries which gave them asylum just in time for Hitler to launch his blitzkreig and pick up these prisoners.

I said one final note, but there is one additional point that I must make.

We like to think that we are doing this out of compassion, and by and large that is our motivation, but let us not forget the pragmatic side of this, and there is a pragmatic side.

Wassily Leontief, the Nobel Prize mathematician and economist, some years ago devised a correlation between periods of more than normal American prosperity with periods of high immigration. When one thinks of it, it is not surprising. Periods of high immigration bring lower costs, high energy, well-motivated employees to the United States. Even the Chinese who built the railroads fit those categories.

At the present time, we desperately need an infusion of the kind of orthodox education—I don't mean Soviet propaganda, but the Three Rs. The Soviet Union does a very good job of educating its youngsters in the Three Rs. It gives them a lot of ideological baggage in addition. Their work ethic has always been the high. The one thing that keeps the output low is that there is nothing that they can do with their money. That is their restraint, it is not laziness.

Above all, they bring to this country something which this country and every country would always need. If you are enjoying freedom and it is not under challenge that notion has to be refreshed periodically. It doesn't normally arise in the human breast. Here are people who are capable of doing that at a time, as I say, when we are going to enter a period of euphoria in which reality is going to take to beating.

Therefore, you understand why I so value this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to come before you and the other members of your subcommittee.

I did not have the opportunity to say, Senator Sasser, my pleasure to have this opportunity to testify before you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Cherne, for a most educational and, I must also say, inspiring testimony to our committee.

I don't think that you introduced your companion when you came.

Mr. CHERNE. I am sorry, that is a terrible neglect. Mr. Robert De Vecchi is the Executive Director of the International Rescue Committee. He directs our programs on four continents, as well as our resettlement effort in the United States. He was, himself, a member of the U.S. Foreign Service, when he suddenly got one of those irrational impulses that he was a little tired of dealing with abstract problems and wanted to get himself involved in the destiny of people.

Senator NUNN. We welcome you, sir. We appreciate your being here.

I just have a few questions, and I will defer to Senator Cohen and Senator Sasser. One question is: How much budget do you have in your International Rescue Mission per year? I don't want any private information, but generally speaking, where do you find the source of your financing?

Mr. CHERNE. Our budget will tend to run between $22 and $24 million in recent years. When I became chairman of the IRC, our budget was $50,000 and we couldn't make it. As a matter of fact, Reinhold Niebhur, who was my predecessor as chairman, asked me to undertake that responsibility for the purpose of liquidating the IRC. That was, curiously enough, at the very peak of the Cold War. Nevertheless, we could not raise our budget.

This year, the budget is $24 million. Not because the figure is significant by itself, but because it is so meaningful, year in and year out, between 10 and 12 percent of our total budget will be contributed by former refugees.

Senator NUNN. Former refugees?

Mr. CHERNE. Former refugees whom we have helped.

Senator NUNN. Does the U.S. Government put any money in?

Mr. CHERNE. Yes, the U.S. Government reimburses certain of the programs, generally certain resettlement programs of the IRC. The UNHCR will pay the minimum costs of certain other kinds of operations. For example, our major operation on the Sudan border of Ethiopia was one we would have had difficulty sustaining on our resources without an infusion of assistance by the UNHCR.

Let me also say, in connection with that program, the average American never heard of the ghastly tragedy that was imposed upon the Ethiopian people by its Marxist-Leninist government until a British film, a television film, in 1985 brought those terrifying pictures of starvation of children. The IRC was on that frontier in 1980.

Senator NUNN. You mentioned many different messages that we should take to heart this morning as well as legislatively, but getting right to the focus of our hearings, trying to determine what the U.S. Government can and should do, and what we should not do, in improving overall performance in this area, you said that money is not the main problem. Although money is part of what is needed, but money is not the main problem. You, I believe, put your finger on employment, meaningful employment as being the main problem.

Mr. CHERNE. That is the main problem, but I hope I didn't leave the impression that money is no problem.

Senator NUNN. No, you didn't. I think I got the message. You didn't dismiss money, but you said that employment, meaning employment is the main problem. The government should not be the primary entity responsible for this.

Mr. CHERNE. It is my opinion, and also happens to be the judgment which, over these 50 years, the IRC has come to, having tried various formulas.

Senator NUNN. The government should not be the employer of last resort.

Mr. CHERNE. Right.

Senator NUNN. You clearly indicated that there needed to be some energizing way of getting the private sector more involved in this.

Mr. CHERNE. And government.

Senator NUNN. And government. Now the question I have: Do you have any specific suggestions about what we, as a committee, or what the government can do to help bring this to the attention of the private sector, the resources available from these people, the tremendous talents that they have over a period of time, and what they can contribute to individual entities, universities, and that kind of facility. Do you have any specific suggestions?

[At this point, Senator Sasser departed the hearing room.]

Mr. CHERNE. No, I do not have any specific suggestions. I will tell you one that I have been playing around with, trying to see the pros and cons of it during recent weeks, when I knew that I would be testifying here.

I don't have a very high opinion of the contribution which government appointed commissions tend to make. Some, however, do make very substantial contributions. There is no one I know who has come up with an answer to this that any of us persuaded is wholly satisfactory. We are dealing with a very difficult and very complicated subject.

In this case, I offer as a suggestion, I can't do so with 100 percent confidence, but it may well be that a well-selected body of both private and governmental people, acquainted with the subject, dealing with it, or maybe former governmental people who have been dealing with it, keeping the commission entirely private, ought to focus on this one subject: What can be done to enhance the opportunities for employment for refugees.

I would not restrict this committee's focus on the Soviet Union, the Soviet Bloc, I would not restrict their efforts. The IRC is resettling Ethiopians. We are resettling Iranians. We are resettling all of the Indochinese groups.

I sometimes wish someone would explain to me why the country which has suffered most in that Indochinese tragedy continues to be the country singled out to continue to suffer the most, and that is Cambodia. The Cambodian refugee has much the hardest road, if he manages to escape from Cambodia.

I return to my suggestion. This would, in my opinion, form a group of people to give concentrated thought—what can be done, in a free society for defectors. In a sense, it is a dilemma similar to the dilemma the defector I talked of faces. He has a problem he can't solve. We have a problem we have not come up with an adequate answer to.

Now to come back to the business of money. One very tragic case, an IRC case, a defector case. A husband and wife, he was a very distinguished photographer, operating for the Soviet Union in Bonn. She was an executive secretary. They had a nice apartment. They had a car. Bonn is a very lovely little town. They defected. They came to the United States.

Refugees usually choose the agency which they wish to have as their resettlement agency. The State Department, if they go to the local embassy, may recommend to them a voluntary agency. Our work over a period of years, this is not just a self-serving statement, has earned the high respect of governments throughout the world.

In any event, they became the IRC cases. He was 65, and this was one of the big problems. We tried to find a job for him in his field. He happened to be almost paradigm of the cultural/emotional problem I talked of before. He is not one who could have readily accepted the job of parking cars.

Nearly nine out of ten doctors who escaped from Cuba in 1959 became car-parks in Miami Beach. They had no difficulty with that at all, and they didn't stay there very long. It was their way of now starting the steps of fulfilling the requirements to be permitted to practice medicine in the United States.

Four months passed, and he became more and more depressed. To assist in their economic problem, we suggested that it would be easier to find a job for his wife, while we continued with the effort to assist him. This upset him further because he was accustomed to the notion of the man being the breadwinner. He gave the IRC no notice that he was leaving. His message was quite simple: My homeland needs me more than you do. The two returned to the Soviet Union.

We did have a job for her. Tragically enough, within two weeks we had a documentary photographer's job for him as well, but he was gone.

We receive reimbursement, $650 for each of the family. Our expenditures were well over $3,500 in that case, in that limited period of time. In the case of defectors especially, but only somewhat less true with emigres, a voluntary agency should feel its job is never over.

It doesn't mean intervening, sticking your nose in the affairs of these refugees if they have resettled themselves. But the particular person must have the feeling, if he runs into an emergency there will always be someone who, with real warmth, will counsel him. This should not be a job that comes to an end. I say the same for those who are in the hands of the government.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Leo.

Senator Cohen.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cherne, I regret that the chairman did not have an opportunity to read your biography in the beginning of the hearings, because it is truly an impressive record—including being a lawyer, which some regard as positive. I still do.

Mr. **Cherne**. I gave it up.

Senator **Cohen**. As an author, I think that you authored your first book at the age of 27, and wrote one book, called "The Rest of Your Life," at the age of 32. I think that I would be interested in reading why you wrote a book about the rest of your life at the age of 32. Also an artist, a student of government, and certainly that of the human heart.

As you were talking—and because I think you really have great insight into the problem you have been discussing—that several members of the audience seemed to be indicating disagreement with what you were saying in terms of the guilt suffered by defectors, the depression suffered by defectors, and perhaps they will have an opportunity to testify later during the course of the hearings. But that is one of the great benefits of this society that people can have disagreements with people like yourself or myself.

I was intrigued by your statement about why it is important to have Soviet emigres, defectors or others come to the country, and you talked about the benefits of the Three Rs. I thought that you were on the verge of repeating what Vice President Bush said recently about Soviet tanks and bringing their talents to this country.

I raise the issue perhaps as a devil's advocate. Why should we be more concerned in this country about attracting or encouraging or facilitating refugees or defectors from Soviet Bloc countries, who suffer political repression, as opposed to those individuals who flee from economic hardship?

I am thinking, for example, of the Haitians, or Mexicans, or others from Latin America, who might wish to come to this country because there is no hope for any kind of economic freedom. Why should we make such an effort in attracting, or helping individuals who flee the kind of political repression as opposed to economic?

Mr. **Cherne**. Let me say, first of all, that there is a very fragile but terribly important idea which animates this society—it is freedom.

Even in the periods which I spoke of, in which our door closes, and the surge is not very high, the Americans like to think of themselves, even when they are not and, fortunately, for the most part, they are, as unique by virtue of their freedom, unique by virtue of the nature of this society, it utter openness, even its anarchic openness. Our openness is not in every respect always an advantage.

I spoke of the urgency of keeping this refreshed, and no one refreshes it better than someone who has not experienced freedom, even if they have to go through a period of several years of utter bewilderment by the variety of choices which they are compelled to make if they are to live in the United States.

But I have an additional reason for thinking that we must be especially sensitive to two groups, one of which does not and need not take any refugees. There are two groups, in my opinion, two countries, two very different nations, that will have a profound effect on our future. One is Japan, and the second is the Soviet Union.

We are as deficient in our knowledge of the Japanese culture, I would say probably more deficient in our knowledge of the Japanese culture than we are of Soviet culture.

Soviet culture is a very particular thing, and I must say that they have every reason to be proud of it. Excuse me, I want to modify this, the Russian culture. This is one of the common mistakes we make. There is a thing called a Russian culture, and it is not Soviet culture. The Russian culture is very complex. It is very rich. The Russian sense of homeland is remarkable. We don't understand it at all, and we can't possibly devise sound policies and relations even with friends without a better understanding of their culture.

In the case of Japan, the reason is fairly simple. We vacillate in our looking at the enormous competitive success Japan has had between attributing most of it to the fact that the Japanese keep our goods out, and they do keep a certain percentage of our goods out, or turn the coin over, because the United States has lost its competitive drive, instinct, and doing all sorts of things wrong, it is selling its patents to the Japanese.

Almost no thought is given to the fact that Japan, in fact, the reason why the Pacific Rim is turning in such an extraordinary performance, it is not actions which their government takes, it is the culture, it is the heritage left by Confucius which reinforces all of the attributes singularly useful, but none more than the drive to become educated, reinforced by a family structure which is the compelling force behind that educational drive.

We have no such culture. Until we understand that, I think our own efforts in the direction of repairing our educational system will be deficient. In addition, I think we will misunderstand what it is we face as we will continue to deal with Japan and the other groups.

Senator **Cohen**. Let me be more specific, if I can.

Assuming that we do more to help either your organization or others, and that we, in fact, make it more comfortable, more adjustable, more convenient for emigres and defectors to function and flourish in our society, what is the ultimate goal?

It is to embarrass the Soviet Union and the Bloc countries in the eyes of the world, as being opposed to freedom versus repression?

Is it to force them to change internally, or is it, again, to force the world to look at the kind of opportunities that exist in a free society vis-a-vis the Soviet Union?

What is the ultimate goal, because we have to articulate that?

Mr. **Cherne**. I suppose that we each have our own view. I will give you my set of priorities.

Senator **Cohen**. What I want you to do is to juxtapose your goal vis-a-vis, let's say, the Haitians or the Mexicans, or the others who wish to flee to this country for another type of freedom.

Mr. **Cherne**. I will do that.

In the case of those who come from the Soviet Bloc, but especially those who come from the Soviet Union, my number one goal is that we enrich ourselves with their effort, with their background, with an increasing realistic knowledge of what it is we are dealing with, what is the nature of that society, with the infusion, which they will bring with them, of a sense of value to the freedom we take for granted.

The enrichment occurs in a number of ways. In some cases, the enrichment occurs with the professional and scientific attributes some of them bring, which are ill-used or not adequately used in the countries from which they come.

It is very interesting, for example, that we literally would have been able to break the puzzle of atomic energy, or it would have been years delayed, had it not, ironically enough, been for three people who came from one country, Hungary. It is one of those that are now part of the captive empire. There are a variety of ways in which we would be enriched in the process. In my view, nearly all immigration enriches us.

Why not Haiti? I feel very strongly, especially during the days of Papa Doc Duvalier and then his son, and the IRC reflected that strong feeling. Mine was shared by all of my colleagues. It was not a decision of mine. It was not the policy of the United States Government to encourage Haitian refugees who made their way in boats as flimsy as those which leave Vietnam, but it was the IRC's function to help them.

Here is a case where there is no government reimbursement. There are added costs, and so is wrestling with the U.S. Government agencies. We resettled Haitian refugees. Our test is simple. The IRC was formed to assist those who flee totalitarian governments of the left or the right, we make no distinction between them.

In the case of Haiti, you are not dealing with a great culture. There is a Haitian culture, but it is not a culture which will enrich us. But we are dealing with some of the victims who hurt most as a result of a very primitive and very violent dictatorship that prevailed in Haiti. Haiti today, apparently, does not have the dictatorship, it has something just as grinding, poverty.

The International Rescue Committee's function has been to concentrate on situations which have a political aspect, the flight from totalitarian governments. There are other agencies, many of the church agencies, who concern themselves, without reference to the political element, simply to the question of need. Therefore, I will not make a suggestion that it is more important to assist those who come from the Soviet Union than those who come from Guatemala.

Senator **COHEN**. Thank you.

Senator **NUNN**. Thank you very much, Mr. Cherne. We would like to go on with you for a long time, because you could tell us a great deal that we would be the beneficiaries of, but we have other witnesses this morning. You have been most helpful. We are greatful to you for your testimony, for your insightfulness, your experience, and for your insightfulness, your experience, and for your dedicated service to this country and, indeed, to humanity.

Mr. **CHERNE**. Thank you.

Incidentally, I don't know whether you would wish a copy—one of the questions that you intended to go into, at least the staff alerted me to it, was the efforts of the Soviet Union to encourage the redefection from here back to the Soviet Union of Soviet emigres.

Senator NUNN. Yes, we would like to have that. We will put that in the record.

Mr. CHERNE. This is the Donovan Commission report. In 1955, that was a major effort of the Soviet Union, and General "Wild Bill" Donovan was pressed into service to head a group of citizens to look into that subject. They did a stunning job, if you would like to enter that into the record.

Senator NUNN. We will have that as part of the record, without objection.

[The Dovovan Commission Report was marked Exhibit No. 28 and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.]

Senator NUNN. We will stay in touch with you as we come up with our recommendations. We would like for you to continue to have input.

Mr. CHERNE. I admire the work that you do.

Senator NUNN. Thank you so much.

We have two defectors who are now going to testify, both of them have, I think, a very meaningful story to tell for the committee this morning.

We have Elena Alexandra Costa. She is one of the few successful defectors, I understand the only one from the Soviet Embassy here in Washington since World War II. Ms. Costa defected in 1978 with her two small children. Although she offered the opportunity to her husband and encouraged him, he decided to return to the Soviet Union.

Ms. Costa will explain to us her unique reasons for defection, and certainly the problems of a woman with two small children in defecting. I suppose that too many of us view defectors as a world of men, diplomats and spies, in many cases. Ms. Costa's testimony, I think, will show us that there are other dimensions of this. She has gone on to become a very successful author.

We are delighted to have you here this morning. We are going to have both witnesses appear at the same time. They will not testify simultaneously, but we will have them both at the table as a panel.

The next witness that we will call is Dr. Ushakov. He was with us yesterday. He will testify and, as I mentioned yesterday in my opening statement, he has a story of just untold bravery and peril in his escape from the Soviet Union. It shows the quest of one man for freedom and the extent of his desire to be in the free world.

We will hear from both of them. We do swear in all the witnesses before our subcommittee. Before you begin your testimony, if you would both rise, I will give you the oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Ms. COSTA. I do.

Dr. USHAKOV. I do.

Senator NUNN. We also have this morning, Dr. Nancy Lubin, who is the Sovietologist for the Office of Technology Assessment. She is going to come up to join Dr. Ushakov. Dr. Lubin has assisted the subcommittee in this investigation. She is fluent in three languages, including Russian, and she will be available, if necessary, for translation purposes. She is suffering from the same kind of cold that I am this morning. Even translators have that problem, I understand.

Ms. Costa, why don't you lead off and give us your story. Then we will hear from Dr. Ushakov, and then come back with questions to both of you.

TESTIMONY OF ELENA ALEXANDRA COSTA, SOVIET DEFECTOR

Ms. COSTA. Mr. Chairman, and members of the subcommittee. I thank you for the opportunity to speak here today. I must say that for a year-and-a-half I have resisted all pressure from Counsel Sopko to submit a written statement.[1] Now I find that I will probably be reading from something that I jotted down yesterday because we are running out of time.

Senator NUNN. We would be delighted for you to read it or however you would like to present it.

Ms. COSTA. If I don't stick to my notes, it will take forever.

I would also like to say that contrary to the introduction that Senator Nunn gave to my appearance here, I do not want to speak of my story as a story of a woman with two small children. Surely, two kids on your hands doesn't help very much in building a life in a new country, but this is one case where I really don't have any reason to complain.

The problems I have are typical for most defectors in this country, both men and women. Just because I happen to be in a very strange minority, it doesn't make my problems any different.

I have submitted a biographical sketch to the subcommittee. To repeat very quickly, my name is Alexandra Costa, and my former name was Yelena Mitrokhina. My husband was the First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington. We came here in 1975 to open the Soviet Copyright Office. In 1978, I requested asylum and stayed here. My husband returned to the Soviet Union.

For the purpose of this discussion, because I am going to pay specific attention to the problems of employment, meaningful employment of defectors, I would like to go briefly over my educational background.

When I came here, I had an undergraduate degree in foreign languages, Scandinavian and English. I had a graduate degree in sociology. I have taught in a very special school in Moscow, a school for foreign Communists that is run by the International Department of the Central Committee.

After my defection, I went through the master's program at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania. I received an MBA degree from that school. I taught computer courses in an American college—Montgomery College here in Washington. This is relevant to what I am going to talk about in terms of qualifications for employment and things like that, and that is the only reason that I am bringing it up.

I should also mention, probably, that after graduation from the Wharton School, I worked for a consulting company here in Washington for a couple of years, and then for Tandy Corporation. Since

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[1] See p. 306.

1983, I have been self-employed, running my own computer business. Also, last year, I published my autobiography, "Stepping Down From the Star," and since then I did some lectures on campuses and for private organizations. I also participated in a variety of radio and television programs.

Senator NUNN. What is the name of your book, you might as well get a little free advertising in here?

Ms. COSTA. It is sold out anyway, but the name is "Stepping Down From the Star."

Senator COHEN. I have the same problem, but mine didn't do as well as yours. [Laughter.]

Ms. COSTA. I did read yours, Senator Cohen.

Senator NUNN. Senator Cohen is not permitted to name his title any more. He has done it for the last six to eight months constantly.

Ms. COSTA. Isn't it terrible that publishers don't go into reprints?

Senator COHEN. I know.

Ms. COSTA. I would also like to note at this point the clearly delineated distinction between intelligence and non-intelligence defectors that was made yesterday by Director Webster really does not apply to me. Mine is a borderline case that enables me to look at the issue sort of from both sides of the fence.

I went through the CIA debriefing and received government assistance through the CIA defector relocation program, including the change of identity, and all of the necessary security procedures. On the other hand, after I have established myself professionally, I requested that the financial assistance would be discontinued, and now I am one of the other group of defectors.

I support myself fully. I support myself and my children. I don't get any assistance from the government. In that respect, I am in the same boat as other non-intelligence defectors who came here to this country and have to cope on their own. So I am looking at the issue from those two points.

I was not able to be present at the hearing yesterday, but I did read the statements of all the people who were testifying yesterday. In order to save time, I do not want to repeat the points that they made here. I would like to note that I found the staff report of the committee to be extremely comprehensive and well researched. I subscribe to every point of that report. That, I would like to note for the record.

Although I will try to avoid a repetition of what other people said yesterday, I would like to take some of the points made there and expand them in light of my own experience. There are only three issues that I would like to bring up today, and after that I will be happy to answer your questions.

Number one, I think that serious consideration or reconsideration should be given to the definition of intelligence value and national security issues. There is no question that information of direct intelligence value, such as the identity of Soviet agents, covert operations, and military intelligence, et cetera, is and will remain the first priority of the U.S. Government.

However, the U.S. foreign policy does not depend solely on knowledge of the intentions of the Soviet Army. It is especially true nowadays when the changes in the Soviet economic and cultural policy make understanding of Soviet mentality critical to foreign policy considerations.

I can understand the frustration of so-called "civilian" defectors who are not intelligence officers—the economists, the high level members of the Soviet apparatus—when they are told that their knowledge of the workings of the Soviet system, of its decision-making process, of the personnel involved in the policy-making, are of no intelligence value.

It is, and when these civilian defectors interpret the current changes in the USSR and are able to give prognoses about future directions of the developments there that would be of benefit both to the U.S. Government and to the American public in general.

I would like specifically to emphasize that the field of understanding the Soviet mentality and of correct interpretation of the changes, real and not so real, taking place in the Soviet Union, is no longer the domain of academic and government experts. The Soviet Union is taking its case directly to the American public. They are trying to influence American public opinion. They are doing it through very skillful use of their spokesmen, of the so-called "Space Bridges," and Citizen Summits.

The Soviet effort to influence American public opinion has reached unprecedented dimensions. One of the ways to counteract this onslaught is to provide a balanced view from our side, and many defectors are better qualified to do so than American born scholars.

If there is any question that the Soviet Union still considers us, the defectors, a threat to them, I would like to remind the committee that the Soviet spokesman, Vladimir Posner, who is the foremost speaker for the Soviet establishment, never hesitates to engage in a debate with any American scholar or any government official, but he has never agreed to debate any of us, and for a very simple reason—we can beat him at his own game, and he knows it.

The second point that I would like to make is a very specific one. Dr. Bittman was talking yesterday about the psychological trauma of defection, debriefing and resettlement. Mr. Cherne, this morning, spoke very eloquently on the same issue.

I don't know whom Senator Cohen saw in the audience disagreeing with that, but I don't know any defector, and I know quite a few, who did not go through that terrible agony of guilt, frustration, next to suicidal tendencies. It is all there. And at the time when you are going through all that, and I went through this CIA debriefing process myself, at that time, the first three or four months, when your whole world collapses, when you don't know who you are any more, you go through the routine CIA procedure of psychiatric examination.

If there is any way to influence this, either through legislation or by any other means, I appeal to this subcommittee to do something about it. This is very wrong. It is a very wrong time to do that, and it has damaged many people, and could potentially damage many more.

My own life and my own future in this country was nearly ruined by a report from a psychiatrist who was, fortunately for me, stopped in time, and I have heard from people who have similar experiences.

On top of the fact that the defectors are in a highly emotional state at that time, and maybe not the easiest people to deal with, the psychiatrists are American trained, they do not understand the difference in cultural and ethnic background, and the result is a total disaster. I can give you some details of this later, if you wish, but this is just a personal plea on behalf of many who will still have to go through this procedure. It should be discontinued.

Senator NUNN. Could I interrupt you there just for one question.

Ms. COSTA. Yes.

Senator NUNN. Is there any organization of defectors who are organized to assist new defectors coming in? Is there any kind of a structure where people like you and Dr. Ushakov would be available to counsel with to help in this transition for new defectors?

Ms. COSTA. In that initial stage, Dr. Ushakov and myself would have found ourselves in a different place. When I asked for an asylum, I talked to the FBI, and immediately after the final meeting at the State Department, and I was turned over to the CIA. At that point, I had no contact with the outside world. I was kept in a safehouse until the debriefing was over.

One of the organizations that exists and is working effectively to help defectors to go through this anguish of initial adjustment is, of course, the Jamestown Foundation. As far as I know, the Jamestown Foundation has been lobbying for several years to have early access to defectors, but without much success.

As a matter of fact, the reason I came out into the public in 1985, because I was living under an assumed name for seven years, was that I tried to get in touch with Vitaly Yurchenko. I called the FBI and I called the CIA, because I had read reports that he was having a difficult time. I knew him slightly when he was at the Embassy in Washington, and I thought that I could help. Unfortunately, he had returned to the Soviet Union before that meeting took place.

My understanding is that the Agency does not encourage it, and I think it is a wrong practice because nobody can help a defector at that stage better than another defector, especially those people who made it successfully, whose transition is complete, who can tell them, yes, there is light at the end of the tunnel. It is not forever. There is hope. But we are not permitted to do that for security consideration, or whatever. This is probably another change that probably needs to be made.

Senator NUNN. I think that Senator Cohen and I should take that up with the CIA, and get their reasoning. They may have a reasoning, but I think you make a very valid point, it seems to me.

Ms. COSTA. There is always a reasoning, but quite often bureaucratic reasoning doesn't make particular sense. But there always is some.

Senator COHEN. I would say, from my observation, the intelligence community has a shortsighted goal, and that is to get as much "intelligence information" as they can in the shortest period of time, and not taking into account that by, perhaps, utilizing the services of others who have gone through the experience, who understand the psyche or the Russian mind as such, would accomplish that goal in a much more secure and productive fashion.

I think the tendency has been, over the years, to get the information, to squeeze it, as they say, to get as much as they can, and then they drop the individual. This has proven to be not only counterproductive, but inhumane as to the feelings of the individuals.

Senator NUNN. Why don't you go ahead. We didn't mean to interrupt, but I just wanted to clarify that one point.

Ms. COSTA. That is all right. I don't mind being interrupted. Certainly the question about the debriefing has been raised many times before.

I understand that there are some changes in the defector relocation program. I have been told, for instance, that the number of case officers has been increased. I don't know how much good that will do because, if the quality of people has not changed, you can have any number of those case officers, and you would still have problems.

It is a matter of the people who are involved with the defectors. It is a very difficult job. I don't want to diminish the effort that the Agency is making. There are some excellent people there. In all honesty, we can be difficult to deal with. When you have an individual in that state of turmoil, it is difficult.

It is not a nine to five job, and that is why it is so important to have people who are committed to it, who are almost volunteers. That's why help from such organizations as the Jamestown Foundation would be critical, because people from the foundation are committed to this cause and they are volunteers.

That brings me to the last point and probably the most painful. Mr. Cherne was talking this morning about meaningful employment. It is a sore point for all of us. I must say that I am considered one of the most successful cases. I went through school. I run my own business. I don't depend on anybody, I am self-employed. Yet, I do have an axe to grind. I am also speaking for somebody else here.

Let me start with the fact that it has been said many times that defectors come here with a mission. It is probably true.

The most important issue for many defectors is meaningful employment. For those of us who don't receive government assistance, it is also a matter of financial security. For those who are provided for under the provisions of the Central Intelligence Act 110, it is a matter of sense of self-worth and self-respect.

There are many ways in which defectors can be employed in this country. It is not a matter of finding a job, because any person who is reasonably healthy can drive a cab or wash dishes in a restaurant as some of us have done. There is no lack of job opportunities, and there is nothing wrong with holding jobs like that.

There are many emigres in the history of this country who started as dishwashers and rose to become presidents of corporations. That is the American dream, and I don't argue with that premise.

What is more, I do believe that any person who has found enough strength within himself to break away from his past, with his system, with his established standard of living, will find in himself enough strength to build his new life from scratch, and most of us do, only a few don't.

It has also been said that defectors come to this country with exaggerated expectations. It is probably true, but this statement must be qualified. It is not the expectation of striking it rich that we suffer from, it is the expectation of being useful.

Most of the people I know defected because they have given up any hope of being useful to the society where they lived, useful in the right sense, not as obedient servants of the society, but as thinking people who wanted to improve that society.

Yes, we come here with that expectation that we can be useful to our newfound motherland, the country that adopted us, and when that doesn't happen, it is a very difficult experience.

Quite obviously, given our area of expertise—our knowledge of the Soviet system, its inner workings, the Soviet mentality—we can be most useful in academia, in teaching, in sharing our knowledge and expertise with various government agencies.

In light of what I said earlier about the quiet conquest of American minds by Soviet propaganda, I would even put academic work and teaching ahead of all others, but these are precisely the areas that are virtually closed to us.

General Odom pointed out yesterday in his testimony that there are serious barriers to employment of defectors in academia. There is langauge, writing skills, lack of knowledge of the body of Soviet research that has already been done by American scholars, and lack of academic credentials. All of this is true and applies to many people who come to this country, although it is not something that could not be overcome.

When Sasha Ushakov came to this country, he could barely speak English. You will hear him speak today. He is fluent. He teaches courses at universities. It can be overcome, but to demonstrate my point, I will bring up two individual cases—my own, and that of my colleague and co-author in both journalistic and literary projects, Major Stanislav Levchenko.

I would like to note, for the record, that although Mr. Levchenko could not be present here today, he has submitted a written statement [1] to the committee and he has authorized me to bring these specific points on his behalf.

Most of the points made by General Odom about barriers to academic employment are not relevant in our cases. Both Mr. Levchenko and myself speak fluent English. We both have writing skills that at least the print media in this country have found adequate. We have written newspaper articles that have been published. Both of us are frequently called upon by the media to comment on current events, so our expertise is valued. Both of us have lectured on American campuses, usually at the direct invitation of the students. Yet, I don't think that either of us would ever be offered a teaching position in a college or a research position in a major think-tank.

In fact, although I have not tried simply because I cannot spend time on fruitless search, Mr. Levchenko has tried and has not been successful in obtaining employment in academia.

At this point, let me diverge and take each case individually.

I have done graduate study in sociology in the Soviet Union, and I have taught Marxism there for three years before I came to the

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[1] See Exhibit No. 11 on p. 685.

United States, so I had some teaching experience. I already mentioned that I have also taught at an American college here. Yet, I have heard about difficulties of assimilating in the American academic community. Also, I wanted to break with the tradition. I decided that I would not follow the so-called "mission." I decided that I would do it the American way.

I went to a business school, and I started my own business. I stayed out of the field of Soviet research for five years. Well, one of the things that happened to me is that no matter how hard you try to reject that mission, it is in you.

When people start asking me questions about this and that, what is going on in the Soviet Union, and when you see how much ignorance and, at the same time, interest to know there is in this country, you can't help it. I have been drawn into this missionary work, into Soviet affairs almost against my will.

The fact that I went on television in connection with the Yurchenco case, and the fact that I wrote the book, of course, contributed to that. But the point is that I enjoy it immensely. I enjoy lecturing. I enjoy talking to students. I enjoy giving them knowledge about the Soviet system, the knowledge that, I think, is sorely needed in this country.

However, with over 90 radio and television shows in one year, with two lectures broadcast for two years in a row on C-Span nationwide, after going to campuses and writing articles, I have not heard anything from the academia. Nobody contacted me. There has been no question of getting together and maybe discussing some possibilities. There was nothing like that.

To tell the truth, this work has affected me adversely in the financial sense. In order to be current on Soviet affairs, and I am self-employed, I had to take time away from my work, and my business suffered. But I didn't have any choice. I couldn't go out there and sound like an incompetent, and I didn't want to give up this thing.

If Soviet research became my job again, those things would be compatible. But trying to run a computer business and at the same time to keep up with the literature and the press that is coming out on the Soviet Union is almost impossible. Last week, I was looking at my bills, and I simply faced the situation that I can't pay them.

The ideal thing would be probably to take a part-time job teaching maybe at the local college. I am sure that there should be some interest in that. I found another solution, temporarily, hopefully, in the old, time-honored American tradition. I applied to deliver pizzas in the evenings. It is okay, and it will pay the bills.

I had a pretty bad experience applying for a government job several years ago, when I was turned down because I was a Russian, not because I was a woman, by the House Information Services. I was the only candidate for the position, to design the computer system there. It went for approval to whatever House Committee, I think the Appropriations Committee.

I was told that I was as good as hired, but the reply came back that "we can't hire a Russian in an election year. Come back after the election." Of course, by the time the election took place, the appropriation ran out. So they had to put another ad in the newspaper. I have not tried to get a job with the government since, because I am scared.

I have not tried to find a teaching job because I have listened to what Mr. Levchenko told me about his efforts, and I really can't afford to take time to go into a fruitless search. I would rather deliver a pizza, that is a certain bet.

Going to Mr. Levchenko's situation, his experience in this country in trying to establish himself as an expert in Soviet affairs was even more disappointing. Because his area of expertise has been and still is Soviet disinformation and active measures, from the very beginning he did not try to go into any other area of work.

His expertise has been eagerly sought by many people, such as members of academia, writers, journalists, representatives of think-tanks. Being rather naive about business relationships in this country and eager to show his gratitude for being accepted here, he gladly shared his knowledge as a service to the American public, only to find out that the result was mostly of benefit to private individuals who had used his knowledge for personal gain.

Not only was he deprived of potential income, because what he was doing should justifiably have been paid for on a consulting basis, but he was also deprived of credit for the work that otherwise could serve as a basis for his academic credentials.

A good example is the book "Disinformatsia." It is a fairly well-known book, to which he contributed hours and hours of interviews and his in-depth knowledge of disinformation, only to find out that his name was not even mentioned in the acknowledgements. This is just one example.

So when we are facing the problem of credentials and academic background, how can we get that background? It is changing now, but for three or four years, Mr. Levchenko spent an innumerable number of times and hours giving away his knowledge, and as a result he has nothing to show in his academic credentials.

There are many reasons why Soviet defectors are not welcome in the academic community. I will name only three. One is fear of competition. There are some excellent scholars in the field of Soviet research in this country, probably the best in the world. There are many who are mediocre, and there are many, many more who are simply no good. We are a threat to them, because we know from personal experience what it is there in the Soviet Union.

I have been told several times, more than once, at least: How can you say that you can stay current? You can't go back there. That is true; at least, not on a round trip, on a one-way trip, yes.

I can't go back there, but I can assure this subcommittee that even reading Soviet press and watching Soviet television programs, I can read more between the lines there than those so-called Sovietologists who go there on a short trip once a year for two weeks to see what the Soviets want to show them, and claim to know and understand how the Soviet mentality works.

So we do present that unfair competition and there is quite a lot or resistance. Another problem with academia is that may professors in colleges still live, in their mind, in the radical campuses of the 1960s. They seem not to notice that their students live in the 1980s.

When Mr. Levchenko and I lecture at universities, it is not the students who debate with us, it is their professors who accuse us of going too hard on the Soviets. The students don't disagree. It is the students who invite us, because usually the decision is that of a student board. If it were up to the school boards, we probably wouldn't have had so many invitations.

This is an experience that we have had on many campuses. Of course, he travels more than I do, but there is no question that this attitude exists. Unfortunately, it is the professors who decide whom to hire. They are members of the school boards.

The third thing that I want to note—and that is not not just in academia, but also it the government—is that there is a certain mistrust. We are considered to be biased, and we are also considered to be an embarrassment.

I would like to bring up a specific point that was mentioned in the U.S. News and World Report that during the Chautauqua meeting there was an attempt to ask for an asylum by some members of the Soviet Delegation, and the person or persons were discouraged from doing so by the State Department officials because it was an inopportune time.

I have little reason to doubt a report from such a respectable publication, so I tend to think that is is true. I also tend to think that it is true knowing the State Department mentality.

I think that it is about time that we stop worrying about offending the Soviets. If they want to negotiate with us, they will do that whether we aggravate them or not. Turning away potential defectors—and the people who came to Chautauqua were not ordinary citizens, they were high level officials—not hiring defectors for government jobs because if, God forbid, the Soviets will see that we employ defectors, we will be embarrassed or maybe they will get angry at us, it is a wrong policy. We should not worry about that, but unfortunately, it is an impediment to employment for many defectors.

I don't have any solutions. I know that you have been asking for constructive suggestions. I don't have any solutions. I think the government can provide some employment as long as it is not a handout. I don't think that any of us wants to be on welfare. We do not want handouts. But we also have to realistic that in this country, unlike in the Soviet Union, the government does not order university boards to change their hiring policies.

If the prejudice exists, there is no way to legislate it out. You can legislate the equal opportunity for Blacks, but the prejudice still exists. You can pass ERA, but there is still inequality. We will always find that the prejudice exists. No matter what the legislation, it will be there. So there must be some other ways of doing that.

There could be some effort with some enlightened universities. They are working with some people, and their boards are interested in that. There could be something that the government could set up because, as I indicated in the very beginning, I do think that it is in the interest of this country to have us go out there and talk to the American people, and there must be some way of doing it. The point is that right now not very much is being done. It is an uncoordinated effort. It is an effort by separate organizations that are under-funded, under-staffed. I hope that it can be changed somehow.

Thank you.

Senator NUNN. Thank very much, Ms. Costa, for very enlightening testimony, very helpful testimony. We will come back for questions, but at this point, we will turn to Dr. Ushakov for his fascinating story.

Dr. Ushakov, you proceed however you would choose to. If you would like to read your statement that will be fine, or you would like to summarize it, that will be fine. We will let you proceed as you deisre.

TESTIMONY OF ALEKSANDR A. USHAKOV, PH.D., SOVIET DEFECTOR [1]

Dr. USHAKOV. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss with you the problems faced by defectors from the Soviet Union and other Communist controlled countries as well as the unique information about the functioning of Marxist dictatorships these defectors can provide to this country. I have a rather detailed statement that I would like to summarize for the sake of expediency.

I come to you today as someone who was forced to leave his homeland due to the policies of the Soviet government, but who is now proud to be an active member of this great country's society. My reasons for defecting as well as the problems faced once I came here may be similar to others who have defected, and by proceeding from it, I will define the problem of defectors as it is generally, on the whole.

The problem of defectors from the Soviet Union and other Communist controlled countries has existed for 70 years, ever since 1917 revolution in Russia. During these 70 years, its character has changed repeatedly and, in order to form an adequate reaction to this problem, we have to define its invariable components together with the changes taking place in the Soviet Union right now.

At the present time, some changes are taking place in the USSR. By that I mean a certain democratization of social life, a certain indulgence in the field of economics, and the gradual erosion of governmental atheism. This is the beginning of the great process. One can define these changes as a disintegration of Marxism.

This is good. However, in spite of it, three basic factors of Marxist dictatorship still remain immutable in the Soviet Union, namely, the one-party political system, various restrictions on the private initiative, and hermetically sealed borders. As long as those basic factors remain as immutable as before, the problem of Soviet and Communist Bloc defectors on the whole will inevitably take place in the future and, because of it, there is a question: How to react to it?

To clarify this question, I am suggesting we begin from the viewpoint of defectors themselves. In using the term "defector," one must first define this concept. Several people tried to define it, and I appreciate it, yesterday and today, but maybe it would be interesting to look at the defector's point of view. By that I mean that all those who come from Communist Bloc countries belong to one of the following two categories: Emigres and defectors, and there is a difference between the emigre and the defector.

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[1] See p. 310 for Dr. Ushakov's prepared statement.

For instance, the emigrant from the Soviet Union is permitted by the Soviet authorities, the KGB included, to leave the country, I mean by that the Soviet Union, whereas the defector is not permitted to leave. The paradox is that the emigres will receive visas from the KGB to leave the Soviet Union, and receive considerable assistance in the West, while the defectors who took their visas from God, so to speak, remain in the West without any support.

Taking into consideration that emigres here in America number some 100,000, but the defectors number approximately 100, yet at the same time they receive no support, one might add that such a dismissive attitude to the defector's problem can hardly be justified. If you have some doubts about it, let me show you the reasons and price of the average defection, and particularly of mine.

The primary motive for my coming to the West was the political repression in the USSR. In March of 1984, I was criminally charged, according to Article No. 70, for "writing, keeping and spreading anti-Communist literature." I was to be sentenced to 12 years in prison. Considering that in Soviet concentration camps, one's incarceration might be extended indefinitely, I decided to hike to the West across the Soviet-Turkish border, that is, across the Caucasian mountains.

As I did not belong to any group in the USSR which is allowed to emigrate, there was no other alternative for me, not before my arrest in 1984 or after it. I escapted the trap of the agents of the KGB between the first and the second arrests and then, when I achieved it, I still had a hard trial ahead of me.

Right now, I would like to stress that I had worked irreproachably in the USSR for 20 years. Yesterday, one of the speakers said that immigrants are legal persons. They leave the Soviet Union legally. Defectors are illegal persons. I don't like this word "illegal," because it has a negative meaning.

I want to stress that I had worked irreproachably in the USSR for 20 years at plants and factories, and then in institutes and universities, and I had served in the army. I had never committed a crime. I had never been sentenced. I had two small children, a boy and a girl.

Prior to my arrest, from 1979 to 1984, I taught Marxism-Leninism and psychology of management as an associate professor at the Odessa Naval Academy. In the Department of Philosophy, I also directed research on the social and psychological bases of selection, placement and maintenance of naval command personnel.

Simply stated, I researched and taught in the area of naval personnel management. In this position, I held the rank which was equal to the naval rank of commander here in the United States or the equivalent of an army lieutenant colonel. I had published 17 professional articles in the official press plus my dissertation on socio-economic forecasting for my Ph.D. degree from Leningrad University.

Then why was I arrested? That is the question. For my other books. I wrote four books and many articles about the coming decay of Marxism in Russia and how to accelerate that process. That is why. There is no crime more dangerous in the USSR than writing anti-Communist books, but I wrote them because I was anxious for the future of my country and the whole world, and because of that I had been arrested and my apartment searched.

To understand this disenchantment, you should consider for a moment my own personal experiences. For generations, my family, like many other Russians, Ukrainians or Byelorussians and so on, had been brutally repressed by our Communist government. My uncles were killed by the Bolsheviks. My mother was sent to Siberia to do penal servitude in the gold mines for six years and ten months, from the time she was 16, I stress, she was only a girl, from the time she was 16 until she was 23. Her only crime being that her father was a farmer who had opposed collectivization. My father, in turn, was luckier. He was expelled from the military for making a joke about Stalin. He could have been shot, but he survived.

Right now it is understandable why I was against Marxist dictatorship. But let us return to my arrest. After that arrest, to my surprise, I was released within a matter of hours. The reason for the release was not the result of bail reform or some other nicety of constitutional law. Rather, it was for two sinister and hypocritical reasons.

The KGB hoped that I would immediately contact my fellow conspirators, trying to warn them or trying to get help from them, thereby exposing them one by one so the KGB could get us all. As to me, it was their mistake. I didn't expose my friends, and I used their miscalculation.

But that wasn't all. The bureaucratic machine of Soviet jurisprudence handed me another ace, everybody has to be expelled from the party first, and I was still a member of the CPSU, and then turned over to the investigators. This was their second mistake.

I knew that I had at least a day or two before my second arrest, after I was called into the party committee meeting to be expelled. Of course, the second and final arrest could take place at any moment, unexpectedly and without any formalities, but instinct told me that I still had some time. It was a hard time.

In order to escape an encirclement, you have to at least study it. My first foray outside on the day after my first arrest convinced me that it would be impossible to escape even in the daytime. I won't mention the nighttime. I noticed and recognized only two cars following me around town on the first day, and then there were five of them on the third day.

Then, as a real professor, I decided to teach them a few lessons in Pavlovian conditioning. Practice revealed that a KGB man is a two-legged creature who walks erect and—like all mammals—can be trained. I gave them the slip on three different occasions, but allowed them to find me again. Once they were confident that I didn't intend to leave their trap, they relaxed.

The fourth time, I kept on going. In that manner, I would be saving more than just myself. I left my shadows on April 1, 1984, and I won nothing less than my life. It was very hard, but at the time it turned out to be the grandest April fool's joke of my life, because the price of it was the biggest one, it was my own life.

From that day, concealing my whereabouts, I went to the Crimea. I think you know where it is. It is on the Black Sea. There I obtained mountain climbing equipment. Every day, I shopped for my supplies—a backpack, sleeping bag, slicker, sneakers, flask, compass, knife, food concentrates, rope, binoculars, and so on. I did a lot of training in the local mountains.

Finally, after two weeks, I left for the Caucasus mountain range and from there I started my hike to the West. Because of the presence of the KGB training camp and fighting facilities around Batumi City, I had to go east instead of south. I had to go east along the Caucasian range for ten days, and then south to the border for nine days as well.

I cannot even recall exactly how many times I risked my life, it would be too hard to count. It is enough to say that I crossed two mountain ranges and twice swam across icy mountain rivers at night in order to be invisible. Eighteen days out of 19, it was either raining or snowing.

On May 11, 1984, I reached the Turkish border. My biggest shock upon arriving at the border was not the awesome obstacles I faced—mine fields, guard towers, electrified fences. Rather, I was shocked and angry to finally realize that the top of the fences were angled in, back toward the Soviet Union and not out toward the so-called "hostile" West.

It clearly crystallized in my mind that this entire network of fences and guards was not intended to keep invaders out, but rather to keep the Soviet citizens in. We were prisoners in our own society. It was awful to notice it, to see it.

From my hiding place at the border, I was barely able to see three border patrol guards. I assumed that they couldn't see me since the standard military issue binoculars in the Soviet Union is only five-power, and my binoculars were ten-power field glasses.

The problem is who will see another person first. Due to the grace of God, my crossing the three fences was almost uneventual. I am certain I set off some type of alarms, however, since a Soviet helicopter was launched and attacked me while I was on Turkish soil.

I was able to survive the attacks once again due to my previous military training where I had been taught that helicopter crews have a far more difficult time spotting a stationary target than they do one that is moving. Thus, I merely stayed behind clumps of bushes whenever the helicopter made a pass overhead.

I later went to a Turkish control point and turned myself over to the authorities. I had taken 19 days to hike out during which time I had lost 20 kilos of weight, approximately 44 pounds.

I stayed in Turkey for about three weeks. Eventually my passage to Munich was arranged. While there, I had an opportunity to work part-time as a broadcaster for Radio Liberty. I especially wanted to do this so that my family could hear my voice and know I was alive. I remained there for eight months until I obtained a visa to New York.

When I arrived in the United States on January 29, 1985, I was put into contact with the International Rescue Committee, which arranged temporary housing in Harlem and a modest amount of spending money for a few months. I also arranged through them a few low-paying jobs, photographer assistant, for instance, though none that were related to my previous experience.

In May of 1985, I was put into contact with the Jamestown Foundation, which assisted me in moving to Washington and finding temporary work house-setting in the Maryland suburbs. These efforts gave me an opportunity to work on a book describing my defection which I am pleased to announce has been accepted by Alfred Knoph Publishing Company for eventual release in the beginning of 1988. It is entitled "In The KGB Gunsights."

Through the assistance of relatives of Christian Sizemore, the President of Alderson-Broaddus College in Philippi, West Virginia, for the last six months I have been able to work on a second book, which attempts to reduplicate the manuscript I was working on in Odessa in 1984 when the KGB seized it.

In addition, I was able on my own to obtain employment as a Russian language and culture instructor for the Foreign Service Institute. Unfortunately, this is merely on a contractual basis which does not provide any medical or retirement benefit.

Needless to say, I am very grateful to the many Americans who have helped me, and several of them are here in this room. Thank you, my friends. I am also grateful to the country that has accepted me as a refugee. If this country didn't exist, I would have been killed, and this is very important to have such a country as a supporter. I particularly appreciate the actions of the Jamestown Foundation, the International Rescue Committee, and Alderson-Broaddus College.

However, what does surprise me, and what I believe must also concern this subcommittee, is the absence of a clearly designated and adequately funded system for the resettlement of defectors from the Communist world. My comparatively successful adaptation in the United States was conditioned by a chain of fortunate circumstances, but in order to solve the problem of defectors, we cannot rely upon fortunate circumstances. We have to have a system of resettlement.

Moreover, it seems to me that I and many of my friends who fled Communism would be of more useful service to this country if we were given the opportunity to tell the people and to the government what we know about how the Communist world really works.

Therefore, it appears to me that as long as this is true and as long as the Communist Bloc countries continue to conceal their inner-workings from the West on the whole, the defector is an important source for understanding our common opponent, by that I mean the Marxist dictatorship, and learning what his peculiarities are.

I would hope that this subcommittee develops an appropriate and properly funded mechanism that better untilizes the defector resource. At the same time, I hope that the Congress will advance a system that also addresses the unique problems the defector faces in resettling here in the United States.

The question of assistance to Communist Bloc defectors remains grave and must be addressed. In my view, the following must be done in order to resolve the problem:

One, creation, inside the appropriate government agency, of a small department dedicated to working with defectors.

Two, a provision for the appropriation of sufficient funds in the department's budget to cover housing expenses for a fixed period of time, language instruction and career placement of the defector.

Three, a system of low interest loans for education and retraining would be appropriate. In return for this assistance, the defector would be required to do work for the government in either translating or analysis. He could be paid to write about his experiences for the government while he is also developing new skills, et cetera, in this country. The government will be compensated by the benefit of his knowledge. This was a reciprocal exchange, 50/50, so to speak.

Four, one staff member of the department should be a former defector who is thoroughly familiar with adjustment problems and the defector's language. Don't think, please, that I reserve this place for myself. I don't mean by that that I have to work in that place, but such a department has to have a person with similar experience in his or her background, because from the beginning they talk with defectors, the Jamestown Foundation, or other organizations, in unknown languages. As to me I didn't know English at all.

Five, a regulation, granting early citizenship to defectors in those cases where U.S. citizenship is a requirement for employment considerations. Without citizenship, you can count on only low paid jobs.

Six, the last one. One objective of the newly-created department should be the dissemination of information about defectors' activities both inside and outside of the United States.

As a result, our mutual efforts will help defend freedom in the United States, in the Communist Bloc countries and in the world on the whole.

Thank you for your attention.

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you very much, Doctor.

We appreciate both of our witnesses' very educational testimony this morning, which has also been uplifting, and I think very inspirational for all who have heard it. We, in America, as we celebrate the 200th birthday of our Constitution, even with celebrations going on, don't stop long enough to think about what freedom really means.

I think that when Leo Cherne said this morning that the presence of people in our country who have lived under totalitarian systems is a splendid way to remind us what freedom means has been exemplified by the testimony of both of you this morning. We thank you for that.

I have a number of questions. Our time is running short. We thought that we would have two other witnesses this morning, and they are both very important witnesses. We are not going to be able to do that by the time we complete questions with this panel.

We will, of course, invite both of those who had been put on possible alert that we will be having another hearing on the 21st of October on this subject, so this is not a closed book and we would invite them to come back. We particularly wanted to hear about Afghanistan from the lady who spends so much of her time working in that area, and we hope that she will be patient with us and come back, because we will give her a chance at that time to testify.

If necessary, we will put another day on of hearings, because I think that we definitely need to hear about that, as well as our other witness who has, I think, some very interesting testimony about utilization of defectors and how they can be extremely productive for particular endeavors.

Doctor, I would like to ask just one or two questions, based on your testimony, that occurred to me while you were testifying. Is it a standard practice in the Soviet Union to expel someone from the Communist Party before they are actually prosecuted?

Dr. USHAKOV. Right, this is a standard practice, because no Communist can be a criminal, so to speak, and before they will put you in the concentration camp, they have to expel you from the party, and this is what happened to me.

Senator NUNN. So that they can say that Communists are never criminals?

Dr. USHAKOV. Yes. This is a special invention of the CPSU to avoid the statistics for themselves.

Senator NUNN. Senator Cohen, we ought to consider that for the Democratic and Republican Parties.

Senator COHEN. I have been expelled on several occasions. [Laughter.]

Senator NUNN. You mentioned the books and magazine articles. You said that you had written several books and several magazine articles. I am curious as to whether you were able to disseminate those before you were arrested, or whether all of them were confiscated.

Dr. USHAKOV. This is why I was arrested.

Senator NUNN. Had you disseminated them? Had people had a chance to get copies?

Dr. USHAKOV. Just only among my friends, but among my friends was an acquaintance of mine who was the informer to the KGB, and this is how it took place.

Senator NUNN. This was a secret or clandestine press that you were printing these on?

Dr. USHAKOV. Right.

Senator NUNN. You were able to get some of them out into society, though, or do you think that the KGB seized all of them?

Dr. USHAKOV. Yes, you are right.

Ms. COSTA. Senator, a clandestine press in the Soviet Union is a typewriter that takes a maximum of six carbon copies. There is nothing else available. There are no Xerox machines. There are no presses. They are government-owned.

Senator NUNN. I am told that the personal computers that exist with printers are kept under lock and key. Is that correct?

Ms. COSTA. Xerox machines are kept under lock and key.

Senator NUNN. Xerox machines are kept under lock and key?

Ms. COSTA. Yes. As for the typewriters, font samples are taken when you buy them and kept for identification purposes.

Dr. USHAKOV. Xerox machines are not available to make a single copy.

Senator NUNN. That is even for members of the Communist Party?

Dr. USHAKOV. Even the members of the Communist Party.

Senator COHEN. Do you have any need for shredders? [Laughter.]

Senator NUNN. It occurs to me that that kind of tight control over the computers and printers from the point of view of state security or secrecy or totalitarian control, whatever the motives, is totally incompatible with the Soviet Union's desire to be part of the modern world economy.

Is that what they are coming to now, trying to figure out how to rationalize that incompatibility, because I don't see how any country can compete economically when the citizens cannot really have a free flow of information, a free use of computers in this age. It seems to me that their system of security is completely incompatible with the information age. Do you agree or disagree with that, both of you?

Dr. USHAKOV. You are absolutely correct. The prohibition of the dissemination of information is the breaking of the Soviet economy.

Ms. COSTA. As a computer specialist, I can tell you that it can be accomplished. They do have industrial computers that run the airlines and major industrial enterprises. Quite obviously the military have quite a few computers purloined from the Silicon Valley and replicated there. So they do have computers.

They don't have to introduce personal computers, or what they introduce is an outdated version of Apple IIc that you can use, but you don't necessarily must have a printer. Besides, in the Soviet Union, there are many ways to control the printer output, and one is to take ribbons off the market. You can have a printer, but there is nothing to print with. It is very easily done.

Senator NUNN. I can see how they could make that work in a military organization, and perhaps in heavy industry, where things are heavily centralized, but I just think that the information age has moved us into a whole new dimension of decentralization in the utilization of computers and the exchange of information. I just don't see how they are going to be able to make that transition except in the industries that lend themselves to centralization.

Ms. COSTA. Senator, the whole country is centralized.

Senator NUNN. I realize that, but I am saying that it is incompatible with a prosperous economy in the information age.

Ms. COSTA. That is why they are so poor.

Senator NUNN. That is the point that I was making. It seems to me, no matter what they try to do with their economy, they are not going to be able to become a prosperous thriving country in this age that we are in now without a considerable dose of freedom of some sort, maybe totally different from what we have here, but a much less rigid system. I just don't think there is any way they can span the gap between economic needs and that totalitarian rigidity.

Perhaps, Mr. Ushakov, you would like to explain further? I am just asking you about the Soviet Union's economics, and whether you believe the totalitarian system itself is incompatible with economic prosperity.

Dr. USHAKOV. For instance, the hermetically sealed borders, this is a barrier for the contacts between people in the field of economy. The average Soviet plant or factory cannot establish contacts with a similar plant or factory in the West or in the Eastern European countries immediately, without mediators. The mediators are ministers and so on, this is a bureaucracy. This practice is the real breaking for the developing of the Soviet economy.

Senator NUNN. Doctor, what about your family? Have you been able to be in touch with your family since you had to leave them?

Dr. USHAKOV. The usual practice is that the members of a defector's family are hostages in the Soviet Union. My mother died two-and-a-half years ago, she had a heart attack, they think because of questioning by the KGB. My wife, who still lives in the USSR, has not been given appropriate medical treatment.

She has been denied a visa in spite of my official invitation and her illness. This is in violation of the Helsinki Accords, as well as Soviet law. Incidentally, she has breast cancer, and she is only 33 years old. She is only 33.

I hope that the Senate will help me and others with this problem, since it is common to all defectors, not only to me.

Senator NUNN. I have written a letter, and I know that Senator Cohen will join me in sending that to General Secretary Gorbachev about your wife. I don't know what results it may produce, but we will do everything we can to put the case before him and ask for his attention.

I understand that under both Soviet law and international law, without any doubts, her rights are being violated even under Soviet law. Is that correct?

Ms. COSTA. No.

Dr. USHAKOV. It is against even the Soviet law because they signed the Helsinki Accords.

Senator NUNN. Ms. Costa, could you tell us a little bit more about your motives for coming to this country and leaving your country?

Ms. COSTA. Yes, but first I would like to comment slightly. The Soviet law does say that their internal law supersedes international law. The Soviet Union states that their internal regulations supersede international law.

Senator NUNN. I think that what Dr. Ushakov is saying is that when they signed the Helsinki Accords, they took on a different set of obligations internally.

Ms. COSTA. Yes, but the new law on emigration states clearly that if the invitation comes from the person who is abroad in violation of the Soviet emigration laws, permission will not be granted. I am trying to get my mother out, and there is absolutely no way. That law is a stone wall.

Dr. USHAKOV. Ms. Costa, I want to correct you. This is not a law, this is the rule inside of the local law. But the international law is more hard than the local one. It is stronger, so the Helsinki Accords are stronger than the rule inside of the usual local, the Soviet law. You have to think about it.

Ms. COSTA. Theoretically, yes. In practice, they do apply that law that was passed on January 1, 1987, and there is that Article 25(e) that absolutely prevents any families of defectors from leaving. As a matter of fact, what the Soviets are doing right now is playing with the statistics just the same way as they played with the statistics in Alex's case.

You need a permission to submit papers for emigration, and if that permission is not granted by a special officer, you cannot even submit the papers, and that is how they keep the number of Refuseniks down. My mother never got over even that stage. They just quoted the law and said: Don't bother. She is not officially counted as a Refusenik, because she never even submitted the paperwork. It is very simple.

My motives, it is almost next to impossible, there were so many, and so complicated. There is a whole 300-page book that basically tells about motives. I guess, I went through several stages of self-realization, getting acquainted with this country and understanding how this country works, and also arriving at the point where I realized that the Soviet system doesn't work and can't work because it is wrong in its own foundation.

Whatever I was trying to do, and I was trying to be a very good citizen, and I was trying to do my best for my country, it was an absolute waste of effort. As a result you feel that you have wasted half of your life. I was over here at that time, and I also realized that there was another way of living, an honest way, where you don't have to say one thing and think another, where you don't have to teach your children to do that. You can contribute something to the society that wants your contribution.

This is why I am going back to the problem of employment for defectors, because it is such an important issue, because in the Soviet Union, we are just little pegs in a huge machinery. There the state comes first, and in this country, the individual matters. Because we came to this country to feel ourselves as individuals who matter, it is so critically important for us to maintain that feeling of self-respect and self-worth.

I guess that this was the main reason that I stayed here, because I felt that I was nothing there, and I had certain abilities and certain capacities that I wanted to use not just for myself, but for the country, and that country there did not need me. This country does, at least, I have not been disappointed by this country. I do feel that it needs me. It has welcomed me warmly and it has given me an opportunity to be myself, and I am grateful for that.

Senator NUNN. Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to echo the remarks of Senator Nunn with regard to what he said to both Dr. Ushakov and to you, Ms. Costa, of your testimony.

First, I might say that John Hausman may have to do a new ad for the both of you. You both have done it the old-fashioned way, and you really earned it. Perhaps, these hearings, with C-Span—and I wish that the other networks could have been here to listen to the messages that you have given all of us—will help you advertise.

I would say, Ms. Costa, I am terribly impressed with your testimony, and we have a great deal to learn from you. I think that I might offer you something from us, and that is, you are right, you cannot legislate morality, we all know that, but laws do make a difference. ERA is important, for example, to me because it makes a statement about what our goals ought to be.

When we outlawed the unequal treatment of blacks, it made a big difference in our society. The force of law does change at least external opportunities, if not the internal workings of the heart. By providing the rule of law and giving people or persons, individuals, the same opportunity, perhaps over a longer period of time, we will change ultimately the bias or the bigotry or the prejudice toward given groups.

So I think that the law does serve a very positive function. It doesn't legislate morality, but it helps, I think, to shape society for the better. I think that the effort on the ERA, while not successful thus far, has made a big difference in the way in which we have provided for opportunities for women. The laws pertaining to civil rights have made a lot of difference in the lives of black people in this counrty, and I think, ultimately, have changed the attitudes of the American people toward minorities for the better. This is to be kept in mind, I think, as we go along.

I asked a rhetorical question of our first witness, Leo Cherne, who is still sitting in the back of the hearing room. I said, "What difference does it make?" Why should we give you special attention as opposed to those from Latin America or any impoverished country?"

It was rhetorical, but your testimony today answered it, because it does serve a very special purpose. We have to attribute all of our quotes in the life in which we live, and one of the quotes that has remained in my mind by one of my favorite authors—you two may become my favorite authors—Alistair Cooke wrote a book called "America," and in one of his chapters he compared us, as most writers do, to Rome.

He talked about how we were in danger of falling victim to the same kind of fate as Rome did, because of the internal decay, which you identified in your home country, also occurs here. He said, in America, "I see the most persistent idealism and the blandest of cynicism, and the race is on between its vitality and its decadence."

It is true of our country. The race is on between its vitality and its decadence, and I think the valuable contribution you make is that you constantly reignite the idealism as opposed to the decadence. That is why we have open borders, and that is why we invite people in, especially those from countries who are oppressed by totalitarianism. We know that if you have a free and open stream, you have life, and you have regeneration. If you have a closed point, you have death and decay. And that applies to not only ponds and rivers, but to societies as well.

What you have sacrificed to get here, and the message you bring, helps to shake us from our lethargy or our sloth or our indifference—and if not shake us, then replace us. So we welcome you in that particular spirit.

A final point, I guess, Ms. Costa, I wanted to ask you. You were shaking your head as Senator Nunn was asking a question of Dr. Ushakov about "don't the Soviets want to move into the 21st Century of information," and you were shaking your head. I think that what Senator Nunn was saying, he was using it in terms of a metaphor.

Doctor, you talked about a sort of barbed-wire mentality that border represented to you. Senator Nunn was asking, does the Soviet leadership today still have a barbed-wire mentality, will they choose control over the prospect of economic prosperity.

At that particular time, Ms. Costa, you were shaking your head, they really don't want this. The question I would ask you is, do they prefer control or prosperty?

Ms. COSTA. I firmly believe that without unleashing some kind of free enterprise the economy cannot become prosperous. They can shore it up, they can salvage it, it will creak along for generations. It is not about to collapse. It has been on the verge of collapse for a long time, but it is not about to collapse. It will go along, but it will not reach the true prosperity—and I firmly believe that—without unleashing the private initiative of the people.

So far, with all those half measures that have been undertaken, private initiative is still a rather undesirable quality. It is still a centralized economy with central party control. Without abolition of that—and don't see how Mr. Gorbachev can do that, with all due respect to him in what he is trying to do—and I certainly wish him the best, because, being a Russian, anything that can make life better there, I can only welcome—but there is only so far he can go.

If I may, Senator Cohen, comment on your diatribe about the law.

Senator COHEN. You mean dialogue.

Ms. COSTA. No, I mean diatribe. My English may not be that good but I know the difference. This was a perfect example of where the difference in mentalities comes it. Coming from the closed society, the Soviet Union, it is still difficult for me to understand that the law that is written on paper means anything at all.

The Soviet constitution is probably the most progressive one in the world. It grants you all kinds of freedoms: freedom of assembly, freedom of speech. Women have been declared equal to men in the Soviet Union 70 years ago. I came here and I looked at the practice, at the reality, and I can see that in 10 years women made more progress in this country than in 70 years in the Soviet Union.

I don't think in terms of legislation, I see the practical results. That is a very good example of why we still have to try to understand each other and each others' mentality and that is where defectors can make a contribution. My reaction is completely different from yours, because we grew up in a different culture, and that cannot be learned from books. That is why even the best American scholars sometimes have trouble understanding Soviet humor and Soviet reactions.

Senator COHEN. We can continue a dialogue or a diatribe about the virtues of law and the difference between a society in which there is law and justice and a society in which there is just law, but that is not our purpose here today.

I don't know whether any representative of the Soviet intelligence community is here in the audience today, I hope that someone from the CIA is here to listen to your testimony. I think it is terribly important, and I would hope that Senator Nunn, myself, and others, the staff who are here today, might find ways in which we can spread your message and advertise your talent, because I think that is something that we are sorely in need of and we should put your expertise to work in a very productive way.

My final point, I am going to contact the networks to make sure that the next time that either Mr. Vitaly Churkin or Mr. Posner go on one of our major shows, that they call one of you to appear in opposition.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ms. COSTA. They have done so. He always refuses.

Senator NUNN. You have been invited and he actually has refused?

Ms. COSTA. Yes. ABC tried to put Mr. Shevchenko against him on Nightline, and a station in San Francisco tried to make me a spokesman for the audience on their show, but the ethics of broadcasting is that he has to be notified in advance, and he never agrees to appear against any of us.

Senator NUNN. Thank you both for your appearances, your suggestions, your enlightenment of the subcommittee. We will be having one more hearing, maybe two more, on this subject and then we will be working on a series of recommendations to our own government and to our own private sector, although our private sector, as you have already observed, they make their own decisions. We don't tell them what to do. We may make some recommendations in that regard, and we will hopefully be able to keep in touch with both of you so that we could get the continuing thoughts and ideas you may have.

Ms. COSTA. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you so much.

[Whereupon, at 12.33 p.m., the subcommittee recessed to reconvene Wednesday, October 21, 1987.]

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 21, 1987

U.S. Senate,
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations,
Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to recess, at 9:35 a.m., in room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, under authority of S. Res. 80, Section 13, dated January 28, 1987, Hon. Sam Nunn, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.

Members of the subcommittee present: Senator Sam Nunn, Democrat, Georgia; Senator Jim Sasser, Democrat, Tennessee; and Senator William Cohen, Republican, Maine.

Members of the professional staff present: Eleanore J. Hill, Chief Counsel and Staff Director; Mary D. Robertson, Chief Clerk; John F. Sopko, Deputy Chief Counsel; Cynthia Comstock, Staff Assistant; Mary K. Vinson, Staff Investigator for the Minority; Alan Edelman, Counsel; Kathleen A. Dias, Executive Assistant to the Chief Counsel; David B. Buckley, Investigator; David Munson, Investigator; Jim Dykstra, Intelligence Committee; Marianne McGettigan (Senator Rudman); Natalie Bocock (Senator Cohen); Evelyn Boyd (Senator Sasser); and Jill Abelson (Senator Chiles).

[Senator present at convening of hearing: Senator Nunn.]

Senator Nunn. Good morning.

Before we begin with the witnesses I have a statement for Senator Chiles that he would like entered into the record.

[Senator Chiles' statement follows:]

Opening Statement of Senator Chiles

Mr. Chairman, I am glad to be here today as the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations continues hearings on the handling of Soviet and Communist bloc defectors. I commend the subcommittee for the work it has done, and for your leadership on this issue.

There is no question that defectors from the Soviet Union and Communist bloc countries serve as unique and invaluable sources of information. Through first-hand knowledge and insight, defectors contribute to our understanding of the military, political, economic, cultural and national security workings of the Soviet bloc. They provide information that our best intelligence efforts simply cannot provide, given the closed nature of Communist bloc societies.

These hearings have stressed, however, that the United States has not "tapped" defectors for the resources they can provide. In fact, there is no agency of the Federal Government which is uniquely charged with the complete handling, questioning, and resettling of Communist bloc defectors. I was surprised to note in the subcommittee's staff report that some defectors spend as many as ten years in the West without having once been questioned fully about their previous experiences under Communist regimes. I was disturbed to learn about the specific case of a high-ranking economist who spent five years selling ice cream before his knowledge and expertise were discovered and put to use. I think this is a tremendous waste. It is clear that our system of handling these defectors must be improved.

I believe that these hearings serve a unique purpose, in that they will help the Senate to better understand the potential that defectors hold for us in terms of national security. I regret that I will not be able to hear all of today's testimony, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to signal my support. Again, I commend you and the subcommittee staff for the excellent work you have done so far.

Senator **Nunn**. This morning, we open the third day of hearings with a panel representing the Jamestown Foundation, a private, non-profit organization whose goal is to assist the high-level defector in coming to our country and adjusting.

Mr. William Geimer is the President of Jamestown Foundation, which was founded in 1984. Mr. Geimer is an attorney who represented Mr. Shevchenko, a Soviet diplomat at the United Nations, when he defected to the United States in 1975.

Mr. Geimer is accompanied by General James A. Williams, a former Director of Defense Intelligence Agency, and Mr. Donald Jameson, a former CIA official. Both General Williams and Mr. Jameson bring with them considerable knowledge about the intelligence factors and the benefits we gain from these and other categories of defectors. Mr. Jameson also has years of serving as a volunteer in helping defectors from the Communist Bloc.

Mr. Geimer has a brief statement on behalf of all three members of the panel. I understand that Mr. Jameson and General Williams will not make any statements, but are available for questions.

We are very grateful to you for the considerable amount of time and effort you spend, unremunerated in this case, on behalf of this important area to our country.

Mr. Geimer, Mr. Jameson, and General Williams, we thank you not only for your present work, but for your services to the country over a number of years, and for your leadership in this important endeavor. We look forward to your statement.

I have to swear all of you in as we do with all of our witnesses according to the rules of our subcommittee. I can't change the rule and make an exemption so if you would all stand and take the oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. **Geimer**. I do.

Mr. **Jameson**. I do.

General **Williams**. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM W. GEIMER, PRESIDENT, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, ACCOMPANIED BY DONALD F.B. JAMESON, VICE PRESIDENT, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION, AND LT. GEN. JAMES A. WILLIAMS (RET.), VICE PRESIDENT, JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

Mr. **Geimer**. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you and discuss the situation of defectors to the United States.

As has been said, I'm President of the Jamestown Foundation, a privately supported organization which works with high level defectors from communist countries. The gentlemen seated with me are both vice presidents of the foundation on a part time basis.

Donald Jameson retired from a distinguished career at the CIA, where be became an expert on the subject of defectors and defection. Lt. Gen. James Williams retired recently as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, a position in which he had direct experience with the value of the defector to military intelligence.

I think that it might be useful at the outset to define a few terms. At Jamestown, when we use the word "defector," we mean an individual who has illegally removed himself or herself from jurisdiction of a Communist government. We do not as a rule work with emigres who have left their former countries legally.

When we use the term "high level," we mean someone whose position and experience in his former country was such that he is qualified to make a sustained contribution to Western understanding of the East.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Geimer, unfortunately, we have a vote up there. I would like to hear your testimony, and we don't have anybody else here. This is a strange time to take a break, but we are going to have to take about a five-minute break. I will run and vote, and come back as soon as possible. I think that it will be better than going all the way through it. I will be back in about five minutes.

[Recess.]

Senator NUNN. Mr. Geimer, why don't you proceed right where you left off.

Mr. GEIMER. I was explaining that Jamestown represents high level defectors. I was saying that when we say high level, we mean someone whose position and experience in his former country was such that he is qualified to make a sustained contribution to Western understanding of the East. Admittedly, applying this label entails a certain amount of subjectivity.

Within the category of "defector," we distinguish four groups. First, there are the people with relatively little education and who occupied relatively low positions in their former country. I refer here to seamen who jump ship, and soldiers who defect in Afghanistan, for example. Jamestown does not work with people of this type because they have little of interest to say beyond the initial press conference.

Second, there are the people from ordinary occupations who have transferable skills. I refer here to hockey players, physicians, engineers, ballerinas, and so forth. Jamestown does not work with people in this cateogry. For the most part these individuals simply want to practice their profession in freedom. They have relatively little trouble adjusting to life in the West, and little interest in participating in the public dialogue on East-West issues.

Third are the intelligence officers. Usually people in this category live quiet lives in the United States. They are given new identities, learn new skills, and live anonymously. This group is believed to be at risk of reprisal from their former governments and, as a result, are not given to public activity.

In most cases, the public and Jamestown would not even know of the existence of an intelligence officer who has defected. There are a few exceptions, however, and Jamestown does work with some former intelligence officers who are willing to write books and to lecture.

The fourth category consists of people who were diplomats, or occupied other high positions in government or in the academic world. These are the people with whom Jamestown works, because we believe it important that the experience and insights of such people be shared as widely as possible in the West. These are the people from whom we can learn the nature and purposes of our adversaries in the East.

Among those whom Jamestown assists, as I mentioned above, are a few former intelligence officers. These are supported by the Federal government under what is commonly referred to as Public Law 110. This law requires the government to support for life individuals who defect and who bring with them important intelligence. However, the vast majority of the people we work with receive no financial assistance. They work for a living just like anyone else.

If an individual is newly defected and requires resettlement assistance, Jamestown will help him find housing, employment, language training, driver's license, or whatever is needed. If an individual is well settled here, Jamestown will provide whatever services are necessary to enable the defector to convey his message to policy-makers and the public.

We may provide editing and translation services for those who are writing articles and books. We may provide training in public speaking for those who have joined Jamestown's speakers bureau. The one thing that we don't provide, because we don't have enough of it, is money.

Most of the people Jamestown works with could and should work full time speaking, writing, and teaching in the field of international relations. They are, after all, a unique and scarce national resource. However, this resource is not being fully used. Let me cite some examples.

A former Soviet scientist works for the U.S. Government in a capacity unrelated to his education or experience. He should be a full-fledged member of the American academic community, but there are no funds to support his research or to enable him to acquire a degree from an American university.

A former Soviet military officer and university professor makes his living teaching Russian. In our opinion, he should be studying for a U.S. degree so that eventually he can teach in a university here.

A former Soviet diplomat is studying for a graduate degree here, but his studies suffer because he must work nights repairing refrigeration equipment in order to support himself.

A former Cuban diplomat, with a wealth of experience, has just lost his job as an editor because the company he worked for has collapsed. His future is uncertain.

A former ambassador from Ethiopia, a highly educated and cultivated man, is unemployed. For a while he earned a living doing menial work, but found it beyond his physical capacity.

A former high level diplomat from Eastern Europe is nearing the end of a temporary assignment. He would like to obtain a U.S. graduate degree and pursue a career in teaching, but this is impossible because he needs to support his family.

These are only six of what could be a list of thirty. Numerous high level defectors from Communist countries are, out of economic necessity, wasting their education and experience. Many who could be publicly active in the national interest are on the sidelines. The general public, and policy-makers, in both the legislative and executive branches, are deprived of information and insight which would improve our national capacity to deal with the realities of the world.

We, at Jamestown, think that a fund should be endowed which would finance high level defectors in the acquisition of the education and credentials necessary to establish themselves as full members of the American academic and policy-influencing sector. Investment in these people, who have proven themselves in their former countries to be high achievers, should pay dividends in the form of increased understanding of the issues involved in East-West relations.

Ideally, such a fund, which would give selected defectors five years of research and study in American institutions, would be raised in the private sector. The flexibility and relative efficiency of the private sector is to be preferred to a government program. Our experience, however, indicates that raising sufficient money to establish such a fund privately will be difficult. We, therefore, suggest that the Congress consider funding such a program.

Another problem shared by the Jamestown clientele is that of citizenship. Current Federal law provides that a defector or any newcomer, for that matter, wait a period of five years before he becomes eligible for citizenship. If the defector had been a member of the Communist Party, the law adds an additional five years for a total of ten.

We think that the penalty for party membership makes no sense, and believe that it should be repealed. It is precisely the party members who we should encourage to defect. Deterring them by penalizing them is contrary to our national interest in having as many as possible highly placed officials of Communist governments change sides.

In fact, we think that the Congress should consider reducing the waiting from ten years to three years for certain highly desirable individuals. Our national interest would be better served if easy and early citizenship were held out as an incentive to defect.

Our final suggestion relates to the government's handling of defectors. Nearly all defectors, even those whom the government will not support under Public Law 110, have extensive contact with the government immediately after their defection. Much has been said and written about the quality of the treatment accorded to them, virtually all of it negative. We, at Jamestown, have in the past joined in that criticism.

However, I am pleased to be able to report to you today that the CIA seems to have resolved the problems which affected its performance in the past. It has been quite some time since we have heard the type of horror story which used to be commonplace. We are inclined to give the credit for this to CIA Deputy Director Bob Gates, who has a sincere interest in the welfare of defectors. The improvement in the CIA's handling of defectors coincided with his assumption of his present office.

[At this point, Senator Cohen entered the hearing room.]

Mr. GEIMER. We would like to suggest, nonetheless, that two steps be taken which would contribute significantly——

Senator NUNN. You may want to repeat that for Senator Cohen. Since he is Ranking Republican on the Intelligence Committee, I am sure that he would like to hear that.

Mr. GEIMER. We would like to suggest, nonetheless, that two steps be taken which would contribute significantly to the well-being of defectors who are, at least temporarily, in the hands of the government.

First, we suggest that very early in the debriefing process, the defector be told that there are organizations, such as the Jamestown Foundation, whose function it is to assist defectors to build new lives in this country. Ideally, the government should arrange a meeting between the defector and foundation personnel for the purpose of determining whether the defector's plans for his future are of the type which Jamestown might foster.

Second, we think that something in the nature of a defector's bill of rights should be established. The government should be required to explain to the defector the nature of his present and future relationship to the government. The defector should know exactly what he can and cannot expect the government to do for him, and he should be given and informed about a right to appeal decisions made about his life with which he disagrees.

Third, we think that some consideration should be given to either broadening the language of Public Law 110, or to seeing to it that the existing language is interpreted more liberally. Defectors are now given support by the government if "it is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission." As this language is interpreted, permanent assistance is confined virtually to intelligence officers. We submit that others from high places should also be given this safety net, and should be relieved from the fear of surviving in our capitalist economy. We submit that encouraging and facilitating defections of the highly placed *is* in the interest of national security, and *does* further the national intelligence mission.

The fact that we are suggesting improvements should not obscure the fundamental fact that for those thinking about choosing a life of freedom there has never been a better time for implementing decision. The government is now handling these situations about as well as a government can. Jamestown is ready and willing to help out in certain cases. Especially if the foregoing suggestions are adopted, I think we can look forward to learning a great deal from many who forsake totalitarianism and join the struggle on behalf of freedom and democracy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Jameson, or General Williams, do you have anything that you want to say before we get into questions?

General WILLIAMS. No, sir, not at this point.

Mr. JAMESON. I don't think so.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Geimer, thank you very much.

I assume that it is correct to say that the Jamestown Foundation was founded because you perceived a void in this area in terms of what government was providing to these defectors. Is that a fair assessment?

Mr. GEIMER. That is right. I learned, through years of working with Arkady Shevchenko how difficult it is to adjust to life in this country and to become productive. We assumed, and we certainly were proven correct, that there are a lot of other people who might need the kind of help which I gave him. That is the void that we are filling now.

Senator NUNN. What year was your foundation established?

Mr. GEIMER. In 1984. It was at the end of 1983, but we really opened our doors at the beginning of 1984.

Senator NUNN. What is your annual budget now?

Mr. GEIMER. This year it will be probably between $500,000 and $600,000. When we started, it was less than $100,000, so we have more than tripled in the past four years.

Senator NUNN. How many paid employees do you have?

Mr. GEIMER. We have six.

Senator NUNN. Are they all full time?

Mr. GEIMER. They are all full time. That understates it a bit, because there is a seventh who is full time, and now we have at least one volunteer in the office on a full time basis, plus we have a lot of outside volunteers, people who pitch in and provide housing or other kinds of help for defectors. Then we have a wonderful bunch of student interns. There are quite a large number of people involved. It is a very cost effective operation.

Senator NUNN. What kind of payroll would you have? Out of $500,000 or $600,000, how much of it would be consumed in payroll approximately?

Mr. GEIMER. Maybe half, I would say. I am not sure.

Senator NUNN. What would the other half mainly be used for?

Mr. GEIMER. It would be rent, and the rest of what goes into it.

Senator NUNN. Your purpose is to assist high level defectors. How do you define that? Is that a pretty subjective judgment?

Mr. GEIMER. It is a subjective judgment. We have to just take one case at a time. The question we ask ourselves is: Can this individual, over a period of time, contribute something unique and important to our understanding.

The types of individuals that we work with vary considerably, but in each case we have said: This person has something important to say that we ought to hear and have others as widely as possible.

Senator NUNN. So you don't pretend to be able to handle or work with all defectors?

Mr. GEIMER. No. We are swamped as it is.

Senator NUNN. Is there a void for the other defectors, people who might not fit your category?

Mr. GEIMER. I think so, because we get appeals constantly from people who don't meet our criteria, let's say, for example, physicians. We have been contacted by former Soviet physicians who have problems getting themselves placed here, and so forth. In a case like that, we try to refer people out to a network of friends that we have nationally. In the case of physicians, it is a doctor named Peter Wolkonsky in Chicago, he takes them on and he helps them, but they don't officially become Jamestown clients.

Senator NUNN. You work with a variety of academic institutions. How have you been received in your work, and how have the defectors themselves been received by these academic institutions in general?

Mr. GEIMER. Not very well. Almost all of the people that we work with are qualified to work in academic institutions. I think that at the present time only one of, let's say, 30, and his situation is going to change soon. We have knocked on a lot of academic doors and really haven't opened a single one.

There are many reasons for that. One is that there are legitimate budgetary constraints in a number of places. But there is also a bias. There is a feeling that a defector is not an objective seeker of the truth. He is vengeful. He wants to strike back at his former masters, therefore, what he says is unreliable from an academic standpoint.

I think there is also a feeling in some individuals, the resident Sovietologists whose knowledge of the Soviet Union is based on a few trips there and a lot of books, and they are not that anxious to see someone come on the faculty whose views are rooted in his own experiences.

In some institutions, we have been told straight out, "We can't have these people here because we don't want to jeopardize our relations with Eastern governments, and scholars in Eastern Europe." Major foundations and other institutions have told me that.

Senator NUNN. Is there anything that can be done about that? I am not speaking governmentally, because I don't think that the government should dictate in this area, but is there anything that can be done that you can think of?

Mr. GEIMER. At one point, and you may have read it, we proposed creating an academic institution for this very purpose, this narrow purpose. At a meeting of my advisory committee, however, Dr. Brzezinski shot the idea down. So we concluded that that wasn't, for a number of reasons some of which relate to physical security, a very good idea.

We have proposed, as a substitute, that a fund be endowed which would provide fellowships, scholarships, to support the academic activities of our people, so that one individual might be funded to do some research at one university or institution, and we might fund a Chair at another institution, something flexible along those lines is what we think is needed.

Senator NUNN. Do you have any particular recommendation to make about defectors who would meet your category of high level, but who are not intelligence officers, former intelligence officers?

Mr. GEIMER. That is essentially who I have been talking about all along, high level people who are not intelligence officers. The intelligence officers are supported by the government.

Senator NUNN. That is under Public Law 110?

Mr. GEIMER. That is under 110, yes. They don't have a financial problem. But most of the rest have severe financial insecurities.

Senator NUNN. If you had twice as much budget, what would you do with it?

Mr. GEIMER. I would get more staff so that we didn't have to work such long hours.

Senator COHEN. It wouldn't necessarily mean that you would work less hours.

Mr. GEIMER. That is a good point.

What we would do, we would fund the academic activities. We would say: Stop your job as a shoe salesman, and get in the library and produce that book that you have in you. That is what we would do if we had more money, it would be to make these people productive from an intellectual standpoint.

Senator NUNN. Are you going to be able to continue your budget at the present level? Are you going to be able to raise $500,000 or $600,000 a year from the private sector?

Mr. GEIMER. I think so. As I mentioned earlier, it has been growing. We started below $200,000 and we are three times that level now. I would hope that it would continue to grow. I would hope that it would start to grow at a rate approaching the growth in the workload.

Senator NUNN. How much of your personal time do you put into this?

Mr. GEIMER. About 70 to 80 hours a week.

Senator NUNN. Are you full time now?

Mr. GEIMER. It is full time by my definition.

Senator NUNN. Do you practice law also?

Mr. GEIMER. I did for the first two months. I thought I could do both, and it was a silly idea. I have been more than full time for four years.

Senator NUNN. So you are not maintaining any law practice now?

Mr. GEIMER. No.

Senator NUNN. How important is the citizenship issue to the defectors? I know you had a recommendation on that subject.

Mr. GEIMER. It is more important than I realized for a long time. You get a sense, after a while, talking to these folks that it is extremely important to them. They don't feel that they are really at home here until they become citizens. It is just hugely important to them. I really think that it is foolish that we penalize party membership and make these people wait ten years. It is a real struggle.

On this, I should mention that there is one thing, I think, the government ought to do. Somebody ought to get the INS to put a higher priority than they do on these cases. We have people just stacked at the bottom of somebody's pile somewhere, waiting years to get green cards, being unable really to travel. It is not a fast moving agency, it needs a prod.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Jameson, the CIA has been criticized about its handling of defector resettlement cases. Do you think that there has been any change in this over a period of time; do you see any improvement?

Mr. JAMESON. I am not very closely familiar with the cases in the last three or four years, although I do gather that in some of them there has been an improvement. Some of my colleagues in former years, as a matter of fact, are apparently being called from retirement and are handling them. Perhaps there are other able handlers. I would hope that the Yurchenko case taught several people out there a lesson about how things really ought to be done.

But, I think, as Bill said, there are grounds for optimism as far as what is happening right now.

Senator **Nunn**. You believe that there is a good number of former CIA agents and other intelligence types that worked in this area, who are retired, who would want to come into it as you have? You are doing volunteer work; is that right?

Mr. **Jameson**. That is correct.

Senator **Nunn**. Do you get paid?

Mr. **Jameson**. Not now. I will become a member of the staff, but at present I do it on a voluntary basis.

Senator **Nunn**. Are there other people like you that would like to be helpful part-time?

Mr. **Jameson**. I think there are, not necessarily in the Washington area, but there are certainly and some who do.

General **Williams**. Senator, may I make a point?

Senator **Nunn**. Yes, sir, General.

General **Williams**. We run a risk, however, if we populate the assistance effort with former intelligence officers. I came into the effort because I believed in what the foundation was doing but, nevertheless, I sense some reluctance to get involved with people such as Mr. Jameson and myself, because it sort of looks like it is an intelligence operation, and that is not our intention. We might go too far if our colleagues were to join us in a tidal wave.

Senator **Nunn**. It is too many, too big a percentage.

Mr. **Jameson**. That is a good point.

Senator **Nunn**. I understand that Jamestown Foundation believes that there are inherent flaws in the philosophy of the United States Government as far as our approach as a government to defection. Do any of you want to comment on that?

Mr. **Geimer**. Our opinion is that more people ought to be helped by the Federal government than presently are, and that could be done either by broadening the definition of who is covered by Public Law 110, or else liberalizing its interpretation for people who provide information.

There are people who are debriefed for months and months by the government, and then they are turned loose. The government says: They are not intelligence defectors. Then I ask, what is it that they were providing for all those months, if not intelligence? I think there needs to be a broadening of that.

Senator **Nunn**. Intelligence doesn't necessarily mean classified information. Intelligence about a totalitarian country goes far beyond that, does it not?

Mr. **Geimer**. Yes, it does.

General **Williams**. One of the things we found, which has existed for a long time, regardless of whether the individual concerned is a defector or a legal emigre, once they have been talked to by the intelligence community, they tend to be swallowed up by our society, and there is no real good means for us to follow up with other questions.

I have had Jamestown clients tell me that the initial contact was in an environment that did not lend itself to them understanding the context of the questions. A year or so later, when they have been in our society, maybe studied English a little bit, in some cases attended academic institutions, they are more than willing to be reinterviewed because they have so much more to tell us.

There is no mechanism, and in most cases, because we have no controls on movement, we don't even know where these people are. They don't come forward because they don't know where to go, and there is a lot of information that slips between the cracks.

Senator NUNN. What is the main value that you, General Williams and Mr. Jameson, see in defectors? What is their value to American society?

Mr. JAMESON. I think over and above the specific intelligence, with a capital "I," you might say, that they contribute, there is the question of understanding, helping us interpret what is going on in the societies from which they come.

I think that it is particularly important, perhaps, now when we are facing the Soviet Union with a new and innovative leadership that has launched many significant initiatives, and is rather changing, perhaps fundamentally, the way in which the Soviet Union goes about its business.

Obviously, what is going to happen is of critical importance to our government in this change, and one of the types of sources that is particularly important are those who have lived within these societies that can look at them from that point of view.

Their information is certainly not inherently biased by their own frustrations or experience over there. Among other things, it is demonstrated because, among themselves, they do not agree as to the significance of what is happening. But to have the access to their insight and their understanding and their knowledge on analyzing and interpreting what is happening, I think, may be of special importance now and in the immediate future.

Senator NUNN. General, would you like to add to that?

General WILLIAMS. Yes, I would, Senator.

I think that it is also important—I agree with what Mr. Jameson said, however, there is more to it. The United States, by its nature, is a very open society. We almost tend to accept, in our naivety, people who are white, Anglo-Saxon, who smile and shake hands, as good guys. We fail to understand the depth of the control the Soviet society places on its people. We accept the Arbatov's and the Posner's at face value. We accept the people who attend Chatauqua as being representative of Soviet society. That is malarky.

We, as a society, do not understand that the people with whom we deal are those people who are allowed to deal with us, those people who speak the party line, and those people who are trying to project an image. It is important for us to take advantage of the opportunities to talk to defectors, to talk to people who have been at high levels, and find out the nature of that environment, and acquaint our population and our policy-makers with it, so that when we enter into these relationships, we are not blind and we are not being fooled.

Senator NUNN. That is a good point.

Senator Cohen, I have a few more questions that I want to come back to, but I want to yield to you at this point for whatever you have.

Senator COHEN. Just a couple of questions.

Again, back to the definition of the "high level" defector, would that include ballet stars, or would that include highwire circus performers?

Mr. GEIMER. No.

Senator COHEN. I didn't ask that metaphorically.

Mr. GEIMER. Just within the last few days, we were asked if we would take on the ballet dancer who defected in Dallas, and we had to say, no, that is not the kind of person that we are equipped to deal with.

Senator COHEN. What exactly do you mean by "high level?"

Mr. GEIMER. There is no definition for that, it is just kind of an idea. If we think that someone has got something, coming from an informed position over there, if they have something important to say, a book a write, or books to write, that is the kind of individual we work with. We wouldn't, normally, get involved with a physician, but if it was the number two guy in an embassy somewhere, it would be much of interest for us because that is what we need to know, how that system works and thinks at the higher levels.

Senator COHEN. What is it where someone who was just a bureaucrat, a sort of aspiring young bureaucrat within the system, is there any interest in understanding the Soviet bureaucracy?

Mr. GEIMER. Sure. You may remember the young diplomat who ran across the DMZ in Korea some years ago in a hail of gunfire. We have tried to help that young fellow because we think he has a potentially brilliant career academically here.

We are very flexible. On the one hand, you know, you have the Arkady Shevchenko, and on the other hand, you have this young fellow. It is just one day at a time.

Senator COHEN. I was just curious. One of the witnesses who will testify later was such an individual. He defected back in 1970 or 1971, and he was, in fact, a young, rising bureaucrat as such.

[At this point, Senator Nunn departed the hearing room.]

General WILLIAMS. Senator Cohen, in Mr. Geimer's statement, he said that we deal or try to deal primarily with people from policymaking levels, people from embassies. There is a bit of a dichotomy in that, too, because my role has been to present to the United States society people who have hard skills, scientists, engineers.

In some of the professional societies to which I belong, I have been confronted by representatives of industry saying, if you come across these people, we would like to know about it. We would like to find out how our adversaries go about engineering. Their universities are different. Their skills in titanium surprised us. How do they produce airplanes? What are they doing in space?

Every once in a while, you get somebody who has done a lot of research in those areas, and our marketing, if you want to call it that, of the availability of those people is very poor. Not just Jamestown Foundation, but the United States society doesn't know who is available.

Senator COHEN. How many defectors do you handle, about 40?

Mr. GEIMER. That is about the vicinity, that is right.

Senator COHEN. Do you keep sort of a data bank, keep a defector's resume on hand, so that if you have such a request from industry saying, we need somebody with a specialty in computers, for example, who might be involved in international banking, who might understand something about leverage buy-outs at the international level.

Would you keep something on hand such as that, even though you are not handling him, that you would consider him in terms of job placement?

Mr. GEIMER. We do have a good deal of information on who is out there, and even though we are not working with them.

From the standpoint of the people that we do work with, if one of them gets a job in banking, they are lost as far as we are concerned. We are helping one individual now, for example, interested in working with the Federal government, and we are helping her because there isn't much alternative. But once she gets that job, if she gets it, then she is silenced as a public educator. From our standpoint, she is not of any interest, except on a human level.

Senator COHEN. Do you find that many, if not most, of these defectors have false expectations in terms of what their standard of living should be in the United States compared to what it was in the Soviet Union?

Mr. GEIMER. I think that when they defect, most are overly optimistic about what will happen to them here.

Senator COHEN. If they are high level enough, then they are probably at the higher levels of Soviet society, are they not? Don't they tend to expect to have a comparable standard here?

Mr. GEIMER. Some do.

Mr. JAMESON. I think they do. I think there are those who expect to be received with great ceremony, et cetera, but I think that most of them, particularly these days, have a fairly realistic understanding of what the opportunities may be. There are almost invariably frustrations, however, and aspirations that are never quite realized.

Speaking of this business of "high level," if I might just refer to it for a little, it does seem to me, at any rate, that the critical question is the potential of the person to help us understand the country that he came from.

It could be like this young man in Boston who crossed from North Korea to South Korea, or another one who is a student in training for the Foreign Service, who is an expert in the Japanese language. These are people who can make a contribution at the beginning of their career, and there have been many of those from past years as well.

I think that it is also important to say that the Jamestown Foundation is, I believe, concerned with finding people the right kind of jobs, even if it means possibly some reduction in the amount of public information they can pass on, because that is also a way in which they can radiate their information.

Senator COHEN. Is there a deep-seated bias or prejudice in the United States toward defectors, in other words, they associate defector with being defective?

[At this point, Senator Nunn returned to the hearing room.]

Mr. GEIMER. I think there is in many quarters. I think that it will change in time as more people get more exposure to them. There is some bias against them, and there are also a lot of people out there willing to pitch in and help.

Mr. **Jameson**. I think one facet of that that needs to be mentioned is that basically we have these people who are called "defectors" because of the nature of Soviet law, which makes it a crime to emigrate without the government's permission, and that is really what a defector is. From France, from England, or from Germany, indeed, from almost any other country in the world, people can leave, but you cannot leave over there unless the government says that you can leave. If you leave under other circumstances, you are in a way a defector. What we are dealing with is a problem that has been created for us by the Soviet attempt to keep its citizens fully under control.

Senator **Cohen**. Do you find a difference between, let's say, Soviet emigres and their attitude toward defectors? Is there a problem within Soviet society itself for those who come here and really risk a good deal by filing a petition to leave, and as such be called Refuseniks, or whatever, and wait their seven years or ten, 12 or 15 years, and finally are allowed to emigrate? Is there a difference of attitude toward those who defected to come over?

In other words, is there a sense of community that exists between emigres and defectors?

Mr. **Jameson**. To a significant extent, they are somewhat different in that most of the emigres, for example, do have specific ethnic origins, although not all of them. I don't think that the question of how you got out is a barrier to people in establishing relations or friendships or confidence. The legal emigres can do it.

Senator **Cohen**. I think that some of the prior witnesses have indicated that there is, and this is the reason that I asked the question.

Mr. **Jameson**. When you are talking to them, let them speak for themselves.

Senator **Nunn**. We have had some testimony, I think, that there is a strained relationship because the defectors normally have been people in leadership positions, and there is some usual resentment by the emigres toward those people, the emigres being normally not people who have been in high leadership positions.

Senator **Cohen**. I just want to test their testimony against your experience.

Mr. **Jameson**. I think that it is true that there is a difference in position. There are certainly both defectors and emigres who really don't care to meet an ex-KGB officer no matter how decent a guy he is now, or how helpful he is, just per se, and there are other considerations like that. But you will be talking to more of them, and I have to yield to them as they are closer to the truth than I am.

I know a great many cases where people came out legally and people who came out illegally have certainly developed friendships and have been close, and have worked together. I think that this is the experience among various clients in Jamestown.

Senator **Cohen**. I take it that none of you are advocating that the government undertake a public program of providing funding for the resettlement of defectors, other than what we have on the intelligence side?

Mr. **Geimer**. I think that we are ambivalent about that. We want to see more help forthcoming, but what we do, I don't think can be done by government. It is a very intensely personal kind of a work. You get involved very deeply with the lives of these people.

Senator COHEN. Are you suggesting that government agencies don't get deeply involved in the lives of people?

Mr. GEIMER. Yes, they do, but not in the way that I am talking about.

Senator COHEN. I might differ with you on that.

Mr. GEIMER. The bulk of our work or the thrust of it is to produce books and articles, to sponsor lectures, and I don't think that we want the government in that business. I think, also, to the extent that the government is involved, the integrity of the output of the individual is probably brought into question. We don't want our people seen as spokesmen for this Administration or that Administration. We want seen as telling the truth as they understand it.

General WILLIAMS. I think, though, that there is definitely need for some kind of coordination as to who these people are, where they go, what kind of skills they possess, so that if someone in industry or in government wants to talk to them, or if there is a job opportunity that might be applicable. There is no mechanism to track that. It is beyond the private foundations and private assistance organizations' ability to do that.

Senator COHEN. As I understand it, there is no coordination between the CIA, the FBI, the State Department, the INS, or any of the government agencies, in terms of maintaining either some sort of centralized record or bank which can be drawn upon or referred to.

Mr. JAMESON. There is or at least was an Interagency Defector Committee that had a CIA official as the chairman, and representatives from all of these other agencies, at least in my day, shall we say, that used to look after that reasonably well. General Williams says that it doesn't work that way any more.

General WILLIAMS. The most difficult thing to do is to find these people once they have been spoken to or if they enter the United States from a third country, and this has been my frustration with Jamestown. They defected to the West, not necessarily to the United States. They then enter the United States legally through INS channels, and most of the time nobody knows they are here unless they come to our attention as in dire need of assistance. I still call that person a defector because of the way they left the Soviet Union. But, yes, you are right, there is no data bank that exists to enable us to find those people.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Just wrapping up with this panel of people who are spending so much time in this area.

Mr. Jameson or General Williams, do you have any specific recommendations to this committee or to our government that you would like to make in this area that you haven't already alluded to?

Mr. JAMESON. I think that mine, essentially, are those that Bill mentioned before that have to do with helping this program of trying to place people in careers where they can radiate their information, where they can backstop it, where they can do research, where they can acquire the skills that will get them into the careers that will allow their information to be best exploited by the United States. I think that that is rather important.

The other thing that he mentioned as far as the immigration bill, beyond those I have no particular recommendations, because I know that you are going to mention one about what you have just been talking about, and I will leave that to you.

General **Williams**. I call it "marketing," Senator. We do not market the availability of these skills. Getting back to Senator Cohen's question, there is no mechanism for making people or industries or anybody else aware of the knowledge resident in individuals.

To my way of thinking, the United States society falls short, if we don't take advantage of it, and, therefore, we do a disservice to people who, in many cases, have risked their lives to come across. We may question their motivation, but they have risked a lot, they have left a lot behind, and yet we don't recognize that and we don't take advantage of it.

Senator **Nunn**. What would you have the Federal government do here as opposed to private foundations in this particular void area?

General **Williams**. I guess that is the place that I would like to a clearinghouse of some kind, not in the intelligence community, but some place where someone could say: These people are available. The organization should at least be required to tell the government some place that So-and-So is here, here is a résumé, here are the skills that that individual possesses.

Then industry can say: We need a physicist. We need an agricultural expert from Central Africa. We need a banker. We need somebody who has worked on aircraft structures. Is there anybody available? Then it is up to the questioner or the inquirer to make the contact. But someone has to do that.

Senator **Nunn**. One final question to both of you who have been in the intelligence community and spent a great deal of your time in that capacity.

How big a danger is the whole question of defectors who may continue to be loyal Soviet Union, who have been put here as plants?

Mr. **Jameson**. There have been several cases of this sort. I remember several. In my opinion, this is not a critical danger. In the first place, none of the defectors, even the most significant and important high level have really deep access to U.S. Government secrets. The people who work as career agents for the CIA are compartmented to some degree at least.

I think also that it is very difficult for the Soviets to prepare an agent, alleging that he is in a high level position, because, frankly, in order to substantiate that allegation, he has to give away more than probably the game is worth.

I think that there has been continuing controversy that relates to intelligence officers in the 1960's, which in my mind was a mistaken assumption about who was an agent and who wasn't anyway. I think the other ones that have come out are people who are used to test the system to find out the Western powers coordinate their intelligence work, and these, I don't think, pose major dangers.

It is obvious that there is a potential for some kind of a threat, but I think that most of the time it has been exaggerated. The cases that I know of don't seem to be ones that too seriously threaten our society.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

General Williams, do you have anything to add to that?

General WILLIAMS. I would only say that, beyond that, an occasional propaganda coup, a one-shot or two-shot appearance on television to testify how the individual was treated or allegedly mistreated in the United States, would be about what we could expect. As Mr. Jameson said, I don't see any long-term serious danger.

Senator NUNN. Thank you all for being here this morning. We look forward to continuing working with you. We congratulate you on your noble ventures. Thank you.

The subcommittee will now hear from two outstanding American Sovietologists who have worked with defectors and emigres, and who will share their insight on how they can be better integrated into our study of the Soviet world.

Dr. Bruce Menning is the Director of a new U.S. Army program that studies the Soviet military, its strategy, and its tactics. This organization, the Soviet Army Studies Office, relies upon many of the insights that many former Soviet educated and trained citizens possess.

Joining Dr. Menning will be Mr. Vladimir Toumanoff, the Executive Director for the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. We are especially pleased to have Mr. Toumanoff with us today. Not only is he a product of the first wave of immigration from the Soviet Union, his father having been a Czarist officer who fought against the Bolsheviks, he is also a well-respected Sovietologist in his own right.

We are delighted to have both of you here today. If you would come forward, before you take your seat, we will give you the oath, as we do of our witnesses before this subcommittee.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Dr. MENNING. I do.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I do.

Senator NUNN. Dr. Menning, do you want to lead off this morning?

TESTIMONY OF BRUCE W. MENNING, PH.D. DIRECTOR, SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE, U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER [1]

Dr. MENNING. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senator Cohen, Chief Counsel Hill. It is an honor this morning to be here to offer testimony on behalf of my organization.

My organization is relatively new. We are less than two years old, although the conception goes back to 1984. The Soviet Army Studies Office belongs to the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command; more specifically, within Training and Doctrine Command, we belong to and report to the Commanding General, Lt. Gen. Gerald E. Bartlett, United States Army Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

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[1] See p. 327 for Dr. Menning's prepared statement.

What I thought I would do this morning would be to capsulize, insofar as possible, longer remarks that I have made in a formal white paper that I submitted earlier in the form of the draft questions and answers. What I want to do is to talk about the nature of my organization and explain why the kind of input that we can get from emigre/defectors is useful to my organization. Secondly, I want to address the issue of what kind of usage those emigre/defectors have.

Before I launch into a synopsis of those remarks, let me say that there are a couple of things that make us different from some of the previous organizations and people who have testified on behalf of their organizations. One is that the Soviet Army Studies Office or, as I will refer to it in shorthand, SASO, is not an intelligence organization. It is primarily a military-academic think-tank, which is charged to study the Soviet operational and tactical levels of war to see what that kind of study can teach us for the development of training and doctrine.

Secondly, we really don't get into the area of high level defectors. Indeed, the kind of emigre/defector usage that we are concerned with is, quite frankly, in terms of the more spectacular testimony that has gone on on other days, is relatively low level and mundane.

Anyway, we see defectors as being useful in three primary ways. One, they are sources of information; two, they are interpreters of information; and three, they are developers, that is, they help us develop strategies of investigation and methodology to bring forth still more interpretation and knowledge.

Because of the uniqueness of its mandate and method, the Soviet Army Studies Office is an important beneficiary of insight garnered from emigre/defector sources.

Founded in the beginning of 1986, SASO traces its origins to 1984, when General William R. Richardson, then Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, visited the Soviet Studies Research Center at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst.

For more than a decade, Soviet Studies Research Center, as we call it, SSRC, had been engaged in highly effective, open-source research, teaching and publication on the Soviet military. In fact, its Director, Mr. Christopher Donnelly, has become very prominent as an interpretor of Soviet military affairs.

With the educational and training benefits of this effort in mind, General Richardson collaborated with then-Lieutenant General Carl E. Vuono, who is now General and U.S. Army Chief of Staff, and then-Colonel William A. Stofft, who is now Brigadier General and U.S. Army Chief of Military History, to fashion an analogous U.S. organization, the Soviet Army Studies Office.

Directly subordinate to the Commander, U.S. Army Combined Armed Center, SASO's mission is to conduct, encourage and facilitate in-depth research, analysis, publication and lecturing from open source materials on the Russian and Soviet tactical and operational levels of war.

Developments in conventional war fighting capabilities over the last decade have made the examination of questions relating to Soviet operational art and theater strategic offensive major foci of SASO's studies.

As an institution dedicated to unclassified research, SASO exists to exploit the growing mass of open source material, which we estimate at somewhere in the neighborhood of about 4,000 pages of material per month, and the availability of other sources, including emigre/defectors. The intent is not only to extend and complement other research, but also to test ideas in open fora, to cut across traditional international and academic boundaries and to encourage immersion in Soviet material for perspective.

In many respects, Soviet Army Studies Office forms an ideal complement and partner for the educational effort at the older U.S. Army Russian Institute in Garmisch, Federal Republic of Germany.

Now in looking at how emigre/defectors fit into the Soviet Army Studies Office picture, let me observe that they fit into our picture on several levels. On the most elementary level, they help us deal with the language. It is very simple, but something that often we take, probably wrongly, for granted.

That is to say, not all emigres are automatically language teachers, only that the influx of new linguistic blood, when properly trained and focused, helps all Russian and Soviet area scholars maintain linguistic currency. This is particularly important with reference to evolving military technical langauge, an area in which recent emigres can assist SASO in keeping abreast of changing terminology and usage.

Second, emigres can teach us what is unique about the culture itself so that we can avoid many of the worst pitfalls of mirror imaging, that is of seeing aspects of other cultures in terms of our own. As you well know, this is a constant threat to our proper understanding of Soviet things military. To be sure even immersion does not absolutely prevent mirror imaging but, of course, to the extent that emigres are living witnesses of their parent society, they also have a role to play in helping to immerse us in Soviet culture.

Now, more specifically, emigre/defectors can help us to understand the Soviet/East European military. Even what we would call ordinary defectors are important sources of first-hand information. For example, the average emigre/defector usually has had some kind of military experience.

It is useful to view Soviet military reality through the eyes of former Soviet soldiers who have much to say about training, equipment and military art. One need only look at a number of studies from RAND and other organizations to realize the enormous contributions which have been and are being made by emigre/defectors in the area of research.

More specifically, emigre/defectors are important sources of information not only on the military, but also about their parent societies themselves. In the case of Soviet and East European society, where we are still dealing with totalitarian control, that is, a systematic program for state security which reaches into every aspect of society, emigre expertise is a critical component of our knowledge of that society.

Many emigres bring with them extraordinarily valuable information concerning the functioning of Soviet society, which is not available to Western governments and area study specialists in any other form.

Let me make an observation. I have lived on academic exchanges for more than two years in the Soviet Union, and scarcely the opportunity passes during which, when I am interviewing or talking with a Soviet emigre, I do not learn something new.

It is very difficult, even if you have had long-term experience in the Soviet Union as a foreigner, to address the kind of aspects that you can develop with the assistance of an insider, so to speak.

Simply put, we need emigres to help us interpret information. They form one of our most important gauges of openness by helping us to recognize and understand what has not been said and what has been said that might be legitimately classified as disinformation.

Fortunately, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are more open today than they were 40 years ago, however, comparative openness makes emigre expertise even more vital because the emigre perspective assists us in seeing the connection between various parts of the Soviet/East European mosaic, a reality which is of sufficient complexity to warrant the assistance of former citizens in helping us make sense of it, especially in its military dimensions.

To the extent that emigre/defectors can familiarize us with training, processes and procedures, they can be extraordinarily useful in helping us understand the Soviet approach to conventional operations. In order to exploit this potential completely, the emigre must be directed to those specialists most capable to use, that is, to interpret and analyze, their information, and this channeling cannot be haphazard but must be the result of a well-organized system. Only in this way can we be sure that we are benefiting to the fullest extent possible from emigre knowledge and experience.

It is important, finally, to keep in mind the fact that with respect to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, all-source information and research interests relate not only to the Soviet military itself, but to all aspects of society, since all aspects of society, including the economy, science, technology, arts and the humanities, relate to the national power structure.

A planned, centralized economy such as exists in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe integrates all sectors of the society into the national defense effort. This has been so since the creation of the first five-year plan. Therefore, any emigre may have potentially vital information even if he or she was not directly involved in the official apparatus, that is the military, the government, formal academia, and so on.

What I would like to do now is to defer to my colleague, Mr. Toumanoff, and note that there may be themes and questions that we can develop at greater length in the subsequent question and answer period.

Thank you very much.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Menning.

Mr. Toumanoff.

TESTIMONY OF VLADIMIR I. TOUMANOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARCH

Mr. **Toumanoff**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to come and testify. It is a very welcome opportunity.

I wonder how you would like to proceed. I have submitted a written form of my testimony. Would you prefer that I summarize it?

Senator **Nunn**. A summary will be fine, and your written testimony will be included in the record, without objection.[1]

Mr. **Toumanoff**. In the term Soviet emigres I include defectors of whom there are, I suppose, several hundred, and recent emigres, since the early 1970s of whom there are something on the order of 130,000 now resident in the United States. So we are really talking about a very large number.

For purposes of this discussion, and from the point of view of the value that these Soviet citizens or former Soviet citizens have for the American society, it seems to me that it makes very little difference either in terms of the information and knowledge, insight and comprehension of the Soviet Union that they bring to our society or in terms of the contribution which they can make as fully integrated, productive, creative members of the United States body politic and society, whether they come with the permission of the Soviet government or without it. So in my comments, when I refer to emigres, I would include what is technically known as defectors of whom, I think, as I said, there are several hundred at the most.

My knowledge of emigres really involves my entire life. My parents came in the first wave. My cousins and their friends came in the second wave, which was just after the Second World War.

In the middle 1950s, as a Foreign Service Officer, one of my tasks was to interview Soviet citizens who had escaped to the West for information of interest to the Department of State.

Later, when I was posted by the U.S. Foreign Service to our Embassy in Moscow, I traveled very widely, and spoke with Soviet citizens in all walks of life.

As Director of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, I have been involved since 1978, in probably the largest systematic survey in the United States of the knowledge of the Soviet Union that the Soviet emigre community has brought to us.

In the late '70s, the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, and the academic community were both very interested in finding out from this very large body of Soviet citizens what they could tell us about the Soviet Union, which we simply didn't know or which we thought we knew but might not in fact be true or accurate.

As a consequence, they both turned to the National Council, that is, the Executive Branch and the academic community, to design, and manage a major survey. That survey has interviewed something on the order of 6,000 carefully selected Soviet emigres, selected on two principles.

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[1] See p. 338.

One is a very large group, calculated to act as a surrogate for the Soviet population to the maximum extent that that can be done, taking into account the fact that they are here and not in the Soviet Union, and that there is an ethnic composition and an educational selectivity and other factors which makes them atypical. Others were selected individually for knowledge in great depth of certain specific topics, such as economic management, the political system, the statistical administration, and things like that.

That work has been almost completed. It has been completed in terms of the assembly of data, of information. It has involved 20 or more scholars at a dozen or more universities across the country, and something on the order of 150 to 200 graduate students in the field of Soviet studies. The work was done almost entirely in the Russian language. The data has been collected and it is very voluminous.

West Germany, on the basis of the undertaking here in the United States, has conducted its own survey. The data from the German emigres, that is, ethnic Germans, who emigrated from the USSR to West Germany, is being exchanged with us.

The analysis of the data has really, in a sense, barely started. There have been several books and something on the order of 40 research papers already made available, and all of these are reported to the United States Government, distributed by the National Council. But scholars will be working on this veritable mountain of data for, I suppose, the next 10 years intensively, and perhaps substantially longer than that for background information.

[At this point, Senator Sasser entered the hearing room.]

Mr. **Toumanoff**. In addition to that major survey, the National Council has sponsored about a dozen smaller research projects focused on data provided by emigres, that is, based on emigre interviews, and some 20 research projects actually conducted by Soviet emigres themselves.

We have done quite a lot. We have done much more than scratch the surface of the knowledge which this very large group has brought to us, but there is just a great deal more information available which has not been tapped or made generally available. Let me give you two very quick examples.

A Soviet citizen was found recently, who emigrated legally, whose task was to transmit messages to and from the Soviet submarine fleet. He was found just recently, and to my knowledge he still has not been interviewed in depth, I suppose you could say, certainly not intensively in terms of his experience.

A recent finding, based on emigre information, suggests strongly that the Soviet military arm seems to function no more efficiently than the civilian economy, than the civilian segment of the society. It is a very significant finding, and it is one which comes as something of a surprise, I think to most Americans, including Sovietologists, including even some of our military specialists.

If it is indeed true, and it needs to be verified and researched further, I think that the significance of it lies in the fact that the civilian side of the system is working so ineffectively as to drive the Soviet leadership to radical measures of reform. If the military arm operates equally ineffectively, that matters and it matters a good deal. Those are two examples of the kinds of information which are still there in this community.

Senator COHEN. Who made that finding?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Professor William Zimmerman of the University of Michigan on the basis of this emigre survey project. It was reported to the Chicago Convention of the American Political Science Association.

I think the next major point, which I should make for you today is that as great as this contribution of knowledge and understanding is, and as great as is the benefit which the American society can derive from that knowledge, and that insight, and that comprehension from their countinuing contacts, I think that that is the lesser of the contributions which Soviet emigres can make to the United States.

These are highly educated by and large, highly motivated, skilled, experienced, talented, above average, people. My clear impression is that there is almost nothing that they hope for and desire more than to become fully productive, fully assimilated members of our society. If this most recent wave and future waves follow the pattern of previous waves of Soviet emigres, then that is precisely the area in which they will make, ultimately, their greatest contribution to America.

That, I think, is terribly important. It is important because of the two elements which, it seems to me, have been identified in the testimony in these hearings. One of them is how to make available to the American society the knowledge and the information, the continuing comprehension and insight, which these people have. The other one is how to help them in that assimilation, how to help them make that transition from their society to ours, which is very very different from what they are used to.

I think there is a good deal which could be done, but, as you know from General Odom's testimony and others, it is a very complicated picture, this entire emigre community, and what can be done and how it can be done is equally complex.

A great deal is being done. There are all kinds of programs of assistance and resettlement, and a variety of programs, in fact, which tap into their knowledge and their comprehension. Whatever additional program or activity might be generated should avoid reinventing the wheel, or duplicating what is already in existence. But it might be possible—let me see if I can find that part of my written testimony.

There may be some measures which Congress might wish to consider taking to ease and speed the transition and the contribution which the emigres can make. We are all aware, and I suppose Members of Congress are perhaps aware most of all, that ours is a much more complicated society today than that facing the two previous waves of emigres from the USSR in the 1920s and the 1940s. In spite of that, the great majority of recent Soviet emigres, after the first shock and confusion, adjust, adapt, and begin to make their way. They do so with a variety of help, private and public, organized and casual.

Some individuals, however, and their families, find it especially difficult and get blocked. This is apt to be true particularly among certain groups.

Former professionals, in vocations that either do not exist in America, or which require extensive, expensive retraining and recertifications, such as law, medicine, engineering, and others.

Older people have a more difficult time.

Former professionals who arrive with little or no knowledge of English, especially if the practice of their profession in America requires written and spoken fluency.

Defectors, in the technical sense of the word.

These groups are apt to have an especially difficult time.

This comes about not by any fault or lack of effort on their part, most frequently, but sometimes through unfamiliarity with the multitude of different private and public assistance programs available, and most frequently through simple economic necessity.

We know of civil engineers working as draftsmen, physicians who are hospital orderlies, eminent defense attorneys employed as paralegals, and bank managers who are driving taxis. The point these cases drive home to me is that each can tell us much about the Soviet reality, and as a national resource of proven ability and skills, they are being wasted.

A measure you might push to consider would be a program of grants in aid, or something you might call national resource fellowships, which could address both sides of the problem; make their special knowledge of the USSR generally available and, at the same time, provide such temporary assistance, if appropriate, as could help them rise closer to their potential and their hopes.

The program would need to be very carefully designed and administered, but I am confident it could be done in such a way as to make a genuine contribution to the intellectual capital of the country and to its productivity. The details of such a program are really much too long a topic for today, but some of the features I think worth mentioning are as follows:

It could and should be modest, less than $1 million a year, aimed toward awards of something on the order of 10 or 20 individuals or families per year.

It could and should start slowly. It should be considered a pilot project, experimental at first.

It should have some assured duration from the start, say, five years or ten years, either through some kind of multiple year appropriation, or a modest revocable trust in the U.S. Treasury. Annual uncertainty would probably doom its quality and it would be a costly break of faith to start and then suddenly to stop. Better not to start at all.

It should not be conducted by the intelligence community, but probably would be best administered by some private organization with experienced expertise on the USSR and competence in the Russian language.

It should not be done at the expense of existing Federal support for the American profession of Soviet area studies, and I have in mind Title VIII, lest it alienate a component of the American society whose sympathy would be essential to the success of the program. Somehow existing support for the American professional community should be visibly held harmless.

It would be a mistake to duplicate existing forms of aid available from a multitude of private, State, Federal, or municipal programs. On the contrary, it should rely maximally on existing American instruments, organizations and dynamics of assimilation. That means it should be conducted in close coordination and collaboration with resettlement organizations. It should, however, have the capacity to steer confused and bewildered emigres to such sources of aid, and to provide direct temporary assistance where these are absent.

The doors to the program should initially be very wide, but the selection process should be rigorous and highly selective. The awards should be tailored individually and followed up. It should be a prestigious program and, as a consequence, would probably be very labor intensive.

Women emigres from the USSR may have an especially difficult time for three reasons: We have found, generally speaking, that they have a lesser role in the decision to leave the USSR. Indeed, sometimes they take no part in this decision at all. The Soviet pattern of a double burden, of employment and housework, is often carried forward to this country, and they frequently take the first job available, usually very menial and may stay in it, whereas the men tend more to seek work closer to their former profession. A possible program would need to be especially sensitive to women's potential and needs.

One of the scarcest skills in our country is genuine bilingual fluency in Russian and English. It is a sore need in a number of professions, including government service and the academic profession of Soviet studies. This pool of emigres is a prime source of such bilingual fluency.

There has already been testimony on the need for some sort of a clearinghouse. I think the basis for a clearinghouse already exists in resettlement agency records. We are dealing with a very, very large number of people. Indeed, it is something on the order of over 100,000, with something between 5,000 and 8,000 new arrivals every year. We are speaking not of a clearinghouse just for technically defined "defectors." It is a much larger task, and a much larger problem. I think that if a program like this got underway, a clearinghouse, or the basic data for a clearinghouse could fairly rapidly be accumulated, and this is a real need.

Finally, as an experimental or pilot program, it is not too much to hope that in some fashion, we would evolve and discover, and gradually design, a very legitimate Federal role that would apply not just to Soviets or East Europeans, but to emigres to this society as a whole.

Thank you.

Senator NUNN. We thank both of you very much.

I have just a few questions.

I wanted to ask you, Dr. Menning, about the Army program. How many people do you have involved in that program?

Dr. MENNING. Do you mean within my own organization, Senator?

Senator NUNN. Yes.

Dr. MENNING. In all, I have 13 people. In addition to these 13 people, which are my regular staff, I have a provision to add, provided we have the funding available, at least two resident fellows. We just completed the tenure of one resident fellow, Natasha Gross. She left, after doing several superb studies with us, including one on Glasnost and the military. She left us to do work in the RAND-UCLA program in California. We have the potential to carry at least two visiting fellows with us for extended periods of time.

Senator NUNN. You are conducting a lot of discussions with these various people on the subject of conventional war, are you not?

Dr. MENNING. Yes, sir.

Senator NUNN. Has that been upgraded in recent years, the whole effort to know more about what the Soviet tactic and doctrine is in conventional warfare?

Dr. MENNING. Yes, sir. If you look at us as a reflection of the concerns of the Army Training and Doctrine Command, our own existence serves as a kind of barometer for the growth of interest in that area. In addition to that, I would say, insofar as I can tell, that is, insofar as that interest is reflected in the growth of the Army's own fighting doctrine, yes, those interests go back, indeed, in their more prominent version, to the late 1970s and the early 1980s, with the gradual evolution of Air-Land Battle doctrine.

Senator NUNN. How much have the Soviets changed in their own approach to conventional warfare, if any, in the last 17 or 18 years?

Dr. MENNING. Well, sir, we like to look at evolving Soviet attitudes as reflected in their own literature toward conventional warfare. Over a period of about 20 to 25 years, if we look back in retrospect at the amount of open-source literature that has come out, it seems to us that you start with a period, roughly in the early 1960s, when the Soviets went very far over in the direction of simply accepting as most likely the idea that there would be a nuclear battlefield within the theater. Consequently, they shaped their forces and their ground force military art, and supporting tactical air military art around that conception.

Then what we see is a breaking point, and one might argue exactly when it occurs—Michael MccGwire, for instance, in his book on military objectives in Soviet foreign policy, is fairly precise. He says December, 1966, but our reading is a bit more ambiguous than that. What we see beginning, let's say, 1964 or 1965 or 1966, is a rethinking and a re-emphasis on the importance of conventional operations, and then over the period of the last 20 years, the subsequent debate that occurs within the open press.

Finally, I would say, within the last four or five years, especially since the time when you see Marshal Ogarkov's writing appearing prominently, you see a stress on the importance of conventional operations within theater, but operating with the understanding that conventional operations can become nuclear at any moment. We call that the dual-track approach. You hope that everything stays conventional, but you understand that the nuclear hammer hangs over your head.

So we see this, really, as a 20 or 25 year process that you can track in the Soviet open-source literature, sir.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Dr. Menning.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. A couple of questions.

Dr. Menning, how do you go about screening defectors or emigres for their utility in military analysis?

We heard before, from the first panel, that there is no data bank among the agencies to draw upon. They sort of drop between the cracks. If they go into the private sector and get a job, they are separated from the system as such. How do you go about determining which individuals might have some information which would provide the kind of analysis that would be helpful to us?

Dr. MENNING. Right now, sir, it is really haphazard and almost by word-of-mouth. For example, our first fellow, Natasha Gross, who proved herself to be an extraordinarily effective researcher and writer, also was herself a source of information.

I lived for maybe six months or so at a time at Moscow University, for example, and I never realized until I talked with her that an entire complex of military training areas, to include rifle ranges, and so on, exists below the university in the sub-basement, and so on. So you get these surprising sources of information even from what one might call the most casual Soviet emigre/defector.

If you look at the larger picture, by and large it is haphazard and word-of-mouth, so we find out from the Europeans and the English that So-and-So had useful military knowledge, and it might be worthwhile for us to talk with them.

For example, a couple of months ago, we sat down and interviewed a Pole who had been chief of staff of a Polish division, and then later on chief of staff of a military district, which would become the Polish front in the event of a war in Central Europe.

We found out that not only had we missed him, but so also had the Israelis. He had been around for eight or ten years, and this was the first time that anybody had ever talked to him about things military.

Senator COHEN. What do you recommend we do to correct the obvious problem?

Dr. MENNING. Sir, the idea of the clearinghouse, however it could be worked out so we could find out exactly who is out there and what kinds of information they have, but with the caveat that this is where it should involve people who are familiar and, indeed, even sympathetic to the emigre/defector plight.

You go to an emigre or a defector and you say: Do you have military service?

Yes, everybody has military service.

What division did you serve in?

I can't remember.

What did you do?

Nothing important.

They are used to living in a society in which one really does not talk openly, or even with fairly close friends, about that sort of thing. So it requires a very special approach and one which says that you may not get all of that information and insight the first time.

I can remember, ten years or so ago, when the Army was doing some interviewing of defectors. They had a young man who had been commander of a tank company. They sent a couple of military intelligence types to interview him. He said, no, I don't want to have any memories of the Soviet Union. I can't have anything to do with military intelligence.

Later on, a friend of mine, whose name I will leave unmentioned, had the occasion to travel out to California, and he looked this former tank company commander up. They had a couple of drinks in a bar, and he said: Gee, if I could talk with a guy like you, I would really be able to tell the United States a whole lot more about the way that we did our tank training, exercises, and so on, in the Soviet Union. But so often, you don't get somebody who comes to you as sympathetically as you do.

This is one of the problems that we face. They have to be trained people, and they have to be very sensitive and aware of what all of the difficulties are.

Senator COHEN. Is the issue of citizenship important to the people that you deal with as well?

Dr. MENNING. Yes, sir. In fact, one of the reasons why we had Natasha Gross with us for six months was that, if you will pardon the expression, we were helping her punch her ticket, so that she could get at least six months of her time for the green card.

Then she went on to the graduate program at RAND-UCLA where she will continue to be a terribly important asset to the school, I think, as a student, and then, hopefuly, later on, something else will develop for her where she will be a terribly important asset not only to them but to us.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Toumanoff, I was terribly interested in your comment about Professor Zimmerman's analysis that the Soviet military is just as inefficient as the civilian sector. I was wondering if Napoleon and Hitler had also read that particular study.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I assume Bill is pretty familiar with the previous military history of attempts and experiences with the Soviet military.

Senator COHEN. One thing, I suppose, you have to draw the distinction between inefficiency and ineffectiveness, and it is something that we ought to keep in mind.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I can tell you a fair amount about the finding and what it is based on, if you would like me to, but it will take a little time.

Senator COHEN. Perhaps, you could either submit it to us, or we could talk to you. With Senator Nunn and I serving on the Armed Services Committee, we would probably have a greater interest than the other members of the committee.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I have a copy of Bill Zimmerman's paper.

Senator NUNN. Could you submit that to us, I think we would find that very interesting. We would like to have it.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Surely, I will be glad to.

[Professor Zimmerman's paper was marked Exhibit No. 29 and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.]

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen.

Senator Sasser.

Senator **Sasser**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Toumanoff, I also have an interest in the statement that you made with regard to the Soviet Army functions being no better than the civilian sector. Quite frankly, I am not surprised to hear that.

I think that anybody who has spent some time in the Soviet Union has seen how inefficient and ineffective the civilian sector is just to the casual observer. Then you realize that the vast bulk of the Soviet Army is made of draftees coming in from this same civilian sector, I assume bringing the same inefficient ways and being reluctant to serve to begin with that you would have some inefficiency or ineffectiveness.

[At this point, Senator Nunn departed from the hearing room.]

Senator **Sasser**. I have been mystified, and I have never gotten a satisfactory answer, as to why Western intelligence estimates seem to put a higher degree of effectiveness and efficiency on Soviet military capability than would seem to be the case when you look at where the Soviet military comes from.

Could you comment a little further on that?

Mr. **Toumanoff**. I think I should really defer to Bruce Menning on that question.

I suppose, to put it in very broad terms, the fact is that the Soviet military has gotten the job done, and has gotten the job done against extraordinary odds and very, very difficult circumstances.

[At this point Senator Nunn returned to the hearing room.]

Mr. **Toumanoff**. Perhaps in the field of high technology, military high technology, the fact that they launched that first Sputnik has left us with the impression that in some fashion, both through the military controls of economic production, through quality controls imposed by the military for military production, and through the recruitment of the best and the ablest, in some way the priority ascribed to the military by the Soviet Government produces better results than in the civilian economy. But let me defer to Bruce Menning.

Dr. **Menning**. I was struck by Mr. Toumanoff's assertions of the study, too, because I haven't had a chance to read it yet. I must say that what popped into my mind were two questions: At what level, and where? Because, certainly, you have certain conceptions, from our point of view, of the relative inefficiency of what the Soviets do militarily.

For example, historically, a weakness of the Imperial Russian Army that has carried over into the Soviet Army is the whole problem of the regimental economy. The fact is that there simply isn't always enough commissary wherewithall to support a unit, so what you do, you regularly detach members of the unit to raise cattle, to have gardens, and so on. It is extraordinarily inefficient, and possibly ineffective, from our point of view, but it is an extraordinary continuity in both Russian and Soviet military history and affairs.

What you have to do, you have to sit down and look at that whole system in context, and see what it means. For example, if someone would talk about effectiveness and efficiency, what I would do would be to look at the Soviet General Staff, and look at it as a kind of cybernetic information system where I think they are probably extraordinarily effective and efficient.

In fact, I am one of those who believes that the Soviet military is neither a giant nor a pigmy, and what you have to do is go in and look at each element, case by case. But what you will be struck by is two things. One, the extraordinary degree of rigor that they go about studying things military. Second, the way that they try to actualize what they need to in terms of the conclusions based those studies within their military machine to make it effective. It might not be pretty, but it works.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. I think that before we finish this topic, I should point out, in all fairness to the paper, and to Professor Zimmerman, that this is a rather general measure that he is working with. Everything that you have suggested, and Bruce Menning, is not inconsistent.

If I didn't say so at the start, I should say that the data support strongly this kind of a conclusion, but that it warrants a good deal more investigation, and I think that this is exactly what Professor Zimmerman would say if he were here.

Senator SASSER. I have one final question, Mr. Chairman.

In the effort to assimilate Soviet defectors into our culture and our economy, would these defectors be able to "test out" with regard to proficiency? In other words, if you had a Soviet physician, would he be proficient enough to perform effectively in our society? Are they accomplished enough to perform the job, given that their language skills are adequate?

Mr. TOUMANOFF. It would vary, obviously, from individual to individual, and profession to profession. I think that there is a general point, however, which applies pretty widely across-the-board, which is a cultural difference. There is a cultural difference in the form of their educational system. There is a cultural difference in their approach to research.

One of the difficulties that they have in being assimilated into the academic community, for example, is that the philosophy of research is a little different in the Western academic culture from that which most of the emigres bring with them.

In a sense, there is almost a kind of aculturation process, which has to be gone through, in almost any profession, which is familiarization with the modes and vocabulary, and intellectual style of the Western profession or a comparable profession as practiced and trained for in the Soviet Union.

Dr. MENNING. Sir, this is an issue that I addressed at some length in the materials which accompany my testimony. But, basically, what I pointed to, I think, is some of the Israeli experience, which they are much more rigorous about the idea of networking, that is, taking a Soviet emigre by profession and identifying that person's professional interest, and putting that person with someone in the same profession.

This is one of the areas that I think that possibly we can assist some of the emigres defectors; it is not only with the idea of the clearinghouse, but that is the idea of—I am not sure how to do this—creating a set of incentives that makes it worthwhile both for them and for American or Western professionals of various stripes to sit down and actually take in an interest in these people as they become acultured.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Some form of assistance might be appropriate in what you might call a work-study combination, an apprenticeship. I think that this is what the Israeli experience was.

Senator SASSER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Toumanoff and Dr. Menning, we appreciate very much your assistance, and your testimony. We will be making some recommendations later, and your testimony will be helpful. We urge you to continue to stay in touch with the subcommittee if you have any further thoughts or recommendations.

Thank you both for being here.

Mr. TOUMANOFF. Thank you.

Dr. MENNING. Thank you, sir.

Senator NUNN. We next have a panel of four individuals, and I suppose we really have five individuals that I will call up and introduce each one.

As I said to all of our witnesses, we would like to spend several more hours on this subject, but we really have less than an hour. I have to be at another meeting at 12:30, but perhaps Senator Cohen will be able to stay a little while longer. We are going to have to ask each of our next witnesses to summarize so that we will have time for some questions.

The first witness is Dr. Vladimir Sakharov, who defected from the Soviet Union and took up residence in the United States in 1971. Prior to 1971, Dr. Sakharov served as attaché and Secretary to the Soviet Consulate General in Alexandria, Egypt.

Prior to that time, Dr. Sakharov served as a Soviet Consular officer in North Yemen, and from 1965 to 1967, he was a broadcast controller at the Department of Broadcasting for Middle Eastern Affairs at Moscow's Institute for International Relations of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Dr. Sakharov's father was a diplomatic courier, and his mother was a physician specializing in the treatment of alcoholism. Dr. Sakharov has written a book called "High Treason," and remains one of the definitive works on the rearing, educating, and the value system system of the children of the people in the Communist Party and the KGB.

After coming to the United States, Dr. Sakharov received his Ph.D. in international relations from the University of Southern California, and he has written on a number of subjects. His dissertation was titled "Soviet/Arab Intermesh: Historical, Cultural, and Socio-Political Dimensions."

We also have Dr. Dmitry Mikheyev, who was born in the Soviet Union in 1941, received his Ph.D. in physics from the prestigious Moscow State University in 1970. Shortly after he completed his doctoral dissertation on the subject of lasers, he attempted to flee the Soviet Union for political reasons.

Arrested by the KGB, he was formally charged with treason and sentenced to a hard labor camp. After serving six years of his sentence, he was released from prison, in part due to the activities of Western human rights groups. Dr. Mikheyev was expelled from the Soviet Union in 1979, and subsequently emigrated to the United States.

Since coming here, he has not only continued his interest in physics, but also embarked upon a thorough study of Soviet mentality. His views on the subject of mentality and its relationship to defector resettlement as well as his personal experience and observations from the Soviet Gulag, where he met a number of defectors who had returned and been imprisoned, will be an important addition to our subcommittee study of the defector issue.

Then we will also have Ms. Ludmilla Thorne, and she will be accompanied by a Soviet soldier, who was in Afghanistan, Mr. Movchan. This is a related, but not directly related issue, that certainly is interesting to the subcommittee, and we will hear from them.

Ms. Thorne is a Sovietologist for Freedom House, a non-profit organization which, for over 45 years, has been a worldwide advocate for human rights. Ms. Thorne is currently involved in championing the plight of Soviet soldier/defectors. She has traveled to Afghanistan on several occasions, and has personally interviewed many of the defectors there.

Mr. Movchan was an army sergeant with the Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan, where he defected in 1983 to the Afghan Resistance. For the next 13 months, he stayed with the Freedom Fighters until granted asylum in the United States in July of 1984.

We heard, of course, from Senator Humphrey on this subject. He is very interested in it. Senator Humphrey has been following this issue with a great deal of interest.

We also will hear from Eugene Demchenko. Last week, we introduced into the hearing record a statement from Mr. Demchenko. Mr. Demchenko was an official in the Ukranian Communist Party before defecting in 1972. Senator Cohen made a particular request that we have Mr. Demchenko here today, and we are pleased to do so.

As I mentioned, we will ask all of our witnesses to try to summarize as we have approximately a ten-minute limit on each one, I will not be absolutely rigid with that, so that we can then have some time for questions.

If we could have all of our witnesses come forward, we will give the oath, as we always do. If you would remain standing until we have sworn each of you in.

Please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before the subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help you God?

Mr. SAKHAROV. I do.

Mr. MIKHEYEV. I do.

Ms. THORNE. I do.

Mr. MOVCHAN. I do.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I do.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Mr. Sakharov, we will hear from you first. We don't want to rush anyone, on the other hand, we hope to hear from every one of our witnesses, and we hope to have some time for questions. So if each of you could try to summarize your statement, we would appreciate it very much.

TESTIMONY OF VLADIMIR NIKOLAVEICH SAKHAROV, FORMER SOVIET DIPLOMAT [1]

Mr. SAKHAROV. Mr. Chairman, it is an honor for me to appear before the committee. I was looking forward to this hearing, because I think it presents a great deal of importance.

I will skip my bio, basically, because it is part of my testimony. However, I must say one thing. We talk about defectors' motivation, their motivation to come to this country. They are all different. Some of them are political, and some are ideological. I do believe that most of them are personal, however. They are personal reasons.

For example, one of the reasons for my wanting to come to the United States was created very early in my life, when I went to see the American Industrial Exhibition during the time of the Nixon "kitchen" debates.

I went to see that exhibition. I saw American Cadillac cars there. I went to see an American fashion show, I stayed at that fashion show for about two hours, comparing those models with other Russian housewives of the period. The thought occurred to me, how do you set up to defect, then. So defection set in, in my life, very early.

Another reason for my defection was that I was one of the first to originate jazz in the Soviet Union, having become a good jazz musician. At that time, jazz was illegal, and it was a very great deal of pride for me to do something illegal and fight that system in my own way.

Later on that dream was fulfilled, finally, I was able to come to the United States.

When I was in Kuwait, working as attaché over at the embassy, there was the possibility to establish a relationship with the United States Government, which was very helpful in my coming to the United States.

I can tell you, from my personal example, that debriefings are not a very pleasant experience. However, it might be looked at at another angle: a person who is being debriefed by the United States Government also feels that he gives something important to the United States Government.

A person who comes to the United States at first has no analytical, academic, or political knowledge about the United States. He assumes that the United States knows nothing about the Soviet Union, which is not true, during lengthy debriefing procedures, as I found and as it was confirmed to me on many occasions.

A person under debriefing has a tendency to puff his own importance. He has a tendency to puff or exaggerate facts, provided that the atmosphere of debriefing is fairly pressing. On top of that, when a person has no assurances as to what his future life is going to be in the United States, he tries puff some more to sort of raise his own price. That is only human, I believe, and I believe that this is where we have to start, because that must be avoided, because this puffing very often leads to cases such as the case with Nosenko, or some other defectors.

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[1] See p. 351 for Dr. Sakharov's prepared statement.

There are ways to avoid it, and one of the ways to avoid it is to have a program of assurances by which a person will be able to at least see into his future. I have some suggestions as to how to do it.

While addressing the subject of defectors during these hearings there were various definitions of defectors. I would like to bring my definition of defector on record, and later on probably it would be introduced. It is in accordance with Articles 64 (a) and (b), 65, 70, 72, and 75 of the special part of the URFSR Criminal Code. The defector definition is here.

This is according to the Soviet definition of defector. However, we might want to utilize it, if needed, or at least look at how the Soviets identify what a defector or a traitor is. I don't like the word "defector," and I wish there was another word for it, but for the lack of that, we do say so.

Like some newcomers to the United States, and I have been here for 16 years, I went through a program of resettlement by the CIA. I do believe that in my case the program worked very well. At first, I had my qualms and criticisms of the program. It was not due to the program itself, it was just due to the people who administered this program, because we do deal with different individuals.

Even in the United States Government there are different personalities. In my case, I went through eight, nine, or even ten case officers. Some of them were great guys, and some of them were not so great guys. Sometimes you take a personality, and by one personality you tend to judge the whole United States Government and say, "screw them."

I found, in the long run, as I look at it right now, that the program which the Central Intelligence Agency has had for many years as far as defector resettlement, as defined in my testimony has been adequate from one particular standpoint. There has always been a guiding light in that personality of the case officer, and there will always be some imaginative ways to handle troublesome defectors.

I consider myself, as any newcomer, a troublesome defector, because a defector, when he comes to this country, he anticipates way too much from the United States. Every Russian thinks that all Americans are rich. So a defector comes here and he thinks, "I want to have a house in Beverly Hills. I want to have that big Cadillac. I want to have that big, marvelous job."

I believe a defector shouldn't have that sort of design. The defector might not be necessarily an educated man, might not know the environment of the United States, might not know that that Cadillac and house in Beverly Hills is earned through mail order catalogue business, or something like that. The defector doesn't know it. So the point is education from the very beginning of the defector's coming.

I have worked in this country, lately especially, with a number of organizations that help emigres. One of the most marvellous organizations, I consider, is the United Jewish Fund, who provides a great deal of assistance not only to Jews in Israel and worldwide, but also to Jewish emigres in the United States. There is a hotline and a redline that you call if you have trouble, and it is a great support network.

The Vietnamese have created their cities. For example, if you travel to Los Angeles, I will show you cities where Vietnamese live in their own communities and they have businesses. The Japanese took over small businesses in southern California, and me coming from southern California, I know it. Other communities have their support systems, too.

So what we are talking about here, basically, there is a small number of individuals who come to this country illegally, according to the Soviets, legally according to the United States, who might not have that kind of support network.

The reasons for coming are numerous. The problems are similar for all. I don't care whether they are from the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Afghanistan, or anywhere else. America is a unique country, because America is based on individual freedoms, and very often the defector has a tendency to be mixed up with regard to individual freedoms, because individual freedom basically means that you can fail, you can go through bankruptcy, you can make it in business. It is those freedoms that they do not understand. I know that because I have talked to many of them. So there is a tendency to misunderstand what freedom means.

There is one other point, I found, as far as defectors are concerned, and I agree with most testimonies that I have heard. I have seen all the hearings on C-Span, and I greatly appreciated the testimony of Judge Webster. I know he knows that the Agency has some deficiencies in the defector resettlement program, and I am absolutely positive that he is personally going to look into it.

One of the problems I see is that defectors have a tendency to stay within their own community—I don't want to be criticized by defectors, really—to get together and cry to each other. "It was so nice in the Soviet Union." "You had a good job there." "Now, if I didn't defect, I would have been made an ambassador." And all that nonsense. I am following the career of Igor Andropov, with whom I went to school, and he was Ambassador to Greece. I said, goodness, gracious, I might have been Ambassador somewhere in the United States, maybe, who knows.

They talk to each other and by talking to each other, without communicating that to other Americans, they sort of go back to their old values. The value of a defector represents the value of the society he comes from, and the values of the Soviet Union are that it is, for example, illegal not to have a job.

It is illegal to be without a job for more than 45 days, actually, and then you have to get a job. Defectors insist absolutely that they must have a job in the United States. If he doesn't have a job, the defector feels like he is a criminal.

Another point has to do with a defector's "elitist syndrome." Because defectors do come from higher echelons, or potentially higher echelons of the Soviet society, feels he must have a big job. He feels he must have a chair somewhere in the university, professor, or deputy director of some kind of think-tank. This is the defector's objective in life. Sometimes it doesn't work. In most cases, it doesn't work. However, to stoop down to menial jobs is supposed to be a traumatic experience.

I have been through the defector resettlement program in the Agency. I have been in that program for about 10 years. One of the greatest credits I give to the Agency, and I wish that would be applied to many other programs, is education. In fact, I was insisting to an organization—I don't want to name that organization, some testified from that organizaion—that when you resettle a defector, first of all, concentrate not on the amount of public speaking or book writing, or other things, concentrate first of all on providing or creating a possibility for a defector to have American academic credentials, because credentials from Moscow University, or credentials from the Moscow Institute of Transport Engineers, mean zip in the United States.

You have to have American graduate credentials in order to compete in the competitive American market. In this sense, I say that the Agency I am talking about, the CIA, did one marvellous thing in my case. They helped me get my Ph.D. from the University of Southern California. There were some bright people in the Agency who said: Let's do it. They did it.

It was hard at the same time because I did have to wash dishes. I had to wash cars near Santa Barbara. I did have to drive a cab in Los Angeles. But I knew that, at the same time, I was going to the University of Southern California, I knew that something was going to be good in my life.

Russians are basically pessimistic and fatalistic people. Whatever happens, happens. But Russians can live on hope. They have been hoping about Communism for so many years, and they will probably be hoping for a thousand more years. Russians are optimistic people in the sense that they have hope, and I had that hope, and that is very good.

Also I heard that defectors come here, supposedly they carry a message or they say: I have this message. I am going to fight the KGB. I want to fight the Soviet Union. I want to fight the Communist system. I want to fight. So they come to fight here.

To carry a message to an extreme is not necessarily true. In fact, there was an example when I went to Mexico City. There was one of the defectors who participated in a panel, and in Mexico City he said: I came to fight the KGB here. I was next on the panel to go, and you don't say, in Mexico City, that you came to fight the KGB. I was next to him on the panel, and I said: I want to make sure that I am not on the same plane, truck, or ship going back to the United States with you. This was basically it.

To carry a mission is very good, but you cannot carry a mission without a substantial base, without employment, without having enough support. So it is very important to have a job first of all, and then you can carry the mission, if you want to.

I disagree also very strongly with previous statements that there is no room in American academia for defectors. There is plenty of room. There is a study by AAASS that was issued recently. It is very easy to get. The study said that by 1990, the majority of professors who teach Soviet affairs, East European affairs, will be of retirement age. There will be a great vacuum in American academia as far as teaching is concerned. There is no replacement for those professors.

In my opinion, and in my experience, for example, when I was teaching at the University of Arizona, usually positions that were supposed to be in Soviet affairs are substituted by computer sciences. The professor is gone, so let's get rid of the subject, let's put in computer sciences.

In my particular case, when I was teaching Middle-Eastern affairs to about 60 students, my subject was substituted by a subject called something like "Ethics of Abortion," which is, I suppose, very important, however, in my opinion, it is not as important as Soviet policy in the Middle East.

There is room in academia, but the defector has to be able to compete with American graduates to get into academia. I find that there is no bias in academia against defectors. I find there is bias in one very particular sense.

Very often, defectors try to prove themselves and they come to this country carrying the banner, carrying sort of a grudge on their shoulder, and they go overboard. They don't know the American political system. They are used, very often by ultra-right wing organizations, which I am not going to name. First of all, those ultra-right wing organizations offer money, defectors are very often in need of money. On top of that, they offer some kind of recognition to those defectors who would speak at their meetings.

I would like to enter into the record my article that I wrote on the subject in the Chicago Tribune, "How Defectors Can Be Used For Political Reasons By Organizations Who Seek Political Causes." In this case, for example, my article deals with the fact that some defectors were being used to claim that Jesse Jackson is connected with Communists, and there was a panel of defectors gathered to do so. It is very important to educate defectors.

Before I end, the key to resettlement is not crying from defector to defector. It is not crying and complaining that I have to deliver pizza in the evening to make my ends meet. The key is, first of all, community involvement. A defector comes to the United States. He is no longer a Russian. Obviously, he left Russia for certain reasons, whether they are political or personal.

I was very fortunate, in my case, because I became American probably at the age of 14. Probably I became more Americanized than Americans, especially as far as my knowledge of American jazz and big bands is concerned.

The key is not to cry, but to integrate defectors into the American community. How do you do that?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Sakharov, I don't want to cut you off, because it is fascinating testimony.

Mr. SAKHAROV. I will finish in one second.

There is a need for involvement in community work in American communities by the defectors, coaching soccer, hockey, water polo, and so forth. The other need is marriage with an Americanization of defectors. An educational program, such as initial program for defectors on how to acclimatize themselves in the American community is essential.

The other important point is that no private organization, regardless of their heroic efforts can really fulfill this void of which I am talking about. What is important is to have a government liaison committee, not necessarily with the intelligence, or the military, but a liaison committee that will see to it that defectors are okay. I have elaborated on that in my testimony, which you have.

Thank you very much.

[Exhibits submitted by Mr. Sakharov were marked Exhibit Nos. 30–33. Exhibit No. 31 may be found on p. 950. Exhibit Nos. 30, 32, and 33 may be found in the files of the subcommittee.]

Senator **Nunn**. Thank you very much, and we will make all of those documents part of your testimony, without objection.

Our next witness is Mr. Mikheyev. We are delighted to have you here today. I have already given an introduction on each one, so we will just turn it over to you.

TESTIMONY OF DMITRY MIKHEYEV, FORMER SOVIET DISSIDENT [1]

Mr. **Mikheyev**. I have set my clock for nine-and-a-half minutes.

I thank you very much for inviting me. It is very exciting. I think that very few people realize the importance of this hearing. It is not just a matter of several hundred people's fate. It is a matter of great importance, because defectors are someone who are caught between two cultures. Unless we understand their problems, unless we understand their thinking, the problems of defectors, we will not understand what Gorbachev is thinking and doing.

Effectively, the problem that we are considering now is a problem of Soviet versus American mentality. I had a pretty unique chance to look at this problem for 25 years from totally different angles. First, when I met Americans at Moscow University 25 years ago. Then, in prison, I met redefectors, those people who defected to the West, and then they couldn't make it in the West. They went back to the Soviet Union, and they went to prison.

I have lived in America for eight years now. I am an American citizen now. I live a typical American life, I suppose, so I can now look at this problem of defectors' problems and the mentality clash from yet another point of view. I can only give you a conclusion, in the couple of minutes I have, about what we are talking about.

Defectors have, of course, some facts, but the most important thing about defectors and people coming from the Soviet Union is the way they look at the world, the way they approach the problem, and it is totally different from the American way. This is where we really can learn from them and help them to help America.

I can give you examples about this difference in Soviet mentality, thinking, and American thinking, and it is really fascinating, I was involved for one year in research at the National Security Research Foundation, a think-tank here in Washington. We had been analyzing the way American specialists, American experts and Sovietologists were thinking, and Soviet defectors were thinking in exactly the same situations. It was staggering how different their thinking was.

An American expert might know all the nuts and bolts about the Soviet Union. Perhaps many of them know more information, more facts, data about the Soviet Union, but they think in the American way, and the Soviet defectors have a totally different approach. I will give you just one illustration of what I am talking about. It is not totally isoteric.

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[1] See p. 371 for Mr. Mikheyev's prepared statement.

Americans would identify the problem as primarily economic, primarily military, or primarily political problem. Once they identify the problem as such, then they look for the solution along the economic, or political, or military lines. So they will never consider solutions to an economic problem within the scope of political or military solutions. This is how they will look for the problem's solutions.

The Soviets will define a problem in all of its complexities, as a military, political, economic and so on. They will describe the whole complexities of this problem, and attack the problem from all directions.

Effectively, what might happen, the Soviets will find a political solution for an economic problem. Or they will find an economic solution for a military problem. Or they can find several solutions for the same problem. Americans will limit themselves to economic, if it is an economic problem, and they will look for economic solutions, that is all.

This is just one example. I have a whole set of these things. I would say that this is where the real value of helping defectors lies. We can really learn from them how to approach problems, how the Soviet leadership attacks problems.

We shouldn't go to negotiate with Soviets in Geneva without really trying to negotiate with defectors, with emigres. I have had the experience of simulated negotiations between an American team and a former Soviet team in the National Security Research. Their approach was very different. I will give you one more example.

American thinking goes toward finding a compromise. This is how they negotiate. This is the American way, to strive for a compromise. Americans assume that both sides will make concessions, find common ground, and strike a deal. However, this approach is totally irrelevant in the case of the Soviet Union. The Soviets are not looking for compromise. A compromise is a derogatory word for them. Compromise means that they admit they are in trouble, they admit their weakness. Hence, they do everything to avoid a compromise.

Therefore, the Americans are working to find a compromise, and the Soviets are working at avoiding any kind of compromise. When Americans make a concession to the Soviet team, they think they demonstrate their goodwill, a strong position, and confidence. "Here, you can have this concession." They think they can afford it. The Soviets, however, perceive concessions as a manifestation of weakness. As a result, Americans want to manifest strength, and instead they manifest weakness to the Soviets.

We have to understand at least some fundamentals of this communication between Soviets and Americans, and it is not just a matter of raw facts or what platoon commanders know. This is almost irrelevant. We know almost all this information. The way of thinking of Soviets and Americans, which is dramatically different, this is what matters.

I guess my nine-and-a-half minutes have expired, but I would love to explore more on that during the question period, if you have time. I have my written testimony on the defectors' problem which might help, I suppose, understand that they stem from differences in their mentality from American one.

Thank you so much.

Senator NUNN. Thank you so much.

Ms. Thorne, we are delighted to have you.

TESTIMONY OF LUDMILLA THORNE, SOVIET SPECIALIST, FREEDOM HOUSE

Ms. THORNE. Mr. Chairman, first of all, I would like to thank you and your colleagues for allowing me to come here today and to share with you a problem which has been of great concern to me for more than four years, namely, the plight of Red Army defectors in Afghanistan.

To save time, I know we are very short on time, I would like to familiarize you with the problem by reading just a few excerpts from my prepared testimony.

Senator NUNN. We will put your entire testimony in the record, without objection.[1]

Ms. THORNE. Thank you.

The immensity of the Afghan people's suffering caused by the Soviet Union's invasion is immeasurable. When I was inside Afghanistan four times, most recently last March and April, I myself have seen many Mujahedeen wounded. I myself have seen young Afghan children with arms and legs blown off by so-called "butterfly bombs." I have seen the masses of Afghan refugees huddling on the Afghan-Pakistani border. The tragedy is immense, and once you have seen the face of this tragedy, you can never, ever forget it.

But the Afghan conflict has also been tragic for the Soviet people, whose young sons must die in a war in which they do not believe. Many people in the West don't realize that the mighty Red Army in Afghanistan is composed primarily of Soviet teenagers. And the war has created a hopeless situation for Soviet Red Army defectors and POWs.

As Senator Nunn has mentioned, I have made several trips inside Afghanistan for "20/20" and Australia's "60 Minutes," Life Magazine, and last year I took in a group of Canadian journalists. During these four trips to Afghanistan, I interviewed 22 Soviet soldiers. Out of the 22, 20 had deserted voluntarily, and two were captured. Out of the 22, nine have been brought to the West so far, and 13 are still inside Afghanistan, waiting to be rescued, if they are still alive.

Because I was born in the Soviet Union and speak Russian fluently, these boys could sort of spill their guts to me. Some of the soldiers' pleas for political asylum were heartrending. For example, when I was in one of the Mujahedeen strongholds, one young soldier, called Sergei Meshcheryakov, screamed, with tears running from his eyes, "Ludmilla, take me back with you to America. Please take me back." When we were saying goodbye, he slipped this little note into my hand and, in part, this is what it says:

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[1] See p. 388.

"You, who are Orthodox Christians, must help us make our way to America. We hope that you will help us in striving to come to America. Please help us come to America. We want to become American citizens."

The reason that these boys mentioned Orthodox Christians in this note is simply because they happen to have seen my Orthodox cross. But actually, Khasanov and Fayzulayev were Central Asian Uzbek Moslems. Meshcheryakov is Russian. I have also interviewed many other nationalities, young men who are Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, and Armenian, and so on.

This note was given to me in February of 1983, sir, and I have shown it to many American government officials, again and again pleading that these four young men be given asylum in this country. Unfortunately, so far nothing has been done about it. As a matter of fact, I am not even certain whether Sergei is still alive, because when I made a second trip to the same stronghold, Sergei's legs were swollen, and he had to crawl on his stomach just to go to the bathroom.

The main reason that Soviet soldiers are deserting in Afghanistan is because of what they call "the cruel, unjust, dirty war." Many of the Red Army deserters that I spoke to had witnessed and took part in the killing of Afghan people, and it was precisely for this reason that they defected, because they could no longer bear to carry out their hideous orders.

For example, one Red Army deserter, Igor Kovalchuk, who had to take part in very vicious attacks on Afghan villages, described to me such an attack. He said, "When we were finished, I peeked into the hut and saw 15 people, men, women and children all slouched together in blood. It was like a butcher shop." He told me, after seeing such brutality, "I decided I'd rather be a 'traitor.'" He told me, "But in the eyes of God I will not be mired in this dirt and blood which the KGB has unleashed here."

A young man, by the name of Andrei Skoropletov, was in charge of a tank unit, and he defected with 700 rounds of ammunition and a brand new Kalashnikov rifle, because he could not bear to order his men to shoot at Afghan men, children, and villages. Andrei Skoropletov, today, is still inside Afghanistan waiting to be rescued.

Unfortunately, during my many meetings with United States Government officials during these past four years, they were usually aghast at the idea that if they will bring out a few Red Army deserters, there may be a whole stream of Red Army defectors coming out.

But so far, the United States has brought only six Soviet Army deserters to this country, while in one year alone, 1985, 22 others were killed during desperate attempts to gain asylum in this country or some other Western country. I believe that this is not a very good record for freedom-loving America.

It is estimated that there are several hundred Soviet Army defectors and POWs inside Afghanistan. I have brought with me today a list of 17 others whose names and photographs I have, which I have presented to this government again and again.

I have been told again and again during my many meeting with government officials that the main problem with spiriting Red

Army defectors out of Afghanistan is that they have to transit very briefly through a third country, and that this country doesn't want to participate in the effort in fear of the Soviet Union's retribution. Yes, there are some problems with the use of transit countries, but they are not unsurmountable.

I have now come to the sad conclusion that the main problem has been in this country, and not in any third country, as I have been repeatedly told. There has been an apparent lack of resolve on the part of this Administration to get these boys out. Bringing Red Army defectors to America, who have been pleading for asylum in this country, has simply not been a high priority project for our Administration or our government.

If it were, I feel confident that all of the Soviet soldiers whose names, photographs, and asylum requests I have forwarded these past four years, they could all be here with us today and have given you testimony, very dramatic testimony.

I think, at this point, I should close my comments and give Nikolay Movchan a chance to read his statement.

Senator NUNN. Are you going to interpret, or is he going to read?

Ms. THORNE. He is going to read his statement in English, but if you have questions, I may need to help him a little bit.

Senator NUNN. Could I ask you a question now, or two questions. One is: How are the Soviet soldiers being treated by the Mujahedeen?

Ms. THORNE. It all depends on which group is holding them. As you know, there are seven major resistance groups now. The treatment I described for Sergei Meschcheryakov was somewhat of an exception. He was held by the most fundamentalist resistance group. I have also visited many Mujahedeen hideouts where the boys are treated with extreme care.

So the treatment differs and it can vary from harsh to paternal. On the whole, they have been treated well, considering the fact that the Mujahedeen themselves often have nothing to eat. They have to share their last crumbs of bread with their POWs. It is very difficult for them to keep Red Army soldiers, defectors. I believe we should not put all the burden on them, sir.

Senator NUNN. Are any of them fighting with the Mujahedeen?

Ms. THORNE. Yes, sir. Three Soviet soldiers, Sergei Busov, Vladislav Naumov and Vadim Plotnikov, all three Russian, fought and took part in 20 combat operations for the Mujahedeen. They are all in Canada now. I have also known several Central Asian soldiers who actively fought with the Mujahedeen. They are a rare exception, I should add.

Senator NUNN. All right, Mr. Movchan.

TESTIMONY OF NIKOLAY MOVCHAN, FORMER SOVIET ARMY SERGEANT BEFORE HIS DEFECTION IN 1983 IN AFGHANISTAN

Mr. MOVCHAN through Ms. THORNE. Before, I begin, I would like to apologize for my bad English. I have just recently begun to study it extensively.

Senator NUNN. We are glad to have you here today.

Mr. MOVCHAN. Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to share with you some of my thoughts and hopes regarding a cause which is of great concern to me—Afghanistan—and especially the problem of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan.

My name is Nikolay Movchan. I was born on August 15, 1963, in a small village near the City of Zhitomir in the Ukrainian USSR. In 1978, I completed eight years of school in this village, and then entered the Zhitomir Technical School of Carpentry, from which I graduated in 1982.

On March 22 of that year, I was drafted into the Soviet Army and sent to Ashkhabad, the capital of the Turkmen SSR, for six months of military training, which I completed with the rank of sergeant.

In Afghanistan, I served for 9 months in Ghazni, where I was on guard duty and was in charge of a grenade launching unit. After spending a relatively short period of time in Afghanistan, it became clear to me that the entire Afghan nation was fighting against Soviet forces stationed there.

We were not allowed to visit Afghan villages and we practically had no contact with the Afghan people. We did not see any of the Chinese, Pakistani and American mercenaries that our officers described to us before we were sent to Afghanistan. Thus it was easy to see that Soviet troops in Afghanistan reprensented an intervention force. The reason I left the Soviet Army is that I did not wish to take part in the terrible war in Afghanistan and in the cruel annihilation of the Afghan people. I made the decision to leave in a split-second when the opportunity availed itself.

Early one morning, when everyone was asleep and unarmed, I left my base and started walking in the direction of any Afghan village. But the Soviet command soon noticed my absence, and helicopters and tanks were sent after me. However, the Soviet officers were afraid to send the other Soviet soldiers after me.

As I was nearing an Afghan village, I met an old Afghan man on the road who understood what was happening. He gave me Afghan clothing into which I changed and took me to the Mujahedeen. I was saved by the fact that the helicopters were searching for me in a different area than the one in which I was hiding.

When I was still with the Soviet forces, the Soviet Union began to use scorched earth tactics in Afghanistan. By destroying the harvests and villages, the Soviet forces were depriving the Afghan resistance of the support that Afghan villagers were giving them, and thus the Afghan people were forced either to flee to Pakistan and become refugees or to go to big cities in Afghanistan where they could be under the watchful eye of the Communist government.

A village which was located close to our regiment was completely destroyed by Soviet tanks because the residents of the village had aided the Mujahedeen. The Afghan Communist government forces do not represent a truly fighting force. At least, this army is not capable of carrying on the war by itself without the support of Soviet military troops.

Our regiment used equipment which was capable of covering large territories, such as the "Grad," rocket-propelled launchers and automatic grenade and mortar launchers, as well as helicopters and tanks. Chemical reconnaissance platoons had fired launchers, and mines were everywhere widely used.

Senator Nunn. Excuse me just a minute. I am going to interrupt. Senator Cohen is coming right back, and he will continue. He is over there voting right now. We have about four minutes left before the vote is concluded. If you could just take a brief recess, as soon as Senator Cohen comes back, we will complete this. Then we will hear from our final witness.

I will be back in about ten minutes, but I think that Senator Cohen will be back in less time than that.

[Short recess, following which Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen returned to the hearing room.]

Senator Nunn. Mr. Movchan, we were right in the middle of your testimony, and we want to hear the end of it. We had two votes instead of one vote, that is the reason we had to wait for the second one.

Mr. Movchan. I personally was trained to use anti-tank weapons, such as the "Pturs" directional rockets and anti-tank grenade launchers (SPG-9M). But because the Mujahedeen do not have tanks, these weapons were not widely used. Our anti-tank platoon, where I served as commander of an anti-tank unit, was located approximately one kilometer outside our base. An Afghan government tank regiment was located near our base and it was considered to be unreliable and in a sense, we were guarding the Soviet base against this Afghan tank regiment.

One of the major problems in the Soviet Army, especially in Afghanistan, is the bad relationship between the new recruits and the senior enlisted men, who have already served for one year or more. The senior enlisted men push all of their work onto the younger soldiers. They humiliate them and often beat them up.

Sometimes, this hostile relationship reaches tragic proportions, when the young draftees resort to shooting the older men or to throwing grenades into tents where they are sleeping, or under the wheels of their vehicles. In my platoon, there was a case where a young soldier wounded a senior enlisted man after the older serviceman, a sergeant, hit him.

When I was with the Mujahedeen, my life was quiet and uneventful. Our relationship was friendly, but they did not trust me completely. I spent 13 months with the Afghan resistance, from June 1983 to July 1984, at which time I was brought to the United States.

I cannot describe to you how I was transported to this country because I very much hope that other Soviet POWs, who are still in Afghanistan, will be brought in the same manner. Unfortunately, since July 1984, when I and three other Soviet Army deserters were conveyed to the United States, no other Soviet soldiers were brought here.

Of course, after arriving in the United States, I encountered numerous problems. I was facing different kinds of surroundings, different opportunities, and a different language. The main problem is that Soviet Army deserters are emotionally not ready for all this change, because they were thrust out of the Soviet Union by the Afghan war. Many of them need support.

In our case, we were helped by the International Rescue Committee and Freedom House, but their assistance, which they offered to the maximum of their possibilities, was not completely sufficient.

I hope that the United States and other Western countries will change their attitude toward Soviet Army deserters from Afghanistan. That is, I hope that these soldiers will be accepted by the Western countries more systematically.

First of all, such a gesture can be considered strictly from the humanitarian point of view, since these young men have no future in Afghanistan, especially under the current circumstances of war, and since the Soviet Union does not even recognize the status of Soviet prisoners of war.

Secondly, the presence of these young men in the West can help in the fight to liberate Afghanistan, especially since the Soviet Union blames the Western countries, and most of all America, for the entire tragedy that is taking place in Afghanistan.

Thirdly, bringing the Soviet soldiers to the West will help the Mujahedeen, who must exert a great deal of effort in guarding the deserters from the Soviet command, who literally hunt for the POWs, and usually bomb the area where their prisoners of war are held, in order to kill them. By giving asylum to the Soviet Army deserters, you will be contributing toward real peace because these young men left a very real and ugly war.

In order to facilitate the solders' adaptation to their new lives in the West, they will need certain kinds of support, and one of the most important of these is the opportunity to study. Many of the men will want to continue their education, but they have no means to do this.

The Soviet Red Army deserters who come here also need help in finding jobs, a place to live, and in wading through the many bureaucratic problems. In essence, these are the main ideas I wanted to share with you, and I would iike to thank you for letting me speak to you.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much. You are doing very well with your English. Congratulations.

How much education did you have in the Soviet Union?

Mr. MOVCHAN. I completed technical school, and I don't know what it is in America.

Ms. THORNE. It is a technical sort of high school, a vocational high school for carpentry. It is higher than high school, but less than college.

Senator NUNN. Had you studied any foreign languages before?

Mr. MOVCHAN. Yes, German.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Our next witness is Mr. Demchenko. We are glad to have you.

TESTIMONY OF EUGENE DIMITRIEVICH DEMCHENKO, FORMER SOVIET PARTY OFFICIAL[1]

Mr. DEMCHENKO. Since you didn't introduce my background, perhaps I could say a few words.

Senator NUNN. Yes, it is very impressive.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. Let me give you a little bit of a description of what my background is.

Senator COHEN. It will count against your ten minutes, though.

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[1] See p. 392 for Mr. Demchenko's prepared statement.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I was born in the city of Kiev, which is not far away from Zhitomir, the birthplace of the witness who just testified. I belonged to the post-war generation, the plentiful post-war generation of the Soviet Union whom, today, Mr. Gorbachev is leading to new heights of socialism.

I started working at the age of 14, as a part of something called "practica"—working during the day and taking classes at night. By doing that, I was able to advance my career to the point when, before the age of 18, I was promoted to perform as the so-called "performing responsibilities of an engineer" of the Ukrainian Union of Consumer Cooperatives, thus becoming at that time the youngest official of the Ukrainian Government.

My background in the Soviet Union, in addition to the College of Soviet Trade, and the Kiev University's Philosophy Department, also consisted of attending special courses at the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Community Party of the Ukraine, designed and offered to those slated for a promotion.

In addition to the Ukrainian Union of Consumer Cooperatives, I also worked for the Committee on Radio and TV Broadcast, for the chairman of that committee as a consultant. Eventually, I was recruited by the Party to work in the Propaganda Department of the Kiev Governing Board. In that capacity, I was sent to Chile and Peru at the time when Allende was in Chile. I defected in 1971, on the way back from the trip to South America, in Holland.

Since I came to the United States, I attended Stanford University, where I earned a Master's Degree in Political Science, and I also attended the Harvard Ph.D. program, where I was a teaching fellow for about three years.

Like the gentleman on my right, I was working on my Ph.D., and I had to work not only on my Ph.D., but take some other jobs, which included nightshifts at a computer facility and also working on some construction sites around Cambridge. Because of family considerations I wasn't able to finish it and receive my Ph.D.

About ten years later, after my defection, I had to start anew, and I went into banking. I entered the management trainee program of a major New England bank. I graduated at the top of the class. I began as a commercial bank lending officer, later on, assistant vice president, and still later on, I left the bank and became managing director of an international division of an investment banking firm specializing in leverage buy-outs, acquisitions and mergers.

At present, I am a political and financial consultant in the Washington, D.C. area. I have an American wife and four young children who were born in the United States.

Senator NUNN. How did you adjust to the Black Monday episode this week?

Did you handle that well in transition from Marxism to capitalism in its purest form?

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I guess you are right, Senator, I am sort of a living witness that it is possible to bridge the gap between the Communist indoctrinator and the commercial banker in the United States.

The event that you refer to, and please remember that I am under oath, I could say that I think it is a corrective action because we had the bull market for five years. I think that if I had extra money, I would invest now in some certain stocks.

Senator COHEN. Which, for a fee, he will tell you about. [Laughter.]

Mr. DEMCHENKO. That is why I mentioned that please remember I am under oath. I didn't want to be asked that question.

I want to make two specific comments concerning the treatment of defectors and what could be done to improve their lot here in the United States.

First, I would like to suggest, if I may, a formula to be used to really understand and study the situation that the Soviet defectors are facing here in the United States, and that is, how well we treat defectors here in the United States is really a function of how well we utilize them. We tend to take care of things that we use well or we are fond of using. I think that all the difficulties with the treatment of defectors here really stem from the fact that we don't utilize them that well.

I would agree, to some extent, with the gentleman on my right that defectors mostly have been used to illustrate and to confirm the already existing theories about the Soviet Union, especially those on the right.

I think that this is really regrettable because, in my view, the real value of the defector's knowledge is that it is unusual in comparison with the scholarly knowledge of academicians born in the United States; it is an applied knowledge. It is the kind of knowledge that tells us what we can do, what could really happen, as opposed to theoretical knowledge which always warns us and hedges and tells us what should not be done.

Defectors, as was testified before, indeed, are used more to teach us how we should mistrust the Soviet Union. I really wish that there would be a time when they will be used to teach us how we could trust the Soviet Union, how we could trust the Soviet Union by realistically perceiving their capabilities, and also having no illusions about how their system really works.

It was also testified before that the problem with defectors is that they are frustrated, and sometimes even disagree with each other as to what is happening, for example, in the Soviet Union today, and so forth. I think we also have to understand the market in which defectors are forced to operate.

I often argue with some people who are handling defectors and I urge them to treat defectors' knowledge, and offer this knowledge outside, not in the context of a warehouse, wholesale operation, but that of a "boutique store", because, indeed, we have a very unique knowledge, and we have to make the world outside, in American society-at-large, in business, and in the government, be aware that such knowledge exists, and market it accordingly; something that General Williams was referring to, and for this we need a clearinghouse operation.

Let me also give you a simple example, to give you a sense of the market which someone like myself—who is a politicial-financial consultant in the Washington area—is facing today. It is a brief example that I think illustrates the situation very well.

Recently I was approached to give an extensive presentation on a subject which happened to be my specialty, which is the day-to-day workings of the Soviet Communist Party apparatus, as a part of a training seminar for middle-level personnel of a government agency. The original price mentioned for such service was unbelievably low.

I met with intermediaries and the representatives of the consulting firm putting together this seminar. For a moment, it appeared as if they were agreeing to subcontract five to six lectures, as opposed to one, and for a total price that was starting to reflect the uniqueness of the information to be provided.

At the last moment, my presentation was cancelled and substitated for a single one made by a former Soviet music teacher, who was paid about half of the original unbelievably "lower price." I happen to know this other individual, another defector who is a music teacher, and I am very fond of his abilities, not only his musical ability but also his knowledge of Soviet cultural life.

What I am trying to say is, if that was the case, if that agency really needed the knowledge of cultural aspects of Soviet society, they still should have paid him maybe three or four times as much as what they paid.

This is a typical case of the Washington, D.C., market, which should be probably the best market in the country, considering the potential customers that we have here, including the various government agencies, but government contracts, usually, reflect no cognizance of the wealth of the specific knowledge available from highly qualified defectors.

As a result, there is a strong tendency to interchange rather indiscriminately the services of former Soviet officials with a plethora of other Soviet immigrants, thus making the market very depressed and very competitive, sometimes a too competitive place to function.

What could be done is the second point, and I am finishing on that.

As I mentioned, I am seconding General Williams' recommendation, I think that it came up several times before—the clearinghouse type of operation that make government agencies aware of what sort of knowledge is really available out there. It is really a must next step in my opinion.

I think that for a larger American audience, for businesses, for example, I think the government clearinghouse operation may not be that appropriate. I propose, perhaps, to consider funding a small quarterly magazine where the defectors could sort of show their "wares." They could write small articles, comments on the current developments in the Soviet Union and the U.S.-Soviet relationship, and through such a publication they could advertise their abilities and their knowledge; and maybe this will attract the business side and help them to make their living.

I also wonder if it would be possible for Congress to legislate something similar or analogous to "the minority contracting provisions" in every government contract or grant that deals with various aspects of the Soviet Union and the Soviet relationship with the United States. By doing so, I think, we would deal with the imperfections in the market that exist today, which is dominated by well-established companies, for example, in the Beltway area, consulting firms, or the academic go-getter type of organizations that always know how to channel the funds available into certain channels.

I think that if this provision would be made as a part of every contract government has on the study of the Soviet Union, these provisions will make certain that the minimum percentage of a grant, a research grant, or some sort of sponsoring contribution will go directly to the defectors, regardless of what kind of organzation is involved. Perhaps this type of legislation will help to recognize, I think, the deficiency that exists in the market today.

If you notice, of all the people who testified here from the agencies that handle defectors, none of them employ, actually employ defectors on their staff. Despite the fact that in front of your committee, we saw people with MBA degrees, with other degrees, with knowledge and command of English sufficient enough, a knowledge of financial aspects that was sufficient enough to warrant their presence in a managerial capacity in one of those organizations.

To conclude, I would like to say that as long as the Soviet Union continues to deny to its otherwise privileged officials, the government and party functionaries, the right not to be prosecuted for desiring to act as a political opposition to the party, the United States will do well by encouraging such officials to seek political asylum in the United States. The wealth and the creative qualities of the knowledge these individuals bring with them is essential for the development of dynamic U.S. foreign policies, the type of policies that we seem to be in need particularly today, at a time when the Soviet challenge is suddenly growing again in stature and sophistication.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Demchenko.

I just have a couple of questions, and then I am running about 30 minutes late for a meeting. I am going to ask Senator Cohen if he would preside and close the hearing. I know that he will have some questions.

Mr. Mikheyev, you mentioned that to the Soviets, compromise is deemed almost an insult in their own mentality, and so forth. That has been our experience in negotiating with the Soviets over a long time, until the INF negotiations. In the INF negotiations, if you look at the various fallbacks—I don't know whether you would call them compromises, but fallbacks that were made from the Soviet position, they have been considerable.

There have been a considerable number of moves toward what I consider to be a more sensible direction, and that is one of the reasons that we are on the verge of coming up with an agreement.

How do you place the INF, the intermediate nuclear force, negotiations in that context of the mentality you were describing?

Mr. MIKHEYEV. Mr. Chairman, for the Soviets, the goal in all of this operation about INF, it is a big political offensive. They are taking a big political offensive and in this regard, they are making no compromises whatsoever. They do make concessions on the military side, on the rockets which from their point of view will be irrelevant in final analysis.

If we go ahead with the SDI, those rocket forces will be largely irrelevant in any case. So they can afford to make those little compromises and concessions for the bigger political goal, which is eventually to stop this advance of American technology and American economic progress, because the Soviets have very, very serious problems inside. They want the Americans to stop this new technological revolution, or at least to put brakes on it as much as they can, and they need about ten years to catch up because their infrastructure has been neglected and is in very bad shape.

I repeat, the goal is not military, it is political. From this point of view, they have made no concessions and no compromises whatsoever so far.

Senator NUNN. Thank you.

Mr. Sakharov, how much change do you see under Gorbachev's leadership, observing it from your present position? How would you describe the leadership change?

Mr. SAKHAROV. The leadership change is very serious. It is not only the leadership change, it is how the change affects the Soviet people. Right now, I am probably not going to be wrong in saying that the Soviet people have a new sense of might, of national pride which they see in Gorbachev's leadership. There is a great deal of consensus, disregarding the trans-Breshnev people. There is a great deal of change that is occurring in the U.S.S.R.

Senator NUNN. How should the United States react to that, in your opinion?

Mr. SAKHAROV. In my opinion, we have to take advantage right now of a number of opportunities that the new avenues for business, for cooperation, are there. I think that it is time now to finally realize and drop that evil empire syndrome.

The Soviets have problems just like any other super power has problems. They have problems with terrorism. They have problems with their monetary system. They are going probably to go into the international market with a convertible second ruble. Most likely, the Soviets are going to develop a second ruble which will be convertible currency.

There are so many mind blowing things occurring in the positive sense that can be utilized for cooperation and economics with the USSR.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Demchenko, would you comment on Mr. Sakharov's statement. I want to see if you all agree or disagree, and then I will ask Mr. Mikheyev to comment.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I essentially agree with Mr. Sakharov's assessment that there is a major change brewing in the Soviet Union. I think I see, so far, after I have done some careful analysis of the change within the Soviet Union, more of a change in the international posture of the Soviet Union. It is an issue that you, I guess, deal with.

The Soviet Union really has grown today much more flexible in the foreign policy arena. Today, the Soviet Union is more of a moving target than a stationary one. As you experience in the "Capital-to-Capital": the first question during that discussion was asked of the Soviets: What do you think of today's capture of the Iranian ship in the Gulf, and all that?

In the past, a Soviet Union representative would be climbing the walls, or taking his shoes and banging them, which was a very predictable response. Instead, what we heard from Mr. Toklunov was a very sophisticated response, very carefully crafted not to offend

Iran, but also catering to the United States position, saying, if the facts are what you are stating them to be, then, I guess, we applaud this action, and so forth.

I think that for this type of sophistication, we shouldn't pay much attention to Gorbachev in this respect, because I think the mastermind behind this major change—a much greater change internationally than domestically—is really Andrei Gromyko. I think that he was able to assemble, at the Politburo today, a formidable intellectual and functional knowledge that has never been present there before. You have out of ten members Gromyko, Arbatov, Dobrynin and Shevrenadze. I am not surprised that you realize that you have your hands full with this type of team on the other side. This is really remarkable.

As far as the domestic reform is concerned, I think there is a new spirit of openness in the sense that the public discussions that in the past were confined to a few newspapers such as Literaturnay Gazeta and Izvesta now have been broadened and include a wide range of newspapers, magazines, and so forth.

As far as the actual reforms, specifically was mentioned the transferable currency, and all that, I think there is really very little progress. They are still running in circles at this point.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Mikheyev.

Mr. MIKHEYEV. To be very brief, and perhaps even primitive, I would say that so far they didn't do any institutional changes. The institutional structure is still the same. The maneuvering within the existing structure and all the changes are taking place on the intellectual level, the discussions and so on.

In this regard, there were very significant changes within the last six months or so. You can see incredible publications in the Soviet press, which indicate, and this is what I want to stress, very serious discussion, almost a split within the leadership, on two parts—reformers and conservatives.

Our policy should be to promote that split. We really don't want one of the factions to take over and to come back to one leadership policy. We want to have that split. We want this split to be promoted and to develop into legal opposition, because as long as two factions in the enemy camp are talking to each other, we feel much more comfortable. If one of those factions will take over, it will be the end of discussions, and we will go back to this closed society, very dangerous and so on.

We want to have those two factions talking to each other, and we want to promote it. I am not advocating any concessions to the Soviet Union dealing with Soviet concerns, but any possibility that we have to keep those factions alive, talking to each other and developing two political parties, some kind of beginning of pluralism, should be explored and used.

Senator NUNN. Thank you very much.

Let me ask Ms. Thorne one question, and then I have to leave.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. I am concerned, Mr. Chairman. Just one comment on this. It is related to your participation in "Capital-to-Capital," a very brief one.

I am sure that before meeting, you were briefed by various people, but I hope that you also had utilized a defector, because that would also have been beneficial. You made certain statements during that "Capital-to-Capital," broadcast and if sometime you would like to discuss that——

I am sure that he would have phrased it a little bit differently if you were briefed by a defector.

Senator **Nunn**. What subject was it?

Mr. **Demchenko**. You made a statement that the United States fears the Soviet tank armies and it produced a big grin on the face of Deputy Zhukov. Along those lines again, I am just trying to broaden the market.

Senator **Nunn**. How would you have worded that?

Senator **Cohen**. First, we have to find out whether Senator Nunn is interested in hiring a Soviet defector for his staff.

Mr. **Demchenko**. I am trying to broaden the market to see how we would be better utilized. I think that almost any defector here would have pointed out that one of the restraining forces upon the Soviet Union has been their fear of United States technology, and also of the way the United States sometimes acts unpredictably in certain areas. To suggest to the Soviets that we fear their tank armies was a little bit playing against that restraining force that has been always there in the past.

Senator **Nunn**. If you did fear their tank army, how would you word it?

Mr. **Demchenko**. I would not have used the word "fear," it is as simple as that. It may be a minor thing, but when many, many millions are watching, and a lot of analysts are sitting and analyzing every single word and comma, it may be a minor thing, but it is a very, very important one.

Senator **Nunn**. How would you have worded that?

Mr. **Demchenko**. I would have worded it that it represents concern.

Senator **Nunn**. You would have stayed away from the word "fear."

Mr. **Demchenko**. Yes, because it is a very shocking word for the Soviet ears to hear that Americans fear anything in the Soviet Union.

Senator **Nunn**. That is interesting. Thank you.

Senator **Cohen**. Would it be equally shocking if we said that we envied anything in the Soviet Union?

Mr. **Demchenko**. No. I think that the Soviet propaganda has done a lot of that.

Senator **Nunn**. Let me thank you very much, I will keep that in mind.

Ms. Thorne, let me ask you a question. I believe Senator Humphrey told me, or it came to my attention at some point that you were going to meet with President Reagan about the subject that you have been so concerned about, and I think that you made a very strong case on it here today. Have you had a chance to talk with President Reagan?

Ms. **Thorne**. No, sir, I have not, but last Friday I had a meeting with the National Security Council, and I walked out of that meeting where half of me wanted to cry, and half of me wanted to punch those people, frankly.

I was told things that were truly unacceptable. I brought them a beautifully worded letter from a Soviet soldier who is now inside

Afghanistan, Valdimir Romchuk. I brought it to them on July 7th. I again, showed them the letter last week. Nothing was done about my plea that the letter be given to the President. Of course, I have never met with the President personally.

I pleaded to bring out not only this one boy, whose letter to the President says, among other things, "Sir, the reason I defected is not because I wanted a pair of American blue jeans, I had them while I was living inside the Soviet Union. The reason I defected is because I didn't want people to call me a Russian fascist." A letter like that was never even given to the President.

Also, I pleaded for the other 17 boys, and I was told again how difficult it is because of the third countries, et cetera. I was also told, "By God, if we bring out these 17 guys, a whole stream of Red Army defectors may come out, and what are we going to do?"

I said, "It may just help end this dreadful war. It just may act as another lever on the Kremlin leadership to pull the forces out of Afghanistan. The Kremlin leadership is going to realize that their stuffing the Soviet soldiers into one end like cannon fodder and their coming out of the other end, it may just help end the war." They were aghast at the idea.

I was rather disappointed, but Senator Humphrey, since that time, has given the letter to the President, and I do have high hopes that something good will happen, sir.

Senator NUNN. We are going to try to follow up as best we can on this, too, and we hope that you will stay in touch with us.

I thank all of you for being here. I regret, but I am running 40 minutes late for a meeting which started at 12:30, so I am going to have to run. But I am going to turn it over to Senator Cohen to close the hearing.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have just a few questions. I think, Mr. Demchenko, your statement about words is terribly important, because words are important in literature, in diplomacy, and, indeed, in politics, as we all live by the word, as we find out how we use them.

I would like to ask, Mr. Sakharov, you have an interesting statement in your prepared testimony about "Jazz now, treason later." I was wondering what is the impact of music in the Soviet Union?

For example, we have seen Billy Joel have a concert. I think George Will would like to have Bruce Springsteen go to the Soviet Union as the rock symbol of the United States, perhaps, or the blue-collar rock musician of the decade.

What is the impact, in your experience, of music upon young people? Is it as treasonous or decadent as the older established officials view it?

Mr. SAKHAROV. I think the Russian soul is akin to the sole of a black man in Watts. There is that kind of Russian soulful expression in music. Russians, over the centuries, expressed their inner feelings through music, through opera, through Tchaikovsky, Prokofief, everything, in the legal fashion.

I will go back a little bit. What is happening under Gorbachev right now, the rock and roll in the Soviet Union now is permissible. There are rock concerts and everything. There is a top-ten list. What was illegal four years ago is legal now.

There is a feeling about American music especially in the Soviet Union as music that represents the country that the Soviets admire and all the things that they will never have. Let me give just one graphic example.

The older generation, we are talking about people 40, 50, 60 years old, who were born after World War II, and the younger generation. If you can imagine yourself sitting somewhere in the Soviet society, in some dreary town, and you know that you are going to have the same work, and you are going to have to be going at 6:00 o'clock in the morning to that work for the rest of your life, no chance, no nothing, boring extremely boring.

Then you turn on the Voice of America, and you can receive shortwave there, and the voice of god comes in. The god in the Soviet Union is called "Willis Conover." He is the Voice of America disk jockey. You turn it on and you listen to "April in Paris" by Count Basie through that. In the atmosphere of this environment, if you are a Russian, your hair is going to stand up. There is that incredible impact.

I do believe that one American musician, in the Soviet Union, traveling, can subvert or corrupt, in the good sense, more than any CIA disinformation operation, or whatever you want to put there.

Senator COHEN. That we should send musicians and not missiles, is that the message?

Mr. SAKHAROV. That is why I always support exchange. One American in Moscow will do more good, because Russians, in addition to being music lovers, are lovers of American music, particularly—they don't like Italian Technorock, they don't like all that stuff, like songs about hydroelectric plants—but American music, and being also touch and feel people.

One of the peculiarities of the Russian character is that they have to touch and feel. So when they see that American in Moscow, they can actually touch him, and he is a musician. Then the Russian goes and he tells: You know, I saw Billy Joel. There is a network, everybody distributes records, and Americans become just idols. This is such a powerful weapon that it is incredibile.

Senator COHEN. You mentioned several things. During your direct testimony, you talked about the word "zip." You've picked up the idiom very well since you have been here.

Mr. SAKHAROV. I lived in Watts too long.

Senator COHEN. You also recommend a golden parachute for defectors—Mr. Demchenko will know what that word is as well—or at least a silver parachute, that defectors be given roughly the equivalent standard of living to which they were accustomed in the Soviet Union. But then you said something to the effect that "The debriefers assume that the defectors know nothing about the United States, and that is a false impression."

The question I had is: Maybe it is not quite as false as you believe now or then, that some of the defectors tend to have a sort, if I can use the phrase, Potemkin Village perception of the United States. You looked, and you saw Cadillacs, and you saw the beautiful women in the chorus lines, and so forth, and you saw Beverly Hills, but all of the United States is not like that. What you saw was a Potemkin Village perception of the United States.

So perhaps the debriefers are not totally wrong in saying that you don't understand fully what the United States is about. Perhaps defectors do have a false impression in the sense that they don't realize what is behind the image of all the beauty, the glitz, and the jazz, which a lot of Amercans would like to share in, too, and don't necessarily. They have the opportunity, but don't necessarily share it.

I don't know whether you were overstating the issue and saying that the debriefers simply have no real understanding of how knowledgeable Soviet defectors are.

Mr. **Sakharov**. That is correct. In fact, I did make a proposal in the program that I propose, but I didn't have time to read it. I made a proposal that a defector has to be put through the paces that every American youth would go through.

The point here is that Americanization of an ex-minister of foreign affairs, or KBG, or scientist, or whatever, is not going to take place unless a person would have gone through experiences, American experiences. Unless he has experienced some hardships, he will not be able to compete with Americans in the job market. That is related to this Beverly Hills type of thing.

Senator **Cohen**. You also said that you had seen a play called "Promises, Promises" in New York. It raised in my mind another question that we might have with defectors, namely, that the agency operatives in the Soviet Union or other countries, Eastern Bloc countries, might in fact be making promises, promises to potential defectors. When they arrive in the United States, suddenly the resettlement folks say, "We don't know anything about those promises that were made to you." The defectors don't know whether they are real or imagined, whether they have been phonied in order to extract the most that they can out of the newer life in the United States.

What I have learned in a very short period of time is that a number of defectors are disillusioned when they arrive here, because the promises are not matched with the performance once they arrive here, and there is disenchantment. Has that been your experience?

Mr. **Sakharov**. My experience was, when I was being transferred, and I am not going to say how because I am not supposed to talk about it, there were people in the Agency who told me explicitly that—I said: What is going to happen to me in the United States?

They said: Well, you will get a job. You will be working, and you will be working in what you are doing, according to your Middle-Eastern specialization, using your Arabic and this and that. I said: Fine.

I was coming in here sort of assured—not sort of assured, but basically assured that I will continue working in some capacity after debriefing, earning money. Basically working, because work is very important.

However, when I was given to the resettlement people, they said: You are going to motel management school now. You are going to be a bus boy. I said: What kind of special operation is that?

In any case, there were promises, and I think that it is the lack of communications and compartmentalization within that particular governmental organization that one part considers that they have a right to make a statement, and the other part simply doesn't know what statement was made by the other part. It is a question of communicating those promises to the resettlement people, I think, this way, they might be able to help fulfill them.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Mikheyev.

Mr. MIKHEYEV. To me, it is just an illustration of how people speak different languages. Both of them talk about jobs, and all kind of things, but they still mean totally different things.

I understand that the intelligence guy would say: You are going to get a job. He doesn't give a promise. He doesn't imply that the government has a job waiting for him. He calculates, well, the guy is clever, he knows English, so probably, eventually, he will find his place in America, his niche in America. This is what he meant.

This guy, on the other hand, took it as a promise, and he built all of his expectations on that. Nobody in America can guarantee to anybody that he will get a job. But he takes it as a guarantee.

To me, they speak the same language, English, with slight differences in the accent, but they put totally different meanings in the words, "you will have a job, you will probably have a car." The guy implies that he will lead the life of a regular American, and we do have cars, and houses, and so on, eventually.

What is fundamental in this American and Soviet attitudes? The Soviet thinking is about adaptation, adaptation, and adaptation. All his life is adaptation to the Soviet system. It is one big pyramid, and everybody has to adapt to it. American life is adaptation, if you choose to, and also building your environment if one prefers.

You have two options in America. If you want to adapt, go ahead and adapt to the company, to the government, and so on. You want to build your own life, shape your environment, you are free to do it. This is the meaning of American freedom. So you have a second option to adapting.

The Soviets don't know how to build, to shape. They know how to adapt. The second part of the human being, the building, the changing, the shaping things, after a considerable time in the Soviet system, is totally absent. They don't know how to build it, and they expect to adapt to the American system as well.

Senator COHEN. Ms. Thorne.

Ms. THORNE. Yes, sir, may I just add something. Regarding the question or the problem of adapting to this country, one thing which makes the Red Army defector different from these gentlemen is the fact that they did not defect in a premeditated fashion.

They had no time to prepare themselves emotionally. They were thrust into a war, and none of the Red Army defectors would have defected if it hadn't been for the terrible situation, number one.

Number two, what makes them very different is that they are also very young. When they come here, they are usually 19 or 20 years old. All of us remember our own growing pains when we were 19 years old and how to choose one's lifestyle. What these boys need most of all, and I know that you want some concrete recommendations, I recommend that a special scholarship fund be set up to help provide for the college education or vocational training for these boys. This will help them adapt in the long run. They will not be charity cases here.

Number two, a more long range recommendation, I recommend that we set up a systematic method of screening, processing, and bringing to this country Red Army defectors from Afghanistan. We not only have a moral obligation, or just a humanitarian reason for doing this, but a political and ideological one.

In this respect, I differ somewhat with the statement that Mr. Geimer said when he said that Soviet Army defectors have little of interest to say beyond the initial press conference. For example, Nikolay Movchan has traveled during the last three years all over Western Europe, Canada and the United States telling people what this war is really about in Afghanistan.

He has testified in Italy on Afghanistan, and on human rights violations in Afghanistan, in Copenhagen. He has spoken to large groups of students in the United States and Canada. He is young. He has a special rapport with our college kids. So his contribution and that of others has been very long range, way beyond the initial press conference that Freedom House has had for Nikolay and the others.

I implore you to help them adapt better by helping some other way, mostly in terms of scholarship funds. We desperately need help for these boys. They have no family and no relatives to rely on.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Demechenko.

Mr. DEMCHENKO. Yes, I would agree with Ms. Thorne, and also, with Mr. Sakharov. I think the way to reconcile this is to realize that there are different defectors. There are defectors who act on the spur of the moment in a very difficult psychological situation, such as a war; especially the type of war that is being waged in Afghanistan. They are facing the moral traumas. I don't think that they have a problem of inflated expectations. In this sense, Ms. Thorne is absolutely correct.

On the other hand, I agree also with Mr. Sakharov. Someone would get inflated expectations if they "feel" and "touch" Billy Joel—and his spouse—and when they come here, they, of course, see that the situation is different, and then you have the difficulties of adjusting.

I think the middle-of-the-road defector, and I hope that I am representing this type, is the one that comes here for political reasons. I don't see those political expectations as inflated. I see that maybe an individual was in some way misguided by adapting the formerly Soviet point of view "confrontation" and "the adversary society."

When a defector like that comes to the West, first of all, he celebrates his defection because it took him a long time, as opposed to in a momentous type of decision, as is the case with the soldiers in Afghanistan.

High level defectors contemplate their defection for a long time. The difficult decision is made in the past. Then comes a period of careful planning and implementation. When finally a defector, seeing all the dangers, implements his defection successfully, it is a very happy and positive thing.

I guess the way I got on this panel is because I was the one who was shaking his head during the second day of the hearings when someone testified that all defectors who come here have some sort of psychological trauma immediately or they made the decision under some psychological stress. I think we have to realize that this is precisely the Soviet point of view. It is the Soviet point of view of saying that defectors are temporarily deranged people who make the wrong decision that they live to regret.

My experience, and I know the experience of many other defectors, is, as I described before, the actual decision to part with the system happens long before, then comes the process of implementation. If one succeeds, and not many succeed, even being in a position of influence, they are very positive and very happy.

We saw it in the testimony of Alex Ushakov. If that individual is depressed, then it is too bad for all of us, because I think he showed a very healthy psyche, a strong drive, pleasant ambitions. I think that it is this type of material that made the United States what it is today.

I think that it is important for American people to know that defectors who come here, especially when they implement their successful defection, are very positive and very hopeful, not just because of "inflated expectations," but because they have accomplished something that they had the conviction to do.

Senator COHEN. I should point, for the benefit of the committee and the committee staff that I did notice Mr. Demchenko sitting in the audience, when Mr. Leo Cherne and others were testifying about how most of the defectors are guilt-ridden and go into deep periods of depression. He was shaking his head.

I wanted to find whether or not he was scheduled to testify. Since we do promote debate, and sometimes dissent even in this hallowed room, I thought that it would be important to have a different perspective about people who do come for positive reasons, who may suffer some periods of depression, or even guilt, when they find that some of those expectations, legitimate or not, have not been measured up to.

Then they say, "Where do I go from here? I have no job. I am washing dishes in West Hollywood. Lots of great jazz, but it doesn't pay the bills." Or, you drop out of Harvard because you can't pay the bills, going to work for a bank, and all that that entailed.

I thought that it was important to have a positive side of the defector presented as well, and that was the background behind Mr. Demchenko.

Mr. Sakharov, you were once described as the youngest, most knowledgeable defector on record. You are now no longer the youngest defector on record. Perhaps you are no longer the most knowledgeable, but you may be wiser since you are now older. Do you have any advice in terms of how you would handle the defectors, in making yourself and the others, Mr. Mikheyev and Mr. Demchenko, available to counsel our agencies on how to better deal with defectors?

Mr. SAKHAROV. Number one, I would like to note a defector, and I am talking about my case primarily, has to have a legal counsel present at the time when his or her name change is contemplated, or any kind of serious move is conducted for the future of the defector.

Senator COHEN. In your written statement, you point out that you resented the fact that you were given a new identity which happened to be German.

Mr. **Sakharov**. Deeply so. The Germans killed my grandfather. I don't have anything against Germans, I am sorry, but to be German for the rest of my life, and play a German role in this country is very difficult, and this is what I am doing right now.

Senator **Cohen**. Plus your German was very bad at the university.

Mr. **Sakharov**. Yes, it was no good at all. It is difficult to live under a new identity all your life. In this particular case, I think, a defector should have the presence of a lawyer who would advise what the rights would be and what will happen.

Let me tell you one thing. I have two life insurances now, because I am planning on retirement as every American, IRAs, and what-not. They are under my German name. I am beginning to wonder now whether they are valid or not. I have been paying money into those life insurances, because I am not only a German name, I have a Russian name, too. IRS knows me under both names, fortunately, but the insurance company knows me as a German. What would happen if they discovered that I am really not a German, but I am a Russian.

Those are the kind of questions that only a lawyer can figure out for a defector who plans his future in the United States.

The number one suggestion is a lawyer. Number two is a brief program, while debriefing is going on or even the initial stage, an educational program, basics of American life, basics—banking, driver's license. Anything that Americans take for granted, but the defector doesn't know anything about.

Number three, a committee should be appointed. A committee should be appointed that would consist of representatives of business. I, for example, have a gentleman, who is a very good man, R.J. Loomis, President of Magnovox Electronic Systems, I am sure he would be glad to serve on that committee. I didn't tell him, and he might be mad at me.

There are some influential businessmen who would be on the committee, and Senators who know the problem, who participated in this hearing. A representative from the Old Guard, from the Agency that knows defectors. For example, Mark Wyatt has probably more experience with defectors than any foundation. He had done more for them than anybody else, for example, a person like that, and maybe a defector who went through every stage, every ups and downs of a defector.

This committee should work out a program, because hearings are short. What can you say in the hearings. But the committee could spend maybe four or five months working out a program that will make a lot of sense, with a lot of input from other agencies. That is another suggestion.

My point is that the key to success in the long run is not blasting the commies on the John Birch circuit for a defector. It is Americanization of an individual, and the only way that it can be done is through the help of that committee.

Those are the basic suggestions I have.

Senator **Cohen**. Do you think that there is a danger that we are using people like Mr. Movchan to go around and blast the commies?

Mr. **Sakharov**. No, I have no qualms. Everybody can do whatever they want to do, it is a free country. I am talking about maybe narrower parts as far as definitions of defectors are concerned, and the people we are talking about. This is not related basically to me.

Senator **Cohen**. One final question for you, and then we will switch on to others.

You were debriefed at a time when you first came over. I think you discussed earlier the general reluctance to be forthcoming, or as forthcoming as when you first arrived here. Perhaps you are recommending that we go back now and that you would have a different story to tell five years or ten years from the time you were originally debriefed.

Is that something that we should do as a matter of routine? Would that be desirable in terms of getting better insight into Soviet society?

Mr. **Sakharov**. I do agree with you, I think that it is very important. When I was originally debriefed, and the debriefing atmosphere is very tense, I was scared to death most of the time.

Senator **Cohen**. Fear?

Mr. **Sakharov**. Fear, yes. Not concern, but fear. I was scared. I was in an apartment and I couldn't go out, except to watch "Promises, Promises" that they took me to see. It is a very severe psychological environment and a lot of pressure. I didn't know what Americans knew. I used to work with PLO before I came here. The PLO questioning in the United States in 1971-72 didn't come up really. They didn't care about it. But when I went to USC, I read that there is lots of writings by American authors, a whole body of literature. I studied it. Then, I do believe that based on that, when you have the tools, a second debriefing must take place.

In my case, it did take place; not by the CIA, but by the DIA, by the FBI and some other agencies, who were very interested, and this was ten years later. They said, where have you been all these years? I said, I have been around. It is important, I think.

Senator **Cohen**. Mr. Mikheyev, you wrote a book, I think, called "The Idealist."

Mr. **Mikheyev**. Yes.

Senator **Cohen**. Was that fiction or autobiographical?

Mr. **Mikheyev**. It is autobiographical fiction. As a matter of fact, it is interesting that it is relevant to these hearings because I believe that every defector comes through the very same life threatening fight, personality versus system. The system, which I described, is a pyramid, which tries to totally digest you, to kill your personality. Each defector, behind him, has this clash between the personality and the system.

The difference between America and the people who have also this kind of clash, is that here you can always get out of the system and start something new, something on your own. In the Soviet Union, you don't have this alternative. Once you have this clash between your personality and the system, then there are only two options. You perish or you conform, and you adapt to that system. A few very brave people will make a very drastic decision to escape.

Even if Vladimir denies it, it is a deeper problem, it is not just an economic problem, and so on. It is a problem of his personality, his individual self. Effectively, it is a socio-political problem when you have a defector. My book. "The Idealist," was about that clash between an individual and the system.

Senator COHEN. You identified, I think, some of the specific problems that Mr. Movchan and others might have. They don't have the same personality clash as such. For them, it is not as much a political decision as, perhaps, in your case or in all three cases of yours, as opposed to his reaction to the horror of the war itself.

Mr. MIKHEYEV. Probably, he doesn't realize it, or he doesn't articulate it in these terms, but every defector from Afghanistan, the soldier, was revolting against the system, against a particular military system, which doesn't tolerate any deviation whatsoever from middle course and center. It was a revolt against a system, even if he doesn't articulate it in such a way.

Senator COHEN. Ms. Thorne.

Ms. THORNE. Perhaps Nikolay should answer that, but I think they do articulate very eloquently, at least inside Afghanistan, why they defect. As Nikolay pointed out, it is essentially for two reasons. A moral reason, that they no longer wish to participate in mass genocide of the Afghan people.

One young man, Vladislav Naumov, told me that he decided to defect after he witnessed how a fellow Soviet recruit was executed on the spot by a Soviet officer because the young recruit refused to kill an Afghan as he was ordered. That is an excellent example of what I mean about making a moral choice, and why we must be brave enough and moral enough to give them a new life here.

The other reason is this internal bad relationship between the senior enlisted men and the junior enlisted men. That is another reason, which many Soviet Army defectors have articulated to me. They just couldn't bear having to fight in the terrible war, and then coming back to the barracks and having to do not only their own laundry but the laundry of the senior enlisted men, and so on.

It is the double burden that many of them can't take. Some of them committed suicide. Some have killed their senior enlisted men. Some have been killed by their senior enlisted men. It is a terrible situation whichever way you look at it.

Senator COHEN. Mr. Sakharov, first I will ask you a question, and you can respond to that. I assume that your statement and those of others will be taken out of context, and will be printed by TASS or Pravda, or some other newspaper in its worst light. Will that have an impact as far as you are concerned?

Mr. SAKHAROV. I don't think so. I don't think that there will be an impact. The Russians are very interesting people. They read between the lines. There will always be souls that will be coming here regardless whatever is being said. I think that there will be no adverse effect whatsoever, that is my opinion.

Senator COHEN. What about if the Russian people read between the lines, and the Soviet leaders read the lines, namely, should we be concerned about having Billy Joel continue to come to the Soviet Union?

Mr. SAKHAROV. I think that we have to send more Billy Joels to the Soviet Union.

Senator COHEN. I understand what you think. I am asking what they now think, having listened to you and saying, "Sakharov is in the Congress telling them to send Billy Joel over here, because it is going to undermine our capacity to control the young people of this country."

Mr. SAKHAROV. I do hope that they will overlook that. May I say something in conclusion, Senator, because I probably won't be asked.

I was looking forward to this hearing very much. I have one personal word to say. I want to thank John Sopko for organizing and working with us for a long time. I have great respect and admiration for this man. I just want to thank him publicly, because otherwise we would have never been heard. [Applause.]

Senator COHEN. I think that I will probably close on that note. We have all been sitting here a long time, and I think that I could sit here the rest of the day and listen to each of you testify. But we do have to bring this to a close.

Mr. Demchenko, you had your hand up, did you want to say something?

Mr. DEMCHENKO. Body language, I guess. I find myself again in agreement with what Mr. Sakharov said, and what he said before. I think that it is a good example. There has been testimony that defectors are unable to agree among themselves. In this case, you can see that we are quite in agreement with each other.

I also agree with his suggestion that the work of this committee should be given a chance to continue in some sort of form, or some sort of a committee.

As far as his suggestion on the second debriefing is concerned, in response to your question, Senator, I think that it is also a very useful one because in my case, it took me Stanford and Harvard to realize that the reason I wasn't asked anything about the workings of the Communist Party apparatus was because those people didn't think that such a thing existed.

We in this country tend to think of the Communist membership, or the membership in the Young Communist League, as a membership in the Elks or Moose organizations, or something like that. But there is a huge apparatus, machinery of the Communist Party and of the Komsomol that does work. I think that this is the fundamental difference between this system and that system.

At the second debriefing, I will be more in a position, or any other defector will be more in a position, to answer the questions that should have been asked in the first one but were not asked. I think that it is very important.

The only thing I want to say is that the second debriefing shouldn't be in the form of debriefing, but the defector should be given a simple opportunity to debrief himself or herself by publishing, by doing research, and so forth.

Senator COHEN. I think I gave you the title for your book, "From Komosol to Capitalism: Hard Choices!"

I thank all of you for coming. It has been a very informative and interesting hearing. We will now stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:45 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

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STAFF STATEMENT

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PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF
THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE

I. INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, my name is John F. Sopko. I am the Deputy Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee. Since 1982, I have been employed as a counsel by the Subcommittee. Prior to 1982, I was a Special Attorney for the Department of Justice. I have been assigned to conduct this Subcommittee investigation since its inception.

On the evening of Saturday, November 2, 1985, KGB agent Vitaly Yurchenko walked out of the Georgetown restaurant "Au Pied De Cochon" and into the annals of defector history. His subsequent interviews both at the Soviet embassy here in Washington and in the protective confines of Moscow detailed a curious though somewhat dubious litany of alleged United States government mishandling of his case.

The publicity surrounding Mr. Yurchenko's "last supper" in Georgetown continues to this day both in the controlled Soviet press as well as in the Western media. Particularly in the Soviet Union, the events surrounding his "escape" and "handling" have been expounded to illustrate the treatment that can be expected by any other fugitives from the Soviet bloc.[1]

Not far from Yurchenko's memorable repast, just six months before, another event occurred which is just as relevant to the scope of this inquiry. It was the defection of a senior diplomat from an Eastern Bloc country. Although the diplomat neither knew Yurchenko nor anything about him, his treatment as a non-intelligence defector is just as important as Yurchenko's to our understanding of the importance of defection and the problems inherent to the resettlement of a fugitive from totalitarianism.

Little publicity surrounded the diplomat's leap to freedom because of security reasons as well as the desires of the diplomat in question. Although in possession of highly useful information, he did not defect to give us state secrets. Nor did he defect for monetary or personal rewards as with Yurchenko. This Soviet bloc defector left solely for the chance to live and work in a state of freedom that we in the West too easily take for granted.

As the Yurchenko case caused the American people to reassess the CIA's handling of intelligence officers who defect and brought about needed improvements, the handling -- or more accurately, the lack thereof -- of the diplomat-defector who is still here appears to call for needed reforms.

The staff found that defectors are not "squeezed like a lemon and thrown away" as commonly alleged in the Soviet press. Instead, most defectors seem to wish they had been "squeezed" a little more -- much could be done to better utilize and assist the non-intelligence defector. Not constrained by stringent physical security requirements such as new names and identities, the non-intelligence service defector could more easily enhance our nation's understanding of the closed Soviet society which for the foreseeable future will be our country's primary protagonist in foreign and military affairs.

Yet our record so far with the handling of these defectors indicates the opposite. For example:

- Dr. Petre Nicolae, a high-ranking economist for the Romanian government attached to COMECON, spent over five years in New York running a laundromat and selling ice cream before he came to the attention of the Jamestown Foundation and others who are now attempting to find a way to put his storehouse of information on the East European economy to better use through writing, lecturing and research. His information and analysis have been acclaimed by those government researchers who only recently knew of his existence in the U.S. and were provided, for the first time, access to him.

- Alexandra Costa, the wife of a Senior Soviet Diplomat, was initially urged by a government representative to become a clerical worker. Fortunately due to her perseverance and the personal interest of a number of government officials, she was able to attend and graduate from the Wharton School of

Business. Eight years after her defection, her insights into the Soviet society is now a best-seller here in the United States;

- Aleksandr Ushakov, a professor of Marxism at a naval college in Odessa, hiked for 19 days over the Caucasus Mountains to reach the West in 1984. He had been arrested for writing articles "slandering" the State. Fortunately, he was released by the KGB in hopes that he would lead them to other "co-conspirators." Additionally, the Soviets would not charge him until he had been stripped of his communist party membership. This peculiarity of Soviet "justice" allowed Ushakov to escape. However, once here in the United States, the fact that he had been a member of the communist party now bars him for an additional 5 years from becoming eligible for American citizenship. In addition, for two years he worked at various odd-jobs before he was able to find a way to tell his story to the American people.

- Vladimir Sakharov, a former Soviet foreign service officer who defected in 1971 was eventually assisted in obtaining a doctorate in international relations. He is now a prominent lecturer of Soviet affairs. But before then he had to endure a life of menial odd-jobs and was initially advised by government representatives to become a motel manager and forget about ever doing anything public about his experiences or about the Soviet Union.

- Andrey Sorokun, a Japanese area studies student from Moscow State University defected in 1983 while studying as an exchange student in Japan. Although proficient in three languages -- Japanese, Russian and English -- he wound up washing dishes in a New York restaurant for three years until discovered by the Jamestown Foundation. Through their efforts, Andrey found employment as a translator in Washington where he is currently combining his work with research on the "children of the elite" of the Soviet Union.

- Tadeusz Kucharski, who defected in 1983 after serving 5 years as the Polish Commercial Attache in Angola was never even debriefed by the U.S. Government concerning Soviet and Polish activities in that troubled part of Africa. Since his defection, he and his wife have found successful employment in real estate and are assisting other Polish emigres to adjust to their new life here in America.

- Others have not been as persistent or as lucky. Within the last few months, two promising defectors returned home. Vladimir Kovnat, a Soviet TV correspondent, photo-journalist and film-maker who had worked extensively in the Middle East and Southeast Asia returned with his wife on July 31st to the Soviet Union.

- In addition, Bronius Venclova, a former Soviet interpreter who defected in 1985, could not withstand the pressure of the propaganda campaign engineered by the Soviets to secure his return. This August he returned after complaining that he could no longer take the constant telephone calls from his parents and siblings urging his return.

The negative effects of the current state of our defector program are numerous. We do not get their insights in a timely and systematic manner. In addition, the defectors have a hard time adjusting here, a fact compounded by their frustration in trying to get someone in the government, business or society to listen to them. And finally, their reception or lack of it, here in the West is closely monitored by the Soviet bloc and utilized for their purposes of discouraging additional defections.

This last point has been of considerable concern to the staff from the onset of the investigation. Well aware of the sophisticated propaganda capabilities of the official Soviet Bloc press, whose representatives are probably in the audience today, we were initially troubled with a public discussion of this issue.

The Subcommittee's decision for publicly airing the issue of defector treatment was three-fold: firstly, unlike the Soviet Union, "glasnost" or openness is not a recent phenomena in our country. We did not just discover it during the current regime nor after the last party congress. An open and frank discussion of problems within our government or society is as old as the constitution whose Bicentennial we just celebrated.[2] Such inquiries are an accepted way for the American people, through their elected representatives, to hold their government accountable. It is our historic method for change and improvement.

Secondly, from every intelligence expert and Sovietologist that we conferred with, we heard unanimous approval for a thoughtful and public discussion of this issue. It was felt that such a showing of interest by the Congress would do far more towards encouraging the would-be defector than either a closed-door hearing or continued government silence. The message a public hearing sends to the World and particularly to those behind the Iron Curtain is that the Congress of the United States takes the plight of the defector seriously and is doing something about it. This is a message that every credible Sovietologist felt must urgently be sent to the Soviet bloc.

Lastly, these same experts as well as many of the defectors we contacted believed that it would be disastrous for Congress and the American people to be cowered into silence by what the Soviet Bloc press may or may not do with the facts garnered from a public hearing. To be silent would give them far more importance than they deserve and unrealistically assume that they even need a public hearing to present their tailor-made views to their audience back home. Silence by our government and Congress on this important issue is exactly what the Soviet bloc governments want.

Clearly, it is also important to state at this juncture, that no matter what our government and society does, some defectors and legal emigres will return to their communist homelands. Some just can not adjust to the freedom of the West. Moreover, others may well be "plants" sent here for intelligence purposes, or, perhaps even for the sole purpose of "re-defecting" in order to create a propaganda event for internal consumption back home.

But, for the bulk of the defectors and other emigres, who come to this country with useful knowledge and the intention to stay, the current system can be dramatically improved to better identify, utilize and more productively integrate these essential aliens into our society. This is the focus of our hearings.

II. The Investigation

At the direction of Chairman Nunn, the Subcommittee staff has conducted an extensive investigation of the handling of defectors by the government. The inquiry included interviews of a large number of defectors, government officials, former intelligence officers, non-governmental agencies and volunteer organizations.

In the course of this investigation, for example, twenty-nine defectors from the Soviet Bloc provided in-depth interviews and an additional thirty-two defectors and emigres were interviewed informally concerning their experiences with resettlement.

Formal briefings were received from the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and by the U.S. Army's intelligence collection operations in Europe.

Non-governmental agencies that are involved in Soviet research were consulted, including the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), the National Council for Soviet and East European Studies (NCSEER), the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, the Soviet Interview Project of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign and Delphic Associates.

Academics involved in the defector issues at Tufts University, Harvard University, Boston University, Georgetown University, University of Maryland, George Washington University, University of Kansas, University of Arizona, University of California at Berkley and Stanford University also contributed their expertise to the Subcommittee inquiry.

The views from some of the major voluntary refugee organizations were solicited. They included the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the Tolstoy Foundation, Freedom House, U.S Conference of Catholic Charities and the Jamestown Foundation.

Lastly, over twenty current or former intelligence officers were interviewed concerning their experiences with the handling of defectors as well as their recommendations for needed improvements.

Based upon these interviews and the significant body of work performed by both Intelligence Committees of Congress, it became apparent early in the investigation that a vacuum exists in current government programs for the systematic identification and productive integration of a significant group of defectors into U.S. public life.

The staff found that while a government system is in place for dealing with a very discreet type of defector who falls within the purview of the U.S. intelligence community -- the few, such as Yurchenko, who are judged vital to our national security and are eligible to receive government support -- there is no comparable system in existence for the bulk of defectors who do not meet these specific criteria.

Some of the defectors, at the other end of the spectrum, like the common seaman, Medvid[3] -- if he had been permitted to stay -- the Subcommittee staff found to be covered by the programs supplied by the various voluntary agencies that handle the over 60,000 refugees that annually enter our country. These programs are generally geared to the resettlement of vast numbers of people of various ethnic and social backgrounds, most of whom arrive here as legal emigres. The staff found those programs generally inadequate to handle the special, higher-level defector from the Soviet Bloc whose past close association with a totalitarian government often impedes his acceptance in U.S. emigre communities.

In focusing on this latter group and based on our investigation the staff made the following conclusions:

1) These individuals can make a useful contribution to our society and our national security by helping to fill important gaps in our knowledge of the Soviet Bloc as well as in projecting future actions of the Soviet Bloc leadership in the political, economic and military areas;

2) This unique resource remains for the most part untapped by both government and society in any long term, systematic and open way although a few underfunded and uncoordinated academic and government programs successfully utilize them on occasion;

3) Government assistance to defectors is limited to a very small group who currently must meet the stringent requirements of the intelligence community;

4) These defectors face unique problems in resettlement and integration into our society that are not currently being adequately addressed by the government and voluntary private organizations, sometimes leading to their return to the Soviet Bloc;

5) Due to the defectors' prior experience and position within the Soviet Bloc, they tend to find acceptance within those emigre groups that have already settled in the United States to be particularly difficult. Thus, the normal support mechanism for these individuals among previously established ethnic communities does not exist for them;

6) A concerted, sophisticated and intense program of harassment and intimidation meant to force the defector to return to the Soviet Bloc exists and appears to be expanding in the United States. Although it does not approach the violence, intensity or overtness of efforts in the 1950's and 1960's, its novel psychological methods for playing upon the defector's initial adjustment period are a continuing;

7) All of the above directly and adversely affects our national security given the under-utilization of the defector's

unique talents, the negative impact upon future defections, and the propaganda use that the Soviet Bloc makes of these failings. These problems affect not only the number of future non-intelligence defectors but also the critically important defection of the intelligence officer or other essential alien since their treatment is inexorably intertwined to the would-be defector.

III. THE DEFECTOR PHENOMENA

A) Definition: Who Are They?

Unlike "political refugee," "asylee" or "immigrant" that have clear legal definitions and consequences, the term "defector" has been used to cover a wide range of activities and any number of individuals or events. Thus it has been used to describe the 1986 decision of American scientist Arnold Lokshin to move with his family to the USSR[4], the 1960's espionage activities of Col. Penkovsky within the Soviet Union[5], as well as the recent expulsion of known dissidents such as Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Yuri Orlov[6].

Congress has provided for selective assistance to a very small number of defectors who are of special interest to the the intelligence community . Section 7 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, (50 USC 403h), states:

> Admission of essential aliens; limitation on number
> "Whenever the Director, the Attorney General, and the Commissioner of Immigration shall determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission such alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent residence.... Provided, That the number of aliens and members of their immediate families... shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any fiscal year."

Due to the nature of their mission, these essential aliens are limited to an extremely small number of defectors who for clear national security reasons are afforded the protection and special handling of the Intelligence Community. For the most part, due to their special security problems, these defectors are unable or unwilling to enter the public arena under their real names or identities.[7]

In practice only an exceedingly small number of people fall into this category. The staff found that the bulk of those people one would normally classify as "defectors" have tended to fall outside of this definition, despite the fact that many of them are often privy to important and otherwise unavailable information that would be useful in the public domain for the analysis of Soviet and East European affairs.

Even when this type of defector is eager to contribute his or her knowledge to the analytical community, the staff found that few have been afforded that opportunity. While denying ourselves potentially useful information, we are also compounding an already difficult process of adaptation and integration into this society.

These individuals, unlike their intelligence community counterparts, could be helped to integrate "openly" into U.S. society and afforded an opportunity to publicly expand our knowledge of the communist systems they have left behind.

B) Public Knowledge: Another Vacuum

Despite the importance of defectors and the many problems occurring in conjunction with their treatment, surprisingly little examination has been conducted on this topic in the past. Indeed, the Subcommittee staff found that it was not until 1985 that the first attempt was made to comprehensively analyze this phenomena outside of the confines of the intelligence community.

That analysis, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List, by Dr. Vladislav Krasnov, was based in part upon a KGB "wanted list" of Soviet Defectors, commonly called the Possev material.[8] Having found his own entry among the Possev records and being convinced of its authenticity, Dr. Krasnov[9] selected 470 cases of post-war defection from the Soviet Union (1945-1969) and subjected them to a computer-assisted statistical analysis.

From public records he attempted to bring this analysis up to the present. The purpose of his work was to establish a public tally of defectors in order to determine their importance as well as their bona fides. He hoped that this would make the public and policy makers more aware of their unique needs and usefulness.[10]

Two other scholars have since added their work to our understanding of defectors. Dr. Lawrence Martin-Bittman, himself a Czech defector, has initiated a study into the psychology of defection and its implications upon their treatment in the West.[11] Etienne Huygens, the former Research Director of the Jamestown Foundation and the son-in-law of Zdzislaw Rurarz, the former Polish ambassador to Japan when he defected in 1980,[12] has completed three monographs on the defector question.

Dr. Huygens, working with the same Possev data supplemented by the public media accounts concerning defections, has attempted to perform a review similar to Krasnov's for the other East bloc countries. Dr. Bittman takes this research one step further into the treatment of defectors once they arrive in the West.

To the knowledge of the staff, these individual, under-funded efforts compromise the only public research being done on defection in the United States. No government or academic institution has supported larger-scale public research in this area. No data base or public clearing house for information on defectors has been created from which we could possibly learn more about this phenomena in a more systematic way.

As a result, little is known outside of the intelligence community by the federal government, the Congress and other policy makers about the importance of defection and the problems defectors face.[13] The investigation of this Subcommittee is really the first public Congressional review of the overall defector issue.

C) Defector Trends: Some Useful Insights

All three researchers mentioned above agreed to share with the Subcommittee the results of their work, though limited in scope. Their research and the other information gained during the course of this investigation suggests the following:

1) Defections have plagued the Soviet Union and other communist countries since their inception.

2) Although the numbers of defectors per year have dropped significantly since the construction of the Berlin Wall, the annual rate of defection from the entire Soviet Bloc appears to have increased since 1980. The best estimate from the public data is that less than fifty Soviets successfully defect each year to the West of which the majority come to the United

States. The number of attempts are far higher but even harder to document. The best public estimate places their figure in the several hundreds. The number of non-Soviet defections is even more difficult to determine since most finally settle in Europe where public coverage is intermittent.

3) On the other hand, the annual rate of defection for the Soviet Union appears to have fallen since 1980. According to Dr. Krasnov, this reversal is due chiefly to three factors: first, the improvement in Soviet social conditions has caused many would-be defectors to momentarily pause to wait and see; secondly, more mature, sophisticated and effective efforts of the KGB; and lastly, the failure of the U.S. Government programs on defector resettlement as exemplified in the Soviet press' coverage of Medvid, Yurchenko and others.

4) Unlike legal Soviet emigration which by definition has been limited to unique societal groups, defectors tend to come from all walks of life as well as from all social, professional and ethnic groups,

5) Since 1961, members of the Soviet elite have displaced the conscript as the predominant defecting group. Although the data for the rest of the Eastern Bloc is insufficient for a similar conclusion, it appears to corroborate the Soviet experience.

6) Despite a sharp drop in the number of death penalties and the length of prison sentences given to defectors in absentia, almost all re-defectors face prison sentences upon their return. The severity of the sentence does not appear to have significantly decreased since the 1970's. Statistics are inadequate for determining the penalties meted out to Eastern Bloc defectors.

7) Following periods of internal reform, defections increase rather than decrease for a period of time. In part this is due to thwarted expectations after the "reform" period ends. It also has been suggested to the staff that it may equally be due to the loss of power and prestige by those who are replaced by the reformists. Thus, in the case of the current Soviet regime, whether Gorbachev succeeds or not in "reforming" the internal structure of Soviet society, in the long-run we should expect a noticeable increase in defections within the next few years from the Soviet Union. This may balance out the immediate short-fall in defections while those inside the system wait and see what will happen.

8) The current estimate of Soviet soldiers who have defected in Afghanistan range from 10 to 300. Although neither estimate comes anywhere near to the numbers of Soviet conscripts that defected prior to the completion of the Berlin Wall in 1961, their numbers appear to be increasing. If the war continues, sources caution that we should expect an increase in young,

poorly educated working class and peasant conscripts desirous of fleeing to the West if given a chance.

9) The risk of a fake defector continues to exist. Although Krasnov was only able to identify one defector who was charged with espionage after defecting,[14] the staff was advised that a few recent "re-defections" may have been planned. The threat of espionage obviously exists and must be recognized with appropriate cautions.

In conclusion, it appears that the trend of defection since 1961 has been relatively constant, although the numbers of skills of the average defector have improved. Internal reforms and subsequent repressions will usually increase the numbers of defectors as well as skew their backgrounds to include increased numbers from all walks of life. Based on the limited data available, we anticipate an increase in the number of defections from the Soviet Union simply because Gorbachev has embarked upon an unprecedented public program of reform to the internal system of his country. The irony may be that no matter how successful in carrying out such a policy, the end result should be an increase in the migration of Soviet elite to the West.

If this prediction proves true, then it would appear that the West will be left with the challenge to develop a more coherent program than presently exists to fully utilize this new flow of talent from the East.

IV. DEFECTORS: KEYS TO A RIDDLE

A) Their Utility

The most obvious rationale for viewing the defector as important to the West was offered by a defector. Vladimir Rudolph-Shabinsky, who defected in 1947 and was the first employee of Radio Liberty told the staff that "if the defector wasn't important, why have the Soviets so persistently and severely struggled for so many years to prevent them from getting out and then getting those who did, back inside?"

One answer may be drawn from Winston Churchill's description of the Soviet Union as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma." The Soviets prefer us to view them in that light and understand that the defector offers the West one of the best methods for fathoming the Soviet enigma.

The staff found a general consensus within the intelligence and academic communities, that as a whole, defectors can be extremely important to our understanding of the communist world. The reason for their importance is based upon their previous experiences in a society that is otherwise closed to the West.[15]

Dr. Murray Feshbach, the past president of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies (AAASS), who served as the Soviet Specialist to Lord Carrington when he was the Secretary General of NATO, called the information gathered from those who have emigrated from the Soviet Union as historically the most important sources of information received by Western scholars about the Soviet Union.

Dr. Uri Ra'anan, Director of the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, called defectors one of the most highly informative and sophisticated sources of information available to both American academics as well as government policy makers. As a result of their importance, Dr. Ra'anan and his associates have conducted extensive research into the decision-making process in the Soviet Union utilizing extensive interviews of important defectors and emigres in the West.[16]

Government analysts interviewed by the staff corroborated the importance of the defector in better understanding the communist world. Lt. General James A. Williams (Ret.), the former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, advised the staff that such sources are extremely useful to the analyst as well as the policy maker. Moreover, General Williams advised that the non-intelligence service defector can be just as important to the government as the ex-KGB agent. These individuals, just as much as the intelligence officer, offer first-hand insights into the inner workings of the system. They give the flesh and blood to the skeletal overview that the American analyst can develop from other sources.

Likewise, Rear Admiral William C. Mott (U.S.N. Ret.), Chairman of the Advisory Committee to the National Strategic Materials and Minerals Program told the staff that every high level defector/emigre has a better understanding of the workings of Soviet society than the most learned domestic Sovietologist. As examples of non-intelligence officer defectors that offer such insights, Admiral Mott cited Constantine Simis and Dina Kominskaya, two of the most brilliant Soviet jurists who were closely identified with the defense of the Soviet refusniks before their forced departure from the Soviet Union.[17] The problem as the Admiral sees it, is in getting their knowledge into our educational and policy-making process.

Dr. Tonu Parming, the former Chairman of Soviet and East European Studies at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) of the Department of State views defectors as a unique and important resource that is being wasted by our government. From his experience at FSI he has found them to be immeasurable in educating his students. The defectors' area expertise in some areas can be far superior to that of American scholars and analysts. Parming believes a defector can give an entirely new perspective to certain areas of study that only an insider could possess.

Parming feels that most people in the U.S. government don't know about defectors or their areas of expertise. It is a "hit or miss" process in finding out about them through contacts in the intelligence community. In general, information about them is unavailable.

Parming continually repeated that defectors are an incredible asset to us that we are wasting. Parming says that the defector is currently only being debriefed for security purposes. The government fails to debrief the defector concerning his substantive expertise. This oversight angers the defector since he feels he is being ignored and also wastes their most important contribution to our country's collective knowledge of the communist world.

Dr. Andrew Marshal, Director of the Office of Net Assessment told the subcommittee staff that these individuals act as an extraordinarily good "correction factor" to American analysis. Bringing the cultural context of the Soviet Union to their research, they ensure against the dangerous phenomena of "mirror-imaging" that can creep into western analysis.[18] "Mirror-imaging" erroneously applies Western values onto another culture. Such an approach fails to take into account the fundamental "cultural" peculiarities of the Soviet society which is profoundly different from a Western or other "open society."

The importance of the Soviet "mentality" is extraordinarily important in not only the political arena but also in the analysis of military tactics. Both the Departments of the Army and Air Force have initiated specific programs to analyze strategic and tactical planning in light of the Soviet mind-set. In both cases, their planners advised the staff of the critical importance they place on the use of defectors and emigres in this endeavor.[19]

Surprisingly to the staff, the Department of the Navy either does not have such a program or is unable to "find" it. After repeated unsuccessful attempts to locate such a program through the Navy Congressional Liaison Office, the staff was informed that a rather well-respected Soviet Awareness Program was eliminated during the tenure of Secretary Lehman.

By contrast, the Army has developed two unique programs that attempt to capitalize on the important insights that both defectors and emigres possess. A third program to utilize the defector for teaching Army intelligence officers is on the drawing board awaiting funding approval.

The U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) located in Garmisch, West Germany was developed in 1947 to conduct and administer the overseas training phase of the Army Foreign Area Officer Program for Soviet and Eastern European specialists. The Institute provides a two-year program of graduate-level studies on the political structure, ideology, economic system, history, literature and sociological characteristics of the Soviet Union. The Institute attempts to train the military specialists to "think like a Soviet". As such, they rely heavily upon the native expertise of a cadre of defector/emigre professors in the faculty.[20]

In addition, the Army has recently embarked upon an in-depth analysis and research of open source materials on the Soviet tactical and operational levels of warfare called the Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO).[21] The program, which only became operational in 1986, was necessary in order to deepen the Army's basic understanding of the Soviet way of conducting war. Again, a critical aspect of this program was the effective use of the defector/emigre in order to bring his unique insight into American analysis.

The Director and staff of the Army Intelligence School located at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, also recognized the unique importance of defectors/emigres for national security purposes, viewing them as critical to the effective teaching of Army intelligence officers. They doubted that the typical western-educated Sovietologist could adequately sensitize students to the complexities of the Soviet mind, man and society. All of these elements are critical to the training of an intelligence officer since he is expected to understand how an adversary commander thinks, perceives and processes information and organizes his own command, control and decision-making efforts.

Their need for such critical analysis which, only a defector or emigre could provide, led to their decision to propose a program in which defector Vladimir Sakharov would be a professor at their school. Due to funding and civilian personnel requirements, the proposal failed to come to fruition.[22]

In short, the staff found that defectors can make an extremely useful contribution to our nation's understanding of the Soviet world. They are unique, in this respect, since they are a product of the very conditions that shape the society and decision-making process that our own society needs to understand. In addition, many were so closely in contact with aspects of policy formation and implementation that they can act as sophisticated sources of insight on an ongoing basis far beyond their utility as sources of tactical intelligence.[23]

B) Their Current Use

The staff reviewed the current system for identifying, debriefing and disseminating the unique information and talents of defectors. The staff determined the system to be limited and not systematic outside of the intelligence community.

Such a system does exist for the collection of intelligence information by the government. It involves the screening and debriefing of a distinct number of defectors and emigres for various lengths of time at various locations throughout the world. But, by definition, the scope of these debriefings are limited by the unique missions of the intelligence community.

Professor Ra'anan indicated to the staff that in the course of his "Oral History Project", he interviewed a number of defectors/emigres who had been previously debriefed by the government. They uninformally indicated that the type and depth of his interview was superior to their previous experience. Some of those interviewed stated that they had been in the West for ten or more years and had never been asked those questions before. They added that they had not felt the initial interviews had been as extensive and thorough as the Oral History Project.

The defectors directly interviewed by the Subcommittee staff corroborated the Tufts interviews. As examples: Dr. Peter Nicolae, the Romanian economist, remarked that little of his previous debriefing had dealt with economics, his profession. A number of former diplomats and bureaucrats who did not wish to disclose their identities also indicated similar experiences.

Such limitations in the official government debriefings should not be viewed as a criticism of the particular debriefers or the agencies for which they are employed. Rather, it is significant only as an indication of a possible flaw in the overall system.

The agencies involved in original defector debriefings, by the nature of their work, are preoccupied with the search for "tactical" information. Their needs to prove the bona fides of the defector as well as to obtain time sensitive information are expected to be and are therefore given the highest priorities. They focus on the names and locations of adversary agents, the modus operandi of hostile networks as well as other specific and lethal threats to our national security . As one senior analyst put it, "we don't have the luxury of long-term sociological or politico-economic analysis, we're always faced with short-term crises."

The longer-term analysis of the communist system and the other "strategic" insights that the defector may bring with him are considered secondary.[24] However, to the defector, these issues are more significant since they usually involve his professional interests and his life-time experiences. Eugene Demchenko, who defected in 1971 after a career within the Ukranian Communist Party investigating government and industrial programs, told the staff that most defectors believe they will find someone in the West who is interested in changing the Soviet system and who will, in turn, be interested in their insights and experiences.[25]

Regarding the question of debriefing, the staff also found a number of instances where important defectors, currently living in the United States, had never been debriefed. They had totally slipped through the debriefing system.

Tadeusz Kucharski, a former Polish Commercial Attache who was stationed in Angola for five years, defected with his family in 1983. In order to avoid arrest by communist authorities, they traveled via Portugal on a tourist visa to the United States. Upon their arrival at Kennedy Airport, they asked for political asylum. Other than his initial contacts with the INS and FBI officials at the airport, Kucharski told the staff that no one from the government had attempted to interview him up to the time of the Subcommittee interview. This oversight deeply troubled and perplexed him, causing Kucharski to believe that the government has no interest in the defector's important experiences.

The staff was also informed by officials at the Jamestown Foundation of a number of other foreign diplomats and trade officials who had never been interviewed by our government, even in a cursory fashion.

Aside from those few who qualify for P.L. 110 assistance, contacts with the government for most defectors usually abruptly end shortly after their arrival in the United States. A defector is rarely re-contacted, and if he is, it will again be along the same "tactical" lines of the first interview. Andre Sorokun, a former Soviet exchange student recruited by the KGB before he defected in 1983, is representative of the majority of the defectors the staff interviewed. He commented that shortly after he defected in Japan he was told that he would be recontacted again once he got to the United States. He waited for months but never was, even though he was a trained Soviet and Japanese language and oriental area studies specialist who had worked with numerous children of the Soviet elite.

No satisfactory mechanism exists for the defector to get access to an interested government agency with his information once he is in the United States. Moreover, there is no practical system for various government agencies to find and contact the defector even if it desired to do so. The staff was told by a number of government analysts that even if they know of a defector and would like to interview him, there is no central clearing house for locating that person. Even the Immigration and Naturalization Service is of no assistance since it eliminated the annual reporting requirement for resident aliens a number of years ago due to budgetary restrictions and lack of interest. As a result, the defector who is not resettled under the auspices of the intelligence community is soon lost to government analysts.

Faced with the necessities of learning a new language, finding work and adjusting to a new culture, the defector is preoccupied after his arrival here. Even if he is interested in contacting the government or other interested Americans to tell his story, his primary concern for financial security during his initial stage of adjustment, takes most of his time. Only if and when he is successful at resettlement, does the average defector find the opportunity to be heard -- usually via lectures or book contracts.

By that time, years usually have passed and insights lost or dated. In addition, publishers and lecture circuit agents are generally interested in colorful and dramatic material that seldom provides the refugee with the avenue that he, or trained analysts, would prefer for an in-depth and professional analysis of the area of his unique expertise.

What surprised the Subcommittee staff was that 5-10 years after their arrival, so many defectors were interested in still sharing their insights with the government. A partial explanation for this phenomena was given by a number of the defectors themselves.

Dmitry Mikheyev told the staff that a distinguishing feature of the defector is that he feels he has a mission -- much like a convert to a new religion. He feels he must help his new country and the major way to do so is by sharing his knowledge of the old country.

Lev Alburt, a former Soviet Grand Master chess player, commented that until this "mission" is satisfied, the defector/emigre will always feel frustrated and unfullfilled. Other defectors have indicated that this desire to assist is borne of an intense longing to improve their former system. In essence, they find solace for leaving their homeland by knowing that their contributions to the United States' knowledge of the Soviet Bloc will in turn help their countrymen by better and wiser American foreign policy.

The staff found that the defector's desire to be heard, combined with his understandable ignorance of the vagaries of the American political scene makes him particularly susceptible to the manipulation of some political groups. A number of defectors told the staff that they had unwittingly given speeches or written statements for organizations that misused their information for their own political or philosophical ends. For example, Vladimir Sakharov stated that most defectors can't tell the difference between the American political mainstream and far right- or left-wing fringe groups. Driven by their desire to tell the American people what they know about the Soviet Union, they can unfortunately become unwilling tools for whichever group gives them a platform. He warned that such actions embarrass all defectors and lend credence to those Americans who criticize the defectors as being "extremists."

Regardless of the motives, a majority of the defectors indicated an earnest willingness to help the West. They wanted to pass on to American society an appreciation for Soviet Bloc society and its threat. Few, if any, found an outlet for doing so in our government. Some were able to write, but only a number of years after they defected. The few who have found an outlet to do so in academia, have first had to overcome the almost insurmountable hurdles of language and accreditation to get in. With employment opportunities extremely tight even for American trained scholars, it is becoming even more difficult for the defector to pursue an academic avenue.

Those programs mentioned previously in the military sector are limited in resources and mission. None were set up with the sole purpose of tapping this resource but rather have done so as a by-product of their intended mission. The Tufts University "Oral History Project" also has a limited budget and mission. It will cease operations at the end of its current funding. In addition, although its use of defectors is intensive it is only temporary and does not provide a long-term outlet for them. Thus, to a great extent, their stories and insights remain untapped.[26]

V. RESETTLEMENT

A) The Current Programs: Another Vacuum

While any newcomer to the United States is faced with a host of difficult challenges, defectors often face additional and unique problems that are not currently being addressed by the government or by voluntary organizations.

For defectors not falling within the strict purview of the CIA Act, no government program currently exists designed to specifically handle their resettlement and integration into U.S. society. If assistance is provided at all, it is generally through the services of voluntary refugee agencies that provide resettlement assistance to all refugees coming to this country, and/or through one or two small, voluntary associations created specifically for this purpose but limited in funding and scope.

The major voluntary refugee agencies assisting these individuals include: the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), the Tolstoy Foundation, Freedom House, the U.S. Conference of Catholic Charities[27] and the Jamestown Foundation. With the exception of the Jamestown Foundation, these agencies handle the resettlement of all refugees to the United States -- from Vietnamese boat people, to Soviet Bloc ambassadors. With offices around the world, these agencies have long-standing relationships and experience with foreign governments. They are staffed by trained linguists and social workers who have worked for many years in the area of job placement and resettlement of refugees through offices located across the United States. Geared towards handling refugees from throughout the world, however, the amount of resources they can devote to Soviet bloc defectors and emigres is limited. The Jamestown Foundation, the only agency created specifically to assist Soviet bloc defectors, handles only high ranking defectors as determined by their Board of Directors. As the smallest and youngest of these organizations -- founded in 1984 -- it is limited in the resources and experience that it can offer to the few defectors it assists.[28]

The Directors of all of these agencies emphasized that a significant number of defectors either fall through the cracks, or are provided inadequate assistance relative to their needs and their importance to U.S. policy makers and the U.S. public. Soviet bloc refugees, these agencies assert, face a number of additional problems of resettlement that are unique to their refugee group.

From the vantage point of strict resettlement, for example, the Department of State provides each of these agencies approximately $650 per refugee for their resettlement. Without other means of support, all of these agency directors indicated that this amount is not currently sufficient to cover even basic resettlement procedures. As a result, they attempt to supplement this meager allowance through other state and local welfare programs or rely upon their donors.

This funding problem is only compounded among Soviet bloc defectors and emigres who tend to come from higher standards of living than most refugees to the United States and have even higher expectations. In the words of Vladislav Krasnov, with information "scant and distorted by Soviet propaganda,... most defect in the naive assumption that they will receive a hero's welcome in the West and be treated as cherished allies in a common struggle" against communism. These expectations are dashed not only when they find no hero's welcome, but further when the assistance provided them is barely sufficient to last them more than a few months.

B) Unique Problems: Usually Unfulfilled

In addition to these questions of expectations, the defectors also face a host of more fundamental emotional challenges that often extend well beyond those of their other refugee counterparts -- questions of guilt, suspicion, betrayal, harassment and fear. The emotional burden of having "abandoned their homes, friends, careers, and often their families... in pursuing what they believe is right and necessary,"[29] for example, makes the human adaptation to their new surroundings more difficult, and the frustration more intense when resettlement does not proceed smoothly. Former Soviet pilot Victor Belenko's statement to the staff exemplified this problem, common to all defectors. Even though in his case, he was financially secure upon his arrival to the United States, he felt driven to return based upon this "crisis" that he felt every defector goes through.

Former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko likewise commented on the particular problems of this "adjustment period." Its seriousness, in his opinion is compounded by the usual "lack of understanding of the moral, cultural and psychological ordeal that most defectors go through during their first years in this country." This lack of appreciation for the personal problems the defector faces by American officials or private individuals is further exacerbated by the cultural differences between an American and a Soviet. As he writes in his statement:

> "It is not unusual that cultural differences lead to serious misunderstandings and misjudgments. Sometimes these officials (defectors) seek advice from psychologists or psychiatrists, not realizing that these professionals also lack the understanding of such ethnic and cultural differences. Quite frequently these people forget that they are dealing with individuals who have spent most of their life under the dictatorial regime which proscribed them what to do, where to work, where and how to live. Most defectors had never dared to express their political views even to close friends, for fear of being persecuted. Unfortunately, many people in this country fail to realize that transition from being a slave of the socialist system to being a citizen of a free country can be an agonizing process.
>
> All it takes to resolve this problem is to entrust contacts with the defectors to

> specialists on the Soviet Union, preferably Russian speaking, selecting people who are genuinely eager to help the defectors and to spend enough time and mental effort to understand their troubles. Formal, bureaucratic approach causes more damage than anything else."

Defectors and emigres alike carry a good deal of guilt since "their action, in the view of many, involves betraying a trust of their native country." Ladislav Bittman, a defector himself, who is in the process of studying the psychological trauma of defection, viewed this as one of the more serious problems faced by a defector. In his own case he felt it led to his own reluctance for years to intimately discuss with others his background, feelings, etc.[30]

Likewise, although the defectors themselves may wish to assist the U.S. government, they, too, often view both government and volunteer agencies with a good deal of suspicion as well. Coming from a society where all large government agencies are viewed with suspicion -- and where all large agencies are in fact government owned and run -- defectors often find they view U.S. volunteer and government agencies in the same light.

Suspicion also plays a greater role among Soviet Bloc defectors than among legal emigres -- both the suspicion accorded them by others, and the suspicion with which they often view others, including defectors and emigres who are already settled in the West. Coming from the chief enemy of the U.S., and often having been closely tied in the past with a totalitarian government, they are often viewed with suspicion by other refugees in the U.S., and often by the U.S. public as well.[31] Almost all defectors felt they were not accepted in emigre communities as a result of this. Thus, indirectly, the only support system available to them in the West is denied to them.

This is one of the most distinguishing features of the defector vis-a-vis other emigre groups. He has no community support network to rely upon. Unlike Germans, Poles, Vietnamese or even the Russian-Jewish emigres, there is no "defector" ghetto or neighborhood where he can live, discuss his problems and find mutual support. As Dr. Bittman told the staff -- unlike the rest of the immigrants to America -- "the defector is a loner by nature." Thus, when he is faced with the "crisis" that all of the defectors eventually go through, he usually has no one to turn to -- there being no program in existence to help him.

Victor Belenko mentioned to the Subcommittee staff this "crisis" and how it affected him. "Suddenly," he said, "something triggered a deep meloncholia, a homesickness, a depression that turned him toward thoughts of redefection." If there is no helping and understanding person to turn to, the defector very easily could redefect. Belenko, in somewhat "gallows humor," said that the three ingredients for redefection are:

1) The crisis of depression,

2) An insensitive or unavailable resettlement official, and

3) Being within the Beltway (i.e., close to the Soviet Embassy).[32]

His description of this scenario was confirmed by almost every defector and intelligence officer interviewed by the Staff.[33]

Subsequent Soviet bloc actions often further compound the emotional difficulties of resettlement for Soviet bloc defectors. As many told the Subcommittee staff, Soviet bloc defectors are often subjected to harassment by Soviet agents -- through telephone calls, letters from family and friends left behind, accusations of being a KGB agent, or the like -- who try to make absorption into the U.S. difficult, and often try to encourage the Soviet bloc refugee to return home.

In the words of one defector -- Mr. Vladimir Rudolf-Shabinsky, who from his thirty year experience as a senior commentator for Radio Liberty interviewed most of the Soviet defectors to the West, -- "many of the defectors live in constant fear... Many look for an outlet in alcohol... or want to return to the USSR, where they will in turn be used for anti-American, anti-Western propaganda and afterwards sent to labor camps (as in the case of the sailors of the steamship 'TUAPSE')."

Two nights before speaking with the Subcommittee staff, Rudolf-Shabinsky received such a threatening phone call. In Russian, the caller cursed him and referred to him as "an enemy of the people." He commented that his own harassment has been a constant experience since he published a story of his life in 1966.[34]

Representatives of the Tolstoy Foundation and the International Rescue Committee commented on this campaign of harassment to the staff. They indicated that this campaign to encourage defectors and even emigres to return home has recently intensified. Leo Cherne, Chairman of the I.R.C., had formerly served on the Donovan Emergency Commission to investigate the extraordinary measures of the 1950's by the Soviets to encourage redefection. Although the current campaign is not as "deadly" and "intense" as then, to Mr. Cherne, it is serious enough to be a matter of great concern.[35]

Some examples of this darker side of "glasnost" were given to the staff by the various defectors.

- Ushakov stated that on a number of occasions his car was tampered with when he was staying in Washington. On another occasion he saw some people who looked "like Soviet Embassy types" out in front of his house taking pictures of him and the house.

- As already mentioned, Bronius Venclova, who redefected in August, complained to friends at Radio Liberty that there was a program to get him to redefect that used his family in the Soviet Union.

- Another defector told of tape recordings of his family, pleading with him to return, being sent "mysteriously" to his new address.

- Some of the Soviet soldiers who defected in Afghanistan complained to Ludmilla Thorne of "Freedom House" about attempts by Soviet Embassy employees to entice them into the Soviet Embassy and Consulate by claiming they had letters from their parents and families there to be picked up.[36]

- Lastly, it was alleged by a number of prominent members of the voluntary resettlement agencies that one or more self-proclaimed "Soviet dissidents" now living in the United States were actively involved in convincing one of the Soviet military defectors from the Afghanistan war to redefect. Although the staff was unable to confirm this, the "coincidence" of their location, travel and movements before and after the return of Nikolay Ryzhkov to the Soviet Union, where he is currently serving a 13 year prison term, remains suspicious.

The net result of all of these issues -- practical as well as emotional -- has been mixed. Some defectors have overcome these hurdles, and successfully integrated themselves into the professional world -- even when, as in most cases, this was done without the assistance of the U.S. government or other volunteer agencies, but was due to perseverance and luck. But many others have had inordinate trouble finding jobs, homes, and careers, in some cases leading to their return to the very system they had fled.

It is the staff's conclusion that many of the most successful cases of resettlement have been due to the efforts of individual Americans who have taken it upon themselves to assist the defector. Mark Wyatt, a former intelligence officer, has done probably as much as any other individual private citizen to help the defectors. On his own time and with his own funds, he has arranged job interviews, found housing, made introductions and paid for their travel, and lodging. Yet even Mr. Wyatt acknowledges that this important responsibility should not rely for its success upon the "action of a few highly motivated individuals." He as well as the others who have acted "above and beyond" the call of duty for a private citizen feel that a government system should be set up in order to take the "luck" out of successful defections and resettlement.

IV. CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS

Just as with the question of the utility of an individual defector, it is difficult to judge the specific consequences of a defector who does not teach or an emigre scientist who drives a cab instead of working in his true profession. Moreover, it is even harder to determine the cost to our society of unnecessarily delaying, or even preventing, the use of a defector's unique insight in the public domain.

The more apparent result of such actions seems to be in the adverse impact upon future potential defectors from the Soviet Union. All of the defectors insisted that poor treatment is put to good use by the Soviet press and by internal briefings given to Soviet Government employees, especially before foreign travel. Many intelligence analysts commented that Yurchenko is probably being put to good use by the Soviet government as a guest lecturer for audiences of career Soviet bureaucrats as a warning of what will happen if you defect. It is assumed that only after his usefulness as an internal propaganda tool is over that he will start to serve his "real" punishment.

As University of Kansas, Vice-Chancellor Jerry E. Hutchenson comments in his statement for the record:

> "If those who come to the United States find the assimilation process to be a salutory one, then others will be encouraged to follow. If the experience is a negative one, highly educated Soviet citizens may reconsider defection or choose to immigrate to other countries. Thus, from a political viewpoint, it is in the best interest of the United States to make the transition to the American culture an expeditious and positive experience."

In sum, the cost to our society can best be described as that of "lost opportunities." Although totally unquantifiable since we will never know who "would have defected but for the news of a Yurchenko, etc.," it seems obvious that a system that ignores a defector's unique talents as well as his or her unique problems bears a serious cost in terms of our national self-interest.

[1] For a more detailed description of the Soviet propaganda use of redefection as well as the return of Soviet emigres, see the monograph prepared for the Subcommittee, by Etienne Huygens entitled Return To The Motherland: A Study on Redefection and Reimmigration to Soviet Bloc Countries, as well as Appendix A of this staff report which includes the translations of sample articles recently published in the Soviet Bloc press on this topic.

[2] The power to probe by Congress on behalf of the American electorate is almost as old as that document; going back to 1792, when Congress embarked upon its first oversight inquiry into the disastrous failure of Major General Arthur St. Clair's expedition against the Miami and Shawnee Indians.

[3] On October 4, 1985, Miroslav Medvid, an electrician on the USSR bulk carrier Marshal Konev, successfully jumped ship in the port of New Orleans but was forceably returned by U.S. immigration officials. A detailed analysis of this case is found in the Report of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 1987.

[4] Washington Post, October 9,1986 at p. A29

[5] See generally, "The Defectors" by Col. Vernon Hinchley (1967)

[6] For an extensive discussion of the definition of defector, the Subcommittee received a monograph from Etienne Huygens entitled "The Notion of Defector: Attempt to Define and Compare", which is introduced into the hearing record as a seperate exhibit.

[7] The "essential alien" that is the subject of Section 7 of the CIA Act of 1949 is commonly referred to in the intelligence community as a "P.L.110" due to the public law number of that section.

[8] The official title of the KGB Wanted List is "The Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence, Traitors to the Fatherland, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Collaborators and Other Wanted Criminals." It is commonly called the Possev List because of the name of the Soviet emigre magazine published in Frankfurt, West Germany, which received the smuggled official KGB document in 1977.

It is far more than a mere alphabetical list but rather gives detailed physical descriptions of defectors in the West, their last known addresses and employments as well as the criminal offenses they committed in defecting and the prison sentence they received in abstensia. Its mere existence gives added credence to the concerns expressed by some of the defectors toward their safety.

Although the Possey List is dated 1969, informed sources advised the Subcommittee staff that there is evidence to assume that the Soviet government and the other communist regimes currently use similar "watch lists" to keep track of defectors and prominent dissidents.

[9] Dr. Krasnov is also a defector, having fled from a trade conference in Sweden in 1962 while serving as an editor at Radio Moscow's Foreign Broadcast Division. He is currently a Professor and the Coordinator of Russian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in Monterey, California. His entry in the Possev file with translation is attached as appendix B.

[10] For greater detail, see the prepared statement for the record of Vladislav Krasnov and his book, "Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List" (Hoover Press, 1985).

[11] Dr. Bittman has submitted a statement for the hearings.

[12] Ambassador Rurarz has submitted a statement for the hearings.

[13] Attempts have been made to study the three emigre movements of 1917-1926, 1945-1950 and 1970s. The Harvard Project or Inkeles Study, named after its director, Dr. Alex Inkeles, was funded in the 1950's to interview some of the second wave emigres. Currently the Soviet Interview Project conducted by Dr. James R. Millar is underway to attempt to interview a large sampling of the Jewish Soviet emigres of the 1970's. However, no government entity has deemed it important to do the same with the smaller but critically important group of defectors who trickle in every year.

[14] Ivan Rogalsky, a 34-year old former Soviet seaman who had jumped ship in Spain and came to the United States in 1971 was indicted for espionage in 1977 and later found mentally incompetent to stand trial.

[15] See also, statements for the record of F. Mark Wyatt and Tom Polgar for the intelligence officer's point of view on this subject.

[16] See, statement of Dr. Ra'anan presented at the hearings for a more detailed discussion of the "Oral History Project".

[17] For a more detailed description of their lives, the Soviet legal system as well as the importance of the "second or black" economy in the Soviet Union, see Final Judgement: My Life As A Soviet Defense Attorney, by Kaminskaya (Simon & Schuster, 1983) and USSR-The Corrupt Society by Simis (Simon & Schuster, 1982).

[18] See statement of Dr. Marshal introduced into the record of the hearings.

[19] A pamphlet describing the Air Force Soviet Awareness Program is attached as Appendix C.

[20] Lt. General William E. Odom, Director of the National Security Agency will discuss the USARI program in greater detail during his testimony.

[21] Dr. Bruce Menning, Director of SASO, will submit a statement on this program for the hearing record.

[22] See statement of Major General Julius Parker, Jr., Commander/Commandant, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School introduced into the hearing record.

[23] For a concise yet complete delineation of the important contributions a defector can make to government and society, see the statement of former KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko which is introduced into the hearing record.

[24] Such analysis would appear to the staff to fall within the natural purview of the Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Unfortunately, it appears that the Department of State abdicated much of this responsibility years ago in response to budget considerations. A return to such an effort would appear to be an appropriate endeavor on the part of State.

[25] Mr. Demchenko's interesting career, which would be comparable to the staff of this Subcommittee if the Senate wielded as much power as the Communist party does in the Soviet Union, is fully developed in his statement which is made part of the hearing record.

[26] An example from the private sector of what can be done to better tap the unique resources of defectors exists with the operation of Delphic Associates. Gerald Guensberg, the President of Delphic explained to the staff that he attempts to match-up an emigre/defector with an interested government or industry contractor for research. Delphic has successfully done so on a limited basis since 1980. Unfortunately, it does not provide steady, full-time employment to the emigre nor does it specialize in the socio-political and foreign affairs arenas. However, it does offer an ideal model for further review by the Subcommittee. See, statement of Gerald Guensberg submitted for the hearing record.

[27] See separate statements of these voluntary refugee agencies for a description of their programs.

[28] It should be clearly noted, that nothing in this statement should imply any criticism, whatsoever, toward these or other voluntary refugee agencies. With minimal government assistance they have tirelessly performed excellent work successfully resettling thousands of refugees. If anything, the staff

complements their outstanding accomplishments and the strong support that their volunteers and generous donors have contributed to alleviating the plight of the new arrival to the United States. But even the voluntary agencies acknowledged the need for greater assistance of those refugees from totalitarianism regimes due to the additional problems they face here in the West.

[29] See statement of F. Mark Wyatt who bases his views upon over thirty years of experience with defectors.

[30] See statement Ladislav Martin-Bittman submitted for the record.

[31] This public view is enormously tied to the term "defector" itself. To many, it implies a "defect" or someone who is "defective." This led former CIA Director Allen Dulles to refer to them as "volunteers" in order to overcome this pejorative label. See The Craft of Intelligence, (Harper & Row, New York, 1963).

[32] For a more detailed description see Mig Pilot: The Final Escape of Lt. Belenko by John Barron and Victor Belenko, (1980).

[33] For example, see statements of Wyatt and Polgar for an intelligence officer's view point as well as Krasnov, Costa, Bittman, Belenko, Levchenko, Sakharov, Sorokin and Rudolph-Shabinsky statement for the defector's description of this crises scenario.

[34] See Parallax, by Vladimir Yurasov (aka Shabinsky, Vladimir Rudolph), (W.W. Noton, N.Y. 1966).

[35] See Etienne Huygens monograph Return to the Motherland, introduced into the hearing record, for a more detailed description of this redefection campaign of the 1950's and how the current program closely follows the stages of the earlier Soviet efforts. Huygens argues that the current program is similar to the initial stages of the 1950 endeavor but is just more sophisticated.

[36] For a discussion of the unique problems faced by the Soviet defectors in Afghanistan, see the statements of Ludmilla Thorne and former Soviet Sergeant Nikolay Mouchan submitted for the record.

APPENDIX A

SAMPLE SOVIET BLOC PRESS REPORTS ON DEFECTOR AND EMIGRE TREATMENT IN THE WEST

MOSCOW TV: TUMANOV QUESTIONED ON RADIO LIBERTY

LD034318 Moscow Televsion Service in Russian 1740 GMT 3 Jun 86

["Roundtable discussion" with Oleg Aleksandrovich Tumanov, "former head of Radio Liberty," entitled "The Truth About the Corporation of Lies" with Moscow Radio's D. Biryukov as moderator and the following participants: Viktor Ponomarev from TASS, Viktor Gribachev from ZHURNALIST; Yuriy Dmitriyev from TRUD; Aleksandr Mozgovoy from SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA; Pavel Kuznetsov "representing" the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting; and Vladislav Sarkov and Aleksandr Lopukhin, who are not further identified; date and place not specified -- live or recorded with video showing the participants sitting at tables arranged in a circle]

[Text] [Biryukov] Today representatives of a number of the organs of the Soviet press are meeting Oleg Aleksandrovich Tumanov. He worked for over 20 years at Radio Liberty. Tumanov, having long realized the error of his youth, decided to return to his homeland. It was in this connection that he collected confidential documentary materials about the subversive and intelligence nature of the activity of Radio Liberty and its use by the U.S. services for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union. Upon his return to the homeland, Tumanov handed these documents over to the competent Soviet bodies. Taking into account Tumanov's sincere repentance of what he had done, his voluntary acknowledgement of his fault, his desire to expiate his guilt by taking part in the exposure of the activity of foreign ideological subversion centers and the importance of the information he had supplied, the decision on Tumanov's return to the Soviet Union was made. A representation was sent to the Supreme Soviet for Tumanov's release from criminal responsibility through a pardon.

Today, Oleg Aleksandrovich, we will be asking you some questions about the activity of the radio station and those who work for it. Vladislav Sarkov, first please, arguments and facts:

[Sarkov] Oleg Aleksandrovich, I would like to hear about how Radio Liberty is used to conduct various kinds of anti-Soviet actions and examples of them. I also want to ask what you can say about the links of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Finally, what is the attitude of the present administration of the United States of America and Congress toward these subversive radio stations?

[Tumanov] Well, all the activity of the radio station is in principle subordinated to anti-Soviet propaganda. There are, however, broadcasts and there are what we correctly called campaigns which, so to speak, are conducted on a permanent basis. On a permanent basis, since about 1967, there has been a campaign in defense of human rights in the Soviet Union. At one time the radio station, having established contact with the NTS, [People's Labor Alliance] obtained Samizdat documents through the NTS. At that time they were the first such documents and some of them were actually prepared at NTS; that was not even concealed. That was the beginning. Later, the radio station started trying, so to speak, to get all existing truths and untruths via all possible channels, sometimes prompting these channels and Soviet citizens to sign some materials. It started getting Samizdat materials, mainly devoted to the situation of human rights in the Soviet Union.

What began as a weekly program turned into a daily one. The program is given a lot of attention at the radio station. President Reagan spoke about it and the problem of human rights, at the request of the radio station.

Yes, part of the material for his speech was prepared at the radio station, so that we could hear... I mean the radio station wanted it from the mouth of the President.

That was your first question. The second question, as far as I remember...

[Sarkov] About links with the embassy.

[Tumanov] About links with the U.S. Embassy: One could say that this could even be linked with the first question, because it is via the embassy, the diplomatic mail, that all this material from the Soviet Union finds its way to the radio station. There are people at the U.S. Embassy for this purpose -- the selfsame human rights attache -- who meets various kinds of dissidents, dissenters and gathers the necessary material. The embassy also has a special fund, and part of this money is allocated by the radio station, incidentally, to pay for the services of certain people in whose information the radio station is interested.

[Biryukov] Thank you. Viktor Ponomarev of TASS:

[Ponomarev] Oleg Aleksandrovich, the first to respond to your press conference in Moscow was Redlich, an official of Radio Liberty. He declared, for the umpteenth time, that Radio Liberty has nothing to do with the CIA. The emigre newspaper RUSSKAYA MYSL immediately afterward played on people's naivete by asking how espionage could be conducted sitting at a microphone. How would you comment on this, and, a second question, could you name the CIA officials at Radio Liberty by name and the departments most strongly linked with intelligence?

[Tumanov] Well, Robert Redlich, he is the liaison officer with foreign press organs, mainly with West German newspapers and Deutsche Welle. In principle, he would, of course, be fired straightaway if he said that we -- Radio Liberty -- actually collaborated with the CIA.

Few people know that Robert Redlich himself is an experienced employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. At one time he was head of a military intelligence school in the West German town of Baden Wurttemberg. But what can one say about him as a person? Well, in the West they have this word "playboy" and, as you know, this sort of activity requires a pretty large financial outlay, and at one time, because of misuse of finances, he was all but fired a few years ago from the radio station. But, it seems that some kind of higher authority was set up -- it may have been his command at Langley -- and he stayed at the station.

As far as the RUSSKAYA MYSL newspaper is concerned, first of all I will say a few words about the paper itself. Some 80 percent of the material it publishes is material from Radio Liberty, some of it comes over the air and some from the station's research department. So, in principle RUSSKAYA MYSL is an offshoot of the radio station. And of course, it, protects the radio station in everything it writes.

How can one engage in espionage while seated at a microphone? We must not forget that only a tiny minority of the station's employees actually sit at the microphone -- those who speak directly over the air. It may be that not all of them, say, are actually engaged in espionage activities -- they are journalists, journalists we may say of another hue, and of a different mentality, specially trained, but still, journalists.

[Ponomarev] Oleg Aleksandrovich, excuse me but, in connection with this, what was this intricate organization, this Sparta's bureau, you mentioned at the press conference, could you comment in detail about this?

[Tumanov] Yes, I will now really tell it all. This is very important. On Boulevard St. Germain, house No 193, there is a so-called Audience Research Department. At least that is its official title. A number of people work there. But that is just a part of it, a subdepartment, that is, to the main department. It has its own subdepartments in many towns of Western Europe and the United States of America, say, in Vienna, Salzburg, Copenhagan, Rome -- I could continue this list. What are this department and its subdepartments specifically engaged in? It is headed by Gene Parta, a trained American intelligence officer, and Charles Allan also a trained American intelligence officer, although his cover is that he is an Oxford graduate. Never mind.

In recent years a number of citizens have left the Soviet Union in order, say, to reunite with their families, to Israel, but not all of them go straight to Israel, some of them go to the United States. In these cases these people settle for a while either in Vienna or Rome, where they are, so to speak, checked over by American intelligence. It is not just a check over, but a gathering of information. Parta's bureau has people in these American intelligence departments in Vienna and Rome and also uses information in the sense that it gathers information required by the radio station. This is where they get hold of it, but in some of their other bureaus they gather material for intelligence, that is they provide the material. Some of this material is needed by the radio station with the purpose of gathering information about the quality of the broadcasts, what sort of programs are successful, which should perhaps be axed.

But at the same time -- I saw these questionnaires -- people are asked questions on quite different issues which, in principle, the station should have no interest in whatsoever. These could be questions -- there are questions -- of a military nature, in particular; there are also questions about the development, say, of the road network in the Soviet Union, that also comes into the military field. And immigrants are subjected to obligatory questioning. Delegations come in from the Soviet Union, individual tourists arrive, and these people -- Soviet citizens -- may also be approached and introduced. All the people who work with Parta speak excellent Russian, and perhaps indirectly they gain their confidence, perhaps all different kinds of methods are used, but nevertheless they try to get information that they obtain, say, from emigres. Of course, this might be a minimum of information, but the fact is that in all -- every particle of this mosaic gathered together on one canvas -- provides a very accurate and clear picture of certain events in the Soviet Union.

But one might also say that Parta's bureau in Paris on Boulevard St. Germain is equipped with a special computer, thanks to which information is also summarized along certain parameters, including those which interest the American [word indistinct] military.

In addition, the radio station has a number of departments that operate directly for the Central Intelligence Agency. At the Foreign Ministry news conference I was asked about some of these departments. Among these were the Red Archives, which exists at the radio station. What does it do? People sit there slicing through the Soviet press and placing news items in separate files, filling cards, and keeping card indexes. Nevertheless, all this material that is gathered and sorted in various parameters provides the opportunity to make judgements about many things in Soviet life, for instance about the development of the Soviet economy; about changes at the top in party leadership; and even forecasting, perhaps, these changes sometimes; to speak about foreign policy and forecast, perhaps, future foreign policy. All this material is registered and sent to Washington in the form of a special dossier.

Then there is the Research Department. The Research Department is more specialized and works to order. That means that instructions might come from Washington and material may be prepared, say, on how the research people at Radio Liberty assess the priorities of, say, the 27th congress.

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (FBIS)
USSR - Daily Reports, January 7, 1987, p. CC5.

PONOMAREV DESCRIBES 'SAD FATE' OF DEFECTORS

PM061025 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 5 Jan 87 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS Observer Viktor Ponomarev article written for IZVESTIYA: "The 'Diminishir Returns' of Treachery"]

[Text] "I want to get to America, where I'll be able to say what I like and live as like." This is what, according to his recollections, Murat Karimov, a former Sovi citizen who fled abroad, told the Turkish border guards about his reasons for appeari on their coast. Soon afterwards he was transported to Munich, where CIA staffe checked and interrogated him for 3 months in a safe apartment under reliable guard. was convinced that, being a serviceman, he would be able to "offer" something to t Americans and would receive an "appropriate reward" in return. He was assured that New York there is a "Tolstoy Foundation" which would help him to learn English, fi him somewhere to live, and supply him with pocket money.

Now, months after his arrival in the United States, he sits with (Peyman Pedzhmen correspondent of THE WASHINGTON POST NATIONAL WEEKLY EDITION, and laments his fate: has neither a job nor the promised knowledge of the language to enable him to ea anything and is up to his neck in debt, since he borrows spending money from a frien Aside from the monthly rent for his apartment and $40 to set up home, Karimov sighs, has received absolutely nothing from the foundation.

"Ah yes," the U.S. journalist bitterly echoes him. "Many refugees find the promis land highly inhospitable."

That is the phrase he used for the headline of an article describing the collapse the illusions of former Soviet citizens who have broken away from their motherland a whom he met in America.

Yet another eloquent admission of the unenviable fate of the "former citizens"? have already seen a television movie about them, penetrating in its tragic, bitt truth, and have heard the confessions of those who were once deceived and have return home. It would seem that THE WASHINGTON POST has nothing new to add, and (Pedzhmen's) tears over the "sad fate" of defectors [perebezhchiki] who have betray the motherland would hardly be worthy of attention were it not for an article by o old acquaintance David Shipler, which appeared in THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE in ear December. "Old acquaintance" because until quite recently Shipler worked as correspondent in Moscow and was close to people who love to complain about everythi "Soviet" and to gossip about life over there, across the ocean. So he has firstha knowledge of the essence of the problem.

In the last few years, Shipler writes, defectors from the Soviet Union and East Eurc have discovered that the U.S. Government does virtually nothing to help them adapt life in America... [paragraph continues]

JF-87.2

They start in unskilled jobs totally unrelated to their vocational training... People wash dishes, clean typewriters... They find out that they can rely only on themselves and feel lost in the middle of what they perceive as an endless sea of opportunities...

"What they perceive as" is an extremely apt journalistic proviso. Where is it, that "sea of opportunities"? Let us hear what those who have plunged into it have to say according to, for example, THE WASHINGTON POST. And we quote:

"A refugee from the Soviet Union says: 'The rosy picture presented to you by certain radio stations like VOA while you were still in the USSR suddenly turns into something like a castle in the air or a house of cards collapsing before your very eyes. I recall hearing a VOA program describe how cheap a pound of meat was in the States compared with the Soviet Union, and how some refugee or other had obtained a wonderful job and started living in luxury as soon as he got to the United States. They never directly say to you: Fine, Mr Russian, come to the West and we'll give you everything you can imagine. But I would say that they keep on dropping hints to make people think of taking such a step.' What happens afterwards? 'Both you and good old America are left with a mass of opportunities, except that you haven't the slightest idea on whose door to knock and how the local system works...'"

But it must be said that the system works very well! Here is what THE WASHINGTON POST has to say about it:

Aleksandra Kosta, a diplomat's wife, says that she has "difficulties in relationships" since people do not understand her potential and her needs. She is told: You have children, you are not young, and you will not make a career in the business world. Be a secretary!..

Another woman who left the USSR and who was "pumped" for information for several month in Vienna before being given a visa says that, although she used to be a universit lecturer, she was placed in the charge of a refugee organization in New York, where sh was offered a job on a farm...

What about the "sea of opportunities" and the "mass of opportunities"? Here is wha the actual "bosses" who deal with refugees have to say. Take for example (Leo Marian), executive director of the Tolstoy Foundation. If he is to be believed, as TH WASHINGTON POST notes, this organization is in no way "legally bound to bear financia responsibility for refugees and deserters appealing to the foundation." According t an unwritten agreement between ourselves and the Department of State, (Marian) says, w are morally obliged to keep an eye on our clients for 90 days, but that is all! C course, we receive $560 per refugee from the federal government, but the money is sper mainly on...administrative costs, he adds with embarrassment. As for any promise according to (Marian), who is extremely competent in his field, these hopes stem fr "misunderstandings and lack of information."

Washington lawyer William Geimer read a similar lecture to a NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZI correspondent. He heads the "Jamestown Foundation" private organization, founded Chicago in 1984, which is concerned with "diplomats and members of the intelligentsi from East Europe. He subsidizes 25 of them! One of them repairs typewriters, anoth is still harried by lawyers and creditors... In general, there are quite a f concerns, but as for opportunities...they are just like in another simi organization. That is the "International Rescue Committee" in New York, which iss defectors with...$45 each. So, Murat Karimov should not complain: Others are getting any better "breaks"!

"I often telephone the Department of State," (Leon Marian) says, "and loudly persuade them not to promise escapers, deserters, and refugees that they are going to the promised land. Time and again I ask them not to promise these people anything, because as soon as they arrive here these promises simply evaporate, and this creates problems for all of us..."

But maybe this applies only to the "pawns"? There are also the "big guns" who are looked after by congressmen, parliamentarians, public figures, and — finally — the CIA with its "unlimited opportunities..."

Looked after! For a while...

"There is a grave problem of lack of understanding and aid for refugees encountering various personal and psychological difficulties. They could give serious food for thought in the next decade or so to any Russians who may be wanting to flee to the United States" — this is what worries one of those who fled to the United States and is in the pay of the CIA in return for betraying the motherland and his relatives. There are no pangs of conscience regarding the suicide of his wife, who could not bear the shame of his betrayal, and no concern at all about the "other Russians"! He is scaring his masters because he has run out of money and has been refused further subsidies. This is why the "problem of lack of understanding" has arisen...

The "sea of opportunities" proves to be, even for the "big gun," not as vast as it appears to be from afar. It is rather a tiny pond which dries up quickly an irreversible. As, for example, in the case of Irina Grivnina, whose fate was reporte a few days ago by the Netherlands newspaper HAAGSCHE COURANT.

It is exactly a year since she left the Soviet Union amid scandal, clamor, an hysterics. Ed Nijpels, leader of a liberal party faction, made a great show o "adopting" Grivnina and her two daughters at that time. Robert van Vooren (also know as Johannes Baks), a CIA agent from the so-called "Bukovskiy Foundation," shuttled as courier between The Hague and Moscow under his real and assumed names. She was stil living here and had not composed a single poem, but the magazine ELSEVIERS had alread proclaimed her to be "a famous poet and essayist" and listed her as its "correspondent in Moscow.

A year passed. In a rundown apartment in Amsterdam furnished by the Salvation Arm she complains to correspondent Meuninghoff: "I was used." This is also the headli of his article. Her interlocutor describes her confession as a sobering-up process a an inevitable eye-opener. It is worth a more detailed study to hear at first ha about the "freedom" and "sea of opportunities" offered only to people who ha abandoned their motherland. Here it is, as narrated by the Netherlands journalist.

The first thing that a person finding himself in the West can do is tell all sorts scurrilous stories about the Soviet Union. The propaganda apparatus lines up interview him for 2-3 weeks. He gets the impression that he will continue to listened to with great attention. It soon becomes clear, however, that this is misconception. The "blaze of publicity" diminishes day by day. He finds himself ir society that is not particularly interested in him. There are even sounds irritation when yesterday's "hero" tries to get attention once the storm of passi around him has abated. This is what happened with Amalrik, HAAGSCHE COURANT writ The very same is happening with Grivnina. The West had "a completely incorrect extremely distorted and inflated impression" of her. Members of parliament tried get into her good boods, and she was treated as a colleague at a festive cocktail pa at the editorial office.

But the euphoria was soon over. "I should have adapted sooner in order--to beco master of my fate here," Grivnina smokes nervously while conversing with t journalist, "but instead I let myself be dragged all over the place to appear as dissident..."

She recalls how she went off in hysterics at the Geneva press center during the summ meeting:

"I was inexperienced. Some people wanted me to create a scandal there, and I gave out of emotion."

"You were exploited by politicians, ELSEVIERS, and the 'Bukovskiy Foundation'?" — t correspondent clarifies.

"I fully agree with that."

Only 6 months had passed. She ran out of fresh mud to sling at her former motherla Suddenly her "adoptive father" Ed Nijpels disappeared. She was told at the editor office that she was totally incapable of writing and her contract would not extended. CIA agent Vooren, also known as Baks, also disappeared and therefore she no longer in contact with the "Bukovskiy Foundation."

Grivnina smokes nervously: How quickly the "pond of opportunities" dried up! But will "try" again... She has been offered "support" in Bavaria, where she has b promised she can "live almost for nothing in the home of a success anticommunist..." For a few weeks. The "diminishing returns" of treachery are defector's fate and lot.

"They squeeze everything thay can from these people, and then cast them off," Ship of THE NEW YORK TIMES was told by an American in close contact with defectors. They that means the CIA, the newspaper explains so as to leave no doubts at all, and Rob Gates, first deputy director of the CIA, who is named by the correspondent — and "Jamestown Foundation," we would add for our part. After all, its Vice President Ja Williams told Shipler that neither the CIA nor any other U.S. special service can held responsible for the fate of defectors in general. Williams is another w informed person — former director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency! They incapable, he said, of providing "social services."

Why? And we quote:

"People there believe that anyone who becomes a defector is a traitor from any point view, and they treat defectors like dirt."

TUMANOV CLAIMS U.S. ESPIONAGE AT RADIO LIBERTY

LD021903 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 2 Jun 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Television and newspapers have received many letters requesting a fuller account of the subversive activity of Radio Liberty, the Russian-language service that was headed by Oleg Tumanov. Tumanov recently spoke at a news conference in Moscow. Central television has held a meeting between Oleg Tumanov and representatives of Soviet press, television, and radio:

[Begin Tumanov recording] Radio Liberty as such is headed by Dr Vaslev. Dr Vaslev is a regular officer of the U.S. military intelligence service. The Russian-language service of Radio Liberty is directly headed by Golskiy, Konstantin Vladimirovich Golskiy. He is a regular intelligence officer, a U.S. military intelligence officer, a specialist in the methods of conducting psychological warfare. He is a major. At the radio station there are several sections working directly for the CIA. [end recording] [Video shows Tumanov speaking to eight men seated around a table; the namecards Ponomarev (initials indistinct), D.D. Biryukov, and V.A. Starkov are visible.]

[Announcer] Oldg Aleksandrovich Tumanov, who worked more than 20 years at the radio station, in an effort to put right the mistake he made in his youth, collected confidential material over a long period of time that unmasks the activity of the subversive radio station. Following his return, he handed this material over to the relevant Soviet organs. You will be able to see in full the program "The Truth About the Corporation of Lies" tomorrow immediately following the "Vremya" program.

TASS Report

LD032228 Moscow TASS in English 2219 GMT 3 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow June 4 TASS -- Radio Liberty was set up under the CIA auspices and is still operating under its guidance, Oleg Tumanov, a former editor of the radio station's Russian service, has revealed. A videotape of his meeting with representatives of several Soviet press bodies in Moscow was shown on Soviet television on Tuesday.

According to Tumanov, no one could be hired by Radio Liberty without a thorough vetting by U.S. special services. The radio station was directed by Nikolay Vaslev, an American career military intelligence officer, he said.

In Munich, the "security department" was headed by Richard Cummings, a CIA officer.

Robert Redlich, in charge of Radio Liberty's relations with the press, Vladimir Golskiy, head of the Russian service, Nikolay Petrov, assistant director of the Russian service, and many other senior and rank-and-file employees of the radio station were serving at American intelligence departments, Tumanov revealed.

Radio Liberty, he went on, had departments gathering information about the USSR: "Research Department", "Red Archives", and "Samizdat Archives".

In Paris, there operated a department studying the audience, headed by Jean Parta and Charles Allen (both CIA officers). The department had branches in many Western European cities.

Tumanov said that there existed a special "Censorship Department" headed by CIA official Sam Lion.

Radio Liberty maintained close contacts with branches of U.S. military intelligence having headquarters in Munich and its environs, Tumanov pointed out.

These were intelligence schools specializing in espionage against the USSR. "There are two such schools in Bavaria. One is at the McGrow barracks, the other is in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Students at the two schools have free access to the Radio Liberty area, to the station's classified materials and files, while RL employees deliver lectures at the schools. They train the students, tell them how to behave in the USSR and East European countries, how to establish contacts with Soviet citizens for spying or other subversive purposes. The students then move on to Langley, the Pentagon, and not in the last turn, to the embassy and other missions of the U.S. in the USSR."

YUGOSLAV CITIZENS ENTERING U.S. ILLEGALLY VIA MEXICO

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 20 Apr 86 p 7

[Excerpts] The small town of Tuzi, not far from Titograd. The starting point for many young Albanians from this district near the border, who, using the so-called Mexican connection, depart for the United States without entry visas. Illegally! Just recently, 20 young men aged 17 to 25 departed for Mexico, from which they will endeavor to enter the "promised land."

Because this is a very profitable business, special guides-smugglers will await them at the U.S.-Mexican border, and after receiving $5,000 from each youth, will attempt to get them across the border. Many will long remember their walk through this roadless area as a difficult golgotha. If it happens, as it sometimes has in the past, that the U.S. Border Patrol catches them, each will have to pay an additional $5,000. The Americans return those who cannot pay this amount to Mexico, where a new, no less difficult test awaits them. Unable to endure all these enormous strains, some kill themselves on their journey, and their graves will never be found, which is the most tragic aspect of all this.

"My son arrived in America via the Mexican connection, and when he wrote to me later about all the horrors of that journey, I wept for days," a villager from Vukasin-Lekici on the Yugoslav-Albanian border tells us.

The large-scale exodus of youths to America is a big problem in the district, which, if the present pace of departure persists, will be left without young inhabitants, and it is known what that would mean. Emigration is an old phenomenon in this area, but since the end of 1984 the rate has increased dramatically. The exact number of those who have departed is unknown, but the figure 3,000 is mentioned. Demo Pepic, a member of the Presidium of the Opstina Conference of the Titograd SAWP and a delegate to the Vranj Communal Assembly, estimates that about 2,500 young people have emigrated.

And Djerdj Berisa, teacher of history and former director of the intermediate school, who was among the first to publicly warn about the harmful consequences of this emigration, reports that this plague has affected even elementary school students; they can hardly wait to finish school while hoping for a trip across the ocean.

"Previously young people went to America with their parents. Now they go alone. Anyway, air passage to Mexico and certain other services cost about 200 million old dinars. I think a business has arisen around all this which some of our people in our country are participating in. It is my impression that everything is conducted in an organized manner, from agitation among the youth to their departure from Tuzi. Who knows how many stations there are on that road. Upon their arrival in Mexico these young people fall into the hands of suspicious characters who try to extract as much money as possible from them, even by extortion. Five thousand dollars are no longer enough for crossing the Mexican-U.S. border; because of the favorable conditions, the price has gone up."

One of the four sons of Pasko Dresaj, 56, an agricultural producer from the vicinity of Tuzi, departed for America via the Mexican connection 19 months ago and now lives in Detroit.

"When he left, I felt terrible. However, he was genuinely ill until he left. What could I do? I gave him the money and wished him a safe journey. I have only a little land, and if I divided it into five parts none of us would have any place to keep a cow. Nonetheless, I would have preferred it if my son had remained at home. I know that a difficult life awaits him there. He lives illegally; he does not have a work permit. People like him to the dirty jobs, dodging the police, for if they are caught without residence permits, they will be expelled, as some from this area have been. Their difficulties last for 3 or 4 years, until they obtain work and residence permits. One must wait for that," says Pasko, who was recently in America and witnessed in person the hard lives of many young people from this area.

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COMMENTARY ON LETTER TO REAGAN REGARDING KUKLINSKI

LD191834 Warsaw Television Service in Polish 1730 GMT 19 Jun 86

[Text] Alojyz Mazewski, chairman of the Congress of the American Polonia [Poles living abroad], was offended by the Department of State statement on Kuklinski, an American spy, which, we quote: Does not answer many questions important to Poles and Americans of Polish origin! In connection with this, the Voice of America reports, he sent a letter to President Reagan in which he asked why Kuklinski could not find a job after his arrival in the United States; why U.S. broadcasting stations have not yet interviewed him; and finally, why solidarity was not warned about the planned declaration of martial law.

Had Mr Mazewski acquainted himself with the Polish Government press spokesman's statements, he would not have had to pretend to be absolutely naive and would have understood Washington's embarassment. However, one ought to agree with one statement by the chairman of American Polonia, namely, we quote: The trust and friendship of the Polish nation toward America has been undermined! Let us add: Toward the U.S. Administration, and not for the first time.

WASHINGTON 'SILENT' OVER KUKLINSKI AFFAIR

LD112325 Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 1700 GMT 11 Jun 86

[Report by correspondent Grzegorz Wozniak from New York]

[Text] Not having any convincing arguments, official Washington has fallen silent in the so-called Kuklinski case. However the weekly press has returned to the case. TIME underlines that the State Department has been unable to deny that Kuklinski was a U.S. agent. He was evacuated from Poland by the CIA before the introduction of martial law and he is staying in the United States under an assumed name. TIME also quotes another extract of a statement by State Department spokesman in which he admits that the United States did indeed have information about the activities of the constitutional authorities of Poland, and TIME repeats the spokesman's statement that this information was incomplete.

When confronted with facts -- facts which the State Department also cannot deny -- this last thesis is clearly false, while the activities of the United States in the latter months of 1981 are politically and morally repulsive.

KGB

DEPUTY CHIEF ON 'ANTI-SOVIET ACTIONS'

141219 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2314 GMT 13 Jun 86

[Text] Moscow, June 13 (TANJUG) -- First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Security Committee (KGB) Filip Bobkov has disclosed that around 3,000 anti-Soviet actions were undertaken in the past year, which he said required a higher alertness on the part of Soviet citizens.

In article published in the party magazine POLITICHESKOYE SAMOOBRAZOVANIYE (POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION), Bobkov writes that the perpetrators of the anti-Soviet actions were "anti-Soviet emigre, nationalist, and Zionist organizations". The actions, as he notes, included the planting of explosives and fires, the use of fire arms, bribes, and violence.

The first deputy KGB chairman notes that "numerous Soviet citizens were threatened or humiliated, beaten or robbed", and singles out the provocations staged during guest tours abroad of Soviet artists.

Bobkov writes in the article that the foes are trying to paralyze Soviet institutions working abroad, and that Western intelligence services "have been showing an increased interest in the Soviet scientific-technical, military, and economic potential".

He reports that "in the past few years, criminal proceedings have been instituted against a whole range of employees of Soviet foreign-trade organizations for receiving bribes and betraying the interests of their country".

The first deputy KGB chairman also makes note of attempts to fan inter-nationality discord, naming, in addition to Western radio stations, Iran radio, which, as he says, is spreading "pan-Islamic propaganda" in the Soviet Central Asia and Kazakstan.

RETURNED EXILES CRITICIZE U.S. WAY OF LIFE

LD282038 Moscow TASS in English 1717 GMT 28 Oct 86

["Fleeing From the Statue of Liberty" -- TASS item identifier]

[Excerpt] Moscow October 28 TASS -- News analyst Aleksey Grigoryev writes:

The great Russian writer Ivan Turgenev once said that Russia can manage without each of us while each of us will never manage without her.

These words invariably come to my mind when I learn about the return of yet another "has been". Mikhail Gorokhovskiy, born in Soviet Ukraine, spent abroad almost nine years ("No", he specifies, "exactly 5,020 days"). An ordinary driver, maybe he never knew these lines from Turgenev but in Washington he would come to the Soviet Embassy with a poster reading "One can live without one's father or mother, but life is impossible without one's motherland".

After experiencing all the "unlimited possibilities" of the American way of life — unemployment, exploitation, rightlessness and cruelty — Mikhail Gorokhovskiy was permitted by the Soviet authorities to return to his homeland.

Israel Glikman, a former resident of the Black Sea port of Odessa, was met at Mosocw's Sheremetyevo Airport by his wife and nephew. His daughter could not come because of her two small children. Glikman did not have any grandchildren twelve years ago when he was leaving for Israel and than on to the United States. "How right was my wife Sonya when she flatly refused to go with me", he said.

Aleksandr Belikin arrived on the same flight from New York after ten years in the United States, or "ten years in prison" as he described them.

Human lives, difficult human lives. These people did not leave the Soviet Union for the sake of unifying families. Many of them, like Glikman, left without their wives and children. The promises of Western propaganda made them giddy. Many, like Gorokhovskiy and Belikin, lost their families in the West.

Why had they left the Soviet Union? "I fell for Zionist propaganda and lost my senses," says Gorokhovskiy. "He gave in to the persuasions of a relative and was deceived by him", said Glikman's wife.

But that is only a part of the story. It is not by chance that only on finding themselves in the West, in the shadow of the Statue of Liberty that these people had really come to appreciate what they had in the Soviet Union, took for granted and did not appreciate: genuine rights, and not just rights on a piece of paper, to work and housing, to education and medical treatment, relations of human concern and mutual assistance. They took it all for granted as something as natural as the air, water and the sun. "All this simply must exist in America as well which is also a land of 'unlimited opportunities,'" they reasoned.

Everything turned out to be different. This was the topic of a recent press conference at the Soviet Embassy in Washington held by former Soviet citizens who were permitted to return home. They spoke at length and in detail but the coverage of this press conference in the American press was very scant and limited mostly to words about nostalgia, about a longing for friends and relatives, birch trees and the Black Sea. For the American press to quote the words of the participants in the press conference about the cruelty of the "free" society, its hypocricy, the money cult and abasement of the individual would be tantamount to passing sentence on that society which, incidentally, is capable of wrecking the lives not only of those who have grown up in a different social enviornment.

The Western propaganda is now trying to hold these people responsible for their recovery of sight and presenting them as good-for-nothings incapable of finding a place for themselves in the world of free enterprise. [passage omitted]

SOVIET SEAMAN DISCUSSES NEW ORLEANS 'PROVOCATION'

LD040945 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 3 Mar 86

[Text] Four months have passed since the American authorities in the port of New Orleans staged a provocation against the Soviet seaman. Radio Moscow's Anatoliy (?Ilchinko) has met with the 26-year-old seaman, Miroslav Medvid, and sent in this report.

Miroslav was born and spent his childhood in the Ukraine. Now he lives in the city of Lvov. He says he hasn't recovered yet from what he experienced in the American port last October. About his condition he had this to say:

"I'm still undergoing medical treatment, staying at home, trying to forget everything. I lived through as a result of the provocation. I spent 2 months with my parents in the village of (?Solets) in the Trans Carpathian Ukraine. My mother is working in the local farm cooperative and my father is a miner. He began working in the pit almost 30 years ago. Meetings with relatives and friends have been the best medicine. I was so psychologically depressed that only positive emotions could pull me out of the crisis."

What led to the crisis happened on 24 October last year. The Soviet ship Marshal Konyev arrived at the port of New Orleans to take grain on board. In the evening Miroslav, an electrician, was checking the lighting. One of the searchlights on deck was out of order; Miroslav tried to reach it, but slipped and fell overboard.

An American motorboat was passing by and fished the seaman out, returning him to the ship. It seemed nothing extraordinary had happened, except that Miroslav was bruised when he fell and was taken to the sick bay. However, a few days later the American authorities arrested the ship. They did not explain why. Here's what Miroslav Medvid recalls:

"On 28 October, when I felt better, representatives of the American authorities arrived. They said they wanted to take me to a Red Cross clinic. I said no I wouldn't go. They said they would ask me questions at some other place. They insisted I go with them to an American vessel to talk. I said I would if my fellow countrymen accompanied me. As a result, two men from our embassy in Washington -- the captain, the doctor, and myself -- went to a U.S. Navy launch. There I was treated in a high-handed way, with a light shining in my face. There were many reporters around me, and probably 30 if not 40 policemen behind me. I could not understand what was happening, and I was again beginning to feel bad. I had a splitting headache; I limped in my right leg and had an injured arm."

However, Miroslav quickly understood what the representatives of the American authorities were driving at when they began to persuade him that he had deliberately jumped off the Soviet ship to escape and ask for political asylum. At the same time, they tried to persuade him to defect. He was promised all the boons of life in America. When he said he was a Soviet citizen and was not going to remain in the United States, the Americans pretended not to hear. But hard as they tried to provoke the Soviet seaman, they failed to achieve what they wanted; so they had to lift the arrest of the Soviet ship and let Miroslav go home. Nothing came either of the provocative noise raised by emigrants of Ukrainian origin. They all were former criminals who collaborated with the Nazis during the Second World War and who had found refuge in the United States after the war. But what about Miroslav? What plans does he have for the near future?

"I'd like to resume work as soon as possible, and also I'd like to enroll at Lvov University to study law."

U.S. 'ESPIONAGE' ACTIVITIES IN USSR DETAILED

PM241609 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Jun 86 Morning Edition p 6

[V. Vladimirov Article: "The Fall Meeting Will Not Take Place: Failure of a Pentagon Intelligence Agent"]

[Text] Moscow, Kastanayevskaya Street, 7 May 1986. The twilight is rapidly deepening. The woman standing by a car with a diplomatic license plate from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow glances timidly from side to side. She looks tensely in the direction from which the man she is waiting for should appear. She is Ursula Sites, an American. She is waiting for Eric Sites, her husband, a professional intelligence agent listed on the U.S. Embassy payroll as a civilian assistant to the defense attache. She is waiting for his return from a spy meeting in order to immediately deliver him and the expected "catch" to the premises of the intelligence department at the American Embassy, which are reliably protected by the Marines.

Ursula will be waiting a long time, hoping desparately, before she realizes that Eric Sites is not going to return to the rendezvous with her on Kastanayevskaya Street...

At that time Eric Sites, civilian assistant on the apparatus of the defense attache, has quite different concerns: He has been caught red-handed during a conspiratorial meeting, carefully prepared for by the U.S. special services, with an agent recruited by American intelligence, and is watching in anguish as the tools of the spy's trade are removed one by one from the blue bag he was intending to give to the agent. Here is a "Kharkov" electric razor -- in reality adapted to act as a container for storing spy equipment. The most thorough external inspection will not arouse any suspicions. That is the intention: Nobody must have any idea that there is a secret compartment inside that can conceal a mini-camera the size of a tube of toothpaste designed for photographing secret documents. Here is a little cardboard box with a souvenir writing implement manufactured at the Moscow Writing Materials Plant named for Sacco and Vanzetti. In this, too, the American espionage "craftsmen" have fitted a secret compartment. It is in a little depression covered by a metallic plate, designed for a mini-camera.

A phial is taken out of the bag: Our pharmacists sell vitamins in these phials. Inside are tablets designed for invisible writing; they have to be dissolved in water. Envelopes with addresses in the United States are laid on the table. Ordinary envelopes such as can be bought at any kiosk. In them are letters in English, harmless in content; the authors share their impressions of a tour of our country, they like our historical and cultural monuments. Similar letters, but written by American tourists, leave our country by hundreds and cross the ocean. But these two are special. They were to have provided the cover for espionage reports to the intelligence center. The addresses on the envelopes are genuine, the address are one (Rudi Komak) in Brookfield, Wisconsin, and one Arnold (Iston) in (Bvern), Texas. The agent must enter an encoded text on the margins of these letters or between the lines, in invisible ink. If the report is important, American intelligence instructions advise duplicating the letters and dropping them in different mailboxes. It seems that the fatherly dressing-down which the U.S. Congress once delivered to the special services about interference in the private lives of American citizens has already been forgotten.

Finally, a notebook appears, in no way remarkable in appearance, except the cover is slightly swollen, as if it had absorbed moisture. There is another secret compartment in the cover. American intelligence instructions to the secret agent are concealed there. They give instructions on organizing future meetings, detailed diagrams, and calls for special vigilance.

On the pages of fine script, the most important thing is the American intelligence service's list of topics of particular interest. The intelligence leaders ask the agent for information about the tactical and technical characteristics of aircraft, the location and purpose of defense facilities, and the personnel working there. "We wish you a pleasant summer and await a meeting with you in the fall." These words complete the message from the U.S. intelligence center to its agent in the Soviet Union.

The evening of 7 May. Malaya Priogovskaya Street. The twilight is thickening still more over Moscow and the breeze carries a scent of popular resin. There are quite a few people on the street. Sites is in the yard of Apartment Block No 22. The spy meeting is to take place here. The passers-by and the inhabitants of the block who are sitting on the benches on this warm May evening hardly pay attention to him. Eric Sites is indistinguishable from a Musovite: He wears jeans, a check shirt, a zippered jacket, and a cap bought in a Moscow store. He carries the blue bag that by now is familiar to readers. Sites looks nervously from side to side. It seems there is nothing suspicious. At exactly 2115 a man appears carrying a rolled-up newspaper: that is the sign. Sites approaches him, gives the password, hears the answer, and invites him to take a walk... Caught red-handed, Sites stands deathly pale, as if thunderstruck. He will remain in that state for a long time.

As for the Soviet citizen, who is an American intelligence agent, he has been arrested, and an investigation is in progress. There is no doubt that he will get what he deserves. That is really all we can say about the failure of this major espionage action by American intelligence and the ignominous end of the latest "crusader" from the Pentagon.

As for Eric Sites, a resolute protest was convyed to the U.S. Embassy and that country's defense attache about his espionage activity. Sites was declared persona non grata and quickly dispatched to the United States.

The Washington administration, White House Deputy Press Secretary L. Speakes stated, will not comment on the accusation of espionage against Sites. Yes, the case is so obvious that commentaries, as they say in these cases, are superfluous. That was evidently what the official American spokesman meant.

Let us spare Larry Speakes this unpleasant duty. Let us comment ourselves on what happened.

Reporting Sites' expulsion from the Soviet Union for espionage, American news agencies noted that prior to him, Embassy Second Secretary Michael Sellers had been the last American with a diplomatic passport told to leave the USSR for similar reasons. This is not an exhaustive list of exposed American intelligence agents expelled from the USSR recently. U.S. Embassy employees, Third Secretary Peter (Bogatyr), attache Lewis Thomas, First Secretary Richard Osborne, Second Secretary Paul Stambaugh, and Lon Augustenborg and Richard Muller, employees at the U.S. Consulate General in Leningrad, were expelled for espionage. Third Secretary (D. Makmekhen), Counselor Peter Semler, Second Secretary Jospeh McDonald, and Alex (Grishchuk), civilian assistant to the defense attache, were exposed. Intelligence agent Martha Peterson, who used the diplomatic cover of an embassy secretary and archivist, was detained while carrying out an act of espionage. Vincent Crockett, speical assistant to the U.S. defense attache, was caught red-handed.

American intelligence agents do not lack cynicism and blatant self-confidence. U.S. Assistant Naval Attache Lipscombe, who was detained while carrying out an act of espionage, stated unceremoniously that he was operating on the direct instructions of his leadership, which had tasked him with ... "monitoring the situation at Leningrad industrial enterprises."

The basest methods were demonstrated by U.S. Assistant Air Force Attache Wolf, who with the assistance of a Canadian colleague stole official [sluzhebenyy] documents from an Inturist worker's desk in Kazan when she left her "visitors" alone in her office for literally a minute.

As in the case of Mr and Mrs Sites, American intelligence agents Assistant Military Attache Reppert, Assistant Naval Attache Henry, Vice Consul Augustenborg of the U.S. Consulate General in Leningrad, U.S. Embassy First Secretary Osborne, and others, who enlisted their wives in espionage activity, demonstrated an original form of "family espionage" to the world.

The Italians say that two coincidences make a phenomenon. But what if we are talking about dozens of incidents that become more frequent with every passing year? This is a trend compelling serious thought.

The conclusion is unequivocal: The United States is attempting to expand intelligence activity agianst our country. According to American press information, it is planned to allocate $24 billion to the U.S. special services from the budget in fiscal 1987 (by comparison they received $10 billion in 1979, and it is believed that this figure will reach $30 billion in 1990). The main resources and efforts of the American special services are directed against the Soviet Union. U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger spoke at closed congressional hearings some time back. The defense secretary, THE WASHINGTON POST writes, named the biggest recipient of intelligence information. It is the Pentagon.

The American special services have joined frantically in the "crusade" against our country. They are hotly pursuing our defense secrets. However, it would do the new-found "crusaders" no harm to remember how such crusades end. The Sites episode provides further confirmation. The "fall meeting" will not take place.

WOULD-BE EMIGRES DECIDE TO REMAIN, CITE REASONS

Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 19 Mar 87 p 3

[Article by SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA special correspondent A. Kurbatov: "'Please Return my Application to Emigrate...', or Several Interviews at the Final Boundary"]

[Text] An old detached building on one of the quiet streets in the center of Moscow. In the reception line, there is a man of about 50 and a man and women of the same general age. Closest of all to the door of an office, where an employee of the visa administration will see the visitors, sits a no-longer-young, loudly-dressed woman. In well-delivered tones she is informing her neighbor and, it turns out, everybody else as well that: "I have been living "in refusal" for two years. It's not so terrible! Good people will always help. The main thing is to fight until you win." Is she buoying up her neighbor or sharing experiences? I already knew what a "refusednik" is --this is a person whose request to emigrate has been refused. The reasons are varied: some have been connected with work, the nature of which touches upon the security interests of our country, others have aged parents who are dependent upon them and need their help, or minor children... With us, as in other countries, people have not only rights, but also responsibilities.

Receiving hours still have not begun. Hushed voices, half whispers. It seemed to me at first that I had landed in a line where everybody knew each other well. I now have the impression that I am in home where ... there is a dead person. The faces of the people reveal now fright, now confusion, now eerie curiosity -- it is frightening and, at the same time, you want to watch them.

Somebody in the line is now talking about acquaintances who have settled themselves very well "there" -- and hope flares up on the faces. But, somebody drops the rejoinder that "Mikhail Isakovich has not been lucky"., and the faces of everyone grow long. And it seems that many of them want to get up then and there and leave the reception room...

I ask my neighbors about the recent television broadcasts of the film "Byvshiye" (The Have-Beens). They have seen it, and they watched the press conference with those who had returned to the motherland. From the way that they answered me, from certain of their rejoinders, I realized that these people, in general, are greedily searching out any information that come "from there". But...

"Your television exaggerates everything!" This was the rejoinder thrown by a man of 35 years who, with seeming detachment, was studying an English-language textbook for upper school students.

Reception hours begin. And I go up the second floor, to the office of the deputy chief of the visa and registration administration (UVIR), A. Zinchenko, in order to obtain telephone numbers of people who have withdrawn their applications to emigrate from our country. There are getting to be more and more such requests every month. They told me to select any telephone numbers I wanted from two large piles of file folders, which had been prepared for sending to the archives.

The first call. Aleksandr Vladimirovich N. decisively refuses to meet with a correspondent:

"I would like to bury the past," he says. "We are trying to forget the stupid thing that we almost did with the entire family."

"Perhaps your experience will help others," I say.

"You don't know much about the psychology of those people who are bursting to go abroad," laughed my telephone conversation partner. "You won't stop them with words." They consider that the choice of a future is an especially individual thing. They don't need advisors."

"And what caused you to stop?"

"Various thoughts... If a person is not a fool and not an adventurist, he won't want to play the lottery. For us, you know, things are somehow calmer. A genius, you are not; everyone has the possibility of living normally. And there, if you don't want to take chances, you may end up under the hoofs."

Next Call.

"You know, I am a member, for sure, of that catugory of unrecognized geniuses, of which there are many among the people who are leaving. It seemed to me that, on the other side of the ocean, they would be able to judge my capabilities according to their worth." says an engineer at one of the plants in Moscow, Georgiy Konstantinovich M.

"And now it doesn't seem this way to you?"

"Do you want an honest answer?"

"Yes."

"I really am capable of a lot. But I was frightened of the loneliness. I sometimes receive letters from friends who went there earlier. There is a mortal melancholy in them. They have turned their apartments into dormitories

-- if only to have company, their tears flow over gypsy songs in cheap bars... And what do I need all this for? And, in general, a letter I received from a close lady friend, who would now like to return to the motherland, made a very strong impression on me. Do you know what shook her most of all in the United States? The reaction of parents to attention paid to their children! For us, it is a usual thing to praise an unknown child, to smile at him, but there, this is a danger signal: aren't they playing with him so as to steal him? This vexed her to the point of tears, because she loves children, is drawn to them. For some, and for me personally, this fact has been etched in memory, and I have understood that there we, who have grown up in a completely different environment, would simply be like people from another planet."

I call another number. Lidiya Davydovna Klyuzner also agreed to answer my questions.

"What drew me abroad? My children. They left for Israel several years ago, then moved on to the United States. Do I need to say how much I missed them? And so, somehow I made the decision and was getting ready, but then I thought it over: what awaits me there; who needs me, other than my children? And is it possible to be happy in a home where a foreign world lies beyond the threshold? Here I have an apartment, a decent pension, people who are close to me, with whom I can get together and talk in my native language. The motherland, don't you know, doesn't make changes and doesn't make choices."

Still another call. Savelii Mikhaylovich Linnik is in mourning -- he recently buried his wife. He could meet with a correspondent, but it would be better in about two weeks, in a month.

"I have to get myself together. Such a loss. But I have something to say to those who have frivolously agreed to leave for abroad. No matter what golden promises they made us there, we couldn't leave our motherland. I and my wife wrote this in our request to remain. And, indeed, we were a special case.

"My wife was hopelessly ill -- cancer. Her sister, who lives in the US, wrote that she needed to try change in climate, to be seen by a foreign specialist. We grasped at this straw and submitted an application to UVIR to leave. But, later, we thought it over: how would we feel outside our own home, in which even the familiar walls help? My wife and I lived a long life together. We had something to remember and to understand, which we would lose. I once spent 3 weeks on an assignment abroad. The first week, it was interesting for me. The second went by -- I had an irrepressible urge to return home. The third week was torture... And it will be this way with every normal person, particularly one who has grown up in our environment. Here, in our country, there are differences in the material well-being of people, based on their work. But this differentiation is insignificant in comparison to the capitalist world, You know, a normal person needs only to see the fashionable store windows there, with an impoverished child on the sidewalk next to them, in order for him to understand everything: where social justice is real, and where it is imaginary. Is it really possible for everyone to live equally in a society where they consider inequality to be the norm?"

APPENDIX B

SAMPLE ENTRY OF THE KGB WANTED LIST (VLADISLAV KRASNOV)

КРАСНОВ Владислав Георгиевич, 1937 года рождения, урож. г. Перми, русский, образование высшее, бывш. редактор шведского отдела Государственного комитета при СМ СССР по радиовещанию и телевидению. Среднего роста, волосы русые, лицо овальное, рот большой, губы тонкие, нос прямой, основание носа широкое, ноздри большие, носит очки. Отец Краснов Георгий Николаевич. Мать Краснова Екатерина Ивановна, брат Краснов Герман Георгиевич, сестры Краснова (Зонтова), Зоя Георгиевна, Краснова (Кокинская) Любовь Георгиевна, зять Кокинский Валерий Борисович проживают в г. Перми.

Находясь в Швеции в составе группы советских туристов, 26 октября 1962 г. обратился к шведским властям с просьбой о предоставлении ему политического убежища. 22 января 1963 г. в г. Стокгольме выступил на пресс-конференции перед представителями буржуазной печати с клеветническими заявлениями о советской действителности. В Швеции проживал до января 1966 г. С 1966 г. проживает в США, где учится в университете и преподает уроки русского языко. Имеются фотокарточка и образец почерка.

Розыскное дело в УКГБ при СМ СССР по Пермской обл.

KRASNOV Vladislav Georgievich, born in 1937 in the city of Perm, Russian, university graduate, former editor of the Swedish Department of the State Committee of Radio and Television Broadcast at the CM of the USSR. Medium height, light brown hair, oval face, large mouth, thin lips, straight nose, wide at the base, with large nostrils, wears glasses. Father Krasnov Georgii Nikolaevich, mother Krasnova Ekaterina Ivanovna, brother, Krasnov German Georgievich, sisters Krasnova (Zontova) Zoya Georgievna, Krasnova (Kokinskaia) Liubov' Georgievna, brother-in-law Kokinskii Valery Borisovich reside in the city of Perm.

While visiting Sweden with a group of Soviet tourists, on October 26, 1962, turned himself in to Swedish authorities asking them for political asylum. On January 1963, appeared at a press conference before representatives of the bourgeois press with slanderous statements about Soviet reality. Resided in Sweden until January of 1966. From 1966 has been residing in the USA where he studies at a university and gives Russian-language lessons. A photograph and handwriting sample are on file.[12]

APPENDIX C

The Air Force Soviet Awareness Program

The USAF Soviet Awareness Program

—an AFIS mission

by Capt Jack J. Nettis, Jr.
AFIS/INC

Photos by Sgt. Robert Chambers
Det. 4, 1361st AAVS/Bolling AFB

Capt. Jack J. Nettis Jr.

The U.S. audience sits motionless as the Soviet colonel chides them saying: "You do not know what war is: you have not had your towns bombed; families murdered in front of you: and mothers, sisters, and wives raped by Nazi soldiers." The emotion with which he speaks is chilling. The colonel goes on to say that such thoughts are alive in every Soviet citizen over the age of 45 and are kept alive for future generations by the efforts of the party and the people. He then berates the audience by ascribing virtually all the ills of the world to America and all the positive influences to the USSR. When the tirade is finished, the American audience is stunned and angry.

The scene described above seems unlikely until you know that the Soviet colonel is actually a USAF officer at a USAF Soviet Awareness Program. The USAF officer, in his role playing, is trying to educate an American audience on Marxist-Leninist ideology and the Soviets' perceptions of the world. Everything said in the lecture is an accurate portrayal of Soviet stylized propaganda and is derived from Soviet writings. Far too few Americans are aware of these perceptions and, as a result, are often easily duped by Soviet propaganda, or put on the defensive in a conversation with a Soviet citizen.

The USAF was the first of the services to create a program to make its members more aware of who the Soviets are, how they think and why they think so differently from us. The program was begun in 1976 at the direction of the USAF Chief of Staff, General David C. Jones, who agreed with a task force assessment that most Air Force members and their families knew little about the U.S.'s prime adversary. The program from its inception has dealt with the historical, socio-economic, and military factors which bear upon the actions and decisions of the USSR.

Colonel Lloyd T. Moore, Jr. is the Director of this program, which is now headquartered in new facilities: building 1304, Bolling AFB.

The Soviet Awareness Program has tried to reach as many Air Force members, their families, and friends as



Lt. Col. James M. Simpson and MSgt. Russell A. Logan Jr.

Dr. Robert Moore

Maj. Orr Y. Potebynya, Jr.

possible through two basic means: the spoken word and the written word.

Soviet Affairs Publications Division

The written portion of the Soviet Awareness Program is delivered by the Soviet Affairs Publications Division (INCF), headed by Major Orr Y. Potebnya, Jr. This division is also unique in the US Government since it is the only body whose primary focus is the translation of Soviet military writings. The Soviets have numerous professional military journals and newspapers which openly discuss Soviet military life-styles and, more importantly, their doctrine and tactics. These works are screened and selectively translated for publication in a bimonthly periodical known as *Soviet Press Selected Translations*. Recent articles of special interest include a four-part series, "New Features of Air Combat," a Soviet analysis of how air combat has evolved due to the influences of modern aircraft and technology. Other articles have addressed such important topics as the U.S. Army's new Reconnaissance/Destruction Systems and the Strategic Defense Initiative. We often think of the Soviet press as so "controlled" that it is of no analytical use; however this is definitely not the case.

In addition, INCF also is extensively involved in the translation of whole books mainly from the Soviet Military Officers' Library. These books, which the Soviet Officer is expected to read, are part of the "Soviet Military Thought" series (see pages 6 and 7). Some of the books, such as *Military Psychology*, the *Officer's Handbook* and the *People, Army, and the Commander*, give a rare look into Soviet tenets of leadership and what effects and problems can be experienced by subordinates in various situations, including during operations in nuclear environment. Another book, *Fundamentals of Tactical Command Control* discusses their view of the command and Control management function. These publications, plus the others which the division produces, are used extensively both within DOD and throughout the academic community. (The Directorate of Soviet Affairs is an anomaly in DOD in that it has produced revenues approaching $1 million over the years.)

Soviet Military Power Lecture Series

The oral presentations are delivered by the Directorate's Soviet Awareness Division, headed by Lt. Col. James M. Simpson. Over the past ten years, the Soviet Military Power program, an 8-hour set of lectures, has been given to every major Air Force base worldwide, reaching over 150,000 members. The lecture series, given at the SECRET level, attempts to reach all levels of Air Force personnel from airman basic to general officer; and ranging from the civil engineering troop and fightline mechanic, to the medical technician and intelligence specialist.

The program begins with a discussion of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The audience hears the same statements and arguments currently used in Soviet propaganda. The audience finds it very enlightening to see how the Soviets view history and the United States. For instance, few Americans realize the xenophobic concerns of the Soviet people. Just in this century, the Soviets have fought two major wars (WWI and WWII) a revolution, and a civil war. In WWII their loss of 20 million people (the U.S. losses in WWII were approximately 300,000) left their citizens and leadership with a very deep concern for defense. They see themselves surrounded by potential enemies — China and the NATO countries. Every Soviet citizen, after years of being reminded by his government, is quick to tell Americans that after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 it was the British, French, Japanese, and also the Americans who invaded their country trying to eliminate the new Bolshevik Government.

However, the Soviet view of history is not always accurate nor complete. For example, their heavy losses during WWII can be attributed to many causes which they brought upon themselves, such as eliminating their senior military staff during Stalin's purges prior to the war. Also, Stalin failed to heed warnings from his own intelligence network of the impending Nazi attack because he didn't believe Hitler, with whom the USSR had signed a secret pact in 1939, would attack the USSR. Furthermore, in their darkest days during WWII, the U.S. sent large amounts of military equipment to help them fight the Nazis. However, when a Soviet confronts an American, few Americans are able to respond to Soviet rhetoric because Americans are simply ignorant or unaware.

This discussion of Soviet ideology is followed by two hours of talks on their society and economy. It is difficult for us to appreciate the size of this country and the associated management difficulties. You probably know it is the world's largest country; but just how large is it? It covers one-sixth of the world's land surface, stretching across 11 time zones — as the sun sets on one border it soon begins to rise on the other. Within this vast area the Soviets are rich in natural resources, not nearly as dependent as the U.S. on imports. However, much of what they have is trapped in the difficult Siberian frontier. Dealing with the harsh weather there is a major engineering feat. Temperatures can range over a year from 100°F to −60°F in the same area, and when the ground does thaw, a muddy mire makes travel difficult. In many of the areas only the top several feet completely thaws. This frozen-earth condition is referred to as permafrost — requiring special engineering for the building of roads, pipelines and towns. Before this system of engineering was developed roads literally disappeared and buildings sank. Moreover, as the Russian Empire and then the Soviet Union expanded over this vast territory, they engulfed approximately 60 different nationalities speaking over 100 different languages with many different customs and religions. Today the Russian nationality, which has always been dominant, is losing ground as its birth rate declines.

"Americans . . .
are often easily dupe
by Soviet propaganda



Maj. Martin L. Raynor makes an adjustment to the Soviet display case as

The USSR is still quite backward when compared to the U.S. and other developed countries. In villages you still see women washing their clothes in the rivers. Food rationing occurs during years of poor harvest and Soviet people wait in long lines for virtually all consumer goods. There are many reasons why they have these economic problems, but the biggest is their centralized economy. Totally rejecting the familiar laws of supply and demand, the Communist Party dictates what will be produced, by whom and in what quantities. Historically, the Soviet military has been the prime beneficiary of this centralized planning.

The second part of the program deals with Soviet military. For example, military officers are among the highest paid members of Soviet society (even more highly paid than doctors, lawyers and engineers). This high stature is a good indication of the importance of the military in the USSR. In discussing the military, we not only look at the tactical and strategic weapon systems, but also at how the USSR says they will be employed. The Soviets produce some of the best

ol. James M. Simpson assists.

Shirley Burns, Directorate secretary



TSgt. Richard L. Johnson

military equipment in the world and certainly more military equipment than any other country — much more than they need for their own defense. As a result, they use primarily the military aspect of their national power in their efforts to project their power abroad. This is where the discussions are concluded with a look at the Soviets' use of economic, political, ideological and military means to project their influence around the world.

When travelling and visiting the bases, the Soviet awareness team also gives a 2-hour condensed program for the dependents, so that husbands, wives, and children can better understand why the member must occasionally work late, go TDY, participate in an ORI or go overseas. Once a month, this Soviet Military Power Day is expanded into a 5-day Soviet Military Power Week given at the Directorate's new facilities on Bolling AFB. The week is presented with a good balance of lectures, videotapes, and guest lecturers.

The Directorate of Soviet Affairs is the focal point in the Air Force for disseminating information about how the Soviets think, why they think so differently from us, and why it is such a mistake to "mirror-image," i.e. to assume that because we think or act in a certain way, they will also. For ten years, the directorate has been "getting the word out" to Air Force members worldwide.

The director's post script

by Col. Lloyd T. Moore, Jr.
Director, Soviet Affairs

The Soviet Awareness Program began shortly after I returned from Moscow. After studying the USSR for many years, and then living there as an assistant air attache, I was keenly aware of how Soviet society operates and I had a good idea of their state intentions. However, I was also very disturbed and frustrated about the total ignorance the vast majority of Americans displayed in regard to the "other" superpower in the world. In 1976, when I first heard of the establishment of the Directorate of Soviet Affairs, I was very interested in this project which I felt was a much needed, long overdue program. Over the next eight years I watched the program develop and grow. I knew the people assigned to the directorate were all top-notch experts and the feedback I was receiving from Air Force members worldwide was also very complimentary. It was evident that both the lecture program and the translations of Soviet military writings were accomplishing their goals — awareness.

In 1984 when the opportunity arose for me to become the Director of this program I, quite naturally, jumped at the opportunity. My expectations proved to be well founded; the people are knowledgeable and very dedicated to "getting the word out." The principal negative aspect, from my point of view, was that we weren't able to get our program before the true policy makers of the Air Force and the US Government.

For the future, therefore, it is our intention to broaden even further the audience for our program. In my opinion, we cannot begin to feel sanguine until virtually all the opinion makers and policy setters in America understand more completely the realities of Soviet society and the concomitant threat which it poses to our way of life.

For more information on
the program and how to attend;
call: (202) 767-4205
or AV 297-4205

PUBLICATIONS

SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT

Translations of major military writings on doctrine, strategy, tactics, and other topics. These volumes may be ordered by title and stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Prices are subject to change.

The Offensive, Sidorenko, Col A. A. 008-070-00329-5 ($6.00). Praises the offensive as the only type of combat operation that attains the cumplete rout of the enemy.

Marxism-Leninism on War and Army, Author collective. 008-070-00338-4 ($7.00). Discusses doctrine, modern military power, and the revolution in military affairs.

Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs. Lomov, Col Gen N. A. (Ed.). 008-070-00340-6 ($7.00). Describes the impact of science and technology (including nuclear weapons) on military developments.

The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics, Savkin, Col V. Ye. 008-070-00342-2 ($7.00). Presents the "essence of the laws of armed con-

Soviet T-72 tanks (DoD photo)

for their use, and their dialectical relationship with principles of military art.

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(Continued from page 7)

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
НА СТРАЖЕ МИРА И ТРУДА

"On Guard For Peace and Labor"



Soviet aircraft carrier Novorossiysk (DoD photo)



"Always on the alert, always in battle array"



"The victory of communism is inevitable"

STATEMENT OF SENATOR GORDON J. HUMPHREY
BEFORE THE SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS

OCTOBER 8, 1987

MR. CHAIRMAN, THESE HEARINGS ARE LONG OVERDUE. A RECENT PRESS RELEASE QUOTES YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, AS STATING: "WE MUST LEARN TO BETTER ASSIST AND UTILIZE THE GENUINE DEFECTOR, WHO USUALLY ARRIVES AT OUR DOORSTEP IN HIS FLIGHT FOR FREEDOM WITH NOTHING MORE THAN THE SHIRT ON HIS BACK." I AGREE COMPLETELY. OUR GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE DOING MUCH MORE TO FACILITATE ROUTINE DEFECTIONS FROM THE SOVIET BLOC.

THAT WE ARE NOT DOING ENOUGH WAS NEVER MORE EVIDENT THAN IN THE CASE OF MIROSLAV MEDVID. TWO YEARS AGO THIS MONTH, MR. MEDVID--A SOVIET SAILOR--TWICE JUMPED INTO THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER, SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES.

FOLLOWING THE MEDVID INCIDENT, MORE THAN 60 SENATORS COSPONSORED LEGISLATION WHICH LED TO AN INTENSIVE TWELVE MONTH INVESTIGATION OF THE EXECUTIVE'S HANDLING OF THE MEDVID CASE. THE FINAL REPORT OF THAT INVESTIGATION STATED THAT LAWS WERE VIOLATED AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. I COMMEND THE REPORT OF THE HELSINKI COMMISSION ON THE MEDVID INCIDENT TO THIS SUBCOMMITTEE.

FURTHER EVIDENCE OF FAILURE IN THIS REGARD MAY BE FOUND IN CONNECTION WITH AFGHANISTAN.

THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON AFGHANISTAN WAS OUTLINED IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S LATEST ANNUAL ASSESMENT OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, TO WIT: "IT IS CLEAR THAT ONLY STEADILY INCREASING PRESSURE ON ALL FRONTS -- MILITARY, POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC -- WILL INDUCE THE SOVIETS TO MAKE THE POLITICAL DECISION TO NEGOTIATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR FORCES."

SURELY, A POWERFUL WAY TO BRING PRESSURE TO BEAR ON THE SOVIET UNION IS THROUGH AN ACTIVE PROGRAM TO ACCOMODATE DEFECTORS FROM THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN. WE HAVE FAILED MISERABLY IN THIS REGARD.

LET ME OUTLINE THREE MAJOR REASONS WHY WE SHOULD INCREASE OUR EFFORTS:

FIRST, IT IS AN ISSUE OF HUMANITARIAN IMPORTANCE. THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN HAS BROUGHT UNTOLD SUFFERING TO THE PEOPLE OF THAT COUNTRY. THE WAR HAS ALSO BEEN A TRAGEDY FOR THOSE YOUNG MEN WHO ARE SENT TO AFGHANISTAN. HOW DEEPLY DISTURBING IT MUST BE FOR YOUNG SOVIET SOLDIERS TO BE FORCED BY THEIR GOVERNMENT TO WAGE A BRUTAL-- INDEED, GENOCIDAL-- WAR AGAINST

AN INNOCENT CIVILIAN POPULATION. AN ESTIMATED SEVERAL HUNDRED SUCH SOVIETS SOLDIERS HAVE JOINED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. MANY HAVE REQUESTED ASYLUM IN THE WEST, YET ONLY A HANDFUL HAVE BEEN ACCOMODATED.

SECONDLY, SUCH A POLICY COULD SIGNIFICANTLY UNDERMINE THE MORALE OF THE SOVIET ARMY AND HASTEN THE DAY WHEN THE SOVIETS WILL BE TRULY WILLING TO WITHDRAW UNDER CONDITIONS OF A JUST PEACE. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE STARTING TO TAKE A BEATING IN AFGHANISTAN. TWO YEARS AGO, THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WAS IN SERIOUS JEOPARDY. TODAY, THE MILITARY SITUATION IS DRAMATICALLY IMPROVED. THE SOVIETS NO LONGER ENJOY THE AIR SUPERIORITY THAT ONCE PERMITTED THEM TO DEVASTATE RESISTANCE BASES AND SUPPLY LINES. THIS PAST SUMMER, THE RESISTANCE SCORED A SERIES OF IMPRESSIVE MILITARY VICTORIES. THE COST TO THE SOVIETS IN LIVES AND RUBLES FOR THEIR OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN HAS SOARED.

WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS FOR YEARS THAT MORALE AMONG SOVIET SOLDIERS IN AFGHANISTAN IS LOW, AND THAT MANY OF THE SOLDIERS RESORT TO DRUGS. IMAGINE THE EFFECT, IF SOVIET SOLDIERS LEARNED THEY SIMPLY HAD TO "CROSS OVER" IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE WEST.

THIRDLY, SUCH A POLICY COULD GREATLY INCREASE INTERNATIONAL AWARENESS OF A WAR THAT FOR THE MOST PART HAS BEEN HIDDEN FROM THE WORLD. THE FEW SOVIET DEFECTORS THAT HAVE LEFT AFGHANISTAN HAVE PROVIDED INVALUABLE INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET POLICIES AND TACTICS IN THIS WAR. VOICE OF AMERICA, RADIO FREE AFGHANISTAN, AND RADIO LIBERTY COULD ALL CARRY ROUTINE INTERVIEWS WITH SOVIET DEFECTORS. YESTERDAY, NIKOLAY MOVCHAN, A SOVIET SOLDIER WHO JOINED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND WAS GRANTED ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, TESTIFIED BEFORE THE CONGRESSIONAL TASK FORCE ON AFGHANISTAN. HIS TESTIMONY PROVIDED IMPORTANT INSIGHT INTO THE STRAIN SOVIET BARBARITIES AGAINST AFGHAN CIVILIANS HAS PLACED ON THE CONSCIENCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOVIET SOLDIER.

MR. CHAIRMAN, AN EXTRAORDINARY WOMAN NAMED LUDMILLA THORNE OF FREEDOM HOUSE IN NEW YORK, HAS SINGLE-HANDEDLY LED THE WAY ON THE ISSUE OF ASYLUM FOR SOVIET SOLDIERS DEFECTING IN AFGHANISTAN. SHE HAS TRAVELED INSIDE AFGHANISTAN ON FOUR SEPARATE OCCASIONS AND HAS INTERVIEWED 22 SOVIET PRISONERS OF WAR. NINE OF THE SOVIET DEFECTORS THAT HAVE BEEN BROUGHT TO THE WEST, OWE THEIR FREEDOM TO THE DEDICATION AND PERSEVERANCE OF MS. THORNE. WERE IT NOT FOR LUDMILLA THORNE, WE WOULD HAVE NO INFORMATION ABOUT SOVIET SOLDIERS WANTING TO COME TO THE WEST.

IN MAY OF 1986, I PERSONALLY VISITED WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, AND DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE. DURING THE MEETING, I HANDED THE PRESIDENT FIVE LETTERS ADDRESSED TO HIM FROM SOVIET SOLDIERS SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE WEST.

MR. CHAIRMAN, DESPITE THE PRESSING HUMANITARIAN NEED, DESPITE THE VALUABLE STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITY TO SHORTEN THE WAR, THE ADMINISTRATION HAS NO PROGRAM TO ACCOMODATE SOVIET DEFECTORS FROM THE AFGHAN WAR. THE FEW EFFORTS THAT HAVE BEEN MADE HAVE BEEN AD HOC AND SPORADIC, RESULTING FROM EXTRAORDINARY STIMULAE, SUCH AS THE MEETING I HAD WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN. WERE IT NOT FOR DETERMINED ACTIVISTS LIKE LUDMILLA THORNE, THIS ISSUE WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTIRELY IGNORED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. THERE IS NO ONE IN CHARGE OF THIS MATTER WITHIN OUR GOVERNMENT, AND NO AGENCY OR DEPARTMENT HAS THE LEAD.

I URGE THE SUBCOMMITTEE TO EXAMINE THE TRAGIC FAILURE OF THE ADMINISTRATON IN THE IMPORTANT AREA OF SOVIET DEFECTORS IN AFGHANISTAN. I URGE THE COMMITTEE TO RECOMMEND THE ADMINISTRATION PLACE SOMEONE IN CHARGE AND TO DEVELOP AN AGRESSIVE PROGRAM TO ACCOMODATE DEFECTIONS FROM SOVIET FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN.

DEFECTORS

Observations, Conclusions, Recommendations

by

Dr. Lawrence Martin-Bittman

1. The Trauma of Defection

2. The Yurchenko Fiasco

3. Defectors' Testimony

4. Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Bloc Operations Against Defectors

5. Conclusions and Recommendations

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THE TRAUMA OF DEFECTION

The euphoric feeling of victory and relief that follows successful escape or defection from a communist country is short-lived. The first doubts of whether it was the right decision or not emerge almost immediately after reaching safe Western territory. The period that follows, characterized by doubts, feeling of loneliness and guilt, may last for years. Many defectors seriously think about returning to their homeland. Some do go back although they know that they will be punished.

International communication theory recognizes the importance of "value systems" existing within cultures that differ from one another. News stories in the press, lessons we teach in our schools are ethnocentric. We always imply that our culture and country are the greatest...Our textbooks in social sciences and humanities contain plenty of ethnocentric information. These differences in "value systems" are responsible for many breaks in communication, misunderstandings and conflicts. While one culture may consider a value as the most desirable, another culture may label it as most undesirable. In other words, members of each culture firmly believe in certain values which are sometimes unique to that culture.

A defector from a communist country comes to the United States because of serious political, religious, moral or economic conflicts with the values and practices of his own culture and its political environment. The conflict and its resolution (defection) is followed by an inevitable process of abandoning his old value system and accepting the value system of the new country. It is a painful process accompanied by an intense feeling of loneliness and isolation. The individual realizes only _after_ the defection how strong is his bond to the native country. The emotional turmoil is further aggravated by a sense of the permanent loss of the family members, friends, and familiar surroundings that the defector left behind and knows he will never see again.

Without the old value system he feels stripped of the psychological support he needs to function as a normal human being. The only solution is to accept the value system of the new country. In his radical shift away from the doctrinaire socialist value system, he intuitively wants to speed up the process and become an accepted member of the new society as fast as possible. But the libertarian American society tolerates and encourages a wide variety of views which confuse him. (Typical statement by many political refugees from communist countries is: "There is too much freedom here.") He usually resolves his insecurity by embracing conservative political, economic and military doctrines that represent the opposite of his original views. The radical shift is accompanied by demonstratively patriotic statements and gestures. The eagerness to accept rapidly the new value system is mostly a spontaneous gesture of self preservation. It will take several years, however, before the process of cultural adaptation brings the individual to the point when he feels comfortable and secure within the new culture. By then he does not have to emulate the behavior of other members of the society because, finally, he is one of them. Every major personal, economic or professional problem in the defector's life can slow down or even reverse the assimilation process.

Almost all newcomers from communist countries suffer from the lack of close human relationships. Arkady Shevchenko's highly publicized adventures with Judy Chavez, a 22-year-old Washington prostitute who was paid by Shevchenko to become his companion and mistress, illustrate this feeling of loneliness and need for close relationship. It is particularly visible with defectors who come alone, leaving behind their wives and children. "What I saw was the wreck of a human being," Chavez said of Shevchenko. "He was in terrible health, mentally and physically, and he drank day and night. He would even wake up in the middle of the night and go off and get a slug of vodka."

The feeling of permanent separation from immediate family members and close friends is another factor effecting defectors psychological balance as well as physical well-being. In Eastern Europe friendship is a very important value system and many defectors and political refugees complain about what they vies as the superficiality and lack of deep personal bonds among Americans. Back there, they say, one can be very open with close friends and immediate family members. Without this supportive circle of trusted individuals the defector feels lonely and abandoned in a confusing, hostile world.

My own defection and adjustment to the new culture was certainly easier than those of other defectors because I was accompanied by my second wife and also because I knew that sooner or later I could be reunited with my two children. (My first wife, who was Jewish, was on a vacation trip in Rumania with my children when the Soviets invaded Czechoslovakia. Instead of returning to her job as a surgeon in East Berlin, she went to Israel where she and my children became Israeli citizens).

During the whole 12-month period of my debriefing (very intensive 2-month debriefing in a guarded house followed by 10-months of living on my own in rented apartments and house) I never discussed my psychological trauma with members of the debriefing team and they never initiated discussions on that subject either. It was simply ignored.

The CIA operatives who were responsible for handling my case made several gestures that positively influenced my thinking and feelings toward the new country. A day before leaving West Germany, I asked a CIA operative to find somebody who would take care of our dog, a black poodle named "Tommy" to whom my wife and myself were deeply attached because he defected with us, he was a member of the family. The man agreed to take good care of the dog and to find somebody who would take good care of him. Three days after our arrival in the U.S., a large box was delivered to me and when I opened it "Tommy" jumped out. The gesture had strong emotional impact on my attitude toward the U.S., the CIA, and the individuals with whom I was in daily contact.

The debriefing was conducted in German by a senior operative whom I knew under the name Martin and few junior staff members. Martin was a professional with long operative experience, a sense of fairness and tolerance, and a healthy degree of professional scepticism and cynicism. At the end of the debriefing period we departed as friends. At least this was what I felt. The same is true about Eve, a young lady who was our tutor in English. Her dedication, professionalism and friendly personality helped me and my wife to learn English and a lot about Americans. Both Martin and Eve treated me as a colleague. They respected my professional intelligence skills and unlike many other U.S. Government officials whom I met later, never showed any disdain because I was once a dedicated communist.

The psychological trauma of defection is accompanied by feelings of guilt, nightmares and suicidal thoughts and tendencies. The defector is concerned what his closest friends and family members he left behind think about his defection. He worries about his public image when the news about his defection appear in the press. He has to fight a major battle with himself to overcome the feeling of guilt. If he is unable to rationalize and accept his defection as the right decision and sees himself as a traitor, his trauma will develop into serious, long-lasting crisis. In that case he becomes a candidate for suicide, drug or alcohol addiction, or eventually may go back and face the ultimate punishment which unconsciously he thinks he deserves.

For several years I was afraid to talk to the press. As a member of a faculty teaching history and principles of American journalism I gradually changed my attitude but it was a slow process. Defectors, with few exceptions, do not like publicity. They want to live anonymously and preserve their privacy. It is very disturbing for any defector when he finds out that the information he shared with the U.S. government has been leaked to the press. He is afraid that the press without having access to relevant, first-hand information about the circumstances of his defection will portray him as a traitor who simply sold out. And there is another reason why defectors don't like public testimony. They are afraid that sharing the most intimate secrets about communist intelligence with the U.S. government and the American press may eventually result in their indictment as co-conspirators.

When the defector moves out of Washington to start his new life, he does it in most cases under a new name and identity.

His new social contacts in the community where he lives and at work don't know about his past. It is the minimal protection he can get against eventual retaliation by the old country and also against intrusions or attacks by certain members of this society whose idiosyncracies may be dangerous. An insensitive press report about the individual's past may cause isolation from his new friends, colleagues and neighbors and eventually force him to move to another place and find another job.

For these reasons, for many years I refused to be interviewed on camera. After moving to New England in November 1969, I settled down in Rockport, a small town on the North Shore, with some 6,000 people, mainly fishermen, lobstermen, artists and retired couples from New York and Boston. I was charmed by the physical beauty of the place and eventually I established a very deep bond to Rockport. It gave me the feeling of HOME, something I had missed for years. After a few years people knew me, accepted me as a new member of this small community and I was able to find several friends among them. They knew I was a refugee from a communist country but they did not know about my former job. In the early 1980's, after growing pressure from journalists, I opened the gate and spoke about my past on camera. While it was nothing new to my colleagues and students at Boston University, a few of my neighbors and friends in Rockport were shocked. They felt deceived and it took some time to heal the wound and restore the relationship.

Very few intelligence operative turned defectors are able to find suitable jobs in professions where they can use their educational, analytical and language skills unless they decide to work for the CIA or for another U.S. security agency as consultants. The job gives the defector certain financial security but there are some unwritten conditions and traps attached to it. What is mostly expected from him is a testimony of his past, repeated again and again, year after year at various conferences, seminars and meetings. He serves as the personification of communist intelligence evil. After a while it becomes rather stereotypical, monotonous work. A defector who gets involved in intelligence operations has to consider the potentially risky side-effects. If his professional expertise and advice does not coincide with the current political climate inside the agency or the administration he could be considered professionally incompetent or more likely a security risk and suspected of working for the other side. For example, the controversy of whether Mr. Nosenko is or is not a bona fide defector has not been resolved even after 25 years.

The Yurchenko case started a discussion among White House, the CIA and FBI officials as well as the Senate Intelligence Committee and its staff about handling of defectors and their financial security and emotional stability. One suggestion was to reduce the CIA role in defectors' cases and to transfer the primary responsibility to the FBI. According to testimonies of numerous defectors the FBI has been able to establish closer personal relations with defectors than the CIA. Obviously, the CIA's operational field is outside the territory of the U.S. The agency wants to get from the defector as much information as possible. When this is accomplished, the defector--with few exceptions--loses his value and becomes a burden. By law, the CIA's operational field is outside the U.S,. territory and it is difficult for the agency to help the defector find a job or start a new career. Although the CIA tries to steer defectors towards some kind of self-supporting, productive life, the effort is not always successful.

Academic institutions, think-tanks and research centers which could benefit from the intellectual and professional talent among prominent defectors do not accept easily somebody who is recommended by the CIA. Most American academics, even those with conservative political leanings do not like governmental intrusions into their field. A request to put an unknown, untested defector on the payroll of an academic institution at the time when there are not many jobs available for American applicants, is perceived as risky business both financially and politically.

What a defector wants most is a chance, a fair opportunity to start again. In my case it was not the CIA or another governmental agency that gave me this opportunity. It was Dr. David Manning White, the charismatic chairman of the journalism department at Boston University's School of Public

Communication. In the summer of 1971, I decided to attend the annual session of a national organization of public opinion researchers held in Western Massachusetts. One of my friends who knew about my trip asked me whether I would be willing to take with me Dr. White, a BU professor who did not have a car. I agreed, picked up Dr. White and after driving together for a couple of hours and telling him my story he said: "Next semester you may start teaching one course as a part-timer and we'll see what you can do." It was a happy coincident that I met Dr. White at the time. He was the man who was able to open the door for me because he was the Chairman of the Journalism Department at Boston University. Moreover, he had the courage to take this step without consulting any security agency, or academic officials. In my mind he will always remain a symbol of Americanism--pragmatic, unbureaucratic approach combined with trust and generosity.

THE YURCHENKO FIASCO

He was characterized as one of the most important defectors in the history of Soviet-American relations who helped to uncover several Soviet spies in the United States and in Europe. For more than three months he shared with the American debriefing team his intimate knowledge of the Soviet espionage networks and covert operations. For Soviet intelligence it was a major setback. And then came the surprise. At a news conference on

November 4, 1985 at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, Vitaly Sergeyevich Yurchenko said that he had been kidnapped by the CIA and now was returning back home to the Soviet Union. The CIA, Congress, even the White House were left shaken by this unexpected turn of events.

During the first few weeks of debriefing Yurchenko seemed to be cooperative. But he was also angered and scared when he learned that the information he had shared with the CIA was leaked to the press. Every defector wants to start a new life without being identified as a defector. He considers anonymity an important physical as well as psychological security device. Yurchenko asked for discretion and anonymity but found that the press was well informed about his defection and debriefing. Like many other defectors he was also afraid that the press reports would have negative impact on the situation of his family in the Soviet Union. To add to this problem the CIA delivered to him a number of letters from reporters who wanted to interview him.

Yurchenko's decision to return to the Soviet Union offered the Soviets the welcomed opportunity to use him in a propaganda campaign against the United States. Bitter, disappointed and disillusioned, Yurchenko was willing to say anything against this country that did not live up to his expectations. While some of Yurchenko's statements at the press conferences in Washington and Moscow did not sound very convincing, the press conferences generated a volume of anti-American statements that were repeated by the media around the world. Soviet tactics to keep Yurchenko visible as long as possible and to delay his trial and punishment seemed to work. Some people were willing to believe that Yurchenko was really a free man.

In the words of Stewart Powell of the U.S. News & World Report, the decision by Lieut. Col. Yurchenko to return home left behind "a red-faced CIA, an outraged Congress, a mountain of speculation and ranks of jubilant Soviet officials." Long after Yurchenko's return to the Soviet Union the CIA was criticized not only for mishandling the case but also for not being efficient and reliable in its major mission-gathering and analyzing intelligence.

Was Yurchenko a "plant" sent to the United States to confuse and disorient the intelligence experts and then to "redefect" in order to play a role in an anti-CIA propaganda campaign? For an American it is difficult to understand why a man who was offered a high salary, fringe benefits and a million dollars to start his life in the U.S. would go back to the Soviet Union and face the most severe punishment instead. Even President Reagan suggested that the redefection of Yurchenko might have been a "maneuver" by the Soviet Union on the eve of the Geneva summit.

In a highly speculative article (How They Tricked Us, Life, Sept. 1986, pp. 60-66) Edward Jay Epstein said that Yurchenko's reemergence in the spring of 1986 ended the myth that he was a "bona fides" defector. "What is certain," Epstein said, "is that he was a human monkey wrench sent by the KGB into the inner workings of U.S. intelligence...Although the information he provided may have been accurate, it pointed the CIA to the wrong trail." Epstein's conclusion was supported by anonymous "security experts" inside the government who claimed that Yurchenko was a double agent who was sent to the U.S. to undermine another top defector's testimony about a very senior level Soviet "mole" within the CIA and to spread disinformation among national security and foreign policy experts on the eve of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. His return back to the Soviet Union was supposedly part of the plan, to use him in a campaign to smear the CIA. Another speculation offered by a "Washington intelligence analyst" included a bizzarre theory that Yurchenko's mistress in Canada was in fact his KGB control officer. The CIA--according to this interpretation--had been trapped into organizing a meeting in Canada between Yurchenko and his former mistress where he actually received new instructions.

Intelligence professionals with years of practical experience know that the Soviets would never use a high ranking KGB officer who is well informed about many aspects of Soviet espionage operations as a phony defector unless the disinformation message was of vital importance to the survival of the regime. A defector, in order to be believable, has to reveal many secrets including identities of agents, intelligence operatives and detailed descriptions of many sensitive operations. It is a very high price to pay and the KGB would be willing to conduct such a risky operation only at the brink of war with the U.S. when the price would be outbalanced by the potential impact of the deceptive message. In the summer of 1985, the Soviet-American relations did not justify such an operation. As former CIA Director Richard Helms said: "If you were chief of the KGB, would you pick an agent who knew all your agents and send him on a mission like this?"

The information that Yurchenko shared with the debriefing team during the first few weeks when he was cooperative and willing to talk is the most convincing proof that he was a genuine defector. Yurchenko provided U.S. law-enforcement officials with valuable tips that led to identifying several Soviet spies, among them Ronald W. Pelton, a former employee of the National Security Agency who worked for the Soviets since 1980. He voluntarily gave the U.S. interrogators information about Edward Lee Howard, the former CIA operative who was fired in 1983 just before he was to be sent to Moscow. Yurchenko explained the mysterious disappearance of Nicholas Shadrin who was working with the CIA in 1975 when he was kidnapped and killed by KGB agents in Austria. Another lead was concerned with "spy dust" the Soviet counterintelligence technique supposedly used in the Soviet Union to track Americans and other "unwelcomed" foreigners. It was only after Yurchenko's redefection that Soviet propaganda scored several points.

The most believable and damaging message was not found in the Soviet press. It was sent to all potential defectors among the Soviet political, military or intelligence elites who knew how to read in between the lines, i.e., "if you think about defecting, look at Yurchenko. You can never truly escape because we can find you anywhere in the world and get you back even from the territory of the United States." In the words of George Carver, the Former Deputy director of the CIA for national intelligence, now Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University,

> "In the Yurchenko case the CIA conveyed an image of amateurish bumbling that will be a great deterrent to future defectors. Yurchenko had every right to be horrified when he was what he had told us revealed on TV and in newspaper headlines. The handling of his case was about as sloppily unprofessional as anything I've seen by the CIA in a long time."

I agree with his statement.

DEFECTORS' TESTIMONY

During the last four decades, American intelligence and counterintelligence services have been trying to establish the bona fides of a number of Communist defectors. Since a defector can be used as a messenger in a sophisticated hide-and-seek game, his reliability must be carefully evaluated and the process may require months or even years.

One of the most difficult cases was the case of Soviet defector Yuri Nosenko, who came to the U.S. shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy. He assured the U.S. security experts that Lee Harvey Oswald, the assassin, was not a Soviet agent. He was suspected as a "plant" and for several years kept in complete isolation. The case divided the C.I.A. elite. On one side, James Angleton, the chief of C.I.A. counterintelligence until 1974, and Richard Helms mistrusted Nosenko, and on the other side, William Colby and Stansfield Turner believed that Nosenko's message was genuine. Numerous reports on the Nosenko case by the American press during the past ten years have been filled with speculation as well as surprisingly authentic detail indicating that both sides of the dispute leaked confidential or even secret information for their own political benefit. Rather than resolve the Nosenko mystery, public discussion only sharpened the differences between the two opposing groups.

Assigning a KGB officer to the United States as a phoney defector with a disinformational message is a highly risky operation that would be considered only under extremely serious international circumstances. The reason is simple: The KGB must pay a very high price to generate believable disinformation. Every Communist intelligence service knows that the defector will be subjected to numerous tests of his reliability. Even if he passes a lie detector test, the debriefing is a long and thorough process of extracting detailed information concerning the defector's personal life and professional experience, including names and histories of Communist agents operating in the West, information about former friends and colleagues in the service, etc. To be considered trustworthy, more than 95 percent of the defector's information must be factually true. The result is a very serious damage to the Communist intelligence secret networks and plans. During my 14 years in the Czechoslovak intelligence service there was not a single case of an operative (intelligence officer) who would be sent to the West as a phoney defector with a disinformation message.

Every defector's testimony contains a number of distortions most of which are not deliberate. They are simply human errors based on memory lapse, bias, and stereotypes, and the tendency to perceive the outside reality through a number of subjective, personal filters. In addition, his testimony is influenced by his psychological and physical well-being, feeling of friendship, and personal loyalty to certain individuals whom he does not want to hurt, tendency to minimize the damage or just the opposite--to exaggerate and fantasize.

Probably the most common kind of distortion is associated with the tendency to "please" the representatives of the new country by exaggerating the importance of various operations, inflating the numbers and portraying the old country in the most negative terms. By doing so, the defector feels that he is giving the new country what it wants, and, at the same time, he is protecting himself from being considered an uncooperative witness or a messenger of disinformation. He thinks that it is politically safe.

In late May 1987, Rafel del Pino, Cuban Air Force General, fled Cuba together with his family in a Cessna twin-engine aircraft. He landed in Key West, Florida, and asked for political asylum which was granted. General del Pino is the highest ranking Cuban officer ever to defect. For two years, he commanded Cuba's air force in Angola. A month after his defection, he was interviewed by Radio Marti, the United States Government-sponsored radio station that broadcasts to Cuba. He said that the Cuban army has had 56,000 deserters in the last three years in Angola and more than 10,000 casualties there over the last 12 years. In the interview he also claimed that many among the high command of the Cuban forces in Angola believe that "the war is lost." Even for a very casual observer of the Cuban intervention in Angola the numbers look largely inflated. Where did the 56,000 deserters go? How come that this military disaster has not been reported by the American press?

The ultimate proof of the defector's truthfulness are names and identities of Communist secret agents operating on the territory of the country which granted him asylum. For the defector it is the most difficult test. He knows that his testimony will ruin lives of a number of individuals and their families. They will be sent to prison or forced to flee the country. The defector is afraid that he will be asked to testify publically in court as a witness. He is afraid that the public exposure will ruin his chances to live in the new country quietly, with a new identity, without being recognized and eventually disliked, challenged, or attacked by victims of his testimony or the KGB.

Analysis of public statements of many defectors reveals the tendency to distort certain facts, experiences, and developments because of the radical shift in the value system of the individual from a supporter to an opponent of Communist philosophy. The new belief system is the antithesis of the old one, and the individual usually wants to go as far away as he can from his original beliefs. This radical move reflects the individual's frustration, anger, as well as insecurity. The everyday battle of ideas, views, and evidence in a libertarian country confuses him, and he wants to be sure that he is always on the "right" side. Distortions resulting from this tendency cannot be labeled as disinformation, of course. It is a safety valve of a newcomer who does not feel comfortable yet in an open society with many different viewpoints.

While some defectors occasionally succumb to the pressure of publishers or journalists to make dramatic and provocative statements even if these are not true, others--seduced by the opportunities of the large American market--start selling their experience in a supermarket fashion. Victor Suvorov's literary products belong to that category. Inside the Aquarium: The

Making of a Top Soviet Spy was published in 1986 by Macmillan as the fourth book by this Soviet defector. Dimitri K. Simes, a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace characterized it as ". . . the functional equivalent of a consumer fraud." The author, supposedly a former officer of the Soviet General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) writing under a pen name, has produced four books up to now. While the first, called The Liberators, was more or less straightforward, the author later went on ". . . to publish these increasingly questionable volumes about the Soviet army and about Soviet military intelligence."

In the last few years, several books have been published in the United States and in Western Europe which picture the Soviet intelligence as a omnipotent super-monster which has masterminded every problem of the Western world. New Lies for Old: The Communist Strategy of Deception and Disinformation, by Anatoly Golitsyn, former Major in the KGB who defected to the West in December 1961, is one of them.

Golitsyn claims that from the late 1950s, the entire Communist bloc--including Communist intelligence services--was involved in a well-orchestrated disinformation operation of great magnitude: The Sino-Soviet split, the Rumanian "independent" line, the Soviet-Yugoslav split after 1958, the 1968 "Prague Spring," power struggles in the Western Communist Parties--all these, according to Golitsyn, were carefully designed and coordinated Soviet disinformation maneuvers. Supposedly, the major objective behind this operation was to convince the West that the Soviet Bloc is preoccupied with internal problems and conflicts while, in reality, it remained a monolith.

Golitsyn rejects what he calls the "conventional methodology" of analyzing and interpreting the developments in the Communist countries and claims that only his methodology should be used when evaluating the period after 1957.

> "Soviet domination over the Eastern European satellites and Stalinist attempts to interfere in Chinese and Yugoslav Communist affairs were abandoned in favor of the Leninist concept of equality and proletarian internationalism. Domination gave way to genuine partnership and mutual cooperation and coordination in pursuit of the common long-range interests and objectives of the whole of the Communist Bloc and movement."

Golitsyn's version of Soviet super-disinformation disregards elementary operational realities and tends to ignore or distort even basic historical facts. What he says about the Czechoslovak democratization period in 1968 and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, for example, belongs to the category of fiction rather than political literature. According to Golitsyn, the Soviet disinformation plan concerned with Czechoslovakia was developed in 1960 and Alexander Dubcek, who headed the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1968, was an active participant in the deception scheme. He was supposedly instructed what to do during his visit to the Soviet Union in 1961 by politburo member Suslov. Rudolf Barak, Czechoslovak Minister of the Interior, Deputy Prime Minister, and member of the Czechoslovak politburo was arrested in 1962, accused of fraud, theft of state property, violation of security regulations, and conspiracy against President Antonin Novotny, and sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Golitsyn claims that instead of spending time in jail (from 1962 to 1968) Barak was sent secretly to Moscow to represent the Czechoslovak government in the Bloc's intelligence and coordinating center. There was no such center and Barak spent all these years in the Czechoslovak prison. Another absurdity in Golitsyn's interpretation of events in Czechoslovakia is his statement that the liberal writers like Ludvik Vaculik or Ladislav Mnacko were advocating more creative freedom and pleading for democratic socialism on the instructions of the Communist Party in order to disinform the public.

The conduct of these monstrous Soviet deception operations would require thousands of people to be intimately acquainted with the operational plans, methods, and other details. Naturally, the danger of public exposure would be enormous. In the last quarter of a century since Golitsyn's defection there has not been any reliable witness from among the many political refugees and defectors from Eastern Europe who would support Golitsyn's allegations with solid, verifiable evidence.

The KGB is not a super-human, omnipotent organization. If our counter-measures are to be based on false evidence and wrong assumptions, they are doomed to failure.

STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF SOVIET BLOC OPERATIONS AGAINST DEFECTORS

For many Russians, Mother Russia has a magic attraction with legendary power and charm even decades after they leave their homeland. Most Czechs, Slovaks, East Germans, or Hungarians do not suffer from this mystical attraction to their native land. It makes their integration with the American society easier. Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, defected to the West in 1967. Seventeen years later, she went back to the Soviet Union together with her 13-year-old daughter, Olga Peters. At the press conference in Moscow, she made a few anti-American propagandistic statements she later admitted were not true. But she was not lying when she said that she had been tormented by guilt and longing for Russia.

The film director Andrei Tarkovsky, himself a defector, in his film "Nostalgia" presents a story of a melancholic Russian composer living abroad. Tarkovsky says that nostalgia mixes,

> "...the love for your homeland and the melancholy that arises from being far away. It is an illness, a moral suffering which tortures the soul. It can be fatal if one is not able to overcome it, but it can be contracted only in a foreign country."

The KGB strategy and tactics concerned with defectors play upon this long-lasting, melancholic attachment of Russians to their home country.

Oleg Bitov, a foreign culture editor of the weekly Soviet newspaper, Literaturnaya Gazeta, defected to the West in September 1983, while on a trip to Italy. In October, he issued a statement explaining his defection as a protest against the repression of intellectuals in the Soviet Union and to denounce the Soviets for shooting down the Korean airliner 007. Soon, he was able to travel as a free individual living in an open society. In May 1984, he visited the U.S., and on his return he flew to Paris where he talked to the representatives of Radio Liberty, the U.S.-sponsored station broadcasting for Soviet audiences. He also negotiated and signed a contract for a book for which he received an advance of $50,000. In late spring and early summer, his friends and associates noticed that Bitov was growing depressed. On August 16, 1984, Bitov called two Soviet emigres in the U.S. from London and told them that he was to enter a hospital the next day for cancer treatment. Both said that during the conversation, Bitov expressed concern about his wife and daughter in the Soviet Union. Obviously, he was lonely and depressed. By late August, he disappeared. His car was found parked illegally in London, near the Soviet Embassy. Obviously, Oleg Bitov gave up and went home.

Bitov's case shares many similarities with cases of other Russian defectors who succumb to the homesickness and who follow the luring voice from Moscow and eventually go back. The Bitov case is unique, however, as he was the first prominent defector who was allowed after coming back to keep his old job. While five years earlier Bitov would have been sentenced to a long prison term, the Soviets used him instead as a major player in a sophisticated propaganda ploy to lure back home other political refugees and defectors.

On November 21, 1984, Bitov published a positive critique of an article by Norman Mailer about Russia, and a spokesman for Literaturnaya Gazeta told a New York Times correspondent that Mr. Bitov was now a columnist for the newspaper.

The new policy toward political refugees, emigrants, and defectors which was introduced at the time of Bitov's return favors "repatriation." "You can come home again" is the message spread through official and unofficial channels.

In the permanent offensive against organizations of political refugees, their leaders, and prominent defectors, Communist governments follow certain long-term objectives:

1. The Soviet Bloc countries are afraid that organizations of exiles and refugees in the U.S. and in other Western countries could eventually gain considerable political influence on the

formulation and conduct of Western foreign policies (like, for example, with help of Zbignew Brzezinsky, national security adviser to President Carter). The first objective is to undermine the existing organizational structure or major political exile organizations in the U.S. and other Western countries, play one group of refugees against another in order to disorganize, disunite, and weaken them.

2. Millions of American citizens of East European and Cuban extraction are today an integral part of the American society. Many of them occupy important positions inside the political, economic, military, intelligence, and scientific centers of the U.S. Communist countries want to politically neutralize major segments of these ethnic communities and establish friendly or at least neutral relations with many individuals of East European or Cuban extraction. Some members of these ethnic groups are to be recruited for secret intelligence purposes, while others are to be used as friendly propaganda assets to spread positive images about the countries of their ethnic origin.

3. Taking the most drastic measures, like kidnapping or assassination, against prominent defectors is the method to achieve the third major objective: to discourage all potential defectors, "There is no safe place in the world where defectors can feel safe. We'll find you and get you sooner or later," is the message behind these violent operations.

4. The fourth major objective is to lure back home a number of political refugees and defectors and use them in propaganda and disinformation campaigns against the West as living examples that American freedom and democracy is a lie.

A refugee suffers both cultural and political shock during his first years in an open society, because he must adjust to a new environment, gain self-confidence, accept new rules of life in a highly competitive society, and care for himself. Most of them succeed, but some fail, and among them Communist intelligence services find their easiest victims. Their tactics against political exiles is very simple: divide and govern. Political diversity and disagreements within exile communities is a fertile environment for various behind-the-scenes games, and the generation of refugees who grew up in a Communist society are particularly vulnerable because totalitarian socialism deprives them of self-confidence and responsibility for their lives. Disinformation games systematically disrupt the unity of the exile community and create rifts between rank-and-file members and their leaders. They picture exiles as gangs of outlaws interested only in their financial well-being in an attempt to deprive them of sympathy and support by their adopted governments and the public.

American freedom, the vision many of these refugees and defectors followed on their way to America, becomes the major problem when they arrive. Their original vision of freedom ignored the free market principle, job hunt, competitiveness of the new society, the endless drive by native Americans to succeed and to improve. The competitiveness of Americans scares many refugees, and makes their adjustment more difficult particularly in the case of the middle age or elderly individuals with deeply engraved cultural values and norms.

For years a group of disillusioned refugees from the Soviet Union tried to go back but they were rejected as traitors to their homeland. Starting with 1984 a new policy toward emigrants and political refugees from the Soviet Union emerged. Soviet officials became much friendlier toward individuals who wanted to return. According to Vladimir A. Kuleshov, consul general of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, the embassy received by October 1986 more than 1,000 applications from Soviet emigres in the United States who wanted to go back. Soviet officials tell the applicants that they will be able to buy apartments with their American savings, they promise them jobs and even the right to return to the West--if they wish. A periodical called Golos Rodiny (Voice of the Homeland) is being distributed by the Soviet Embassy in the U.S., Canada and other countries with Russian/Jewish emigre communities to promote a positive image of their country of origin and eventually to persuade some of them that they can return.

On April 28, 1986 the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged a press conference with Oleg Tumanov, former Radio Liberty editor who had worked for the Munich radio stations for 20 years. He rose from a low-level clerk to head the Russian service. The Soviet daily newspaper Pravda on April 29, 1986 published a statement by Tumanov in which he said about Radio Liberty that "at its microphones sit traitors, renegades, former accomplices of the Hitlerites and other scum that in Bavaria are collectively given the contemptuous designation baboons." Tumanov quoted famous Russian writer I.S. Turgenev: "Russia can get along without any of us but none of us can get along without her," and he addressed his former colleagues at Radio Liberty saying "the road home is not closed for you."

On October 24, 1986 the Soviet Embassy in Washington presented four former Soviet citizens who announced that they were returning home because of their disillusionment with America: "I feel that in the Soviet Union I will be much freer than I am here," said 27-year old Yuri Chapovski. He said that he could not find a job here despite a master's degree and he added that words like "democracy and freedom" did not match the reality here.

In propagandistic campaigns concerned with prominent defectors like Bitov, Yurchenko or Soviet deserters from the Soviet military forces in Afghanistan the Soviets use the same explanation: these individuals have been drugged either with some special drugs or with opium and hashish, kidnapped, and forced to make anti-Soviet statements. A prominent defector who returns home has to remain visible for a certain period of time even if he committed treason and later will face military court. The tactics helps to maintain the image of motherly socialism with a human face. When he faced western journalists in Moscow Yurchenko said that he was back to his old job as the security officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The KGB would never allow an officer who committed treason to occupy again such a sensitive position. A young Soviet soldier who deserted in Afghanistan in June 1983 came to the United States, could not adjust to the American society and went back home in January 1985. He was tried for high treason and sentenced to 12 years in a labor camp despite Anatoly Dobrynin's assurance (then the Soviet ambassador to Washington) that he would not be prosecuted.

The policies and strategies of other East European communist countries toward refugees and emigres do not strictly follow the Soviet model. Some communist countries like Hungary or Czechoslovakia have encouraged rank-and-file refugees who are not politically involved in "anti-Communist activities" to "legalize" their status. Hungary, for example. became the first East European communist country that opened its door to "former anti-socialist elements" who had fled the country after the Hungarian revolution of 1956. Emigre artists such as conductor Anatal Dorati, cellist Janos Starker and pianist Georges Cziffra have been welcomed back, interviewed on television and allowed to leave again. Another tactic used, in this case by Czechoslovakia, is to encourage emigres to resolve their legal status. For example, a refugee living in the U.S. has to contact the Czechoslovak embassy in Washington, fill out a lengthy questionnaire about his current status, finances, job and activities and pay to the Czechoslovak government the cost of the education they received there, usually between 2-10,000 dollars. In addition, the emigre has to make a pledge that he would avoid activities hurting Czechoslovakia. Practically, it means to avoid political involvement or public statements that communist countries do not approve of. In return the refugee receives the permission to travel to his native country as any other Western tourist.

Obviously, these practices offer satellite intelligence services opportunity to look for new candidates for recruitment. A defector or emigre coming back to his native country as a visitor is vulnerable. He can be arrested, blackmailed or pressured by relatives living there to agree to work on behalf of the regime and eventually become a secret agent.

Prominent political refugees and defectors are permanent targets for retaliation. Active measures involve the whole spectrum of operations, beginning with rumors and forgeries and ending with kidnappings and assassinations. The hunting season is open all year, and it is not restricted by the political climate or fear of Western reprisals. Various communication channels are used to make direct contact with the defector and to persuade him to came back voluntarily. If this does not work, the KGB or the satellite counterparts use the more drastic techniques.

Since 1917 many Communist defectors were kidnapped or assassinated like, for example, Stalin's rival Leon Trotsky. In more recent times, Boris Arsov, who defected from Bulgaria and lived in Denmark where he published a paper exposing the brutalities of the Bulgarian communist system, disappeared from his apartment in 1974. A short time later he surfaced in front of a Bulgarian court in Sophia. The Bulgarian press did not even try to hide the fact that he had been kidnapped. "Arsov was playing with fire, "the Bulgarian newspaper Otechestven Front said." "The timely intervention of the organs of state security put an end to this. The arm of justice is longer than the legs of the traitor." He was sentenced to 15 years in prison and a year later, according to an official statement by the Bulgarian government, committed suicide.

The hard-line policy toward defectors, including kidnappings and assassinations, implemented by intelligence services of the Soviet bloc, frightens many refugees and exiles. Vladimir Kostov, a former Bulgarian broadcaster living in Paris, became a target of an assassination attempt in August 1978. He was leaving the Paris Metro when he felt a sharp pain in his back. For several days he suffered a high fever but survived. It was only a few weeks later that doctors discovered a miniature pellet with poison under his skin. The same kind of pellet killed another Bulgarian defector, Georgi I. Markov, in London in October, 1978.

In November 1983 the wife and a young son of Col. Stefan Sverdlov, a Bulgarian defector living in Munich, disappeared after boarding a train for Austria. With the help of his wife's mother who lived in Bulgaria, the Bulgarian intelligence lured them to Vienna where they disappeared. A short time later the Bulgarian wire agency reported that they returned on their own free will. "We are very happy to be back," they were quoted saying. At the time of this operation the Bulgarian intelligence service was conducting a massive campaign of threats against exiles and refugees. On a letterhead bearing Bulgaria's coat-of-arms and signed by "intellectuals in exile," they distributed a hit list that was mailed to many Bulgarian refugees, defectors and emigres. It said that all individuals on the list would "pay dearly" for their "treacherous behavior." The list was headed by Col. Sverdlev and followed by Vladimir Kostov, broadcaster for RFE, Velicko Peikev, former official of Bulgarian State Information Service, and Iordan Mantarov, former Bulgarian intelligence officer who defected in Paris in 1981.

Manuel Antonio Sanchez Perez was an economic vice minister in Cuba who oversaw much of the country's secret trade dealings abroad. He defected in the fall of 1985 in Spain. One day in

December of the same year, four armed employees of the Cuban embassy in Spain jumped Sanchez as he emerged from a bank in Madrid and tried to kidnap him. Before they could drag him into a waiting car, several individuals who saw the incident freed Sanchez. The Spanish government expelled the four involved Cubans and Sanchez was moved to an undisclosed location.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the words of R. James Woolsey, former Undersecretary of the Navy:

> "Sensitivity and common sense needs to be injected into the Government's method of dealing with defectors without the accompanying straitjacket of statutes, regulations, rigid bureaucratic policies and the annual appropriations hassle." ("Defectors: The Tempest Tossed," by R. James Woolsey, The Washington Post, November 10, 1985, p. D8.)

A. Counseling

Nearly every act of defection is accompanied by a major psychological trauma which many defectors characterize as the most difficult psychological crisis of their lives. The individual--even if he does not show open signs of mental strain or imbalance--should receive professional psychological counselling during the first several months after his defection and eventually even after that. Theoretically the defector can discuss even the most intimate problems of his private life with the members of the debriefing team. However, they are intelligence service professional concerned with facts and information about national security, not therapists. For them a defector's doubts and mental problems are debriefing byproducts they don't like and try to ignore.

Professional, psychological counselling should provide the defector with the opportunity to open up, overcome the feeling of guilt and to learn how to cope with the problems of everyday life in the new society. The last objective is as important as the mental strain connected with the feeling of guilt. Many defectors from communist countries, even after long experience of working in capitalist countries seemed unprepared for freedom. They are used to the system which gives them work, decides what position they should occupy within the system, and provides them with all basic necessities and economic securities like free medical care, free education for their children pensions, etc. Professional counselling on these cultural and economic differences should ease the defector's identification with the new society.

B. Support System

The newcomer to the American society feels isolated and estranged, because he is missing the major supportive system he had in the old country: a group of family members and close friends who allowed him to "open" himself up. They were the relief valve whenever he was down or depressed. With his friends' help he was able to smooth the bumps and go on. They helped him to resolve also a great number of practical personal problems like where to buy merchandise difficult to obtain in regular shops, or how to get his son or daughter accepted at college. This supportive system is not available any more.

I would recommend that the CIA establishes a group of volunteers--retired intelligence officers who have the talent, time and who would be willing to become like an "older brother" to a newcomer. The volunteers would try to develop close, regular personal contact with the defector and his family, invite them to their homes and to various social activities and eventually develop a close mutual bond-friendship in the Eastern European sense.

Among the members of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), for example, are many gifted individuals who are retired. Maybe some of them would welcome this opportunity to volunteer their time and wisdom to guide defectors to productive, enjoyable life in this country.

C. Debriefing Team

Members of the debriefing team play an important role in building up or tearing down the defectors self image and self confidence. Even a minor mistake can contribute to the defector's mental collapse like in Yurchenko's case. I have no knowledge of the CIA internal policies and regulations concerned with defectors, but I suspect that members of the debriefing teams are selected rather hastily, when the new defector arrives in Washington. Obviously, the members of the debriefing teams are not trained in social psychology and problems of intercultural communication, culture shock, etc.

I recommend that all individuals participating in the debriefing process in a professional capacity receive some kind of training in social psychology and intercultural communication.

The most elementary rule for the every day contact with the defector is: treat him with DIGNITY and RESPECT. The best strategy is to show professional tolerance and respect for his previous work even though it had been directed against the United States. Treat him as a COLLEAGUE who--by unfortunate circumstances--worked for the other side until he recognized his mistake. This strategy is not deceitful. In most cases it reflects the defector's thinking, political development and self image.

One of the most difficult problems to resolve is the feeling of guilt. The defector knows that he committed treason and he has to overcome his feeling of guilt. If he does not, he is a candidate for suicide, alcohol addiction, drug addiction, or he would eventually go back which is, of course, a psychological form of psychological suicide. Members of the debriefing team should use every opportunity to help the individual to overcome the guilty feeling.

D. Financial Support

"How am I going to support my family, how am I going to survive in this society?" This is another elementary question that the defector is struggling with. Some defectors complain bitterly about the promises and realities of their economic well being and blame the CIA. Nicalae Horodinca, a Romanian defector, claims that the CIA broke promises to give him a job, a house and medical insurance. "The CIA makes zombies of defectors," he said. Vladimir Sakharov, a Soviet defector, says that his academic accomplishments were ignored by the CIA. When the debriefing was over he was sent to a motel management school in California, and when the school went bankrupt, the CIA recommended him to become a salesman.

The defector who received political asylum from the U.S. Government should also receive a guarantee of basic economic security provided that he supplied the U.S. Government with reliable information according to his best knowledge. When the Yurchenko case became a major issue, the American press reported that Yurchenko was offered $1 million as a special premium, annual income of $62,500, and free medical care for the rest of his life. I understand that this statement is probably distorted. Nevertheless I believe that it would resolve many elementary problems and fears if the defector is granted permanent salary until he is capable of supporting himself. The amount of $30,000 - $40,000 a year depending on his value as an information source would be sufficient. Obviously, as a recipient of a regular salary from the U.S. Government the defector would be obligated to work on certain government projects. He should be free to accept any job in the private sector but he should know that in that case he would lose his guaranteed income. When discussing with the defector his economic future and the American economic environment, the members of the debriefing team should use examples of defectors who succeeded in professions far removed from their original jobs.

E. Retraining

In order to become a productive, self supporting member of the American society, the defector needs counselling about his financial and professional future. Taking care of himself in a highly competitive, business-oriented society is difficult and scary for an individual who grew up in a country governed by communist principles. The counsellor should establish the defector's potentials and realistic options for his future career based on his education, professional experience other than intelligence work, talents, inclinations and even discuss with him the possibility of his going back to school to get a degree in a new professional field.

In order to help the defector to gain practical experience and to earn income at the same time, the CIA or another government agency entrusted with treatment of defectors should establish a system of "FELLOWSHIPS/WORK STUDY JOBS" with various research organizations, universities, foundations and business organizations across the country. The fellowship would make it possible for the defector to spend 2-4 years working and learning the new job. I am sure that there are thousands of administrative positions available with various private companies that defectors could handle quite easily. After the period of 4 years the individual could stay with the company (if he wants to and the company likes his performance) or move on, this time on his own.

There are many talented researchers, writers and potential scholars among defectors whose expertise and analysis could be useful to academic or research institutions. The system of fellowships established with several universities and foundations would create useful mechanism to absorb the defector's expertise in international affairs and at the same time help them to establish academic credentials and reputation.

In the spring of 1986 I prepared a proposal to establish a fellowship at Boston University that would be awarded to a political refugee or defector from a communist country or from an authoritarian Third World country. Boston University's academic officials and the administration supported the idea and encouraged me to proceed. The proposal focused on two major objectives:

1. To collect information about media manipulation, propaganda and disinformation from refugees and defectors who were at one time directly involved in anti-American active measures.

2. To create a vehicle for talented researchers and political writers among defectors for their smoother integration into American society.

This summer the idea became a reality when the J.M. Olin Foundation decided to support this proposal with a $20,000 grant. On September 2, the first J.M. Olin Fellow for the Study of International Propaganda and Disinformation arrives in Boston. He will spend 12 months at Boston University working on a study concerned with current Soviet communication policies.

Another kind of fellowship should be available for individuals who would prefer to enter the field of capitalist enterprise and start their own small businesses. The financial success of Col. Rudolf Herrmann who defected in 1980 and later established a highly profitable construction business can serve as an example of the potential talent (in spite of the fact that

Col. Herrmann now wants to return back to his native Czechoslovakia as a millionaire).

F. Citizenship

The day I became an American citizen was one of the most important days of my life. It gave me the feeling of belonging, freedom and the right to participate in the democratic political process. Whenever I think that the U.S. Government makes a mistake in the conduct of domestic or foreign affairs, I can stand up and say it publically without the fear that I would be arrested or would lose my job. For this moment of freedom I had to wait 10 years. According to American law, the 10-year probation period is mandatory for any individual who was a member of the Communist Party. Most defectors from communist intelligence services were members of the Communist Party. I think the probation period should be reduced to 5 years. I do not recommend to grant automatically U.S. citizenship to every defector or to reduce the probation period to only 2 or three years. The waiting period of 5 years is necessary for the defector to prove that he had adjusted and had become a productive member of the American society.

G. Security

Every defector is scared. Blackmail, kidnapping and assassination are methods used against defectors by Communist intelligence services even at time of detente.

The fear of reprisal can develop into serious psychological problems paralyzing the defector's ability to make realistic judgments. It can influence his social behavior and communication with fellow citizens as well as his job performance.

Every defector should be provided with a realistic assessment of his security situation, what kind of measures has the country of his origin taken against defectors and how he can protect himself as well as his family. Obviously there are 2 major strategies. The first is to assume a new identity and become an anonymous, invisible members of the American society. The strategy can be very effective if the individual wants to live away from the major cities like Washington, New York, Boston, or San Francisco. As an administrator working for a small bank somewhere in the South or in the Midwest the defector could be reasonably safe (provided that he does not maintain any direct or indirect contact with the country of his origin).

The second strategy is to become totally open. After a few years of living in the United States I chose this route and I think it was the right decision. As a university professor, writer and public speaker I had to be open about my background and previous professional experience. From day one of my academic career, all of my colleagues, university officials as well as students knew that I was a former communist intelligence officer. This strategy gave me a reasonable degree of personal security. A perpetrator of any retaliation operation against me had to carefully weigh the risks. Obviously, any drastic measure like kidnapping or assassination would immediately bring about an investigation and possibly a public campaign that could hurt the former country's public image.

The security arrangements should include the pledge that the CIA or another agency responsible for the debriefing would never willingly reveal any information about the defector and his statement unless he agrees with such arrangement.

H. Language Training

The success of the debriefing process depends largely on smooth, unobstructed communication between the defector and the debriefing team. It should be conducted in the language in which the defector is most comfortable.

Mastering a foreign language is a long process requiring discipline as well as talent, unless the individual was able to learn it in his formative years as a child living in the environment of the second language. Most communist intelligence operatives learned a foreign language during their university years and in courses offered at the intelligence headquarters. They are able to communicate in one or two foreign languages as fluent conversationalists who can handle basic intelligence assignments. However, it would be difficult for many of them to deliver a two hour lecture in a foreign language and then answer questions from the audience. According to my estimates only some 15-20% of communist intelligence operatives, diplomats and foreign trade representatives reach that kind of fluency.

For an individual who has not reached the top level of fluency, speaking a foreign language is tiring, particularly if he has to do so for extensive periods of time. After a few hours he pays less attention to the complexities of the issues discussed and his answers become rather simplistic. Few more hours later his concentration drops even further and nervousness and exhaustion reach the point when his answers become unreliable, even without any intention on his part to deceive or mislead the debriefing team.

Mr. Yurchenko stated at the press conference at the Soviet Embassy before his departure to the Soviet Union that he had not been allowed to communicate with the debriefing team in Russian.

If this is true, it was a serious mistake. His knowledge of English did not allow him to explain important aspects of the issues discussed in an intelligent manner. And even if the questions were asked in English and he was allowed to respond in Russian, this kind of communication lowered the validity of some of his statements. A person with limited foreign language skills like Mr. Yurchenko has to be debriefed in his native language.

I assume that just like in my case, the CIA provides tutoring in English to every defector coming to the U.S. It is a very useful and important service that should be continued. It is the necessary pre-requisite for the successful resettlement of any defector.

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STATEMENT OF LEO CHERNE
CHAIRMAN,
INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

Washington, D.C.
September 16, 1987

1. Let me begin these remarks on one organization's experience with the resettlement of defectors from totalitarian countries with a terminological clarification. The term "defector" is usually applied to people who have chosen to break with the dictatorial governments of their countries while abroad, either in official or semi-official capacities. They are not expellees whom totalitarian governments have extruded against their will, nor are they emigres. Emigres are let go legally though reluctantly, and they are deprived of their citizenship in the process. There are totalitarian countries on the Left and on the Right. Usually, though, it's mainly those who flee from the Marxist-Leninist sphere who are referred to as defectors.

Coming from the Soviet Union, there are defectors, expellees and emigres. This exhausts the typology. Clandestine departures from its territory are extremely difficult and thus extremely rare. However, the geography and the uneven degree of control exercised by some other Communist regimes over the internal movements of their citizens do permit illegal border crossings from some areas, and for some nationalities the number of escapees has at times exceeded the number of defectors.

What the defectors, expellees, emigres and escapees have in common is their opposition to the oppressive social and political conditions they are leaving behind, and this opposition invariably relates to the lack of freedom which is the common denominator of otherwise quite dissimilar, and in many respects even divergent societies. It is, therefore, not inappropriate to subsume them under the overall category of refugees. Nor is it in any sense illegitimate that most of them, if they apply for admission to the United States, come here as refugees within the meaning of the definition given in our refugee laws.

2. Turning to the narrower subject of today's proceedings which I understand to be defectors as distinguished from other refugees, and more specifically, defectors from the Soviet Union, we have to be aware not only of what connects them with the larger group but also of how they differ from

defectors from other countries as well as from emigres, in the sense just described, from their own country.

Except for the Baltic states and the region annexed from Poland after World War II, all individual recollections of societal arrangements other than those imposed by seventy years of Soviet Communism have been reduced to what parents, now dead, may have imparted to their children, or to what they may have learned from the pre-1917 literature. Even defectors who lived in foreign lands for some time and have familiarized themselves with the ways of unregimented policies are unlikely to have incorporated their underlying assumptions. This is not the place to describe the adjustment complexities that can be traced to the gap between the "there" and the "here." Suffice it to say that the ex-Soviet defector tends to be even more estranged and bewildered than a Pole or a Czech and that he carries a heavier psychological burden.

As against the emigre from Soviet Russia who was exposed to the same formative and deforming influences and pressures, the defector is at a disadvantage in that he is unprepared or at least ill-prepared for the exigencies of his new environment. The emigre has waged a long and exhausting battle with the bureaucracy in charge of exit permits. He has done that, as a rule, together with others who were in the same boat. This has created a mutual support network, as it were, of people who knew each other, shared experiences, and together developed coping mechanisms, exchanged letters from abroad and information about conditions abroad and were able to prepare themselves for life in the United States, if this was their chosen destination. The defector has to prepare his defection in strict secrecy.

The emigre usually leaves the Soviet Union with family members, albeit often not with his entire family, and with a certain amount of his personal baggage and his personal papers and documents. The defector leaves not only his personal belongings behind but often also his spouse and children.

Upon arrival in the United States, the emigre can count on the help and advice of relatives and friends who preceded him. By now there are emigre enclaves in several of our cities, based on ethnic affinities. The bulk of the newcomers have been Jews or Armenians. The defector tends to belong to a nationality whose members thus far have been barred from emigrating.

Lastly, the emigre partakes of the prestige of the refusniks and dissidents; he has labored, and suffered, for the right to leave. The defector was not a dissident and he was not a refusenik. The more prominent he was, the closer were his ties to the economic and cultural elites, not to mention the political and military establishments, of the Soviet Union. That isolates him from the mass of his fellow refugees. Should he try to get close to them, he is bound to be received with distrust.

3. It is tempting to approach the real or perceived problems these hearings deal with by emphasizing their financial aspect, to seek solutions by seeking more money, public or private, or both. Social issues, to be sure, have their cash nexus, and refugees and related problems are no exception. For reasons briefly touched upon, defectors coming into our midst require more attention, more services, more and longer support than the average refugee. All of this costs money, and the $600 the Government provides for the resettlement of refugees on a per capita basis covers just a small part of the costs their resettlement entails, to be successful. Still, money is not the nub of the problem. Jobs are. No person can be considered successfully resettled unless employed, and employed in a position from which he or she derives a modicum of satisfaction and enough income to pay the rent and to cover daily needs. Public assistance is definitely not a substitute. Nor is a job that is below a newcomer's reasonable expectations and substantially - the stress is on substantially - below his previous occupational attainments. This applies to all nationalities. There is

a former ambassador from a "Marxist-Leninist" African country, trained in the United States, who has been unable to find professional or semiprofessional work with which to support his wife and child. He is now reduced to the level of an office cleaner, and about to become a marginal man, to his, his family's, and our country's detriment.

4. What I am trying to convey is not the idea of the Government's becoming the employer of last resort. This is not a governmental function. What the Government, one hopes, can do is to stimulate and support the planned creation of opportunities in academic, teaching, research, and production facilities which will offer employment to qualifying scientists, artists, professionals, etc., down to technicians and graduate students, all of whom can make contributions, and be they ever so modest, to our stores of learning, creativity and technological progress. The defector with manual skills will find his niche.

Creating such a net of opportunities geared to the needs of defectors, and not only defectors, would not be an easy undertaking. But there seems to be no alternative. What is certain is that matters cannot be left to the workings of the marketplace, for the newcomer is handicapped by not speaking English well and by not being acquainted with the way we interact and do things.

A correlative to such an innovative resettlement policy would be a greater degree of alertness, flexibility, and generosity in our asylum and admission practices. There must be a way to grant asylum speedily to bona fide applicants, with a minimum of red tape, to give them authorization to work at the time of application, and to make them eligible for medical services, as all other refugees are. It makes no sense for a Vietnamese defector who has published several books and given us valuable insights into the minds of the new masters of Vietnam to struggle for several years to obtain asylum and fear deportation while his struggle lasted. His case is now nearing a favorable outcome via a third-preference petition filed by a university. The case of the Cuban woman, however, who had been invited to join the U.S. Delegation to the meeting of the UN Commission for Human Rights in Geneva a few months ago and to testify about torture in Cuban jails, which she herself was a victim of, is still unresolved. She was denied admission to the United States because she had been imprisoned for less than 10 years.

5. Corrective action in both our admission and asylum practices is urgent. In the long run, glasnost cannot be contained in a narrow band of application, hard as the Soviets try to do just that. I would expect one of its predictable corollaries to be a relaxation of stringent

travel controls. China and the East European satellites are already sending larger numbers of specialists, artists, students, and plain visitors to the West. As their numbers increase, so will the number of defectors. And higher defection figures will bring about intensified redefection efforts.

The Soviet Union has always understood the benefits it derives from the return of defectors. It has never abandoned its attempts to induce those it could reach to "return home." Entreaties by family members, letters, telegrams, phone calls are the customary methodology. The pleas to come home with everything forgiven, which the defector has good reason not to believe, are coupled with details of the dire consequences of his defection that his family has had to bear, such as the threatened or actual loss of jobs, apartments, study opportunities, all of which the defector under pressure has good reason not to disbelieve.

In the past there have been more aggressive redefection campaigns. One, which culminated in the middle fifties, was documented in a report of IRC's Donovan Commission of March 20, 1956. Compared with the crude and brutal methods described in the Donovan Report, the next campaign may surprise us by its sophistication and inventiveness. The greater openness of the system itself can be used to buttress the promises of no reprisals, while the guilt of the defectors for having caused harm to their families, as well as their homesickness, can be skillfully played upon. In moments of loneliness and hopelessness, common enough during the first, most difficult period of exile, the less resilient and psychologically less stable defector is a natural target.

A case in point may well be the most recent defectors IRC was involved with -- a Russian couple, he a journalist and filmmaker, she an editorial secretary. He had fair English. She had none. He is sixty years old, she forty-six. During their four months in the United States, a satisfactory though temporary apartment was found for them in Manhattan, which is no mean achievement in itself. Yet despite intensive placement efforts which continued throughout their stay in New York, the search did not yield results for the husband. His age was undoubtedly a factor. Eventually the high hopes with which the couple had arrived in the United States gave way to a perceptible degree of dejection. Tensions developed when the suggestion was made to concentrate on a job for the wife so that employment could be sought at a more leisurely pace for the husband, in line with his background and experience. He seemed to resent the idea of relinquishing his role as provider and head of the family. They decided on returning to Russia, without advising IRC, and left within a few days. They had, needless to say, been promised they would not be punished and were told they would be permitted to resume their professional activities in Moscow. Perhaps with glasnost this was not an empty promise. Time will tell.

As a footnote, I might add that the International Rescue Committee spent $3,390.68 in direct allocations to the couple, not counting the initial housing costs, telephone calls and prorated salary expenses. And we were only halfway through. Well, more than halfway. An independent producer of documentary films came up with an assignment, but by then the couple had left.

6. As long as there are countries which severely restrict their citizens' freedom of movement and which consider unauthorized departures, let along defections, punishable offenses, we have co remain responsive to the needs of refugees in general - and of defectors in particular. Decency requires it. And so does our self-interest. But it would be fatuous were we to limit our concern to high-level defectors because they are a source of specialized, often security-related, knowledge, or because they are people of international reputations in their fields. And we should guard against positing a primacy of political or propaganda considerations. No less entitled to our active sympathy as the well-known are the unknown, the obscure, the people of average skills. As a rule, we

would not see them on television or at press conferences. When they attract attention, as some do, media exposure can be detrimental to their adjustment, warp their ability and readiness to come to grips with everyday life in America. I have particularly in mind young people, such as the soldiers who deserted from the Russian side in Afghanistan. More often than not they will misinterpret the ephemeral glory reflected on a TV screen.

These men and women of no renown do, if given a chance, become productive members of our society. And we should not underestimate what they can add to our understanding of totalitarian systems. Not coming from the upper layers of rigorously stratified societies, they can tell us a great deal of how these work or do not work.

We have a distressing tendency, a mixture of generosity and naivete, to mirror-image people in other countries. This is especially deceptive and disabling when we too readily assume that the mirror in which we see ourselves provides us with an accurate view of the Russian -- loyal, indifferent or dissident. This tendency will probably increase with the euphoria created by an arms agreement. The mirror is a most unreliable instrument if we are to understand those who remain or have fled - and the presence here of these men and women in the flesh is a useful remedy.

To sum it up: our democratic ethos requires us to remain hospitable to freedom-seekers. At the same time, we can derive great satisfaction from our awareness that no nation has yet suffered from having been overly generous to refugees. In a historical perspective, the contributions of refugees to the progress and welfare of our country can hardly be overstated.

STATEMENT OF
ELENA ALEXANDRA COSTA
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today to testify concerning the issue of the handling of defectors from the Soviet Union and other communist countries. My name is Elena Alexandra Costa. My former name is Yelena Aleksandrovna Mitrokhina. I defected in 1978, and I am the only person who had defected from the Soviet embassy in Washington since World War II.

I came to the United States in 1975. My husband, Lev Mitrokhin, was the representative of the Soviet Copyright Agency of the USSR in the United States. Formally, he was attached to the Soviet embassy with the diplomatic rank of first secretary, but in reality, we had a separate office and were engaged in establishing relations with American publishers, promotion of Soviet manuscripts for translation and publication in the United States. I was working with my husband in the copyright office, functioning as his assistant and office manager.

At the time of our arrival to the United States I had a bachelor's degree in Scandinavian languages and a graduate degree in sociology. In the Soviet Union I have held a variety of jobs: an interpreter, a researcher in the field of family sociology and demographics, and, in the last two years prior to our assignment to the States, as an instructor on Marxist-Leninist philosophy in a special closed school for foreign communists that was part of the operations of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

There were only two people working in the copyright office in Washington: my husband and myself. Actually, quite often there was only one -- myself -- because my husband was often absent from the office for a variety of reasons. This created a rather unique situation for me in a sense that I was exposed more to the American business world than any other women in the Soviet embassy. In addition, I had an unusual degree of freedom of movement. My husband could not drive because of his drinking problem, and as a result I was the only woman in the Soviet embassy permitted to drive alone.

These two factors -- the necessity to conduct a lot of day-to-day office activities in the absence of my husband, and the ability to conduct my business largely unsupervised -- gave me an opportunity to explore and to learn more about the working of the American society than a woman from the Soviet embassy normally would have had. Coming from the background of social research, I was also interested in social and economic sides of life in this country. This exploration and learning started me on the road of comparing the two system and, finally, brought me to the point of questioning the validity and the viability of the Soviet system and my own future in the Soviet society. After lengthy considerations I have decided that I did not want to return to the Soviet Union. Through my American acquaintance I contacted the FBI and asked for a political asylum for myself and my children, Christina and Constantin. My husband was notified of my decision on the day of my defection, August 2, 1978. After two days of considerations, he decided to return to the Soviet Union, where he is now.

After the defection and a period of debriefing by the CIA, I enrolled in the Masters Program in the Wharton School of Business of the University of Pennsylvania, from which I graduated with the MBA degree in January 1980. After that I worked for a year for a management consulting company in Washington, D.C., and then for three years for Tandy Corporation, first as a marketing representative at the Radio Shack Computer Center, and then as a Technical Support Representative. In 1983, after two unsuccessful attempts to start my own business, I left Tandy to become an independent computer consultant. My primary business now is designing computerized accounting systems for small business. Last year I have also published my autobiography, "Stepping Down From The Star," and now I am in the process of writing an espionage novel. In addition, I occasionally lecture on Soviet-American relations on campuses and for private organizations, and often participate in radio and television programs.

I have not prepared a formal statement on the defectors issues for the Subcommittee, but I have given it considerable thought. I'll be happy to answer any questions the Subcommittee may have for me.

STATEMENT OF
ALEKSANDR A. USHAKOV
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss with you the problems faced by defectors from the Soviet Union and other communist-controlled countries as well as the unique information about the functioning of Marxist dictatorships these defectors can provide to this country. I have a rather detailed statement that I would like to summarize for the sake of expediency.

I come to you today as someone who was forced to leave his homeland due to the policies of the Soviet government but who is now proud to be an active member of this great country's society. My reasons for defecting as well as the problems faced once I came here may be similar to others who have defected and, by proceeding from it I will define the problem of defectors as it is generally, on the whole.

The problem of defectors from the Soviet Union and other Communist-controlled countries has existed for 70 years, ever since the 1917 revolution in Russia. During these 70 years, its character has changed repeatedly and, in order to form an adequate reaction to this problem, we have to define its invariable components together with the changes taking place in the Soviet Union right now.

At the present time some changes are taking place in the U.S.S.R. By that I mean a certain democratization of social life, a certain indulgence in the field of economics, and the gradual ruin of governmental atheism. This is the beginning of the great process: one can define these changes as a disintegration of Marxism.

This is good: however, in spite of it, three basic factors of Marxist dictatorship still remain immutable in the Soviet Union, namely, the one-party political system, various restrictions on the private initiative, and hermetically sealed borders. And, as long as those basic factors remain as immutable as before, the problem of Soviet and Communist bloc defectors on the whole will inevitably take place. And because of it there is a question: How to react to it?

To clarify this question, I am suggesting we begin from the viewpoint of defectors themselves. In using the term "defector", one must first define this concept. By that I mean that all those who come from Communist bloc countries belong to one of the following two categories: Emigres or Defectors. And there is a difference between the emigrant and defector. For instance: the emigrant from the Soviet Union is permitted by the KGB to leave the country whereas the defector is not permitted to leave. It is important to keep in mind that defectors are those who know they will not be allowed to legally emigrate because, unlike emigrants who are generally members of national minorities, they make up the majority of the Soviet population. And precisely because of it, they are defectors.

These two categories differ in that emigres who are permitted by the KGB to leave the country find themselves under the jurisdiction of two constitutions -- that of the United States, and that of the U.S.S.R. -- while defectors are under the jurisdiction of just one constitution -- the American. Furthermore, for emigres, various programs offering assistance are in place, while for defectors no such programs exist.

The paradox is that the emigres, who received visas to leave the Soviet Union from the KGB, receive considerable assistance in the West while the defectors, who took their visas from God, and because of it cannot return back in the Soviet Union, remain in the West without support. Taking into consideration that emigres here in America number some 100,000, but the defectors number only a hundred or more people, yet, at the same time, they receive no support, one might add, that such a dismissive attitude to the defector's problem can hardly be justified.

And, if you have some doubts about it, let me show you the reasons and price of the average defection, particularly, of mine.

The primary motive for my coming to the West was the political repression in the U.S.S.R. In March of 1984, I was criminally charged according to article N-70, for "writing, keeping and spreading anti-communist literature." I was subject to 12 years in prison. Considering that in Soviet concentration camps one's incarceration may be extended indefinitely, I decided to hike to the West across the Soviet-Turkish border, that is, across the Caucasian mountains. As I did not belong to any group in the U.S.S.R. which is allowed to emigrate, there was no other alternative for me, not before my arrest in 1984 or after it. I escaped the trap of the agents of the KGB between the first and the second arrests and then, when I achieved it, I still had a hard trial ahead of me.

And right now I'd like to stress that I had worked irreproachably in the U.S.S.R. for twenty years: at plants and factories and then in institutes and universities and had served in the army. I had never committed a crime, had never been sentenced, did not use drugs and so on. I had two small children, a boy and a girl.

Prior to my arrest, from 1979 to 1984, I taught Marxism-Leninism and psychology of management as an Associate Professor at the Odessa Higher Maritime and Engineering Institute in Odessa. In the Department of Philosophy, I also directed research on the social and psychological bases of selection, placement and maintenance of naval command personnel; simply stated, I researched and taught in the area of naval personnel management. In this position, I held the rank which was equal to the naval rank of Captain of the Second Rank or the equivalent of an Army Lieutenant Colonel. I had published 17 professional articles in the official press, plus my dissertation on socio-economic forecasting for my Ph.D. degree from Leningrad University.

Then why was I arrested? For my other books. I wrote four books and many articles about the coming decay of Marxism in Russia and how to accelerate that process. That's why. There is no crime more dangerous in the U.S.S.R. than writing anti-communist books, but I wrote them because I was anxious for the future of my country and the whole world and because of that I had been arrested and my apartment searched.

To understand this disenchantment, you should consider, for a moment, my own personal experiences. For generations my family, like many other Russians, have been brutally repressed by our communist government. My uncles were killed by the

Bolsheviks. My mother was sent to Siberia to do penal servitude in the gold mines for six years and ten months, from the time she was 16 until she was 23. Her only crime being that her father was a farmer who had opposed collectivization. My father, in turn, was luckier. He was expelled from the military for making a joke about Stalin. He could have been shot, but he survived.

I could go on for hours about our treatment by the communist regime -- the false promises, the endless shortages. Nevertheless, let it go without saying, such treatment has produced a significant amount of discontent among the citizens who closely monitor the BBC and Voice of America for honest news about the real world.

But let us return to my arrest. After that arrest, to my surprise I was released within a matter of hours. The reason for the release was not the result of bail reform or some other nicety of constitutional law. Rather, it was for two sinister and hypocritical reasons. The KGB hoped that I would immediately contact my fellow conspirators, trying to warn them or trying to get help from them, thereby exposing them one by one, so the KGB could get us all. As to me, it was their mistake.

But that wasn't all. The bureaucratic machine of Soviet jurisprudence handed me another ace: the Communist Party once upon a time, long ago, invented an iron-clad rule to first expel from its ranks all those for whom it has planned a short trial and long prison term. You are expelled from the Party first (and I was still a member of the CPSU) and only then turned over to the investigators. And it was their second mistake.

I knew that I had at least a day or two before my second arrest, after I was called in to the Party committee meeting to be expelled. Of course, the second (and final) arrest could take place at any moment, unexpectedly and without any formalities, but instinct told me that I still had some time.

In order to escape an encirclement, you have to at least study it; my first foray outside on the day after my first arrest convinced me that it would be impossible to escape even in the daytime. As for the night, the exit from the stairs and the balcony were blocked from dusk till dawn. It became even more impossible two days later, since some higher-up in the KGB, having familiarized himself with the thrust of my work and documentation, had the surveillance sharply increased; thus while I noticed and recognized only two cars following me around town on the first day, there were five of them on the third day.

Then, as a real professor, I decided to teach them a few lessons in Pavlovian conditioning. Practice revealed that a KGB man is a two-legged creature who walks erect and -- like all mammals -- can be trained. I gave them the slip on three different occasions, but allowed them to find me again. Once they were confident that I didn't intend to leave their trap, they relaxed. The fourth time, I kept on going. In that manner, I would be saving more than just myself. I left my shadows on April 1, 1984. For I had won nothing less than my life. It was very hard, but at the same time it turned out to be the grandest April Fool's joke of my life, because the price of it was the biggest one.

From that day, concealing my whereabouts, I went to the Crimea. There I obtained mountain climbing equipment. Every day I shopped for my supplies: backpack, sleeping bag, slicker, sneakers, flask, compass, knife, food concentrates, rope, binoculars, and so on. And I did a lot of training in the local mountains. Finally, after two weeks I left for the Caucasus mountain range and from there I started my hike to the West. Because of the presence of the KGB training and fighting facilities around Batumi city, I had to go East for ten days and then South to the border for nine days.

I cannot even recall exactly how many times I risked my life -- it would be too hard to count. It is enough to say that I crossed two mountain ranges and twice swam across icy mountain rivers at night. Eighteen days out of nineteen, it was raining or snowing.

On May 11th, I reached the Turkish border. My biggest shock upon arriving at the border was not the awesome obstacles I faced -- mine fields, guard towers, electrified fences. Rather, I was shocked, and angry, to finally realize that the top of the fences were angled in--back toward the Soviet Union and not out toward the "hostile" West.

It clearly crystalized in my mind that this entire network of fences and guards was not intended to keep invaders out--but rather to keep the Soviet citizen in. We were prisoners in our own society.

From my hiding place at the border I was able to barely see three border patrol guards. I assumed that they could not see me since the standard military issue binoculars in the Soviet Union is only 5-X power, my binoculars were 10-X power field glasses.

Due the grace of God, my crossing the three fences was uneventful. I am certain I set off some type of alarms, however, since a Soviet helicopter was launched and attacked me while I was on Turkish soil. I was able to survive the attacks once again due to my previous military training where I had been taught that helicopter crews have a far more difficult time spotting a stationary target than they do one that's moving. Thus, I merely stayed behind clumps of bushes whenever the helicopter made a pass overhead.

I later went to a Turkish control point and turned myself over to the authorities. I had taken 19 days to hike out during which time I had lost 20 kilos in weight, approximately 44 pounds.

I stayed in Turkey for about 3 weeks. Eventually my passage to Munich was arranged. While there, I had an opportunity to work part-time as a broadcaster for Radio LIberty. I especially wanted to do this so my family could hear my voice and know I was alive. I remained there for 8 months until I obtained a visa to New York.

When I arrived in the United States on January 29, 1985, I was put into contact with the International Rescue Committee which arranged temporary housing in Harlem and a modest amount for spending money for a few months. I also arranged through them a few low-paying jobs (photographer-assistant, for instance) though none that were related to my previous experiences.

In May of 1985, I was put into contact with the Jamestown Foundation which assisted me in moving to Washington and finding temporary work house-sitting in the Maryland suburbs. These efforts gave me an opportunity to work on a book describing my defection which I am pleased to announce has been accepted by Alfred Knopf Publishing Company for eventual release in the beginning of 1988. It is entitled "In The KGB Gunsights."

Through the assistance of relatives of Christian Sizemore, the President of Alderson-Broaddus College in Philippi, West Virginia, for the last six months I have been able to work on a second book which attempts to reduplicate the manuscript I was working on in Odessa in 1984 when the KGB seized it. In addition, I was able, on my own, to obtain employment as a Russian language and culture instructor for the Foreign Service Institute. Unfortunately, this is merely on a contractual basis which does not provide any medical or retirement benefits.

Needless to say, I am very grateful to the many Americans who have helped me. I am also grateful to this country that has accepted me as a refugee. I am particularly indebted to the actions of the Jamestown Foundation, the I.R.C. and Alderson-Broaddus College.

However, what does surprise me and, what I believe must also concern this Committee, is the absence of a clearly designated and adequately funded system for the resettlement of defectors from the communist-world. My comparatively successful adaptation in the U.S. was conditioned by a chain of fortunate circumstances, but in order to solve the problem of defectors we cannot rely upon fortunate circumstances. Moreover, it seems to me that I and many of my friends who fled communism could be of more useful service to this great country if we were given the opportunity to tell the government and the people what we know about how the Communist world really works.

Therefore, it appears to me that as long as this is true and as long as the Communist bloc continues to conceal its inner-workings from the West, the defector is an important tool for understanding our common opponent and learning what his peculiarities are.

I would hope that this Subcommittee develops an appropriate and properly funded mechanism that better utilizes the defector resource. At the same time, I hope that the Congress will advance a system that also addresses the unique problems the defector faces in resettling here in the United States.

The question of assistance to Communist bloc defectors remains grave and must be addressed. In my view, the following must be done in order to resolve the problem:

1. Creation inside the appropriate government agency of a small department dedicated to working with defectors.

2. A provision for the appropriation of sufficient funds in the Department's budget to cover housing expenses for a fixed period of time, language instruction and career placement of the defector.

3. A system of low interest loans for education and retraining would be appropriate. In return for this assistance, the defector would be required to do work for the government in either translating or analysis. He could be paid to write about his experiences for the government while he is also developing new skills, etc. in this country. The government will be compensated by the benefit of his knowledge.

4. One staff member of the Department should be a former defector who is thoroughly familiar with adjustment problems and defector's language..

5. A regulation, granting (early) citizenship to defectors in those cases, where U.S. citizenship is a requirement for employment considerations.

6. One objective of the (newly-created) Department should be the dissemination of information about defectors' activities both inside and outside of the United States.

As a result, our mutual efforts will help defend freedom in the United States, in the Communist bloc countries and in the world on the whole.

Thank you yor your attention.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

ALEKSANDR A. USHAKOV

In May, 1984, Dr. Aleksandr Ushakov completed a nineteen day hike to freedom. To defect from the Soviet Union, Dr. Ushakov walked from Batumi, USSR, across the Caucasus mountain range to a bordering city in Turkey. He was subsequently granted political asylum by U.S. authorities in Istanbul, Turkey.

For the first few months after his defection, Dr. Ushakov lived in Munich, West Germany, working as a freelance broadcaster for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. In January, 1985, he took up residence in the United States.

From 1979 to 1984, Aleksandr Ushakov taught Marxism-Leninism as an Associate Professor at the Odessa Higher Maritime and Engineering Institute in Odessa, USSR. In the Department of Philosophy, he also directed research on the social and psychological bases of selection, placement and maintenance of naval command personnel.

In 1979, Dr. Ushakov received his PhD in Philosophy from Leningrad State University. His dissertation was titled "Methodological Problems of Social Foresight." In 1974, he received his M.A. in Philosophy from Leningrad State University. Concurrent with his graduate studies, Dr. Ushakov taught Dialectical Materialism.

In 1966, Aleksandr Ushakov was conscripted into the Soviet Army where he served for three years in the missile defense corps.

From 1965 to 1966, Dr. Ushakov studied computer programming at the Leningrad Electrotechnical Institute.

During the period 1969 to 1984, Dr. Ushakov wrote and published four books for the Russian underground press. He was arrested and detained by the KGB once in 1984, after being betrayed by a colleague at the Naval Institute. Facing a second arrest and a twelve year sentence, Dr. Ushakov began the elaborate planning and preparation for his escape from the Soviet Union.

Dr. Ushakov is fluent in Russian and has working knowledge of German and English.

Dr. Ushakov's wife and two children reside in the USSR.

Dr. Ushakov lives in the Washington, D.C. area and can be contacted through the the Jamestown Foundation, 1708 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. Telephone: (202) 483-8888.

ALEKSANDR A. USHAKOV

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PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR Department of Philosophy, Odessa Higher Maritime and Engineering Institute, Odessa, USSR, 1979 - 1984. 1980-1982, Directed research: "Social and Psychological Bases for Selection, Placement and Stabilization of Command Personnel on International Navigation Ships of the Ministry of the Navy of the USSR." Primary method: sociometry; Programming on MIR-3 (large scale mainframe) and EC (equivalent to IBM 360/370) computers; Number of staff: 21 persons.

LECTURER Institute of Improvement of Professional Skills of the Ministry of the Navy of the USSR, Odessa, USSR. On the basis of completed research, gave special course of lectures entitled "Sociopsychological Basis of Management on Sea-Going Vessels," 1982 - 1984.

INSTRUCTOR Leningrad State University (LGU) Leningrad, USSR. Concurrent with graduate studies, taught course on Dialectical Materialism, 1976 - 1979.

TEACHING ASSISTANT Polytechnic Institute of Vladivostok, Vladivostok, USSR. Taught philosophy, 1974 - 1976.

COMPULSORY MILITARY SERVICE, 1966 - 1969.

EDUCATION

LENINGRAD STATE UNIVERSITY (LGU), Leningrad, USSR. Department of Philosophy Degree equivalent to PhD. Dissertation: Methodological Problems of Social Foresight, 1976 - 1979.

LENINGRAD STATE UNIVERSITY (LGU), Leningrad, USSR. Department of Philosophy. Degree equivalent to M.A., 1969 - 1974.

LENINGRAD ELECTROTECHNICAL INSTITUTE, Department of Automation and Computer Technology, Leningrad, USSR, 1965 - 1966.

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Russian, native; German, working knowledge

PERSONAL

Born: 1946 in USSR
Health: Excellent
Citizenship: Stateless, Refugee Status in United States, Employment Authorized by United States Immigration and Naturalization Service

USHAKOV

May 28, 1985

A Request For U.S. Citizenship

My striving for justice and my conscious thought-out anti-Communism for one and one half decades forced me to seek a way out of the situation which exists in my country and in the world as a whole. Millions of people in the USSR are in a similar situation and my fate is typical for many of them. Perhaps, a certain difference from most anti-Communists in Russia can be seen in the particular consistency of my actions. In order to thoroughly study Marxism, I entered the Philosophical Faculty of Leningrad University, graduated, and then defended my dissertation on the problems of social prognostication. I did all this in order that my criticism of Marxism and struggle with it would be professional.

As a result of all my efforts, I wrote books and articles whose basic content was anti-Communism. My major work: "The Twentieth Century: Collapse of Marxism and New Perspectives" was written on the basis of my dissertation. But exactly then, when I was already ready to send my works to the West, the agents of the KGB arrested me, together with my books, articles and everything else. This was on February 21, 1984. It seemed that all was lost. I should have perished in the concentration camps.

However, everything turned out differently. Taking advantage of the pause between the first and second arrests, I lost my surveillance and was able to reach the Soviet-Turkish border which I crossed on May 11, 1984. The pause between my arrests was needed by the KGB in order to discharge me from my job (I worked as an Assistant Professor at the Odessa Higher Maritime and Engineering Institute) before trying me and sending me to prison. I used this opportunity. Now, after three weeks in Turkey and eight months working with NATO in Munich, West Germany, I was given the opportunity to come to the United States and live in New York.

Despite all the attempts of the KGB to eradicate dissidence in the USSR generally, and me in particular, I survived and reached your homeland, which, I hope, will become also mine. Now I am faced with the question -- what to do further. I see two possibilities:

1. To forget about my former life and work in one of my neutral professions, do something simpler (during my 20 years of work in the USSR I worked my way up from a worker to an assistant professor), or, the second possibility --
2. To continue to do all that for which I was repressed by the KGB by order from the Soviet government.

The second path is the most difficult, but also it is the most effective. By taking this path, I will be able to bring more benefit to America and the entire free world. For example, recently I received an offer to continue my work on a new book about my struggle in the USSR and my crossing to the West across the border. I agreed, and in accordance with my agreement, I sent a broad outline of my book to the Jamestown Foundation. The Foundation has accepted it for consideration. I believe that it will be beneficial for the American reader to know about such things. In addition to this, there is a possibility of a job in my former profession -- as an assistant professor in problems of social prognostication. There are possibilities of jobs at Voice of America and in other areas.

However, for this I need American citizenship. Without citizenship, for at least five years I will not be able to work for America and the entire world which stands against Communism, with sufficient effectiveness.

If you could assist me in obtaining American citizenship in the near future, I would be most grateful to you personally and to the entire American government as a whole.

Aleksandr Ushakov

STATEMENT OF
DR. BRUCE W. MENNING
DIRECTOR, SOVIET ARMY STUDIES OFFICE
U.S. ARMY COMBINED ARMS CENTER
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Reflections on the Value and Utilization of Non-Intelligence Emigres and Defectors from the USSR and East Europe

There exists a fundamental need to acknowledge the debt which Soviet and East European studies in the United States owe to three successive waves of emigration from the Soviet Bloc. There is also a need to establish more systematic scholarly utilization of the precious asset which many of the emigres/defectors represent. With the development of coherent vision and programs, their unique experiences and knowledge can be better utilized inside and outside government, both to enrich our society and to enhance our understanding of the prospects and problems inherent in the US-USSR relationship.

Since the beginning of this century, the West has owed much of its insight into and understanding of Russia, the Soviet Union, and East Europe to the three waves of emigration. The first began with pre-revolutionary escapees from tzarist persecution, whose ethnic and religious backgrounds helped shape Western attitudes towards the Old Regime. After 1917, the first wave crested with a flood of diverse elements from tzarist society fleeing Bolshevism. Their representatives provided access to Russian literature (Vladimir Nabokov), shaped our first historical studies (Michael Karpovich and George Vernadsky), gave us much of our initial scholarship on the Russian and Soviet armies (Nicholas Golovin and D.D. Fedotoff White), and imparted unique insight into Russian successes with new technologies (Igor Sikorsky). Their papers have been collected in such major archival repositories as the Hoover Institution and the Bakhmeteff Archive at Columbia University.

The second wave of emigre/defectors, displaced victims of both Stalin and Hitler, provided invaluable materials for the first systematic Western understanding of the very nature of the Soviet system. Some of these figures (Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Wolfgang Leonhard) achieved sufficient scholarly stature to have a direct impact on Soviet studies. Large numbers of others made a less direct -- although no less substantial -- impact through survey research techniques employed by American scholars just as the Cold War began in earnest. The Harvard Study of Soviet Emigres (by Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer) greatly aided the first generation of American scholars in the Soviet area in developing a better understanding of the Soviet government, the role of evolving totalitarian ideology, and the operational codes which governed conduct within Soviet society. For scholars who were actively laying the foundation of Soviet area studies without direct access to Soviet society, the second-wave emigres provided a crucial source of information. Mass survey research techniques were still in their infancy, and scholarly explcitation of Soviet emigres proved both innovative and of enduring value.

The third migratory wave began in the 1970s with the Jewish exodus, and for various reasons received less systematic and innovative scrutiny than the second. American scholars now enjoyed direct access to the Soviet Union, and they displayed higher levels of knowledge and skill than their earlier counterparts. Thanks in part to access and the limited ability to profit from it, there appeared to be no immediate and compelling reason to exploit the new emigre/defectors. Once the scholarly community eventually did awaken to the promise inherent in emigre survey efforts, the very size of the population combined with funding limitations to preclude systematic, in-depth emigre utilization. At the same time, several minor and poorly executed survey efforts demonstrated how seriously emigre sources could be distorted if improperly utilized by scholars lacking adequate area studies background. In general, two new and related complications bedeviled all attempts to use survey techniques to tap the intellectual capital of third-wave emigres/defectors. One was the fact that both the relative openness of Soviet society (in contrast with the 1940s and 50s) and the relative sophistication of Western scholarship required a different order of questions that focused on narrower and more distinct fields of inquiry. The second was the fact that recent emigres did not represent a cross-section of Soviet society: they tended to be urban, they were disproportionately intellectual and professional, and they were Jewish in a religious and/or ethnic sense. If the researchers were now more sophisticated, so too were their subjects. Their uniqueness required truly innovative approaches.

In addition -- and perhaps more telling -- the third wave created a very special challenge at a time when Soviet area studies in the U.S. was unable to respond. The wave's arrival coincided with the onset of a crisis in academia. The period of rapid growth for area studies in general was drawing to a close. Few places were available for scholars in Soviet and East European fields, and a general decline in funding for research eroded possibilities for systematic training and access to materials. By the late 1970s, renewed federal support for research had improved the situation, but that support did not directly address the issue of exploiting emigre/defector resources.

In the late 1980s, little has changed as Soviet area studies confronts a more modest migratory flow of Soviet and East European emigres/defectors. Resources remain thin, direction non-existent, experience scarce, and methods problematic. Consequently, although the number of emigres is now smaller, they continue to arrive in the West, where their reception is varied, their degree of assimilation uneven, and their vast store of knowledge about the Eastern Bloc often unnoticed and untapped. In many cases, the U.S. does not take even the most rudimentary steps to identify either sources of information for additional study or professional skills suitable for further cultivation and advancement.

There are several exceptions to this generalization. One is the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty complex in Munich, where emigres regularly serve as instruments of contemporary commentary and analysis. Another is the U.S. Army, in which several small institutions, for reasons of focus and lack of larger access to the USSR, devote considerable attention to emigre utilization. To develop language skills and to impart a sense of context, the U.S. Army Russian Institute (USARI) in Garmisch, FRG, employs a small number of emigre lecturers and language teachers. To provide insight into heretofore obscure areas of Soviet military organization and its relationship with its parent society, the Soviet Army Studies Office (SASO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, employs Soviet emigres on a short-term basis.

Because of the uniqueness of its mandate and method, SASO is an important beneficiary of insight garnered from emigre/defector sources. Founded in the beginning of 1986, SASO traces its origins to 1984, when General William R. Richardson, then Commander of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, visited the Soviet Studies Research Centre (SSRC) at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. For more than a decade, SSRC had been engaged in highly-effective open-source research, teaching, and publication on the Soviet military. With the educational and training benefits of this effort in mind, General Richardson collaborated with then-Lieutenant General Carl E. Vuono (now General and U.S. Army Chief of Staff) and then-Colonel William A. Stofft (now Brigadier General and U.S. Army Chief of Military History) to fashion an analogous U.S. organization, SASO.

Directly subordinate to the Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, SASO's mission is "to conduct, encourage and facilitate in-depth research, analysis, publication and lecturing from open-source materials on the Russian/Soviet tactical and operational levels of war." Developments in conventional war-fighting capabilities over the last decade have made the examination of questions relating to Soviet operational art and the theater-strategic offensive major foci of SASO's studies. As an institution dedicated to unclassified research, SASO exists to exploit the growing mass of open-source material (estimated at about 4,000 pages per month) and the availability of other sources, including emigre/defectors. The intent is not only to extend and complement other research, but also to test ideas in open fora, to cut across traditional international and academic boundaries, and to encourage immersion in Soviet materials for perspective. In many respects, SASO forms an ideal complement and partner for the educational effort at the older U.S. Army Russian Institute.

Two emigre representatives of these organizations, Lev Yudovich (USARI) and Natalie Gross (SASO) provide excellent examples of what can be accomplished, but their experience also reveals the extent to which talents could be more fully exploited with sufficient support and opportunity. Yudovich, a Soviet-trained lawyer and recognized scholar on the Soviet legal system, has found a niche at USARI teaching general subjects and introducing officer-students to the complexities of Soviet existence. Yet, his background could be more completely utilized if his professional talents were more directly applied and more widely known in the West. Similarly, Natalie Gross, a SASO Fellow, has demonstrated great scholarly promise in her research on the complexities of the Soviet military system and its relationship to Soviet society, but she, too, must lengthen her reach into the Western scholarly and area studies communities. She plans to accomplish this by continuing her work within the framework of a graduate degree program in international security affairs. Both Yudovich and Gross demonstrate the degree to which emigres can find useful employment in the West, but their utilization -- however incomplete -- has been more the result of good fortune rather than design. In addition, their experiences, particularly with the difficulties of attaining American citizenship, demonstrate some of the unique challenges facing Soviet Bloc emigre/defectors in the West.

Even in cases in which potential is only partially realized, evidence tends to reinforce what the better-coordinated Israeli experience has already demonstrated: that emigre sources can be used with great benefit if ties can be forged between the emigre and his professional peers in the West. One key is to make the emigre's information accessible not only to area studies specialists but also to practitioners in the emigre's own field. People -- not just survey data -- need to be targeted for utilization. A net must be cast widely to identify those emigres with experiences, talents, and knowledge of value to particular communities and institutions. For example, the former Soviet museum curator can comment not only on vital aspects of Soviet cultural life but also on aspects of his military and naval service. Or, to put it another way, while General Grigorenko shed valuable light on dissident life in the Soviet Union, he also had many things to say about the Soviet General Staff and his experiences as Director of research studies at the Frunze Military Academy. However, all too often sources like Grigorenko have either been ignored or "discovered" as an afterthought. In turn, emigre/defectors such as Grigorenko can provide leads to others willing to share their insights and experiences on a systematic basis.

Beyond identification and professional networking, another key is to facilitate access to appropriate audiences. Many emigres do not enjoy entrance to the U.S. scholarly and governmental communities and therefore cannot develop the necessary skills to make an effective transition into the Western academic and professional world. Any program for emigre utilization must address the problem of admission and transition so that the emigre professional cannot only impart information but also become part of the scholarly and societal dividend.

As in the case of Yudovich and Gross, two Soviet emigres presently teaching at U.S. universities provide examples of what has been accomplished and what remains to be done. Boris Gommershtadt teaches engineering at Northeastern University in Boston. He came to the U.S. as a Soviet civil engineer in 1977, validated his credentials at Kansas State University, then proceeded to become a well-published authority on methods of construction in seismically active zones. Professor Maia Kipp of the University of Kansas emigrated more than fifteen years ago, became fluent in English, received credit for her Leningrad degree in German, then completed her Ph.D. degree in Slavic languages and literature. She currently teached Russian to both undergraduates and to American military officers and civil servants. Her methods and approach are unique because she has extensive experience in both American and Soviet society. She represents a large payoff for limited sources invested. However, as an untenured member of a university faculty in an uncertain academic market, her future remains precarious. Although the emigre experience with American academia is sprinkled with success stories, Professor Kipp's status is not atypical among her peers.

The solution to some of the broader problems of emigre/defector utilization? First, we must distinguish between emigres as sources of information and as sources of professional enrichment (while realizing that the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive). In the former case, if we are to tap emigre society at large for survey-type information returns, we need to be more innovative and intellectually rigorous in approaches and methodology. Surveys should be something more than tools for sociological analysis. They must be more open-ended to provide American scholars with information not captured in conventional formats. With the aid of judicious funding, these and other issues should be remanded to scholars within revitalized Soviet and Eastern European area programs in the United States and the West. Whatever the approach, it should be one that emphasizes conscious design rather than accident and faddish preoccupation.

In any larger program centering on more complete professional utilization, we must begin with systematic identification of donors and recipients. An effective system must be devised for identifying and screening potential emigre scholar-sources in relation to their experiences, qualifications, and abilities. The system must then match them with appropriate persons and institutions. Funds must be provided for two purposes: the first to assist in the difficult task of skill development -- especially English-language facility and professional accreditation; and the second to support joint Western scholar-emigre research projects. The latter would encourage Western professionals to view emigres as partners in pursuit of knowledge rather than competitors for scarce resources and positions. In addition, alternative ways should be explored to satisfy emigre/defector residence requirements for U.S. citizenship. If system and money can be combined with self-development and self-interest, then the product will benefit all parties to the arrangement. The solution must be built on a foundation of system, incentive, and community of interests.

In conclusion, we must understand that the emigres represent both sources of information and living transmission lines from their parent societies to ours. Although they provide valuable empirical data, many of their experiences lie in recesses untouched and untouchable by questionnaires. We must be willing to make use of various types of information, and in so doing realize that the emigre/defectors themselves have a major role to play in tutoring us on how to ask for, and use, information. They are more than passive sources; with proper utilization, they are active participants in the process. Indeed, with modest cultivation, they can form part of the "seed crop" for the next generation of Soviet area specialists in the West. Finally, we must also bear in mind that emigre/defectors differ from other emigrants in that unlike refugees from most other societies, those from the Soviet Bloc "can't go home again" without exposing themselves to considerable personal risk.

TESTIMONY
of
Vladimir I. Toumanoff
before
The Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee; thank you for inviting me to come today to discuss with you the topic of Soviet emigres who have settled in the United States.

My name is Vladimir Toumanoff, and for the last ten years I have been the Director of the National Council for Soviet and East European Research. Later in my remarks I will describe the Council briefly, but for the moment it is probably enough to say that since 1979 the Council has been engaged in the design and management of this country's largest systematic survey of Soviet emigre knowledge of the USSR. Before that I was an Associate Director of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University which normally includes some half dozen Soviet Emigre scholars on its staff. Earlier still, I spent most of my career in the U.S. Foreign Service as a Soviet area specialist.

My knowledge of emigres from the USSR actually goes back to childhood in Boston. My own parents and many of their friends arrived in America in the early 1920's in what has become known as the "first wave" of emigres from Russia, following the revolution and civil war there. I grew up intimately aware of the experiences of that group in adjusting and assimilating in the

United States. The great majority, as in every subsequent "wave," succeeded and went on to contribute much to our country. A few failed.

My cousins and their friends arrived in the "second wave," mainly through the Displaced Persons Program following World War II, and I watched, and sometimes helped, some of them go through the process and problems of adapting to this, very different, society.

In the latter part of the 1950's I first began, officially, to interview Soviet citizens who escaped to the West for the Department of State as a Foreign Service Officer. Then for two years as Political Officer in our Moscow Embassy, I travelled widely in the USSR and talked with many of its citizens in all walks of life.

In the mid-1960's I spent three days with two Soviet men who washed up on our shores, literally, as they agonized over the decision whether or not to defect. They did, and months later, each separately, and at different times, both returned to the Soviet Union.

The "third wave" came to us mainly in the 1970's, although there has been a continuing trickle since, for the most part with permission of the Soviet Government to emigrate. There are now something like 130,000 of these recent emigres settled in the United States. In 1979, the Executive Branch and the American academic community turned to the National Council for Soviet and East European Research to design and manage a large survey of these new arrivals to see what they could tell us about the USSR. As Executive Director of the Council, then, and still, I have been involved in that Soviet emigre project ever since.

Let me digress for a moment to explain about the National Council. Starting about 1970, the entire field of Soviet area studies in the United States went into a period of nearly catastrophic decline, from which it is only beginning to recover. In response to that decline, and because the nation's capability to know about and understand the USSR was at stake, a truly unique (especially for those days) cooperative effort emerged between the Executive Branch and the academic community. They joined together to define a national program of basic, unclassified research on the USSR and Eastern Europe, and to design a vehicle for its conduct. A central purpose was to make possible a Federal investment in the nation's intellectual capital in that field, and to help train and maintain a professional cadre available for work both inside and outside the government. The Council was the product of that joint effort. It is an independent, non-profit, academic corporation, which conducts a national program of post-doctoral research and related activities at colleges and universities across the country. It was initially funded by contributions from the Departments of State and Defense. the Director of Central Intelligence and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Since the passage of the Soviet-Eastern European Research and Training Act of 1983, that Act, commonly referred to as Title VIII, has been the principle source of support for the council and a number of other organizations.

The Soviet Emigre Interview Project, which actually got underway in 1981, has turned out to be a major undertaking - about half of the Council's activity - and relates directly to the emigres as sources of information and insight on the Soviet Union. Based on an original roster of some 30,000 biographies, sample groups, carefully selected for their special knowledge, or to create as nearly as possible a surrogate for the Soviet population, have been interviewed for a total of about 4,000 individuals. There are general surveys on broad aspects of the society, including one on the Soviet military, and intensive interviews that go on for days with individuals who have deep knowledge of narrower topics. Dozens of scholars from various universities, and over 100 graduate students have been involved. the work is conducted almost entirely in the Russian language. Analysis of the data gathered has barely begun and already there are some 40 research papers and several books. The data is being made publicly available and scholars will be analyzing it for years to come.

In addition to that major survey, the Council, over the past ten years, has sponsored about a dozen other individual research projects based on emigre interviews, and some twenty projects in which research itself was done by emigre scholars.

The Council's is not the only program that benefits from the knowledge, of Soviet emigres. There are and have been others including one currently operating which is systematically based on that knowledge, mostly in science and technology. A few emigres themselves volunteer their information and insights about the USSR through affiliation with American academic institutions and through published materials mainly in the emigre press.

All of the above is not to say that what has been done, and is being done, is enough; that the information and comprehension of the USSR brought to our shores by the "third wave" is adequately being made available to us. I cannot think of any serious American specialist on the USSR who would hold that view. Just the opposite.

In all that follows, I will make no distinction between emigres and defectors. When viewed as a national resource for the knowledge of the USSR that they bring us, and for their contribution to our country through talent and industry after they arrive, it makes little difference whether they come to us with or without the permission of the Soviet Government.

It seems to me that several central points have emerged from our experience with the "third wave" of emigres thus far. First is that they are an enormously rewarding source of information and understanding which is only beginning to be made generally available. The USSR is a rich, powerful, complex and (still) secretive civilization. There is a great deal that we need to know and do not, or can only surmise, or do not comprehend, that emigres can provide. We have done more than scrape the surface, but there is much more gold in those hills. Let me give you two quick examples. Not long ago, an individual was found whose task was to transmit and receive messages in the Soviet submarine fleet. So far as I know, he has still not been interviewed in depth. Also, a recent finding based on emigre data suggests strongly that the Soviet military arm functions no more effectively than the civilian society, which by its inefficiencies is driving the Soviet leadership to drastic measures. That finding bears much more examination.

One weakness of our activities to date is that we have sought from the emigres data on topics which we Americans think important, and our research has been designed primarily around subjects which we have already studied to some extent and in which we have an established interest. None of those designs anticipated the current Soviet drive for reform. Almost nothing has been done to encourage the emigres to volunteer their knowledge and thoughts on topics which *they* think are important. At the same time, very few emigres have the free time and the access to publications, to make their thoughts publicly known on their own. Moreover, most of their volunteered writings appear only in the Russian language emigre publications. There would be obvious pitfalls in an entirely self-determined approach, not the least of which is that emigres often underestimate what we in the West already know about the Soviet Union, and may overestimate the novelty of their own knowledge. But I am convinced that a productive middle course could be devised between pure voluntarism and responses to our own preconceived questions.

Whatever screening process may exist to identify new arrivals who could and would be willing to make particularly valuable contributions, it seems to me must be flawed, or focussed on a narrow range of subjects, or not followed up. My own clear impression, and that of others outside the Government, is that many knowledgeable, astute, perceptive and willing individuals are never approached or given an opportunity to add their contribution to our knowledge and comprehension.

In many respects the knowledge emigres bring with them is evanescent, subject to memory loss, obsolescence, and change by their experiences in America. This is especially true of science and technology, but also prevails to some extent in the social sphere. We have frequently been late in our efforts. In many ways the USSR has appeared to be static, with little change. That is certainly not its appearance today. Which is not to say that it is unimportant to learn from earlier emigres what the USSR has been. Almost all of it still remains unchanged, and most probably will, and we need to know better what has invited, or is driving, change. But in many ways, the fresher the knowledge made available the better. Whatever may be the outcome of the current Soviet efforts at reform, it would be of great importance to hear from new arrivals how the society is responding. I cannot think of a development on the international scene of greater potential consequence for the United States. Many emigres already here keep abreast of current events in the USSR, and have special knowledge from their contacts and their insight. But the Council's Soviet Interview Project has finished gathering information, and except for analysis, will not be continued. The blueprint and new methodology for future surveys are there for others to use, but none is planned.

Now let me turn to a more important issue. The contribution Soviet emigres can make to our knowledge and understanding of the USSR, great and valuable as it is, is the least of their contribution to America. This is the most important point I could make for you today. These people are capable, energetic, talented above average, for the most part very well educated, experienced, and highly motivated. Almost without exception they hope for nothing more than their aspiration to become creative, productive and assimilated full members of our society. As we all know, they face a variety of special problems in achieving that goal. Nevertheless, the great majority manage, not immediately, not fully, but their success already is, and will in this generation and those that follow, be their greatest contribution to us all. That is the track record of those who came before, and the "third wave" is already well started on the same path.

There may, nevertheless, be some measures the Congress may wish to consider taking to ease and speed that contribution. We are all aware, and Members of Congress perhaps most of all, that ours is a more complicated society today than that facing the two earlier "waves" from the USSR in the 1920's and 40's. It is also strikingly different from the Soviet Union. In spite of that, the great majority of recent Soviet emigres, after the first shock and confusion, adjust, adapt, and begin to make their way. They do so with a variety of help, private and public, organized and casual. Some individuals, however, and their families find it especially difficult, and get blocked. This is apt to be true particularly among certain groups:

1. Former professionals in vocations that either do not exist in America, or which require extensive and expensive retraining and recertification (law, medicine, engineering, and others).
2. Older people.
3. Former professionals who arrive with little or no knowledge of English, especially if the practice of their profession in America requires written and spoken fluency.
4. Defectors in the Technical sense.

Individuals and families from these and other groups, and special cases, can and do get trapped in truly difficult and frustrating situations at levels far, far below their demonstrated abilities, to say nothing of their expectations. Often this comes about not by any fault or lack of effort on their part, but sometimes through unfamiliarity with the multitude of different private and public assistance programs available, and most frequently through simple economic necessity. We know civil engineers working as draftsmen, physicians who are hospital orderlies, eminent defense attorneys employed as paralegals, and bank managers driving taxis.

The point these cases drive home to me is that each could tell us much about the Soviet reality, and as a national resource of proven ability and skills they are being wasted. A measure you might wish to consider would be a program of grants-in-aid, or national resource fellowships which could address both sides of the coin: i.e. make their special knowledge of the USSR generally available and at the same time provide such temporary assistance, if appropriate, as could help them rise closer to their potential and their hopes. Such a program would need to be carefully designed and administered, but I am confident it could be done to make a genuine contribution to the intellectual capital and to the productivity of America. The details of such a program are much too long a topic for today, but let me outline some features that I think would be important.

a. The program should be modest, less than $1 million per year, aimed toward awards to not more than 10 - 20 individuals or families per year. It should start slowly, and be considered a pilot, experimental for the first several years.

b. It should have some assured duration from the start, say five years, either through a multiple year appropriation or a modest revocable trust in the US Treasury. Annual uncertainty would probably doom its quality, and it would be a costly break of faith to start and then suddenly stop. Better not to start.

c. It should not be conducted by the Intelligence Community, but probably best be administered by some existing private organization with expertise on the USSR and competence in the Russian language.

d. It should not be done at the expense of existing support for the American profession of Soviet area studies (I have in mind Title VIII of PL 98-164) lest it alienate a component of our own society critical to the success of the program. Somehow existing support for the American professional community should be visibly held harmless.

e. It would be a mistake to duplicate existing forms of aid available from the multitude of private, municipal, state and federal programs. On the contrary, it should be conducted in close collaboration with experienced resettlement agencies, and should rely maximally on existing American instruments and dynamics in aid of assimilation. But it should have the capacity to steer bewildered emigres to such sources of aid and to provide direct temporary assistance where these are absent. (I have in mind training in special vocational skills, language instruction, tuition aid for advanced education, and the like.)

f. The doors for initial application to the program should be very wide and include defectors as well as emigres, but the selection process should be careful, and rigorous, the awards should be tailored individually, and followed up; that is, a prestigious (and labor intensive) program.

g. Women emigres from the USSR may have a specially difficult time, for three reasons. We have found, generally speaking, that they have had a lesser role in the decision to leave the Soviet Union, sometimes little or no part at all; the Soviet pattern of double burden, employment and housework, is often carried forward to this country; and they frequently take the first job available, usually very menial, and may stay in it, whereas men tend more to seek work closer to their former profession. A possible program would need to be especially sensitive to women's potential and needs.

h. One of the scarcest skills in our country is genuine bilingual fluency in Russian and English, and it is a sore need in a number of professions including Government service and the academic profession of Soviet studies. While emigres tend to make great sacrifice for the education of their children, better schools, colleges and graduate training are often beyond their means. Moreover, the pressure on the young to become gainfully employed to lift the burden and help their parents is considerable. The program might be alert to those factors as well.

Two last quick points.

Many of us who have friends in emigre circles are often called by Government officials and others to ask if by any chance we happen to know an emigre, knowledgeable on some particular of the USSR, who might be willing to help. It is a very hit-or-miss, haphazard process. One benefit of a program might be the gradual accumulation of a roster of emigres, knowledgeable, perhaps capable of independent research, and willing to help, to serve as a kind of clearing house for such requests.

Finally, as the program gained experience, it might not be too much to hope that it would start to define an organized systematic, and consistent Federal role in assisting Soviet emigres, and perhaps emigres from other parts of the world, to make their full contribution of knowlege and productivity to our society. Such a program would certainly become widely known in the USSR.

Thank you very much.

STATEMENT OF
VLADIMIR NIKOLAVEICH SAKHAROV
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
U.S. GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Mr. Chairman, it is an honor to appear before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations at these hearings which are performing a vital function of looking into the sensitive area of defector resettlement and its related problems.

My name is Vladimir Nikolaevich Sakharov, a.k.a. William Nichols Stiller. I reside in San Clemente, California. I recently moved after a temporary stay at Tuscon, Arizona, where I had been a Visiting Professor at the University of Arizona.

I was delighted to learn that the members of this Subcommittee have expressed an interest in the subject of defectors' debriefing and resettlement especially after my former Alexandria (Egypt) colleague Vitaliy Yurchenko went back to the USSR.

The Committee's looking into handling bloc defectors is a positive step in the improvement of the program. I was, at one period of my life in the U.S., assisted by the CIA, I went through the turbulences of resettlement typical of any other newcomer to this country. The relevancy of my contribution to this Committee's hearing is based on the good and bad points of my treatment and many years under the existing, but not necessarily adequate, resettlement program of the CIA. I would also like to express my total confidence and optimism in Judge Webster's keen and compassionate understanding of the resettlement issue. Personally, I was very happy to learn about his appointment as the DCI.

My experience within the CIA resettlement program started at the end of 1971 while I was being debriefed in a safe house near Washington, D.C. Initially I was looking forward to becoming a productive and contributing member of the society. My feelings were justifably based on promises given to me by Agency's personnel with whom I had dealt prior to my debriefing. I thought my education and work experience in conjunction with the Agency's sponsorship would quickly help me build my new life in the U.S.

I was born in Moscow on May 3, 1945. My father worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a diplomatic courier. Later I learned he also was associated with the Committee of State Security (KGB). Unwittingly, my father indoctrinated me in the American culture very early in life. From his travels to the U.S. he brought records of Frank Sinatra, Charlie Parker and Nat

King Cole, books by western authors which he read and many other items of "Decadent Bourgeois" culture. As a child I always admired, although secretly, all those exciting western ideas. He told me stories abut Washington, D.C., New York, Paris and London which inflamed my imagination. I played piano imitating Errol Garner. According to a Soviet proverb: "Today it is jazz, tomorrow-treason," I was on my secret path to it probably when I was a teenager.

Following the family tradition of employment is a rule in the Soviet life. I did my studies at the Institute of International Relations which included Soviet diplomacy, Law, economics, international relations, and area specialization in the Middle East and Arabic language. I also learned that the only way to get ahead in the Soviet Union, in addition to being a member of the rising class of the Foreign Service establishment, was to report on your student colleagues before they report on you to the KGB. This did not appeal to me.

My first foreign assignment was to North Yemen in 1967. Since I spoke Arabic and the KGB resident in Yemen needed an Arab expert I was "co-opted" by the KGB while working under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. My duties in Yemen included support for the Soviet colony, consular duties and translations of Ambassador Rakhmatov and KGB officials' discussions with national liberation members and the President's office.

After my Yemen's posting I was assigned as Secretary of the Soviet Consulate General in Alexandria where I received an attache rank. From 1968 to 1970 I provided support for Soviet Naval officers in their talks with local authorities. My special area of assignment was liaison with the Egyptian police, immigration, customs and counter-intelligence. I also participated in information programs out of the Embassy in Cairo and Soviet Cultural Center in Alexandria. As an aside, here I met Vitaliy Yurchenko on several occasions both socially and on business. He was a low level SK (Soviet Colony) security officer attached to the Navy, a free-wheeling type with a taste for pretty women. This is why it was no surprise to me when I heard about his defection. His redefection, although the issue of his bona fides remains unresolved, was neither a surprise, as I will attempt to demonstrate in this statement.

In August 1970 I was transferred to Kuwait as Attache of the Soviet Embassy. My work centered around economic and political analyses and liaison with local and foreign Arab groups. It was also in Kuwait that I could fulfill my long term dream of leaving the Soviet service and attempting to come to live in the United States. There was an American Embassy in Kuwait. After a number of contacts with U.S. officials I became affiliated with the CIA. Although I refused to be paid for my work considering it as full-hearted cooperation rather than working for monetary rewards, I became, from what I learned later, a paid employee of U.S. government. My personal beliefs dictated that one must first prove himself, and earn his ticket to the U.S. instead of just asking for asylum. In July 1971, according to my information, I was about to be recalled back to Moscow after four years of work abroad. Facing a desk in Moscow while affiliated with the CIA seemed to have been an uncomfortable situation. Upon my insistence the CIA removed me from Kuwait in July 1971.

I was brought to a safe house near Washington, D.C. and put under guard. I enjoyed debriefings because that was the only time when I felt I was doing something positive, something needed by the U.S. government for America. Otherwise, the confinement was very depressing. Towards the debriefings' end I felt I gave everything personal and otherwise to all those people who came and nothing was left. The guards rotated every one or two weeks. Most of them were nice, courteous individuals who indoctrinated me in American football. We took two trips: one to New York to see "Promises, Promises," and the other to Gettysburg. On one occasion a CIA psychologist talked to me and advised to forget ever having an "elite career" like I had in the USSR and to forget whatever I have learned. This was quite upsetting. I was going through a time, maybe experienced by every defector--getting home-sick and realizing that you'd never see your family again. On one occasion we drove by a toy store in Washington. I thought of my daughter and felt extremely depressed to the point that it is difficult to describe. I felt, I couldn't share my feelings with the guards or with the debriefers for fear that if I did they'd send me right back. I imagine a feeling common to all defectors.

The resettlement people next stepped in and announced that my name was William Stiller. The cover story was that my father was a German military engineer killed in Al-Alamein and my mother Angelina Hartmann, a Volga German. I worked for Atlas Travel Agency in Cairo and came to the United States to work for Wilton Associates in New York. I had no choice on my new identity, even though my family had detested the Germans because of the Second World War's activities. They said it was a regular procedure and there was nothing I could do about it. I became an unwilling German.

In April, 1972, without prior consultation the Agency insisted that I was to study at the Luis Motel School located in Hollywood's red light district to become a motel clerk. When I got to Hollywood I really did not care about anything. The motel school was going out of business and soon it did. I had absolutely no friends, no one to talk to and no hope for the future.

Mr. Chairman, I raise the "name-changing" and motel-management experience for a number of reasons. Although the intent of the Agency was admirable--my personal security and future employment, the method of carrying them out leaves a bit to be desired. These experiences show that any program to help defectors should be done in consultation with the defector. Ask him what he needs, wants or prefers. Does he want to be a "German" for the rest of his life when for his entire previous existence he has grown up with a natural hostility toward Germans. Does he want to be a motel manager for the rest of his life, when nothing in his prior training and experience has anything to do with administration. The defector is an adult and should be treated as such. Whenever possible, his desires should be considered when planning for his new life here in the West.

Things eventually improved in June of 1972 when, after consulting with me, the decision was made to send me to the University of Southern California's graduate school of International Relations on a trial basis to see if I can succeed in a student's environment.

Needless to say it was difficult to maintain my cover on USC campus. I did not speak German. One of my USC professors who took an interest in my well-being told me I was not German. I told my story to him and he became very instrumental in providing me with his expert academic guidance. Later on he would help me get published in academic circles. In 1975, I received my M.A. Firmly believing in the importance of family and a necessity to apply my best efforts towards the acclimatization in my new home country I got married. Since my CIA subsistence of $620 was rather small I had to work part and full-time at various jobs driving taxis, washing cars and as a night guard.

In 1976 my contact officer in Los Angeles asked me to go on an employment interview. I did. I was hired by an engineering company as manager of international projects. After 6 months of work during which I was positively evaluated, I learned on my trip to Washington that my job was funded by the government and that the contact officer in Los Angeles had no authority to sign a funding contract on behalf of the government with the engineering company. My job was terminated. I did not plan on this course of events. My son was just born. I had no medical insurance and no future plans. Next came a number of bills related to medical expenses. I had to declare bankruptcy and move into a cheap apartment building which I would manage in return for rent reduction. This incident, however, stemmed more from my own carelessness, rather from the CIA's lack of sensitivity. The CIA remained attentive to my progress and acted as a positive reinforcement for me to succeed.

In 1979, I received my Ph.D. Although there were some unfulfilled promises on the part of the CIA, I realized I had to finally fend for myself, because this would really put me on the par with the rest of the Americans. In 1981 I took a definite decision to start building my own life. Although I had complete confidence in the efforts of the resettlement people, the legend given to me by the Agency did not work and I could not wait any longer. I must add, Mr. Chairman, I will always remain grateful to the CIA for really helping me out financially with my Ph.D.

In 1981 my book was out, I did some articles for various publications and received several invitations to lecture at the DIA, Air Force Academy, the FBI and other organizations. Most people to whom I talked were surprised I was kept away from them for so long.

Little by little I was able to rebuild my life on my own by being on a lecture circuit, obtaining a visiting scholar position at the Hoover Institution, Visiting Professorship at the University of Arizona and doing consulting jobs for government and private institutions. My life is far from being organized like the Russians like it. However, my experience of the past two years has been by far the most rewarding in comparison with years in the resettlement program.

In this regard I must say that the resettlement program was a good educational experience for me. Individual concerns of CIA officers in the domestic division helped persuade the resettlement people to provide funds for my work on earnings U.S. graduate credentials. This was important and very positive.

When in the later 70's early 80's I discussed with the CIA officials problems related to education, employment, legends, cover and financial support; it seemed to me, instead of a receptive reaction, it caused a somewhat antagonistic attitude towards me. The suggestions were not intended on my part to be negative but rather positive suggestions. I regret that the last period of my relationship with government personnel lacked in mutual understanding and respect.

It is from this standpoint that I am particularly looking forward to a possibility that these hearings may result in a cohesive, positive, intelligent and prudent program of dealing with defectors.

An inefficient defector program is likely to adversely effect U.S. national security by depriving the U.S. decision-making community of happily and productively resettled, knowledgeable resources with years of expertise of having worked in closed Eastern bloc governments.

In regard to general motivation, a defector from the Soviet bloc is in most cases no different from a French emigre who wants to find a job in the United States, or a British economist who looks for work in American Academia. America has always been a country of attraction for all the people of the world. Russians, Ukranians, Jews, Arabs, Dutch and other minorities have built this country. Russians came to America before and and during 1917 Revolution in great numbers to start their new lives. Of course, now in the USSR no one just can say, "I'd rather live in the U.S." for obvious reasons.

The only alternative is defection. While a French engineer or British economist can go back to visit France and England, a Soviet and Eastern bloc defector cannot go back. This is obviously the point where the rationality of a defector's decision is questioned. How can they forever leave their homeland where they had great careers and close relatives? Abandon their families? This is quite unethical and even immoral in the eyes of some debriefers and resettlers. "A traitor is always a traitor" seems to sum up the attitude on the part of some officials. Hence low priority is given to resettlement which in turn lead to an uneasy climate between resettlers and defectors.

Defectors are, however, really quite normal. They come to America in search of a dream. The problem, however is that defectors do not have a support network which is characteristic of the communities of refugees. For example, Jewish immigration from the USSR has an outstanding Jewish community support network. Such is the case with Vietnamese and Chines immigrants. Defectors are alone, isolated and dependent on the imagination of case officers which are assigned to them. The officers at times have no idea what to do with defectors and may view them as burdensome, demanding troublemakers.

When defectors from the Eastern Bloc and especially from the USSR come to the United States their first concern is for a secure foundation on which they can start building or rebuilding their life. Their expectations might be too high. However, one must understand that they are coming from a society where job security is taken for granted and where the government is a supreme authority.

A defector still carries an elitist syndrome. Most diplomats and intelligence officers from the Soviet bloc come from the upper echelon of the society. Defectors, in addition to initial feelings of guilt about their families which might face repercussions at home, are not sure what their future in the U.S. would be. They can get confused and in the absence of stated commitments from the U.S. government, they may start "puffing" their personal importance. This "puffing" leads to costly evaluation and reevaluation of information solicited from the defectors. It can also lead to difficulties in establishing defectors' bona fides and cause mistrust. "Puffing" affects a defector's accuracy and presents problems for U.S. national security.

However, I do believe exaggerations and inaccuracies can be avoided if a defector is reassured that no matter what rank he was, or what he tells the government--good or bad news, he will have a job and a place in the U.S. as a productive member of this society. Such reassurance must come not only from people in the operations but from the resettlement people. Sometimes, operations division people say one thing to reassure a defector, but the resettlement people pretend they know nothing about it.

This misleading behavior must be stopped. If defection as a process and defectors as individual experts in their fields are wanted by the U.S. government, firm commitments must be made. If they are not wanted no commitments should be considered. Once a long-term commitment is made, a defector must be made aware of it. He or she would feel more at ease and comfortable with the debriefers. The "puffing" will subside. An official commitment to which the defector is perfectly aware would also take the edge off the painful debriefing experience.

The artificial climate of isolation during the debriefing may be reinforced by government insistence on the defector's change of identity. The identity change is a humiliating process. I was told, for example, that Sakharov does not exist. I must forget about it and think German, which has been quite repulsive to me for all those years. Not that I have anything against the Germans.

The debriefing itself seems to reflect U.S. political priorities which emphasize current events. The defector is questioned primarily about current events, and short-term information is collected as a rule. Long term strategic or analytical information is disregarded; at least, that was my case. A defector's opinion is often ill-regarded, and he seems to be treated as a person incapable of thinking, analyzing or interpreting data.

I believe that defectors could be better utilized. An initial debriefing is not the only use for a defector. He can participate in an unclassified manner in analysis and evaluations. He can think like a Soviet or a Czech, or a Bulgarian official, which is a unique ability. If nothing else he can serve as a sounding board for American analysts. Another important aspect of debriefing concerns a lack of American analytical tools in a defector's possession. If he knew more about American political science approaches to foreign affairs, he would be able to understand much better his debriefer's requirements. Therefore it is highly advisable to conduct a second debriefing after a defector has acquired such tools. In my case, after I received my Ph.D. the DIA and the FBI invited me on many occasions to conduct seminars for their employees. Not only was I honored by these invitations, I was also able to use my understanding of U.S. politics and government in my briefings.

I also believe there are some humanitarian issues related to debriefing and resettlement. For every Soviet bloc defector the United States stands for being the land of freedom and opportunity. Freedom, however, is often a misunderstood term especially when one deals with an ex-Bloc citizen. The American freedom is not only a freedom of speech, it is also a freedom to succeed and to fail. If, however, defectors are treated as schizophrenic paranoids, traitors, turncoats, and ex-everything, they are deprived of a chance to become productive members of

American society. The effect of this treatment on defectors may result, as experience shows, in depression, excessive drinking, psychosis and even attempts at suicide. This, in turn, gives some U.S. government officials more reasons for thinking of defectors as nothing but drunkards, turncoats, paranoids, etc. This is a vicious circle. The answer, again, is productive employment.

The most grinding thought on the mind of a defector is financial survival. If one has no money to live on, a friendly talk and a lunch can not help.

In some instances defectors can get by doing labor such as washing dishes under a pseudonymn or running used cars from Santa Barbara to Oxnard. This after awhile may result in discontent and aggravation expressed in an anti-CIA public statement. On the other hand, some defectors are naturally afraid of speaking out against the CIA resettlement people, because the resettlement people may control their purse strings. I am absolutely sure this may influence the outcome of these hearings.

I suggest therefore that Soviet or Eastern Block defectors be given a monetary parachute consistent with their standard of living prior to their crossing over to the U.S.

Unlike refugees who have their community support networks, defectors, sometimes, are required to live in isolation. The job market for them, unless they are ballet dancers, computer experts or nuclear physicists, is limited. Who would want to hire an ex-Soviet intelligence officer who specialized in Soviet propaganda in the Arab countries or an expert in Japanese whose experience was with culture and economics of Japan? First of all if a legend was provided for a defector, like in my case, the supporting employment evidence is usually missing. Any skilled personnel administrator would know it. If a defector applies for jobs under his real name, who in the government would recommend him? The CIA usually sticks to the "no comment" principle. Very often, as I know from my own experience "no comment" is just as bad a reference as saying "he is not good." I do not think the CIA should be shy of commenting. It should be proud, and I hope it will be.

The academic establishment is adamantly against tenuring defectors. Academicians consider them biased, primadonnas and too knowledgeable. In my several years in the academic establishment I have learned a lot about academic jealousy and its cut-throat environment.

Another unlikely area of employment would be in think tanks on a visiting basis. In order to pursue this area a defector must fulfill all requirements: first--to be able to submit a well written, scholastic proposal suitable for funding on a one time project basis, second--to have American graduate credentials. Although it can be done, it is not very easy for someone who just came to the U.S.

Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to be so pessimistic in discarding business, teaching, think-tank and related areas for defectors' employment. This has been primarily my experience based on my personal struggle. I must say, however, that as in any society personal contacts can be very important. Personal sponsorship of defectors in Great Britain, for example, is the key to a very successful resettlement program.

I suggest personal, high level contacts be utilized by the resettlement people. I am sure that if someone of the stature of a Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Brzezinski or General Haig said a personal good word on behalf of a defector to a president of an appropriate university a position might appear. Another way to help defectors would be to have large American companies give defectors a chance to prove themselves in managerial, non-security related capacities. Many defectors are experienced personnel managers accustomed to dealing with foreign and domestic personnel. I, for example, dealt with hundreds of Soviet road construction workers, agricultural and military advisors, tourists, PLO members on a daily basis. I do not know what it is if not personnel or human resource development, Other defectors did similar things.

I also recommend that in addition to the standard of living and corresponding benefits for life including medical and dental insurance, U.S. elected officials approve and the U.S. Government implement a special program, to allocate funds which would be allowed to academic institutions willing to employ defectors funded by outside sources. Work, permanent employment, job security related to defectors' educational backgrounds is the key to defectors' successful resettlement. Most defectors cannot handle unemployment. In the USSR, for example, being unemployed is against the law. I know there exist views that defectors need only a friendly ear and a pat on the back. These take-defector-out-to-lunch schemes seem to primarily satisfy the curiosity of those who take defectors out to lunch. I am also concerned that defectors may be used and abused for various individual political causes. I have heard claims that what defectors really need and want is to write books, be on TV and make speeches. This, however, seems to be more in line with fund raising and in no way relates to secure employment.

I must say, I was most pleasantly surprised by the U.S. Army's receptivity to gain a good insight into the Soviet mode of thinking by using a defector. Recently I was approached to teach Soviet mentality, behavioral peculiarities and social background to U.S. Army officers. But due to the funding problem this program has not materialized. I do hope it will at some future date, maybe with the help of this Committee.

I have several recommendations based on my experience; firstly, job security must be guaranteed to defectors, who made a lot of personal sacrifices for the U.S. Private foundations cannot provide services for defectors' resettlement. Only a government program which includes legal counsel, endowment, teaching grants, GS level assignment and liaison with the Army, can fulfill the U.S. welcome of defectors' plight. Secondly; a small monitoring committee of elected officials must be empowered to watch over the program and make sure that defectors have a right to appeal their treatment. This is important. Thirdly; some essentials must be guaranteed such as medical and dental insurance, retirement and retroactive compensation under the new proposed program.

Mr. Chairman, I do hope your Committee will take a strong interest in this matter. Defectors are not "exotic birds in a cage" as I heard once. Defectors are people who are committed to the United States, its people and its freedom. They would like to lead productive lives complete with self-dignity and respect. The program which deals with their resettlement, can be improved. I do hope it will.

I thank you very much for your attention. Mr. Chairman, you may be assured that my feelings and dedication to the American people and the government have not been shaken by somewhat turbulent experiences with a small part of the government. Once again I must say that my statement in no way reflects on the efficiency, capabilities and professionalism of the CIA. I do respect this organization very highly. If we have a policy which accepts and encompasses defection, let us be committed to defectors. This will benefit our knowledge about such closed societies like the USSR. The benefit of this knowledge will always outweigh material cost of human resources which bring it to us.

Thank you all for your kind attention.

STATEMENT OF
DMITRY MIKHEYEV
BEFORE THE
U. S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Defectors' Problems in the West

Thank you, Mister Chairman, for this opportunity to testify on a subject of the greatest importance, not only for the lives of hundreds of individuals caught in the middle of the confrontation between the two main socio-political systems of our time, but also for the future of this country as well.

In my view, the plight of people who served the communist regime, then, for political reasons, joined the forces of freedom and democracy, and after that experienced great difficulties in adjusting to a new culture, cuts to the very heart of the greatest conflict of our time. We are dealing here with a conf~~lict~~ of two extremely different cultures, not just two ideologies. We are talking about a clash of two mentalities.

Understanding the mentality of one's adversary is the most formidable challenge. In the final analysis, however, the rewards of doing so may be as high as the triumph of Western ideals in the world, not just the benefits of helping hundreds of courageous individuals become productive and happy Americans.

My name is Dmitry Mikheyev. I am currently a writer and broadcaster at the Voice of America in the United States Information Agency. I have lived in this country almost eight years and became a citizen of the USA two years ago.

I was born in the Soviet Union during the Second World War. My dissatisfaction with that system can, to a large extent, be attributed to Khrushchev's thaw. I was a teenager when the horrors of Stalin's purges were made public and my belief in the socialist system was shaken.

In 1961, in the middle of the thaw, I was a student at Moscow University and the chairman of the discussion club of the physics department. Discussions and debates were encouraged by the authorities for several years -- until 1965, and I took advantage of this to raise political and social issues. During roughly the same period, I also became acquainted with a number of American and West European students who had come to the USSR to study for a year under exchange agreements.

My very unhappy experience in the debating society, extensive reading of samizdat, close associations with Westerners, and exposure to Voice of America broadcasts and Western literature eventually led me to conclude that the communist system was fundamentally flawed. By the mid-1960's, I was totally convinced of the moral, economic and political superiority of American type democracy. Yet, I, along with many other Soviet intellectuals, maintained a belief that the Soviet system could somehow converge with the West and become democratic. The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 put an end to all my hope for such a convergence. The moment I learned about the invasion, I decided to sever the umbilical cord tying me to the Soviet regime.

Because there was no way for me to leave the country legally, I decided to escape. I made my attempt in 1970 and failed because my dormitory room at Moscow University was bugged by the KGB. I was charged with high treason and put in a hard labor camp for political prisoners for six years. A couple of months prior to the Brezhnev-Carter summit in Vienna in 1979, I was expelled from the Soviet Union. The authorities apparently did not want to upset the upcoming event with a new arrest.

In the Mordovia hard labor camp #19, in 1972, I met hundreds of political opponents of the Soviet regime. I met people who, like myself, had tried to escape the Soviet Union and failed and, surprisingly, some who had defected and then returned to the USSR. My curiosity about the latter was enormous, because I could not imagine what could possibly bring these people to voluntarily return to the Soviet Union, and moreover to a Soviet prison, after several years in the West. I befriended several of them and listened to their stories. The most startling thing was that most of them knew that upon their return they would be punished.

Most of these returnees were soldiers and low ranking officers who defected to the West from East Germany but there were several educated people: two musicians, two students, a couple of low ranking diplomats, interpreters and so on. Altogether, I came to know several dozen such people.

Since then, I have devoted a great deal of thought to the powerful forces that can push people to return to a much worse life, not only compared to the one available to them in the West, but even compared to their life before defection. The question of different cultures and their clash has become my true profession.

To understand the problem it would help if we ask ourselves two questions:

1. Considering that the Soviet system is, indeed, very awful and that many thousands of Soviets work and travel in the West, why do only a handful choose to defect?

2. Considering that the Soviet system is as cruel as it has always been, why did the KGB stop killing defectors in the West about twenty-five years ago?

Obviously, life in the West does not provide powerful enough incentives, and would-be-defectors prefer their system, bad as it is.

The Soviets also learned from a half-century long history of defections that "imperialists" so poorly use defectors that it is not really worthwhile to take the risk and trouble killing them.

During my nine years at Moscow University, I had had a number of very good American, British and Scandinavian friends. There was no doubt in my mind that there were very big differences in the way they and the Soviet people acted and thought. At that stage, however, I could not formulate my perceptions clearly and coherently.

It took several years of living in America and very intensive study, as well as the personal experience of being an emigre to understand the problems defectors face in the West.

Soviet defectors rejected their system, its values and all that it stands for. But they cannot, at least in the short term, alter the way in which they, and other typical Soviets, think. In other words, even though the content of their views has changed radically, their way of viewing the world and of dealing with it has not. Indeed, cast into a totally unfamiliar environment by the act of defection, they have no choice but to rely for guidance on their deepest instinct, their most fundamental perceptions about how people act and what causes things to happen. These perceptions were formed in totally different reality and, in many ways, are out-of-synch with the way things are in the West.

Typically a man with a Soviet mentality possesses the following subconscious view of the world, based on his experiences:

He believes that people are generally greedy, selfish and cruel, and therefore they are not to be trusted. They have to prove that they are trustworthy. They very rarely act out of compassion; if they approach you, it almost certainly means they want something from you, and you'd better watch out, because they will try to use you.

Americans, as a rule, have a much more optimistic view of people and the environment.

Every officer who deals with former Soviet citizens has to be aware of these instinctive reactions, and the very suspicious attitude the defector will have toward the officer's motives. Until the officer proves otherwise, the defector's working assumption will be that the officer cares little about him as a person and is just pursuing his personal interest.

Let me describe what goes through the mind of a defector during debriefing.

During the debriefing process, the intelligence officers are understandably interested in facts, places, names, actual events and so on. They are not writing novels about the personal dramas of people caught in a conflict between their personality and the requirements of a dehumanized system. But this conflict is the most important fact for the defector. His defection was the culmination of this conflict. Figuratively speaking, he cut off his hand, which was caught in a trap, in order to get his body and, most importantly, his personality free. His wound hurts badly. However, the people around him do not seem to care about his pain and want only to know the data they can put on the computer.

Soon the defector comes to his first negative conclusion: They (the Americans) are not interested in me as a person; they are only interested in the information I possess. They are using me.... Is this much different from the Soviet system? Not much, they just pay better. The Soviet officials were right when they said: If you defect, they will squeeze you like a lemon and throw you away.

Yet, most defectors are pleased by the fact they are helping the American fight the communists. They are finally getting even with the horrible system which humiliated them so many times.

The defector wants to participate in this fight as it continues and intensifies, because he knows that the other system is implementing its already existing plans and working on new ones.

Then comes the second shock. Debriefing is completed, and the defector is encouraged to think about returning to "normal life." Officers in the resettlement program think: We are giving him security in the United States under a new identity; we are providing some financial cushion and even some training in one of the professions. We have given him, therefore, all the opportunities and security the United States can offer. What else can one ask for? Social life? But nobody can provide it, one has to get it by himself. Furthermore, if he wants to continue his fight against communism, he is free do do so, but on his own.

However, most defectors look at the situation in a totally different and, in fact, almost opposite way. They way they feel is this:

They (the Americans) took away my real name and, with it, my personality. They took from me everything they thought was valuable -- the data. They bought it, they squeezed me and threw me into this horrifying ocean they call "freedom" which means for me the freedom to be alone; freedom to be exploited by those in a much stronger position than me, such as bankers, landlords, and employers; freedom to be killed, perhaps, by the local mafia or the KGB. They think that the names of the KGB officers and party apparatchiks I gave them is all I have to offer. What kind of fools are they? Or perhaps they think I am a "plant." Yes, they do not trust me and never will. They will keep an eye on me and make sure that I keep a low profile. I could be of tremendous help to them because I know how "THOSE" guys think and work, but I am helpless outside of a powerful institution. In order for my life to have meaning, I have to be a part of a powerful institution that is waging a war against communism. But this is exactly where they (the American establishment) does not want me to be, because they do not trust me.

During the first year in the West, these gloomy thoughts and doubts are cushioned by the experience of new colors, smells, beautiful scenery and goods, some allowance money and the absence of any real responsibility. But within a year or two, the novelty of the new environment wears off, and this is when the real psychological crisis strikes. Normally, the second year after defection is the crucial one.

A defector is not an ordinary man, in general, and not an ordinary Soviet man, in particular. As a psychological type, he is a nonconformist. His personality and will are much stronger than those of an average man. His perceptions of himself and society are different from the perceptions of most people. He often sees himself in terms "I vs. Them" (society). He is a risk-taker, a doer, a person who does not just complain about situations and adapts to them, but also tends to change things.

On the other hand, a man in the Soviet system, including the highest officials, is daily humiliated and denigrated because this is the only way for the system to make its office holders comply with its rules. As a reward, the system provides them with privileges and the right to humiliate others. Eventually, most people will accept their position in the pyramid as the ultimate criterion of their importance, or dimensions of their personality: the closer one is placed to the top of the pyramid, the bigger are his personal dimensions, the greater is his self-esteem. In the Soviet Union, there is no other way to measure the worth of a man but his position in the hierarchy -- no private property, popularity, fame or awards upon which to construct an alternative sense of worth, unlike, for example, the situation in the United States.

Having found himself out of a familiar coordinate system, the defector goes through a very painful identity crisis. Who is he -- an engineer, scientist, linguist, or military man? Perhaps in the Soviet system of coordinates, yes, but these American engineers, military and intelligence men are so different; they are real professionals; and they are established in their system. How can I compete?

These painful questions are asked by every defector. But they will be particularly painful for those whose profession is totally irrelevant in the West.

In other words, the defectors have to resurrect their identities or build them anew. This is why they, and even emigres, are so eager to talk about themselves to anybody who is willing to provide a friendly, sympathetic ear. Self-examination is essentially a cleansing process. For defectors, restoring their personal identity, not learning about the new world, is their first priority.

A friend of mine, who worked for five years with the Soviet emigres arriving in Vienna, Austria, told me that she was overwhelmed by their desire to talk to her about their personal life stories.

However, debriefing officers are not particularly interested in the psychological drama of rebirth. They assume they are dealing with mature, strong personalities and hard facts of intelligence importance, while the defector is starting over from scratch and questions everything, most of all his own potential, merits, desires and so on.

It is also important to remember that every defector is a man with a mission. Very rarely will he defect just for a better life alone. He has his mission, and this mission usually involves some sort of struggle with the Soviet system, which defectors not only hate politically, but with which he also has some personal scores to settle, as well. A defector hates the system he had fled and wishes to damage it as much as he can. Revenge is his immediate all-encompassing task and mission.

Moreover, the defector assumes that the West is in a state of mortal struggle with the Soviet system, realizing only too well that the latter has declared a sort of war on the West. The defector considers himself a soldier; he knows how dangerous the enemy is; he is ready to fight; but to his great chagrin he discovers that there are few people in the West who feel the same way he does, and there are no institutions in the West designed to wage systematic warfare against the Soviet system. Those who are supposed to be in the forefront of the struggle are just trying to contain the Soviets and neutralize their activities, rather than attempting to confuse, disrupt and attack the enemy. The defector is convinced that he knows how to fight in this war and wants to take command over a detachment to help wage the battle. His new comrades in arms, however, do not appear very eager to fight; all they want is to do their job in order to earn a good living. Moreover, they do not even trust him fully.

On the other hand, having spent many years in the Soviet system, the defector tends to recognize its features in American government agencies that handle him, and probably to exaggerate the extent to which they characterize the American system. Almost unconsciously, he starts to fall into the pattern of trying to "beat the system" the way he did in the Soviet Union. That is, he thinks in the categories "I vs. Them" and tries to get as much as he can from the system.

Unlike emigres, defectors usually do not have a community of friends, relatives and acquaintances upon whom they can rely. They have left behind their friends and loved ones. They hardly have a thing from the previous life; everything is new. They are lucky if they can occasionally meet another defector and learn from his (normally bitter) experience.

People who try to help defectors have to be aware of how to do it without wounding their pride. There are certain cultural values that are totally different in the two societies.

For example, if after the debriefing the defector receives a lump sum of resettlement money, he might regard it as pay for the information he provided, not as a nest egg from which to finance the transition to his new life. He is likely to feel uncomfortable about this money no matter how strongly he hates the Soviet regime. Very often, a Russian will intentionally try to spend this money as quickly as possible. It would be psychologically better for the defector to receive a monthly allowance, preferably associated with some future activity of his, rather than a lump sum which he can only associate with activities of the past.

An additional consideration is that the hierarchy of occupations in the Soviet Union is very different from that in the United States. In the USSR, a writer is superior to almost anybody; an intelligence officer ranks above a lawyer or a medical man, a professor at a university is second to none, and so on. If this scale of values is neglected or disregarded while a defector is offered professional training, his pride and ego may be severely wounded.

Also, the ingenuous American respect for the privacy of others may be read as a lack of attention and interest, or profound heartlessness.

Similarly, the refusal of an American to participate in a heavy drinking session with the defector may be interpreted as an indication of dishonest intentions.

Finally, the notorious American straightforwardness is usually taken for either stupidity or utter cunningness.

Russian and American concepts of friendship also differ dramatically. In America, a friend is a very loose term. Americans may have hundreds of "friends" -- many of whom could be people they have met only several times in their lives. In the hostile environment of the Soviet Union, a friend means a close, intimate friend who is willing to cover your back, or, in extreme circumstances, even sacrifice his life for you. In the USSR, one can have only one, two or, at a maximum, three true FRIENDS and these are earned through loyalty shown during years of mutual troubles and hardship. The defector desperately needs a Russian-style FRIEND, particularly after the debriefing is over and he is left on his own. But precisely at this time even the rather loose friendly ties with intelligence officers are severed -- time, distance and new assignments separate them from the defector. This is very unfortunate because his mistrust of people at this point is still very high; his English language abilities are still poor; he does not accept many American social values (he hates receptions, football, baseball, hamburgers, American women, suburban life and so on).

Recommendations:

Defectors should live close to a large cultural center (life in "the provinces" is, for him, equivalent to exile).

Defectors need an institution to be affiliated with. However, it should not be a big, bureaucratic institution, but instead, an "influential" one. It should provide a place where he can feel needed and where he can start the laborious process of rebuilding his shattered sense of personal identity. It should be a place where he can feel reasonably secure, where he can fulfill his mission and build his social life.

There should also be a place where defectors can learn, teach and receive both personal and public attention. Therefore, it should be a university, a company, a think tank, or a foundation.

A defector needs a steady income for at least three years. I am against giving defectors a large sum of money. It would be better for him to "earn" it. Besides, the bulk of a lump sum installment may be wasted for lack of knowledge of how to manage it. A life-long allowance should be reserved for special cases of particularly valuable, elderly defectors whose chances for adaptation to a new culture are very slim. Perhaps someone older than fifty should be eligible for a permanent income.

A defector also needs the opportunity to meet other defectors, but not to be locked in their community.

He needs a place where friendly people can answer the thousands of questions he has about matters that Americans very often take for granted: how to use the Yellow Pages, talk to an auto mechanic, find an apartment, open a checking account, buy a car, get a driver's license, hire a lawyer, use a credit card and money machine, retrieve a towed-away car, write a job application and not to get frustrated after three refusals. Obviously, this could only be a private institution with a staff of consultants who have a reasonable background in communist affairs.

Conclusion:

With a new leadership in Moscow, the importance of psychological aspects of confrontation between the two socio-political systems will undoubtedly rise. Our better handling of defectors is becoming a very important element of this confrontation. We can already see the new breed of highly educated and sophisticated Soviet operatives in the West. They represent a formidable adversary, but they are also potential defectors. Who they are going to be depends to a large extent on our ability to handle defectors.

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Statement by Ludmilla Thorne Before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations Re: Government Handling of Defectors

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for allowing me to share with you a problem which has been of great concern to me for more than four years. I have in mind the plight of Soviet Army defectors in Afghanistan.

The immensity of the Afghan people's suffering caused by the Soviet Union's invasion of their country is beyond measure. It is estimated that a million Afghans have been killed by Soviet bombs, mines, and other brutal means of Soviet warfare, and another four million have fled the country. The destruction of the Afghan people has reached genocidal proportions. I myslef have seen many *mujahedeen* wounded, young children with their arms and legs torn off by Soviet butterfly bombs, and the countless Afghan refugees who are huddling near the Afghan-Pakistani border. Once you have seen the face of this tragedy you can never forget it.

But the Afghan conflict has also been tragic for the Soviet people, whose young sons must die in a war in which they don't believe. Many people in the West don't realize that the mighty Red Army in Afghanistan is composed primarily of Soviet teenagers. And the war has created a hopeless situation with Soviet Army defectors and POWs.

In 1983 I made three trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan (for ABC's "20/20" program, Australia's "60 Minutes," and *Life* magazine), and last year I arranged a trip to Afghanistan for three Canadian journalists and accompanied them on their travels.

It was during these four trips that I interviewed 22 Soviet soldiers inside Afghanistan (primarily in Zabul and Paktia Provinces) and in the border areas. Of the 22 men, 20 had deserted and two were captured. Nine of the Soviet Army deserters were eventually brought to the West and 13 are still inside, waiting to be rescued---if they are still alive.

Because I was born in the Soviet Union and speak Russian fluently, the Soviet soldiers were able to describe to me in great detail and with profound emotion why they deserted and what they now hoped for. Most of the 13 men who are still inside Afghanistan want asylum in the West.

Some of the soldiers' pleas for political asylum were heartrending. Sergei Meshcheryakov, for example, screamed, "Ludmilla, take me back with you to America," as I was leaving the *mujahedeen* stronghold where he was being held. When we were saying good-bye, Meshcheryakov slipped a note into my hand signed by him and three other Soviet Army deserters.

Here is the note, and in part, this is what it says: "You, who are Orthodox Christians, must help us make our way to America...We hope that you will help us in our striving to come to America. We want to become American citizens. Signed: Sergei Meshcheryakov, Grisha Suleymanov, Fedor Khasanov, and Akram Fayzulayev." The reason why they mention Orthodox Christians in the note is that they happened to have seen my Orthodox cross. Khasanov and Fayzulayev were actually Soviet Uzbek Muslims and Suleymanov was from Dagestan, while Meshcheryakov was Russian by nationality. I have also interviewed Soviet Army deserters who were Ukrainian, Armenian, and Crimean Tatar.

This note was given to me in February 1983, and since that time I have shown it to many American government officials, pleading that these four men be given asylum, but unfortunately they are still in Afghanistan, although I am not certain that Meshcheryakov is still alive.The last time I visited the camp where he was held his legs were so swollen that he had to crawl on his stomach just to go to the bathroom.

How Soviet Army deserters and POWs are treated depends on which *mujahedeen* party is holding them. Their treatment can vary from paternal to harsh. The situation which I have just described took place in a camp belonging perhaps to the most fundamentalist Afghan resistance group, but I have also seen *mujahedeen* hideouts where the Soviet prisoners were treated with extreme care. We must understand that it is very difficult for the Afghan resistance to hold Soviet prisoners. Sometimes the Afghan freedom fighters themselves have nothing to eat, and yet they must also feed the prisoners and hide them from the Soviet command. We should not expect the Afghan resistance, which is involved in its own life and death struggle, to carry the burden of holding Soviet POWs.

The main reason why Soviet soldiers are deserting in Afghanistan is because of what they call the cruel, "unjust war" that is being waged there. Many of the Red Army deserters that I spoke to had witnessed or took part in the killing of Afghan people, and it was precisely for this reason that they defected, because they could no longer bear to carry out their hideous orders.

Igor Kovalchuk, a Soviet Army deserter who was part of a reconnaissance unit in Kunduz, described to me a particularly vicious attack on an Afghan village. "After we sprayed a hut with bullets...I peeked inside and saw about 15 people, men, women, and children, all slouched together, in a pile of blood. It was like a butcher shop, reeking with a horrible smell," he told me. "After seeing such brutality, "I decided to hell with it, I'd rather be a 'traitor'," Igor told me, "but in the eyes of God I will not be mired in this dirt and blood, which the KGB has unleashed here."

Andrei Skoropletov, who was a tank commander, told me that he could no longer order his men to shoot at Afghan peasants and Afghan villages. In the fall of 1983 he deserted to the Afghan resistance with a new Kalashnikov rifle and 700 rounds of ammunition, but today he is still inside Afghanistan, waiting to be rescued. Vladislav Naumov, who was a part of a paratroop unit, said that for him, an important turning point which led him to desert was when he had witnessed how a fellow Soviet recruit was shot to death by a Soviet officer, because the young soldier could not bear to execute an Afghan villager, as he was ordered. Vladislav now lives in Canada and is writing a book about his experiences in Afghanistan.

Many Soviet Army deserters also told me that they felt deceived when they arrived in Afghanistan. "We were told that we would be fighting Chinese, Pakistani, and American mercenaries in Afghanistan, but two months after I arrived here I realized that we were not told the truth," Grisha Suleymanov told me. "I realized that we were fighting the Afghan people."

Another major reason why Soviet soldiers are defecting in Afghanistan is because of theterrible treatment of the new recruits at the hands of the senior enlisted men, or the so-called stariki (meaning "old men"in Russian.) These are soldiers who have already served at least one year in the army, and consequently, feel greatly superior. "The older men make the young draftees do the most humiliating things, such as wash their laundry or polish their boots," said Alexei Peresleni, who commanded a six-man crew of a 122-millimeter howitzer battery in Kabul. The fact that he was a sergeant did not affect his treatment. Alexei described how he, like others, was systematically beaten "for nothing," while officers looked the other way. There have been cases where young recruits were even killed by senior enlisted men, and in other instances draftees have shot older men in the back. After serving only one-and-a-half months, Alexei decided to leave the Red Army. "I hadn't slept for twenty-fours hours, I was hungry and dirty," he explained. "All I wanted to do was to rest a while. I didn't care whether I lived or died." Today Alexei is living in California, where he works as a chef's aid. Alexei hopes that some day he will own his own restaurant.

Those Soviet Army deserters from Afghanistan who were fortunate enough to be given asylum in the United Sttes, Canada, or Western Europe may find it more difficult at the beginning to adapt to their new countries and to the totally new way of life than other defectors. One reason for this is that unlike other defectors from the USSR or Eastern bloc countries, they did not have the chance to prepare themselves emotionally for the crucially difficult step of defecting. For them, it was not a premeditated act. Fate had thrust them into an unbearable war situation; under normal circumstances, I believe that practically none of the Red Army deserters would have entertained the idea of leaving their homeland forever.

Another difference is that the Soviet Army deserters are all very young -- at the time of their defection they are 19 or 20 years old. All teenagers find it difficult to decide what to do with their lives; all of us surely remember our own growing pains. But if you add to these normal problems of adolescence the fact that you don't speak the language, or have any family to guide you and help you, the adjustment problems can be immense. And that is what 19-year-old Soviet Army deserters face when they arrive in the United States.

Freedom House and the International Rescue Committee have provided the Red Army defectors who were brought to the United States in 1983 and 1984 with material and moral support, but many more resources are needed. The first problem is always that of learning English, and gaining an education or vocational training follows suit. A good support system or what I call "collective parenting" offered by Russian and Ukrainian emigre communities has also been crucial, especially in the very first stages of the young mens' arrival, but if the young defectors continue to be imbeded in emigre life too long, which has happened in some cases, it holds them back in their efforts to learn English and become truly integrated with American life.

Since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 Freedom House has deplored the cruel annihilation of the Afghan people carried out by Soviet military might, and we have conducted an intensive information program during the past seven years, to enable the Afghan resistance tell its story in the United States. We have also sought asylum in the West for Soviet prisoners held by the Afghan resistance and have helped Soviet Army deserters tell the world what is happening in Afghanistan. We hope to continue our efforts in all of these areas. I particularly hope that a Scholarship Fund will be established to help provide for the young mens' education. The young Soviet Army deserters living in America have no parents or relatives to rely on, and several of them are having a very difficult time getting an education.

Besides humanitarian consideratons, it seems obvious that there are also important ideological reasons why Western countries should give political asylum to those Soviet soldiers who have asked for it. And I dare say that there is also a moral obligation on our part to respond. Once a Soviet soldier in Afghanistan has taken the crucial step of defecting, he should surely be given an opportunity to live somewhere besides the bleak mountains of Afghanistan.

I recommend that a systematic method for screening, processing and transporting Red Army deserters out of Afghanistan be devised, similar to the program that was set up by the allies for Soviet army defectors and prisoners at the end of World War II. Those Soviet POWs who want to go home should be allowed to do so through the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), provided that they are not repatriated forcibly, and that they are also given information on their right to ask for asylum. Some Soviet POWs in Afghanistan whom I have interviewed didn't even know the meaning of the term "political asylum."

It is also necessary that the ICRC exert all of its efforts to help *mujahedeen* prisoners of war, who are tortured and often shot on the spot by Soviet and Afghan government forces. There is yet another reason why a comprehensive, long-range POW program should be set in motion. Namely, if a steady flow of Red Army deserters from Afghanistan were to make its way to the West it just could act as yet another possible lever on the Kremlin leadership to force them to reconsider their policy in that country. It could induce them to give serious consideration to the idea of pulling their forces out of Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, during my many meetings with U.S. government officials during these past four years, they were usually aghast at the idea that there may be a whole stream of Red Army defectors if more deserters are brought out.

So far, the United States has brought only six Soviet Army deserters to this country, while in one year alone---1985---twenty-two others were killed during desperate attempts to escape or to gain asylum. That is not a very good record for freedom-loving America. It is estimated that there are several hundred Soviet Army defectors and POWs, including officers, inside Afghanistan.

Over the years, I have repeatedly provided our government with the names of Soviet Army defectors who have asked for political asylum in this country. I have with me today a list of 17 such defectors.

I have been told, again and again, that the main problem with spiriting Red Army defectors out of Afghanistan is that they have to transit very briefly trough a third country, and that this country doesn't want to participate in the effort, in fear of the Soviets' retribution. Yes, there are some problems with the use of transit countries, but they are not unsurmountable.

I have now come to the sad conclusion that the main problem has been *this country*, and not any third country. There has been an apparent lack of resolve on the part of this administration to get these boys out. Bringing Red Army defectors to America who have been pleading for asylum in this country has simply not been a high priority project for this administration. If it were, I feel confident that all of the Soviet soldiers whose names, photographs, and asylum requests I have forwarded these past four years---would have been here.

Whether any Soviet defector can make a successful transition to Western life, be it Stalin's daughter Svetlana Alliluyeva or a farm boy who winds up in Afghanistan, depends, in the final analysis, on the internal makeup of the individual. Nikolay Ryzhkov, a Soviet Army deserter who returned to the USSR, didn't want to work, study or do much else unless he was pushed. Life in an open society where an individual must choose and decide for himself is difficult for such a person, especially when he is still so young. But most of the other thirteen Soviet Army deserters from Afghanistan who are now living in Western Europe, Canada and in America are doing well. Some of them, like Nikolay Movchan, have also been actively campaigning on behalf of Afghanistan and their fellow POWs who are still inside. Nikolay Ryzhkov is now serving a thirteen-year prison term in a labor camp in Mordovia.

The fact that some Soviet Army defectors may return to the Soviet Union should not deter us from helping many others who hope to come here., and deserve to come here. At times all of the young men have pangs of homesickness, especially during the first year, and Soviet agents are quick to make use of these feelings. Some of the soldiers have been invited to come to Soviet embassies or consulates to pick up emotionally worded letters from their parents, and in some cases such emotional blackmail has worked.

But I don't regret that I helped Nikolay Ryzhkov come here. When I first met him on the Afghan border in 1983 he was pleading to come to America. It is always better to err on the side of good.

Thank you once again for allowing me to speak to you today. And I implore you to do everything in your power to help bring more Soviet Army deserters to these shores.

STATEMENT OF
EUGENE DIMITRIEVICH DEMCHENKO
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Mr. Chairman, my name is Eugene Dimitrievich Demchenko. I am a former Soviet official, presently a political-financial consultant in the Washington, D.C., area and a naturalized citizen of the United States for the last seven years. I have been asked by your counsel to prepare this statement outlining my background and expressing my views on how one could better utilize the unique and valuable knowledge possessed by those who, like myself, sought political asylum in the United States. I would like to start by saying that I welcome this opportunity very much.

I was born in the City of Kiev, the capital of the Ukraine, right after World War II and held my first job at the age of 14 as a student of the Kiev Technical College of Soviet Trade, doing financial auditing of small retail establishments during Khruschev's re-evaluation of the ruble. By continuing to work during the day, while attending college in the evenings, I was able to advance my career to the point when, even prior to my 18th birthday, I was promoted to become an official of a department of the Ukrainian Union of Consumers Cooperatives, thus becoming the youngest official of the Ukrainian Government at that time.

After I held a variety of positions within the Ukrainian Government apparatus, it was suggested to me that I should get involved in Party work; and, after being elected a Secretary of a primary Komsomol organization, I was appointed "Instructor," a counsel, of the Kiev Regional Committee (the Board of Directors of the region). My work in the Government consisted of planning, auditing, and introducing new technologies. Within the Party apparatus, my work primarily consisted of investigations of the functioning of various segments of the Government and industries and presenting the results for review before the Board.

In addition to the Technical College, my Soviet education included Kiev University (the evening program) with a major in philosophy, and the Special Courses of the Higher Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, given to the Party officials slated for an early promotion. Socially, my privileges included, among others, a membership in the Club of the Council of Ministers of the Ukraine.

My reasons for leaving the Soviet Union, like those of most Soviet defectors, were political and ethical. The more responsible my position became within the Government and the Party, the more sharply I felt the need for a major change in the system. I guess it is because of my personal success vis-a-vis my peers that I also came to believe that it was incumbent upon someone like myself to find the right way to change the system. I could not find a legal way to advocate change from within the system. Meanwhile, my actions became more and more thinly veiled, threatening to betray my true sentiments. After a series of "close calls," I decided to seek political asylum in the West.

My original plan--like that of many political self-exiles, I believe--was to find in the West, namely, in the United States, some influential politicians, wealthy individuals interested in supporting a specific program of change in the Soviet Union. I find it extremely instructive to look back at what, we all now would agree, were rather naive expectations on my part, and try to appreciate the fact that here was a Soviet Government, Party official involved in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy around the globe, sincerely believing that it should not be difficult to find in "capitalist" America certain powerful interests willing and capable to try to directly influence change in the key Communist system. As a matter of fact, I may add, not only did I not see any devious, subversive aspects in such an endeavor, I was convinced by my Soviet upbringing and training that this was a normal, ideologically healthy, competitive position for anyone to take.

Well, of course, I was ready for a surprise as have been many of those who came before and after me. A peculiar situation exists: What really seems to be the United States problem of understanding the true nature of the Soviet challenge, suddenly becomes the major problem for the Soviet defector. If he is not quick to realize what is going on and persists in offering his knowledgeable advice on how to deal with the Soviets, he is running a serious risk of being perceived to be a bitter, unsophisticated individual wishing to get even at any cost with the system he left. But even if the Soviet defector is quick enough to reconsider his original position, the best he can hope for is to be asked to furnish "proofs" and illustrations for the established views and theories about the nature of the Soviet system and its future.

Here, I should hasten to say that upon my arrival in the United States, I did change my plans. But even though I tried to balance my Soviet experience with studies of politics at such fine universities as Stanford and Harvard, I subsequently felt compelled to launch yet another career, this time in the field of commercial banking and direct investments.

There are quite a few Soviet defectors who feel disadvantaged by precisely the side of their knowledge of the Soviet system from which they hoped to benefit the most. After all, the applied, practical side of the defector's knowledge should be the most valuable one. A former Soviet Government official residing in the United States knows the Soviet system especially well --- not because, in comparison with a scholar or an emigrant, he studied it more or experienced it more, but because he is in possession of a proven knowledge, the knowledge he applied to successfully manipulate the system to his advantage: to advance his career as well as to arrange for the relatively secure circumstances of his defection (I, for example, simply took a taxi to the American consulate in Amsterdam.). This creative quality of the knowledge of the once successful Soviet Government or Party official has hardly been utilized by the United States Government. Yet, this is precisely the kind of knowledge that defines what is possible in this world, unlike the theoretical, "social science" knowledge which tends to tell us what is impossible by "explaining" what is given.

The above situation exists mainly because the kind of policies the U.S. has been pursuing vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, have reflected the fact that we in the United States seriously underestimate the strength of Party support in the Soviet society. As a result, many of us believe that the Party would be so vulnerable to an external, forceful political challenge on behalf of democracy, that it would withdraw from peace negotiations and might even try to escalate confrontation and reach for the nuclear button. On the same grounds, it has also been argued that any attempt directly to influence change in the Soviet Union will cause Soviet "masses" to abandon the Party and to rise in expectation of United States military intervention (as purportedly happened in Hungary in 1957), and since such an intervention is infeasible, therefore virtually any direct Western challenge to the Party, the argument goes, is wanting on moral grounds. It seems that the same lack of appreciation of the Party's strength in the Soviet society has resulted in the prevalence in Washington and beyond of a generally lackadaisical attitude toward change in the Soviet Union: An almost amoral belief exists in the eventual, "automatic" transformation of the Soviet regime due to the "inherently" virtuous and compelling requirements of the modern technological age. Accordingly, many tend to think that the Soviet economy is nothing more than a sham and the Soviet foreign policy is just a gimmick, and that the best policy for the United States is, not one of actively challenging communism but to stand back and watch communism "destroying" itself.

Whatever the wisdom of this view might have been in the past, today it seems unwise for the United States to bet on the Soviet alleged inability to last and to gain strength in the modern technological era. The United States should be pursuing a more responsible, dynamic policy. And for this the United States policymaking bodies need more fully avail themselves of the kind of creative, practical knowledge that former Soviet officials have and are more than willing to share with them.

Now, brief remarks about the Washington market for consulting, research, and training on matters concerning the Soviet Union. Needless to say, this market should be the largest and the best in the country. In reality, however, the market has very fuzzy boarders, and its quality is such that only a handful of defectors have been able to win an acceptable living in it. The problem seems to be as much the above-described prevalence of lackadaisical attitudes and the kind of policies we are presently pursuing vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, as well as the dominance of the market by highly competitive middlemen--the consulting enterprises of the Beltway area.

To illustrate this somewhat, let me provide you with an example. Recently, I was approached to give an extensive presentation on a subject which happened to be my specialty--the day-to-day workings of the Soviet Party apparatus--as part of a training seminar for the middle-level personnel of a government entity. The original price mentioned for such service was unbelievably low. I met with intermediaries, the representatives of the consulting firm putting together the seminar, and for a moment it appeared that they were agreeing to subcontract five to six lectures, instead of one, for a total price that was starting to reflect the uniqueness of the information to be provided. At the last moment, however, my presentations were substituted for a single one made by a former Soviet music teacher, who was paid about half of the original, "unbelievably low" offer. Apparently, no one could tell the difference. I must say that it was unfair to this gentleman, whom I happened to know, who is not only an excellent music teacher but also knows a great deal about life and the arts in the Soviet Union and should have been paid a much better price for his effort.

This is a rather typical case of the Washington, D.C., market where government contracts usually reflect no cognizance of the wealth of the specific knowledge available in it from highly qualified defectors; as a result, there is a strong tendency to interchange rather indiscriminately the services of former Soviet officials with those of the plethora of other Soviet emigrants, thus depressing the prices that should otherwise reflect the uniqueness of the services of the true "sole providers."

What could be done to improve the situation and to allow former Soviet officials, as well as qualified emigrant-professionals, to earn a decent living in the United States in return for sharing their unique knowledge and understanding of the Soviet system? I hope, as a minimum, the Congress would make certain that analogous to the "minority contracting provisions," provisions for contracting with Soviet defectors and qualified emigrant-professionals could be built into every government grant or contract made to further the United States understanding of the Soviet Union by way of studies, research, or training. It should be the main intention of such a provision to allocate a fixed percentage of the grant or the contract to be paid directly to a defector or to a qualified emigrant-professional performing work on the contract, and who would be selected according to his relevant Soviet experience, as well as his U.S. education and training.

In connection with the above, it would be appropriate to fund a clearinghouse type of operation, which would match appropriate government contracts with specific defectors, according to their specialties. Funding of a quarterly magazine containing defectors' views on current developments in the Soviet Union seems also desirable, because such a publication would help organizations and businesses outside the government to select the defectors and the emigrant-professionals who could consult on matters concerning the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, I would like to say that as long as the Soviet Union continues to deny to its otherwise privileged officials, the Government and Party functionaries, the right not to be prosecuted for desiring to act as a political opposition to the Party, the United States will do well by encouraging such officials to seek political asylum in the United States. The wealth and the creative qualities of the knowledge these individuals bring with them is essential for the development of dynamic U.S. foreign policies, -- the type of policies that we seem to be in need particularly today, at a time when the Soviet challenge is suddenly growing again in stature and sophistication.

EXHIBIT NO. 1

STATEMENT OF
LEV ALBURT
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

I appreciate the opportunity to present to your Subcommittee my views with regard to U.S. treatment of defectors (and emigres) from Communist countries, particularly from the U.S.S.R. On June 29, 1979, I asked for political asylum while participating in a major chess event (European Cup) for the Soviet team in Cologne, West Germany. Two days later, at my request, German authorities approached the American Embassy in Bonn on my behalf. After being briefly interviewed, I was eventually allowed to come to the U.S.A. as a refugee. I entered the United States on July 27, 1979, after three weeks spent in West Germany and Italy while my papers were processed. I am now a naturalized American citizen.

My Motives for "Defection": Pros and Cons

I began seriously to consider escape to the West in 1971, and this consideration played an important role in my choice of a career in chess (more opportunities to travel abroad), over a career in physics. I began to travel to the West, approximately once a year, starting in 1975, as a member of various Soviet chess teams and also as a so-called "Good Will Ambassador" (Cyprus, December, 1978). Let me explain why, time after time, I reluctantly returned to the U.S.S.R. until the summer of 1979. There were no uncertainties in my feelings toward the U.S.S.R. I always (since my early teens) considered the Soviet Union to be a huge jail or plantation. I knew that the Soviet Government is an enemy, while Western countries and, above all, the United States, are friends.

It is not easy, however, to leave your country--family, friends--even when you abhor that country's regime. My mind produced various reasons, or rather excuses, for waiting a little longer--family matters, for instance, and especially dreams about possible radical changes in my country in the future. In 1978-1979, at the age of 32, I began to realize that those dreams were just dreams, and those excuses just excuses. I felt obliged to do something important, good, and consistent with my views. I felt that I owed it to myself, to my friends, and, in broader terms, to all my fellow Soviet "citizens."

My life in Russia was very comfortable. As a chess Grandmaster, I belonged to a privileged elite, and I was even able to avoid many forms of unpleasantness (not all, however) by which members of this elite usually pay for their privileges. For instance, I avoided joining Komsomol, the Communist youth organization, which 95 percent of Soviet kids join (have to join!) routinely at the age of 14. (This remained, for instance, a big question mark in my applications for travel abroad.) Still, I managed to overcome it. I realized, however, that I was still going against my own wishes serving the interests of the Soviet regime, and that I had better stop it and join the right side.

I was strongly impressed when, in early 1979, listening to Deutsche Welte broadcasts, I heard a description of numerous methods used by Soviet "citizens" to escape from "the beloved Fatherland." This was a chapter from Vladimir Bukovsky's book, To Build a Castle, where he describes his stay in a psychiatric prison (officially, psychiatric "hospital") and the unsuccessful "defectors" who were destroyed by drugs administered by their "doctors." I felt ashamed thinking about their (and others') urge for freedom and their willingness to take great risks for freedom, while I had opportunities on several occasions with little or no immediate risk--and still I obediently returned.

I felt that by returning I was betraying them as well as those friends and fans back in Russia who asked me: How could it be, you already were there, in the West, virtually free--and have come back? This was how I firmly decided to leave, and I still believe it was the best thing I ever did in my life and with my life.

In the U.S.A.

It was not difficult for me to adjust to a new life--first, because freedom is a natural state for all; second, because it is easy to adapt to good things; and third, because my profession, chess, made this adaptation much easier for me than it has been for other "defectors." While not providing for a lucrative life style, chess and chess-related activities allowed me from the very beginning to make a comfortable living and gave me an opportunity to share my views via the news media. Still, I was surprised by a lack in the U.S. of comprehensive studies of Soviet affairs, and by how 250,000 recent refugees from the U.S.S.R. were almost totally ignored as a source of information about the U.S.S.R. Only recently, serious efforts have been made by the newly formed Jamestown Foundation to utilize the knowledge of high-level defectors. This long overdue task is very important and deserves your support as serving the vital interest of the United States.

Debriefing and Life after Debriefing

I would recommend having on debriefing teams:

a) highly trained experts from the Jamestown Foundation;

b) at least one former Soviet national, preferably of the same background as the defector being debriefed. This would make debriefing more efficient, boost the morale of the defector (by taking care of his concerns and curiosity), and, in some cases, alert authorities that there is something wrong with this particular defector (after all, in order to survive in the U.S.S.R. among K.G.B. informers, we all have developed a "sixth sense" about these things). Naturally, all former Soviet nationals allowed to work with "defectors" should be carefully screened, polygraph test included.

- The Jamestown Foundation proved to be efficient in re-settlement of defectors, but it may need help. After debriefing, we should encourage defectors

a) to remain or (at least) to re-appear in public, rather than to go underground under a new name--being public usually provides better protection (the U.S.S.R. depends on U.S. trade so badly that it cannot afford indiscriminate kidnappings and murders on our soil), and besides, this allows defectors to share their knowledge with the American public;

b) to keep up with the latest developments in their former fields. In the past, former K.G.B. officers have been advised to become hotel administrators. We should look beyond getting immediate data from defectors, which is important, but their knowledge of methods is equally important (Lt. Victor BelEnko--M.I.G. pilot--will remain of great value to us as an expert on the Soviet Air Force even 10 years from now, provided he does not go into computer programming or selling fast food.).

It is amazing how much can be done by the right people even with limited resources. This winter, I took part in a simulation (strategic games) in Washington, D.C. On the first day, our group simulated a pre-summit Politburo session. On the second, we participated in a mock summit. Without any special preparations, our group was able to make several suggestions which the Soviets soon "adopted": Sakharov's release ("glasnost"/PR) and zero-option in Europe. The third suggestion (already mentioned by some Soviet officials as a trial balloon) was to accept President Reagan's offer to share American S.D.I. technology with the Soviets.

A think tank or even a study group devoted to such practical aspects of Sovietology can help the U.S. to be better prepared for various Soviet surprises (much more is to come soon), and to act, rather than just react.

What is badly needed is comprehensive and supported-by-facts knowledge about the U.S.S.R. This knowledge should be judged in terms of right or wrong, correct or incorrect, rather than right and left.

Unfortunately, U.S. academia has ignored 250,000 emigres from the U.S.S.R. as a source of any knowledge about their former country. This has happened partly because of protectiveness (fear of competition) and partly because our message was not welcome. A common excuse is that refugees suffered under the Soviet regime and, therefore, cannot be objective. This is sheer nonsense, because, first, there are methods of obtaining some useful information even from obviously biased sources; secondly, there is no reason to believe that most emigres from the U.S.S.R. are "negative" or biased. After all, human memory tends to forget bad things, and besides, there can be many reasons for ex-Soviets to be positively--and not negatively--biased. (For instance, I benefit both personally and professionally from U.S.-Soviet tourism and exchanges, which provide me with information about recent developments inside the U.S.S.R. and allow me to communicate with my friends there. But, objectively, I'd have to admit that these contacts as they are currently conducted are rather harmful to American interests. As you can see, in this case my personal and business "biases" are not "negative"/anti-Soviet.)

Re-defections

I believe that most of so-called re-defections are in fact kidnappings. We should not tolerate another Medvid case--for humanitarian reasons, because this scares off would-be defectors, and especially because it sends the wrong message to the Soviet people: that the United States again sides with their oppressors. And we should not accept any re-defection as legitimate, unless all measures have been taken to assure that this is not a trick (a double, for instance, or a heavy dose of will-suppressing drugs). There should be no problem for our representatives to meet with a genuine re-defector. We should insist on meeting Medvid, and the British should insist on meeting Bitov (an obvious kidnapping, as far as I know).

Other "re-defectors" are K.G.B. operatives who fulfilled their mission and returned home. Using their former pals at debriefings would provide a forecast of such an outcome much earlier and more correctly than is possible now. And, of course, in some (very few) cases, some "defectors" may decide to return (I doubt any real K.G.B. officer will do it--they know too well what to expect). An attempt should be made, through their peers, to help them come to their senses, for unless they are world-famous figures, they are committing suicide.

Defectors and the Soviet People

We should view and treat defectors from the U.S.S.R. as our allies, who are speaking for the Soviet people. We do not know how many millions will leave the U.S.S.R. if given a chance, but the Soviet Government (all Soviet Governments!) acts on the assumption that everybody will, and therefore keeps, for instance, a million-strong Army to guard against escapes (not against invasions) on the borders of the "Socialist camp." Less than one percent of the entire Soviet population is ever allowed to travel to the West, and those who travel always have relatives, usually children, left behind as hostages. Two historic events should be considered in this regard: When Polish Jews were offered a chance to leave Communist Poland, virtually all left. And of millions of ethnic Russians who happened to be outside the U.S.S.R. and its occupation zone after World War II, more than half did not want to return "home."

Raising the Number of Defections

We should try to encourage defections for the following reasons:

a) as a source of information;

b) as a humanitarian gesture and a gesture of friendship toward the Soviet people; and

c) as an easy and inexpensive way of curbing Soviet anti-Western activities.

Even small increases in the number of defections will lead to new restrictions on whom can be trusted to travel abroad. As a result, some of the most qualified (and, thus, most dangerous for us) Soviet technological spies ("scientists"), spy-recruiters, disinformation experts, will remain home. This can even be done selectively by targeting specific groups. For instance, imagine that there were several recent "defections" of Soviet exchange-scientists actively involved in illegally obtaining our microchip technology. Now, the Soviet Academy of Science has to send to the U.S. another such scientist, and they have a choice of two: A) more qualified but single, and B) married three years, with two children. Under normal circumstances, A would go; but being severely reprimanded for negligence because of recent defections, the dozen of security personnel involved in the clearance process (each of them virtually has veto power over each case) will prefer to err on the side of safety: Less-qualified B will be sent. (Or no one will go at all, as indeed often happens.)

If not for Soviet fear of defections, the West would have been flooded with Soviet spies, recruiters, saboteurs, and other similar "experts." By encouraging "defections," we can push the number down.

Voice of America and Liberty: Strange Policies.

This goal can be easily achieved simply by interviewing "defectors" and allowing them to share their experiences on radio broadcasts to the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, both V.O.A. and Liberty are under orders not to encourage defections. And both implement this policy in the most restrictive way in order to avoid protests from the Soviet Embassy usually followed by reprimands, as often happened in the late 1970s.

Recently, I was interviewed on Liberty. Before the interview, a supervisor instructed my interviewer not to mention how I came to the West ("Say simply that he resides in the U.S.A. since 1979"). Then he asked me what I was doing in Washington, with the clear intention of putting it into the introduction ("Lev Alburt is here to address the Rotarians, or to lecture at Georgetown University, or to open a new chess club"). I said that I came to attend the first annual award dinner of the Jamestown Foundation, where Senator Sam Nunn would be the award recipient. "Jamestown ... they deal with defectors, and the Soviets know about this. Let's not mention this. Let's not mention Jamestown. Simply say that Lev Alburt happened to be in Washington and ...."

I was told once by a V.O.A. employee that soon after his famous escape, Victor Belenko (M.I.G. pilot) asked him, "Let me speak for ten minutes, and in a week we'll have at least six more planes." (Belenko didn't plan to tempt his former colleagues by the "dolce vita" in the U.S. and didn't consider this necessary--the only thing needed was technical data: where the nearest Japanese airport is located and how best to avoid radar detection.) The V.O.A. employee replied in horror that it was completely out of the question.

Not only are we not using our broadcasts to reach out to the Soviet people and to offer at least some of them a chance to escape, but we are also undermining our credibility. Because defections are news, and for the Soviet people very important news indeed, and by ignoring important elements of defectors' stories, by obviously bowing to Soviet diktat, we lose the trust of our listeners.

Preparing for my own escape, I listened with understandable interest to broadcasts about the most recent defection which occurred in England. I, as well as my friends with whom I discussed the matter, were surprised, for instance, by the phrase, "His request for political asylum is now under consideration by the immigration authorities. If granted, he ...." The B.B.C. is supposed to inform the Russians about England, and V.O.A. about the U.S. Aren't immigration laws as applied to defectors from the U.S.S.R. legitimate information about the U.K./U.S.--the kind of information Soviet listeners are much more interested in (even if they don't/can't plan to defect) than, say, the costs of a Bahamian cruise? Under which circumstances, we asked ourselves, could a defector be denied asylum? What will happen to him then? Will he be given a chance to go to some other country willing to accept him, or (a life-and-death difference), will he be delivered, handcuffed (operation Keel-haul style) to his masters?

To check on current policy regarding how defections can and, especially, cannot be reported on the V.O.A. and Liberty is probably the single most important thing Congress can do as the result of these hearings.

Defections and "Glasnost"

Despite the growing number of Soviet nationals going abroad--this number may soon double if not triple, as part of Gorbachev's PR campaign and his desperate efforts to fix the crippled Soviet economy by an infusion of Western wealth--I do not expect a sharp increase in the number of defections. The Soviet Union is now a fast-changing society. It does not mean that those changes are for the better, but changes by themselves, even simply personnel changes, make life in the U.S.S.R. more exciting. They also create hopes that the shaky, highly unpopular regime may suddenly collapse if Gorbachev, for reasons of his own (getting rid of opponents and trying to make the Soviet system more productive), continues to rock the boat. Besides, while life certainly isn't better in the U.S.S.R. now than it was two or five years ago, there is at least one positive aspect of the internal "glasnost": Censorship has been relaxed, and more and more interesting stories, articles, and novels appear now in the Soviet press.

Later, in a year or two, the unfulfilled expectations and temporary quasi-freedoms are likely to make the people desperately search for real freedom, and the number of defections will sharply rise to well above the current level. But if we want to see more defections now, we should make some effort for this goal, at least selectively--targeting, for instance, Soviet anti-American operations and the war in Afghanistan (see an attached article).

In sum,

- Welcome "defectors" as our allies
- Correct V.O.A.'s and Liberty's policies
- Use "old defectors" to work with new ones
- Establish comprehensive studies of the U.S.S.R. combining defectors/emigres and U.S.-born experts
- Encourage important defectors to remain in their fields of expertise

- Allocate money to the Jamestown Foundation for research, re-settlement, and help in debriefing
- Raise the price the U.S.S.R. pays for conducting anti-American operations, the war in Afghanistan, etc., by using defections as a tool
- Finally, take a firm stand on the side of the Soviet people and not of their Government.

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LEV ALBURT

SOVIET FEAR OF DEFECTIONS

Lev Alburt, formerly a Soviet chess grand master, escaped in 1979 to the West, and is currently a U.S. champion. He publishes a chess column, and occasional articles on political matters, in The New York City Tribune.

Each political structure has its own strengths and weaknesses. By applying pressure toward the system's vulnerable spots, one may achieve significant results - and at low cost. One of the not-well-known organic weaknesses of communist regimes is their rulers' almost paranoid fear that their subjects will somehow escape, or "defect".

For many observers, the typical reaction of the Soviets or the Red Chinese to the defection of a chess player or a tennis star is highly exaggerated, at least. Soviet defectors, Soviet eager-to-defect tourists or scientists and their sinister keepers from the KGB, frequent American movies. But this phenomenon should be viewed as a politically significant one, and not as a subject for jokes only.

The rulers of the USSR (Red China, East Germany) have overreacted in cases of defection of their "citizens" because they view defections as a serious threat, one not due to their backward Russian (Chinese, German) mentality.

Defections are, indeed, a very real threat to the stability of slave states such as the USSR and the PRC. The more "citizens" have escaped from their masters (called "governments"), the more eager the remaining slaves are to try to do the same.

Also important, people have begun to question their fate: to spend their entire lives (*and the only life there is, as communism predictably teaches - there is no life hereafter)* as "citizens" of a communist "state". Thus, they are becoming less eager to look for various ways to serve the system and to be rewarded for this. As a result, the already shaky "state" becomes even shakier.

The temptation of freedom is a very powerful one. Thus, Soviet borders are "sealed", and outside broadcasts jammed. And the USSR (or PRC) can hardly tolerate, for even a short time, any due-process emigration.

A Success Story

Don't we feel, too often, "enough of words, let's do something" - only to realize that there is nothing we can do?

The "Ban the Soviets Coalition" was an obscure, small group of individuals in Southern California. Their goal (to ban the Soviets from participating in the Los Angeles Olympics) was shared by virtually no other influential group in the US. They were ridiculed by the media. All authorities, from the U.S. government to the U.S. Olympic Committee, did their best to accommodate the Soviets.

Still, the Soviets didn't get from the U.S. government what they wanted: a firm promise of a defection-free Olympics. As a result, the Soviets and their satellites didn't send their athletes to the Games. Because of their fear of defections, the Soviets missed the Olympics - a great propaganda opportunity, available only once every four years.

Huge sums spent on sports have been lost, from the point of view of the Soviet leaders. After all, the major reason for the Soviet expenditures on sports is propaganda (even

②

administratively, sports are "supervised" by the sports sector of the *Propaganda* Department of the CPSU's Central Committee).

The "Ban the Soviets Coalition" had a budget well below $100,000. Their only "threat" to the Soviet state was to have some of their members keeping banners in stadiums. Those banners would say, in Russian, "You have the right to ask for political asylum in the USA. If you want to stay here and need help, call the following number."

During the Olympics, the Soviet athletes were supposed to live on a huge Soviet ship - usually referred to as the "jailboat" - and not in the Olympic Village. They had to be brought to and from their stadiums in Soviet-manned buses, guarded by their KGB keepers. There was only one vulnerable spot: the Soviets were concerned that during the moments immediately before and after competitions, some athletes would run to people holding "urging to defect" banners, and ask for their help in front of thousands of spectators and millions of TV viewers. And after many hesitations, they withdrew.

Thus, a handful of people offset the efforts of millions "employed" in the Soviet sports industry. Their budget nullified the thousands-of-times-bigger Soviet expenditures on the Sports-for-Propaganda machine.

* * *

If it hadn't been for this almost irrational phenomenon, the West would have been flooded with Soviet spies, drug smugglers, and disinformers. Indeed, the Soviets do a lot of harm to their interests almost daily by not "clearing" their citizens for trips abroad.

In the 1970s, I was one of the top Soviet chess players. To be able to travel abroad, I did a lot of studying: how the system worked, how one could increase his chances to be cleared to get an exit visa.

I, and other people with the same interests, shared our experience with each other. Thus, I learned about many cases, some with happy endings, some without. In more than 50% of all cases, experts needed abroad to serve their department's interests - in fact, Soviet interests - were denied visas. Among them were sailors, scientists, athletes, diplomats, even KGB officers. They didn't receive any explanations, and in most cases, no visible reasons for denial existed.

How this system operates was partly described in Prof. Michael Voslensky's work, *Nomenklatura*. This problem deserves further study.

Practical Applications

Imagine that some private group announces, "We're going to help the Soviet soldiers who want to stop fighting a dirty war in Afghanistan to defect. We hope that in a year we will be able to assist those defectors, and to bring them to safety" (to "create a safe haven", as Rep. Don Ritter said at the Congressional Hearings on Afghanistan in early March 1985).

Let's not discuss if such a "safe haven" can realistically be envisioned. Let's not discuss the consequences of real mass defections. The mere threat of them should be effective.

Soviet leaders will learn about the plans of another "Coalition", as they did about the plans of the L.A. group. They will send an order down to army commanders in Afghanistan: "provocations" are likely to come; ensure that the number of defections does not increase above the current level.

Generals, in turn, will issue orders to their subordinates. In such a (for their bosses) serious matter, everyone involved will try rather to overreact than to underreact. As a result, the Soviet Army will lose a lot of its maneuverability. Small groups will not be allowed to operate, and the number of special KGB troops, to prevent defections, will have to grow.

There will be another effect undesirable for the Soviet leadership. Let's assume that the conscripts to be sent to Afghanistan are screened according to the same rules as those going abroad. This will lead to some sort of reward for those viewed as less loyal, and to the punishment of those supposedly loyal (and of the offspring of "loyal" families).

For the Soviet ruling class, hundreds of war casualties are preferable to a few defections. Indeed, in order to prevent possible defections (under present circumstances, not very likely to happen), the Soviets in Afghanistan casually bombed locations where their imprisoned men were supposedly held.

The mere threat of urging Soviet personnel in Afghanistan to defect should make the Soviet government more eager to seek a "political solution", an eventual withdrawal of their forces.

* * *

This approach should work also in other situations, such as toward East German advisors in Nicaragua or Angola. The communist rulers are already preoccupied with the threat of possible defections. If the level of this threat grows, the "Nomenklatura" must and will react strongly.

As a result, for instance, some of the best experts will not be sent to Nicaragua, for "security reasons", and this is only one of several setbacks for the communist cause.

To conclude: the fear of defection is the Achilles' heel of the communist rulers. They suffer from this on an almost daily basis. The L.A. Olympics was only the best known of many examples. We should study this phenomenon and use it to our advantage. In doing so, we can obtain new effective - and inexpensive - tools for our struggle.

EXHIBIT NO. 2

STATEMENT OF
VIKTOR BELENKO
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

My name is Viktor Belenko, now an American citizen, who fled the Soviet Union on September 6, 1976. The fact that I was a Senior Lieutenant in the Soviet Air Defense Command, and piloted my MIG-25 fighter aircraft to Japan is not relevant to what I wish to discuss here.

As a citizen and voter in my adopted land, I have become increasingly alarmed over the past several years by the lack of caring and professionalism which many of my former countrymen have experienced when they too, selected freedom over tyranny. Case examples are depressingly numerous.

Frankly, I was not surprised when I learned of KGB officer Vitaly Yurchenko's decision to return to the Soviet Union. Now, instead of a valuable asset for our country, he has become a weapon which is used against it. He now lectures younger KGB officers -- some of whom might one day become potential defectors (the very name, itself implies treachery) -- about his "first-hand" experiences in our country that led him to return to Moscow.

No doubt, many of his examples of how he was mishandled by CIA resettlement personnel are heavily embellished. But no matter: The damage has been done. It will surely have an impact. Disaffected KGB officers will be less vulnerable to recruitment approaches by U.S. intelligence. And most will think twice before approaching us on their own.

If we feel that those who seek freedom are valuable assets and should be encouraged when and wherever possible, many changes must be made. And not the least among them is a total shift in attitude or "mind-set."

The following observations and suggestions are based on my own experience. Consider them, then, in the light of constructive criticism from one who dearly loves his new country and wishes only that greater numbers of former countrymen could come to know, love, and protect our unique freedoms as I have, myself.

A Different Immigrant

It is ironic that we, a Nation of Immigrants, remain so ignorant of foreign cultures, fears, and attitudes. This is particularly true as it applies to the Soviet Union, a unique, closed society whose violent history of war and revolution, invasion and counter-invasion, has fostered lasting attitudes of hostility, paranoia, and isolation.

In comparison to the West -- or even some Bloc societies -- most of the Soviet Union's population might as well exist on the far side of the moon. Thus, they are totally unprepared to deal with the realities and opportunities of freedom. Thus, they cannot be viewed in the same light as, for example, Irish, German, and Italian immigrants who arrived in our country in another time, to find another society far different from ours today.

Regrettably, there has been a tendency among many "re-settlers" to approach the very severe problems of adjustment encountered by most Soviet arrivals as: "You are now in the U.S. you can be all that you can be. It's all there for the having!"

Such, unhappily, is not the case. The new arrivals are totally unprepared for their first introduction to our freedoms. And to send them forth on their own, expecting them to cope, after a modest period of debriefing and adjustment, is a serious mistake.

Similarly, it is an error to categorize or stereotype programs presently designed to assist the resettlement of Soviet newcomers. Each individual is a different case, unique to himself/herself. A Jewish immigrant usually can count on a welcoming committee of friends or relatives. A KGB officer, a diplomat, or a soldier cannot. And, yet, each of them is a different individual with separate dreams and fears.

These are the immigrants which most concern me. For them, adjustment is the most difficult. In the first year, most are deeply homesick; for a Russian's attachment to his or her motherland is a basic foothold in their lives. Many seriously consider returning -- despite the likelihood of severe punishment, even death. I know. Because I nearly did. Confusion, self-doubts, and feelings of guilt can, and often do, linger for a decade and beyond.

These "different" immigrants must be able to count on the continued support, interest, and care of those who arranged their arrival or first introduced them to their chosen country. Diplomats, for example, should be provided a profession that best utilizes their past skills and interest, permitting them to achieve the confidence of self-fulfillment. Likewise, educators, mechanics, pilots, soldiers, butchers, or bakers; each must be able to count on meaningful employment and a share in freedom.

We have all heard the phase, "Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness?" Well, the new immigrant knows that he is alive all right. As for Liberty, it is a mystery, confusing at best, threatening at worst. And, as for the "Pursuit of Happiness," he, or she, has not the vaguest idea of what they are chasing. The concept is totally alien and will remain so for many years.

In my own experience, I do not believe that these critical areas are being given enough importance today. From speaking with them, I know that all too many of my former-Soviet immigrant-acquaintances feel that they are simply overwhelmed, lost, and/or unheeded by what they see as an unresponsive bureaucracy. I must agree with them. I, myself, encountered similar problems. But I was lucky. God gave me an instinct for survival, forgiveness, and the good fortune of a fine family in my new country.

Not so for others.

Take the case of Vladimir Sahkarov, a key Soviet diplomat based in the Middle East who came over to the side of Freedom in the early 1970's. A man of enormous knowledge and skills -- he spoke four languages -- he was first debriefed, then, incredibly, sent to a "hotel school" in Los Angeles. Needless to say, the experience was a disaster.

This example may be somewhat dated, but I can assure you that similar short-sighted practices continue today. Indeed, most so-called resettlement "handlers" do not even speak Russian. Whether or not a recent arrival can speak English should not matter. The fact is that most such immigrants appreciate the effort which also makes them more at home and eases adjustment problems.

In another area, let's examine the simple nuts and bolts of beginning a new life. Acquiring a driver's license, a social security card, credit, a bank account, housing leases or purchases -- each becomes a seemingly insurmountable problem. In some cases, the CIA -- now responsible for resettlement of intelligence defectors -- cannot help because of charter restrictions on their activities within the U.S. In order to provide such assistance they must turn to "cover" organizations, etc. This is hardly a satisfactory arrangement.

And what about lectures, teaching, or other positions and income generating activities? Here, also, the CIA can help only through the medium of "cut-outs." The new arrival feels that he is being passed from hand to hand with no one team or individual really responsible for his well-being. He or she often feels that there is no one to turn to, no one to share the greatest experience of life with. In a phrase, he or she feels that they have been "hung out to dry."

Long ago, the KGB, for example, took steps to smooth the way for those Western citizens, who, mistakenly, chose their system over freedom. Jobs, housing, companionship, all is arranged to lessen the shock of integration. And it continues. The Soviet

Union, much to our own disadvantage, considers these individuals as "privileged" and takes great pains to treat them as such.

This "elite" treatment may be foreign to our own standards and culture. But it is highly effective. Thus, it simply will not do to tell a problematical arrival: "Look, Viktor Belenko made it, you can too."

He or she is not Viktor Belenko. And I am not them. And the loss of just one important arrival because of incompetent or short-sighted resettlement programs cannot be excused by pointing out successes with others. The Soviets are now wise enough to use these "returnees" to dissuade others from following their examples -- at least before they are shot, or imprisoned.

Obviously, we need a better program -- one that is tailored to the individual on a case-by-case basis and one that encourages and utilizes their capabilities to the maximum. This, not only to assist in improving the security of our nation, but also in guaranteeing the fruits of freedom which these men and women so desperately sought. Many have risked their lives or died in the attempt. Others, surely, were dissatisfied with their lot in the Soviet Union. Some even chose freedom out of spite for real or imagined injustices.

Whatever the motivation, we have the moral -- and, let's face it, self-serving -- responsibility to insure them that they are not disappointed.

What Can We Do Better

After more than ten years of experience with resettlement programs and programmers -- such as they are -- I have a few suggestions on how we can improve our reception and treatment of these "special immigrants."

First, the responsibility for the handling, debriefing, and settlement procedures must undergo a renewed commitment. Each member of the team assigned to a specific immigrant should be able to speak Russian fluently. They should devise a realistic and comprehensive program of counseling, housing, companionship, and ultimately, meaningful employment for the individuals. This commitment must be long-range, not simply for a limited period of time. The "sink-or-swim" approach to final resettlement must end.

The immigrant has made the commitment, has taken the first step in the strange and frightening world of freedom. The very least we can do is ensure his survival -- even if it means a decade or more of care. Many will not require this "perpetual" care. But others will. Simply because they are "different" in no way makes them less important.

The CIA must be given the freedom to effectively manage these programs. If existing conditions do not permit it, then another agency -- whose charter will allow for an effective resettlement to take place -- must be given the responsibility. But, above all, the practice of shoe-horning immigrants into any program must end.

The readjustment procedure has to be tailored to the individual, and those who are in closest contact with the immigrant should be experts in behavioral sciences and the handling of such persons -- not on a transfer basis from another department of the CIA -- but as a career field, itself.

It goes without saying that each member of the resettlement team should have a thorough understanding of Soviet culture and society. Moreover, these teams should be permitted to operate nation-wide, as it is often a good idea to move the new arrival well away from Washington once the debriefing process ends. Adjustment is a slow, gradual procedure. At first, every phase of a new arrival's life must be carefully programmed and supervised. It cannot be otherwise.

Now this may not be our way in the U.S.

However, I think you will agree that even one Yurchenko is one too many.

We are only hurting ourselves as well as those who have had the courage to place their lives -- and confidence -- in the hands of freedom.

I would be more than pleased -- indeed, I consider it a responsibility as an American with personal experience -- to help in any area to improve the present program.

EXHIBIT NO. 3

Statement for the Record
before the
Senate Governmental Affairs'
Subcommittee on Investigations
on
The U.S. Government's Handling of Defectors
by
Reverend Monsignor Nicholas DiMarzio
Director
Migration and Refugee Services
of the
U.S. Catholic Conference

October 8, 1987

Thank you for inviting our organization to submit comments on the important but little attended group of migrants to this country known as defectors.

Migration and Refugee Services (MRS) of the United States Catholic Conference is an operational organization of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States. MRS provides services in two broad areas. In the immigration field, it operates several regional centers offering assistance to persons seeking benefits under the Immigration and Naturalization laws, including the current IRCA legalization program, and coordinates the work of dozens of diocesan offices engaged in this activity. Under a Cooperative Agreement with the Department of State and through more than 100 diocesan offices, MRS resettles refugees admitted under the Refugee Act of 1980.

In connection with our immigration and resettlement activities, we are called upon from time to time to resettle persons designated as defectors. Often these persons are crewmen from Eastern Bloc ships who the Immigration and Naturalization Service refers directly to our diocesan offices for resettlement assistance. In some cases, the Department of State asks the MRS national office to provide assistance to middle level defectors. While the latter cases are few in number, they are a sensitive group and require special handling. Until now, little attention has been focused on their special needs.

To put this issue in context, it might be helpful to distinguish defectors from the other categories of persons seeking permanent status in this country: immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.

Defectors often differ from these others in many important respects: in their motivation, their socio-economic status, the way they are regarded by their former countries, in their expectations, and in the way in which they are received in our society.

Traditionally, immigrants have chosen to leave their own countries and have come to this country to obtain better lives for themselves or their children, to join relatives, to reach the highest levels of their profession, etc. Refugees have felt forced to flee their countries for one reason or another and cannot return; some of them are brought to this country under our refugee programs. Asylum applicants are those who fear to return to their countries often because of changes that have occurred since their departures. The term defector is given to those who enjoyed positions of trust or status in their own usually Communist societies such as to justify the presumption that they subscribed to its principles and supported its advancement, but who now suddenly and often openly reject their societies by abandoning their positions and fleeing to the West.

Immigrants do not necessarily reject the political systems of their own societies, which may well be similar to that of the United States. They may even regret leaving their own countries, but find their prospects there limited in one way or another. Most often they do not intend to return to their own countries; they come to make a permanent commitment to life in the United States. Refugees and asylees, on the other hand, while they have fled certain negative conditions in their own countries, often hope that these conditions will change and that they will be able to return to their former lives. Defectors do not normally hope to return.

An immigrant's country of emigration may hate to lose him or her, but it does not take a punitive attitude. Countries from which refugees flee often do seek to punish the refugees by either cancelling their passports, confiscating their property, or denying their relatives a chance to join them. Defectors not only suffer the typical punishments levied on refugees, but sometimes (justifiably or not) fear for their own safety, both before and after they defect. At the very least, they fear they are being tracked by their former governments.

An immigrant's expectations upon arriving in the U.S. are usually fairly realistic. Probably the immigrant has been to the United States before. In most cases, he or she has relatives here, and has probably learned some English before coming. The immigrant is usually able to plan the move and to transfer assets. The immigrant can bring family members, and may even have a job available upon arrival.

Refugees come without these advantages. Late in a refugee movement, many will have relatives here, but tney are usually newcomers themselves and cannot offer much help. Asylees may have some connections here as, in a few cases, may defectors, but usually not relatives who can be relied upon for significant help.

The expectations and outlook of refugees are, despite formal orientation abroad, often different from those of immigrants. Since they were brought here under a government program, in many cases they look to the government, often for long periods, to meet their needs. Defectors, because they often enjoyed a high status in their own societies and because they may feel they bring something of value with them, may have unrealistic expectations as to how well and how quickly they will fit into our society.

The United States Government receives these different categories of migrants on differing terms. Immigrants are not eligible, for a time, for any special government benefits. In fact, they must demonstrate before they are allowed to come that they will not have to rely on public assistance. Conversely, refugees admitted under the Refugee Act are entitled to a panoply of benefits funded by the federal government and provided in a way by a variety of public and private agencies.

No benefits are available to asylum applicants unless and until they are granted asylum, whereupon they are eligible for any benefits accorded residents of the state in which they reside. Defectors are usually admitted in parole status and apply for asylum after arrival.

There are, of course, great differences in how important individual defectors are considered to be by the United States Government, and, consequently, there are great differences in the way they are treated upon arrival. Some high profile defectors bring not only valuable information but important propaganda benefits. Political and military defectors of all levels may bring information of value. Hard scientists can also bring such information. Artists of stature bring largely propaganda benefits.

Along with the high profile defectors come those with less important information or whose defection is of lesser propaganda value.

High profile political defectors are presumably well cared for by intelligence agencies. Artists of renown are well received by the artistic community and presumably can support themselves with their work. Some hard scientists can also fit relatively easily into their professions.

Defectors of lesser stature or renown are often turned over to the voluntary agencies for assistance, if not immediately, then after a government debriefing. While the agencies are most anxious to help, defectors are often problematical compared to refugees. They are usually not as young as refugees, and have higher expectations as they are often in mid-career, having established themselves in their own societies. They have usually come without their families, and realize that they may not see their families for a long time, if ever. Sometimes they fear for their safety. They may even be untrusting of or unwelcome in their own ethnic groups in this country.

For these reasons, defectors require much more attention, more orientation, and more resources over a longer period of time than most refugees. All of the voluntary agencies handle such cases with great sensitivity because they realize that defectors themselves are often sensitive and need to be affirmed and supported in the choice they have made.

Is it important whether these marginal defectors be provided effective resettlement services? It would seem so if the U.S. wishes to continue to attract important defectors. How defectors are treated at the margin affects the whole movement.

We have seen what propaganda can be made of the return even of a single refugee or group of refugees to the Soviet Union. Such publicity is bound to reach and enter the calculations of even important defectors.

To the extent that high profile defectors are lionized in the media, lower level defectors will inevitably be attracted, bringing whatever they have of intelligence or propaganda value in the expectation of a certain welcome. If the U.S. wishes to continue to attract high profile defectors, it should take steps to satisfy, at least minimally, the expectations of this group.

What should be done that is not now being done? First, there should be a special unit in the Bureau for Refugee Programs of the Department of State to focus on and coordinate the handling of this group of middle level defectors. Such a special unit should do the following:

1. Make sure that INS provides such persons with proper documentation, including work authorization, as quickly as possible.

2. Be able to provide funds to assist in the resettlement of middle level defectors through voluntary agencies' networks. Perhaps a per capita grant, matched by voluntary agencies would be one effective and efficient funding method.

3. Be staffed by a person of sufficient stature to be able to intervene with business, government, and cultural leaders to assist in placing these defectors in positions somewhat commensurate with their reasonable expectations. Such assistance is necessary because potential employers need official assurance of the U.S. Government's interest in such persons. The infelicitous term by which they are designated, "defector," with its pejorative connotation is itself a handicap. It is found odious by the defectors themselves and does little to recommend them to potential employers.

   Moreover, the defectors usually come from countries in which the government was responsible for guaranteeing them work and cannot understand why, when employers fail to consider them for work for which they may be well qualified, the U. S. Government does not intervene on their behalf. If after some time they have not been able to find suitable work, they feel that the government has failed to keep a tacit agreement to provide a quid pro quo.

Thank you for the opportunity to provide these comments.

EXHIBIT NO. 4

STATEMENT OF

GERALD GUENSBERG

1. Delphic - A Brief Survey

Created in response to massive emigre exodus

The research facility, Delphic Associates Inc, was created in 1980 in response to the exodus of Soviet nationals to the West which began sometime around 1970. By 1980, nearly 200,000 Jews had been allowed to immigrate. These had initially gone to Israel but after the October 1973 war, ever more opted for the United States so that at present about 50 percent are in Israel whilst the rest are in the US. (The number of emigres who settled in Western Europe is insignificant; those in Canada are not negligible.) Often overlooked are the ethnic Armenians and ethnic Germans; the latter now numbering around 100,000 who have also been allowed to leave the USSR during the seventies and eighties. Delphic has been investigating opportunities for exploiting these emigres but for the present purpose we shall limit the discussion to the Jewish emigres and the handful of defectors from the USSR.

Emigres, a typical cross-section of Soviet society

It was quickly determined that the emigres represented a cross-section of Soviet society: from the simple muzhik peasant from a kolkhoz collective to highly educated professionals from Moscow and Leningrad. There were professors from the leading Soviet universities; scientists from institutes of the Academy of Sciences; engineers from leading

Dramatic ex-emptions:

Naval captain

Space engineer

helicopter designer

Design Bureaus (NIIs and KBs) of Ministries; economists from the highest planning authorities of Gosplan, Gostroy and Gosnab down to economists from the planning *upravlenny* departments of production associations or plants. Some even had worked in classified installations. There is the anomaly of a former naval Captain (Mikhail Turetsky) who had been assigned to the Northern Fleet's Test Basin in Severomorsk allowed to emigrate, who authored a 150 page study on *The Introduction of Missile Systems into the Soviet Navy*, or the chemist (Viktor Yevsikov) from the aerospace industry's core institute, NII-88 in Podlipky, who prepared the monograph, *Re-Entry Technology and the Soviet Space Program*, or the two helicopter designers (Lev Chaiko and Valery Weinstein) who each prepared a study on Soviet helicopter design procedures; especially the MI-26.

arcane sciences

Perhaps less dramatic but potentially more important were the emigres who could describe basic research now on the drawing board of key Soviet research facilities, which a decade down the road will appear as production items in plants or zavod. An example is the study of Soviet R & D in low temperature physics by Dr. Vladimir Kresin -- a topic which has assumed dramatic importance even as this is being written, because of the new class of superconductors discovered by US (and Soviet) researchers in the laboratory. Or, the series of reports on Soviet developments in large scale finite mathematics (see Delphic monographs by Trakhtenbrot, Goldberg, Lifschitz, Tarasenko) with direct application to Soviet cybernetics and computer sciences.

Delphic and Defectors

Ironically, it was not an emigre study that launched the Delphic operation. Instead it was a Soviet defector to the UK: Galina Orionova, a researcher from the Arbatov Institute for USA and Canada. The pilot project was funded by the Office of Net Assessment, OSD in order to assess the role of Soviet interdisciplinary research institutes, or "think tanks" in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy. Orionova was escorted by Delphic to a dozen or more leading centers of Soviet studies in the United States from Columbia's Harriman Institute to Stanford University's Hoover Institution and RAND Corporation where leading scholars queried the defector on actual, real-life conditions: who funded the foreign policy studies at the Arbatov Institute, what source material was available, who were the principal researchers, what was the role of Soviet authorities from the Foreign Ministry to the International Department of the Central Committee, hiring and promotion policy, etc?

Galina Orionova

Thus, from the beginning the Delphic program has emphasized the tapping of human sources: the defector and the emigre.

2. Emigre-Defector Selection Process

Sponsors of Delphic studies

The studies prepared by Delphic are funded by government agencies and private institutions such as the University of California's Los Alamos Laboratories. These sponsors usually identify the subject of interest and it is responsibility of Delphic to find knowledgeable sources. In this connection, Delphic as accumulated a large biographic data base on emigres with strong academic and professional credentials which serves as pool for locating knowledgeable emigres in the most diverse fields. For the past five years, Delphic has annually prepared inventories of new emigres-defectors that have surfaced during the past year. The emphasis is on recent arrivals from the USSR. These annual SEARCH lists provide biographic data and identify areas of knowledgeability. In many cases, outlines are provided for proposed studies. A sample SEARCH list is attached. (Enclosure A).

Search lists of available sources

In addition, Delphic as access to an automated, computerized data base of all emigres that have entered the US since 1970. It is possible to obtain the biographic highlights, education and professional careers of emigres plus a summary of knowledgeability.

Emigre/defectors from Eastern Europe

Recently, Delphic has also begun to collect data on recent emigre/defectors from Eastern European countries other than the USSR. Of special interest are former government officials in CMEA countries who can report on the decision-making process in their respective country. For example, officials who can report meaningfully on Soviet attempts to integrate the economies of the CMEA countries or the scientific and technical programs in Eastern Europe. A case in point is the computer industry's RYAD: each CMEA country is alloted a share of the third generation computer that was developed in the USSR.

Assessment of knowledgeability

Once a government or private sponsor identifies an emigre from the Search List as of potential interest, he or she is contacted by Delphic for an indepth assessment of knowledgeability and a topic is selected together. Finally, Delphic with an assist by the sponsor, hammers out an outline for the emigre study.

3. The Product: Monographs and Cluster Studies

Eyewitness account monographs

Delphic will have completed by May 1987, about 75 monographs on the USSR. These are scholarly studies from 100 to 200 pages in length on arcane scientific and technical subjects. They represent state-of-the-art reports based on the personal experiences of qualified Soviet specialists. That is their distinctive feature: they are eyewitness accounts and not the product of library research. The studies have been skewed to the natural sciences: nuclear energy, physics, chemistry and electronics. However, there have also been reports in the social sciences as well. Thus, Vladimir Shlapentokh has written on Sociology in the USSR. This Delphic monograph is currently coming out in a second edition by Fred Praeger of Westview Press which plans to publish a large number of Delphic monographs. A number of studies have been published on economics ranging from econometric modeling in the USSR to the Kosygin Reform of 1965 and its evolution. Halfway between technology and economics are the studies on pricing in the energy field and the costing of Soviet natural gas pipelines which was published by Delphic in the midst of the US-NATO debate over the pipeline embargo.

Cluster studies by a group of emigres

Another product of Delphic is the Cluster Study. Initially funded by a government agency as a pilot project in

1985-86, it called for several emigres to report on their experiences in a particular and narrow field. Specifically: decision-making in the energy sector and innovation in the Soviet chemical industry. In each case, Delphic contracted with five emigres to prepare about 25-plus pages on their specific and relevant experiences. Next, the emigres were brought together in a seminar where each paper was critiqued by the participants. These sessions were recorded and from the transcription an analysis was prepared by Delphic identifying new information obtained at the seminar. The cluster study on innovation in the Soviet chemical industry is 300 pages in length: ca 150 pages of edited emigre inputs; ca 50 pages of analysis; and 100 pages of selected transcript. As the pilot project was successful, Delphic has been contracted to prepare additional cluster studies in 1987.

In addition to monographs and cluster studies, Delphic prepares special research reports under contract. Here one or more emigres are charged with reviewing Soviet literature and/or statistics in order to estimate, say, the influence of inflation on the military-industrial sector of the Soviet economy. (see Fyodor Kushnirsky, Estimation of Real Growth and Productivity in the Soviet Machine-Building and Metalworking Sector: The Effects on Economic and Military Capability, January 1986).

4. The Methodology for Delphic Studies

Methodology modelled after special debrief-technique

The Delphic technique is an adaptation of the interrogation method that was developed in the early fifties for the debriefing of top level German scientists who were recruited by the Soviets to reconstruct German wartime developments. By this means the Soviet military was able to leapfrog in record time the German accomplishments in the fields of missiles, aircraft, submarines and nuclear energy.

When these German scientists returned from the USSR, a select few were paired with US military and civilian experts in their particular specialty and an interrogator. This 3-man team would spend as much as six months together preparing exhaustive reports on Soviet advanced weapon developments. This product is still used today in analyzing advanced Soviet military scientific developments and capabilities.

Delphic applies this triad-method to the emigre/defectors. Instead of the German scientist-source, there is now an Soviet emigre. The military technical advisor has been replaced by an expert from industry or the universities and the interrogator has been replaced by a Russian speaking linguist who serves as research analyst cum translator.

Former Debriefing Team		Current Monograph Team	
German Scientists-Source		Soviet Emigre	
Intelligence Advisor	Interrogator	Technical Advisor	Research Analyst

After the draft report has been completed, the 3-man team meets under the supervision of the Delphic program manager for the final editing and the packaging of the report. It is the Delphic program manager who assures the scheduling of the project and the quality of the product.

The methodology described thus far appears to place the main burden on the emigre. However, the role of the Delphic program manager is by no means as passive as this methodology suggests. Many of the emigre/defector sources, though experts in their fields, are not accomplished writers. In order to make the text read like a scholarly Western study in colloquial English, the Delphic program manager is often required to make extensive changes. In some cases, when an emigre-defector was found incapable of presenting a structured technical account, it became necessary for Delphic to debrief the subject and prepare a third-person account. Some examples:

Delphic debrief reports

- The Romanian chemist Magdalena Gheorghe was debriefed and the classified report, The Military Chemical Research Institute of the Romanian Army Chemical Corps was prepared in 1986.
- When the emigre Eric Firdman was unable to prepare a study on his experiences, Delphic wrote the report Select Developments in Soviet Airborne Computer Technology, 1958-1977, based on a series of interviews with Firdman.

Even now, Delphic is conducting an extensive debriefing of the emigre Sergei Freidson on the Lieberman reforms of the sixties. This project is sponsored in part by OSD/Net

Assessment and is aimed at obtaining a model by which to gauge the progress of the ongoing Gorbachov reform effort.

5. The Delphic Staff

Consultants

Program Managers

The methodology used by Delphic is heavily man-power oriented: A three man team prepares a monograph. However, none of these is a full-time Delphic staffer; all are consultants who are contracted under contract to prepare studies within a 6 months period. The fulltime Delphic staff is headquartered in Falls Church, Virginia and it is there that the Delphic program managers supervise the monograph teams. These program managers are political scientists with either Master of PhD degrees and are fluent in Russian. Each program manager is capable of supervising five monograph teams in one year. They assure the uniform quality of the studies: correct and colloquial English matching the standards of Western scholarly, scientific papers. Together with the technical advisor from academia and industry, the program manager guarantees that the study substantially covers all aspects of the topic under investigation.

15-20 monograph teams per year

Monographs can be produced in large numbers without loss of quality

In any year, about 15 to 20 teams have been assembled in the United States and abroad (including Israel and Germany) to prepare monographs. From the very beginning it was clear that the technique is reproducible without degrading the quality of the product. There was only one limiting factor: the availability of high quality emigres and the financial resources to fund the studies. Delphic has available a long list of university faculty members who are eager to serve as technical advisors. Of course, this is a means for these consultants to augment their income; but somewhat less cynically it is a rare opportunity for a US scholar to learn about his or her counterparts in the Soviet Union. Given about 750 plus curriculum vitaes of emigres with extensive academic and professional credentials, the supply of emigres will not dry up for many a year. Furthermore, the supply of emigres in Israel has barely been scratched and there are many indications that the Soviets are about to allow a large number of ethnics to leave.

The supply of research analysts is also inexhaustible. The basic element of the research analyst is fluency in Russian or translation capability and Soviet area study academic background.

Present capacity: thirty monographs

At the present time, Delphic has a staff of 6 program managers which provides the capability for 30 monographs or 12 cluster studies per year or any combination thereoff. Delphic is currently obligated to produce from 15 to 20 monographs and 2 clusters per year, so that there exists a surplus capacity of 10 monographs or 4 cluster studies. More to the point: Delphic has on call a number of recent graduate students with Russian language capability already trained in the Delphic methodology and style. This represents the potential for an immediate expansion.

6. Costing and Time Budget for Delphic Studies

At the present time, a Delphic monograph prepared for government agencies is costed at $35,000. A cluster study of 4 or 5 essays with seminar and analysis costs $60,000.

Delphic has the personnel to immediately assume responsibility for as many as 10 additional monographs and 4 additional clusters to be prepared in one year.

EXHIBIT NO. 5

STATEMENT OF
JERRY E. HUTCHISON
VICE-CHANCELLOR
THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

Soviet Immigrants & Defectors

The issue of Soviet immigrants and defectors poses unique problems as well as opportunities for the United States. Given the ideological differences between the two superpowers, immigration or defection to the United States is an indication to the rest of the world that the democratic American society is the superior one. Thus, from a political standpoint, accepting Soviet citizens as immigrants is to America's credit. Yet, perhaps more fundamental than politics is the long-standing policy of the United States to embrace people from other societies who have been compelled to leave their homes because of political, military, or religious oppression. Soviet immigrants, then, are but a special sub-set of a larger population of the world's people who seek a better way of life by moving to America.

Soviet defectors, in contrast to those who come from other parts of the world, have a special potential. Not only is there a potential for limited military intelligence information, but many come with highly developed academic and professional skills. It is the small number of Soviets, those well-educated future citizens, that is the focus of this document.

The United States government should develop programs which would facilitate the transition of these people from the society of Russian language, government, and culture, to that of the United States. But if this small group is to be singled out for special attention, the first question might be--why? Should they warrant more attention by the United States government that any other group? There appear to be some substantive reasons why this special group deserves assistance and support.

First, as alluded to above, it is in the best political interest of the United States to encourage defection or immigration of well-educated Russian citizens. If those who come to the United States find the assimilation process to be a salutory one, then others will be encouraged to follow. If the experience is a negative one, highly educated Soviet citizens may reconsider defection or choose to immigrate to other countries. Thus, from a political viewpoint, it is in the best interest of the United States to make the transition to the American culture an expeditious and positive experience.

Second, there may be economic advantages in supporting the transitional period of these future U.S. citizens. It would be an economic loss and a loss of human resources to bring highly skilled scientists, educators, and other professionals to this country, only for them to work at menial or subprofessional jobs for the rest of their working lives. This happens all too often to immigrants from other parts of the non-English speaking parts of the world. There should be some way to bridge the language, education, and cultural gap between productive life as a Soviet citizen and even greater opportunity in the United States.

A third but perhaps less compelling argument is that of consistency. The United States is one of only a few societies that believes that all of its citizens should have the opportunity to educate themselves at the highest level possible, and to contribute to that society at a level commensurate with their abilities. Only a strong, prosperous democratic nation can afford such an opportunistic policy. The Higher Education acts in the 1960's and 1970's were promulgated so that all Americans, regardless of financial or cultural background, could work toward their own personal and educational goals. Support programs which would provide education for talented Soviet immigrants would be consistent with this current educational policy.

Program

At the present time there are no policies or programs which focus on the re-education of well-trained Soviet immigrants. As a result, these individuals usually seek out a Russian speaking enclave in a metropolitan area and survive the best they can working in jobs much below their professional potential. What are the alternatives? First, it must be admitted that there is no single solution. One cannot establish one single debarkation process, because these immigrants land in the United States with disparate talents, language proficiency, and aspirations. Each requires a simular analysis and treatment.

Despite these disparities, several generalizations may prevail. First, if these immigrants are to be assimilated successfully into the American society, they should be placed, initially, away from urban centers where Russian enclaves allow them to retain their native language. Second, they should be encouraged to live with and interact with native Americans, not other recent European immigrants. Third, it may be in their best interest to be exposed to the United States that exists outside of the large urban centers of New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. For many Soviet citizens, propaganda has painted a grim picture of the American urban society. Perhaps an initial exposure to smaller communities might be advisable.

Given the above, where should these future citizens be sent? One possibility, given the different educational levels of these immigrants, would be to universities in middle America.

These universities can provide the intellecutal and cultural transition so badly needed if complete assimilation is desired. At these universities future citizens could work toward language proficiency, social and cultural integration, and as appropriate, professional education.

As suggested earlier, the programs would have to be fashioned individually. For the few who already possess a high level of English proficiency, a short course in American studies would prepare them for specialized work as interpreters or analysts with federal agencies, or as teachers. Some would bring professional skills in science, medicine, law, and other professions, but not language proficiency. They would require training in English before making the transition to a recertification program in a graduate school.

Regardless of the specific prescription for each new arrival in the program, there must be some overall process of control and evaluation. Universities have learned from experience that foreign students need constant guidance and support. Offices for international programs are firmly established at all major universities, and they are accustomed to this responsibility. If former Soviet citizens were sent to a university, someone would need to help them get settled in a residence, assist with academic advising, and monitor progress. In other works, each student would need a "shepherd."

Working through a university consortium might be the best way to manage a transition program. In that way immigrants could be deployed throughout a large geographical area, but some form of central control and accountability could be maintained. One such consortium is the Mid-America State Universities Association (MASUA), which is comprised of the major public-supported universities throughout the mid-west (universities in Colorado, Kansas, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Iowa, Missouri, and Southern Illinois). The consortium is experienced at placing and monitoring foreign students on their campuses, and the combined faculty strength of over 15,000 provides the necessary intellectual breadth and depth for the proposed academic program. Well over a hundred faculty have special research and teaching interests in the Soviet area. They would welcome interaction with these Soviet students and could utilize some in teaching and research activities.

Process

Upon entry into the United States it is assumed that there would be some level of screening of Russian immigrants for purposes of security and intelligence. After that the transition period would begin. The program could not be mandatory, but the incentives of subsistence and education would be very persuasive for these newcomers. If the individual opted for the program, a small committee of federal and university officials would work to determine each students interests and needs. After this need assessment, an appropriate university would be selected. Upon accepting a student, the University would be responsible for providing the appropriate academic program and monitoring the student's cultural as well as academic progress. The time of the transition period would vary from as little as six months to several years, depending on the academic needs of the student. The consortium office (in this case MASUA) would be responsible for compiling semi-annual progress reports and forwarding them to a Washington agency for review. At the end of the transition period the future student would be free to relocate anywhere in the United States. By this time professional, business, or scholarly connections would have been made and the student, like all other American citizens, would be free to select an appropriate location in any community.

EXHIBIT NO. 6

STATEMENT OF
ETIENNE M. HUYGENS
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

First of all, I would like to commend you and your colleagues on this Subcommittee for holding these important hearings. Not only am I convinced that the defectors' handling in general can be improved in this country, I also strongly believe that this great country can only benefit from a well-conceived, diversified, and consistent policy with regard to the handling of Soviet Bloc defectors.

Before proceeding with more specific thoughts on this topic, let me present myself. My name is Etienne Huygens. I am a Belgian citizen who arrived about five years ago in the U.S. and lives in Northern Virginia. Through a roll of the dice, I became involved and interested in the subject of Soviet Bloc defectors. While pursuing post-graduate studies in Geneva, Switzerland, I met a Polish girl whom I was to marry. However, I could not have foreseen at that time that this encounter would lead me, a few years later, to a new life in the U.S., since my then-future wife was the daughter of the Polish Ambassador to Japan, Zdzislaw

Rurarz, who together with his wife and daughter requested and obtained political asylum in this country in December, 1981. In this way, I became the son-in-law of a high-level Soviet Bloc defector.

My subsequent work as research director at the Jamestown Foundation from June, 1985, to January, 1987, was another opportunity to be confronted with the problems Soviet Bloc defectors encounter once they arrive in this country.

Defectors' handling is a cluster of complex problems. In the first place, it is complex because it involves a wide variety of people. The phenomenon of Soviet Bloc defections not only relates to high-level defectors, who were members of the Communist Party and/or government or military and intelligence establishments, but also includes the sailor who jumps ship or the auto mechanic who successfully climbs over the Berlin Wall. The public at large is only aware of problems with the handling of Soviet Bloc defectors when one or more of them decide to return to their homeland, or the authorities of the host country return the unfortunate defector to representatives of the country he tried to escape from. To the first category belong people such as Vitaly Yurchenko, the K.G.B. officer; Oleg Bitov, an editor of the Soviet weekly, Literaturnaya Gazeta; or the lower level defectors such as the Soviet soldiers who defected in Afghanistan in 1983, Oleg Khlan and Igor Rykhov (returning from the U.K. to the U.S.S.R.), and Nikolai Ryzhkov (leaving the U.S. for the Soviet Union). To the latter group belong the "unfortunate" cases of Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian seaman who was returned by the U.S. Coast Guard to his Soviet ship in November, 1970, and the Miroslav Medvid incident of October, 1985. We could also add here the numerous Soviet citizens returned by Finland to the U.S.S.R., especially when air piracy was involved.

Such a large group of people automatically implies different personalities and characters, unequal professional and educational backgrounds, enormous differences in experiences, knowledge and expectations and a variety of age groups and widely fluctuating motivations. The ability to adapt to completely new surroundings, personal courage and endurance are other important factors that will influence the integration of the defector into his or her new country, and in our case the U.S., is for many reasons equally complex and unsettling for most of these Soviet Bloc defectors.

Whatever the level at which Soviet Bloc defections occur to the U.S., they are essentially a tribute to the American way of life and to the values this country stands for. Some defectors are even willing to risk their life in order to breathe the free political, economic, and cultural air of this country. The West in general, the U.S. in particular, represents in their eyes an opportunity to break out of a failing system incapable of engendering a viable form of society.

Since the group of Soviet Bloc defectors is characterized by a wide variety of people based on a large number of factors, the necessity for a diversified but consistent U.S. policy for handling Soviet Bloc defectors at all levels becomes imperative.

As leader of the free world, the U.S. has always championed the cause of freedom and democracy, in the first place by being a haven for those who seek refuge from a system that restricts or annihilates the rights and liberties of the individual and, furthermore, threatens U.S. security on a global scale. As a country that has great respect for human rights and especially recognizes "everyone's right to leave any country . . . and seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution," the U.S. ought to accept all those who are bound to be persecuted in one way or another for the mere attempt to defect.

The global policy of defectors' handling encompasses for instance a better implementation and observance of the basic asylum procedure. Some might have forgotten what happened to Simas Kudirka, but the Medvid case should be still fresh in everyone's mind.

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, an independent agency of Congress, concluded its May, 1987, report on the Medvid case stating that "White House, National Security Council, Department of State and Department of Justice officials deviated from constitutionally and congressionally mandated procedures, whereby this failure to follow prescribed procedures constituted a violation of law." Clearly, "the procedures established for the handling of asylum applicants were not followed during the initial stages of the Medvid case. These infractions, while serious in consequence, were the result of carelessness and poor judgment . . . ." The report also added that "the success of the asylum program, as intended by Congress, hinges on quick, decisive action by U.S. officials." One can only guess what happened to Medvid, but one thing is certain: There in Belle-Chasse, Louisiana, a Soviet citizen, who had a tremendous faith in America as the beacon of freedom and justice, lost forever the opportunity to find out if the U.S. was a better place to live and build a new life.

A better, consistent U.S. policy for defectors' handling should also be characterized by more generous asylum practices toward Soviet soldiers defecting from their troops in Afghanistan. I fully agree, Mr. Chairman, with Lidmilla Thorne of Freedom House that "besides humanitarian consideration, it seems obvious that there are also important ideological reasons why Western countries should give political asylum to those Soviet soldiers who have asked for it." She added that "there is also a moral obligation on our part to respond." How strongly those Soviet soldiers are attracted by a new and hopeful life in the U.S. is demonstrated by the letters that five of them wrote to

President Reagan in March-April of 1986 and which are attached to this statement.

Those five soldiers did not find refuge in this country notwithstanding their requests addressed to the President. After a long waiting period, the Canadian Government finally gave them a home in addition to providing for English lessons, a monthly allowance and medical care. This is a concrete example of an effective defectors' handling policy that gives new hope to these Soviet defectors, a policy that might inspire the leading authorities of this country to extend similar assistance. Only six of such defectors have until now found refuge in the U.S., and they were mainly supported by private citizens and organizations.

Mr. Chairman, it would be a serious step in the right direction if some supportive systems could be established by the U.S. Government in cooperation with organizations such as Freedom House, the International Rescue Committee, and the Tolstoy Foundation which are the most experienced, selfless, and understanding of the defectors' needs. Such cooperation would enable defectors such as those Soviet soldiers to obtain a new lease on life under the best possible circumstances. These organizations have accumulated considerable experience over the past decades in helping low- and medium-level defectors to successfully integrate into U.S. society.

The high-level Soviet Bloc defectors represent yet another set of problems. Although their number is relatively small, they turn out to be the most valuable because of the knowledge and experience they have acquired during their particular careers inside the upper strata of the Communist state, more specifically inside the Party structure or the military or intelligence establishments of a specific Soviet Bloc country. This source of information is most important since it can partly offset the enormous advantage Soviet Bloc intelligence services enjoy by operating in an open society like this one. The information includes the possibility to divulge the identities of Soviet Bloc agents who might otherwise never be exposed. Aside from technical intelligence, the data provided by these defectors have contributed more than any other source to the security of the U.S. by illuminating the process of Soviet Bloc operations, attitudes, and goals.

Mr. Chairman, although it must be recognized that the U.S. has led the Western democracies in extending hospitality to Soviet Bloc defectors, keeping alive the very same spirit and tradition that has built this country over the past centuries, it must be said that U.S. policy has at times suffered from inconsistency and contradiction, red tape, or ill will, the failure to understand the defectors' motives, and in certain instances, the insensitivity to their needs and problems. The consequence is that the potentialities of some medium- and high-level defectors are not fully taken advantage of. Some linger on the back burner. Having been members of the Communist Party, they must wait unusually long times for their green card (permanent residency) and naturalization, leaving one wondering what kind of game is being played and who is gaining from it. This old fear of former members of the Communist Party still lingers on in the regulations as applied by the I.N.S. It should be crystal clear, though, that a Soviet Bloc diplomat, Party official, or military or intelligence officer cannot reach the top level--the one that is so valuable for the West--unless he or she was a member of the Communist Party. To collect valuable insights from a defector while, on the other hand, not being able to settle his status after a reasonable time, is nothing more than proof of a poor understanding of human psychology and of the workings of the Communist system.

On the other hand, however, it must be brought home that these inconsistencies in the handling of high-level defectors result from the fact that the latter represent a vast array of personal traits and characters and that the difficult experience, from the psychological point of view, of defection may, and often does, contribute to a surfacing of psychological and thus behavioral problems. In view of this, the handlers should have good psychological training, but the question arises as to whether this is the role of those charged with defectors' handling. Yet, it would seem that precisely because of the said problems there are advantages to an appropriate and professional approach from a psychological view point. This would undoubtedly spare the agencies concerned much embarrassment, often unfounded criticism and problems.

Furthermore, Mr. Chairman, the problems of defectors' handling are compounded by the well-known fact that it is not considered to be a career-promoting activity. It is also certainly not an easy job to handle well at all times and not everyone can do it successfully. It seems to me that a way of improving the defectors' handling is to find ways that would somehow eliminate this impediment.

An efficient defectors' handling beneficial for both defector and the U.S. Government requires quality handlers. No law or imposed policy will produce this kind of skilled personnel unless those who have to implement the handling are themselves convinced that high-level defectors are more than just a useful source of information that can be tapped as the necessity occurs.

It is very difficult, if not impossible, Mr. Chairman, to draw general conclusions from all the above. The issue of defectors' handling is highly complex and, if not well thought out, may have many traps in store. The expression "the wilderness of mirrors," forged in a different context, applies here very well. At its base, the problem is one of human beings, and it offers quite a spectrum of possibilities, from the best to the worst. As such, it cannot and should not be approached in a standardized way. On the contrary, the handling should be custom-made, tailored to the specific psyche of the defector. The sole absolute requirement here should be the professionalism of those dealing with the defectors. In itself, it is a very tough standard to meet. Any individual amateurism in this field is unacceptable and can result in more harm than good playing thus into the hands of Soviet Bloc authorities. Assistance to defectors on a day-to-day basis could in fact be entrusted to private organizations with a long-term proven experience, and for whom this is a humanitarian and not any other mission.

Such work requires very high standards--commitment, readiness to assist at any time and in any situation, profound knowledge of the defector's country of origin and of the language, and an acute awareness of all problems a defector can face. In other words, it requires people to whom defectors can relate. This is what should be understood under professionalism. It is evident that such work can be handled only by dedicated, if not to say charismatic people.

Mr. Chairman, the handling of high-level Soviet Bloc defectors has already improved over the last two years. I am convinced that this Subcommittee will contribute in a significant way to a greater awareness of what can be called an important asset for the free world in general, the national interests of the U.S. in particular.

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EXHIBIT NO. 7

THE JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION
RESEARCH DEPARTMENT

SOVIET BLOC DEFECTIONS: STATISTICAL TREATMENT.

ETIENNE HUYGENS
RESEARCH DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 1986.

Introduction

The present paper is intended to present the overall phenomenon of defection from the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries. Defection as such is usually associated with high-level defectors from Eastern Europe and the USSR be they diplomats, officials or intelligence officers. Yet in terms of numbers, these people constitute a very small minority among defectors in general. For very obvious reasons, they are the most interesting and unique cases, but this should not overshadow the wide-spread character of the phenomenon itself.

As the collected data will show, defection is resorted to by people of all Eastern bloc countries, people of all ages and walks of life. Children as well as the elderly are among defectors; workers as well as scholars. Yet there are certain patterns and every country constitutes a particular case. This may be due to historical factors, such as the Hungarian revolt, the invasion of Czechoslovakia or the crushing of "Solidarity" in Poland. Each one of these events resulted in more massive defections. But even without these dramatic events, defection is a continuous process.

We shall not attempt to analyse the phenomenon as such, but will limit ourselves to providing only statistical data. This is due to two reasons. Firstly, such an enterprise would by far exceed the purpose of the present study and, secondly, defection is a very complex social and psychological phenomenon and, as such, is difficult to study.

We are fully aware of the fact that the data given in this paper are not complete. They are fragmentary and it is difficult to say to what extent our sample is representative. The problem in gathering data on defection stems from the fact that there is no centralized source or data bank. Information is spread throughout a wide variety of sources and often contradictory. This will become very clear in the case of East Germany. With the exception of notorious defections, news coverage is often very poor or inexistent. Access to information is thus very often difficult or even impossible.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

In order to understand the phenomenon of defection one must place it within the appropriate historical framework. As we shall see from what follows, defection is a phenomenon of huge dimensions. It is far from being limited to the several cases of the so-called high-ranking defectors or sailors jumping ship who are usually talked about in the media. This is a pehnomenon of long date and a perpetual one.

The present study considers "defector" and "refugee" (if only because of the fact that defectors obtain the status of "political refugee") as synonymous. But even in spite of this simplification, many problems remain. One of these is, for example, that of the displaced persons. Events such as the two world wars led to the displacement of literally millions of people of which some came to be considered to be refugees because they refused to return to their countries of origin. And even though, in the overwhelming majority of cases, they had not left their countries illegally, having been either deported or taken prisoner by the occupying forces, they should nevertheless be considered as refugees (or defectors). In the case of the Soviet Union, the so-called redefection campaign launched under Khrushchev and whose aim it was to talk these people into returning proves the point.

Aside of the two world wars, civil wars also generated a big number of refugees. And even though this is a debatable issue for many, such as Michael Teitelbaum (1) according to whom those who flee the random violence of a civil war are not refugees, for this sort of violence does not constitute persecution, we shall consider these people as refugees. The very nature of a civil war, not any different from a "non-civil" international conflict, entails persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. In addition, from the point of view of the victim, it does not make much of a difference whether the persecutor is a foreign invader or somebody who shares the same language and culture. In the eyes of the High UN Commissioner for Refugees, persecution for reasons quoted above is what makes a refugee. In view of this, we will include, as refugees, Russians who had fled during the civil war and refused to return. It is also in keeping with this definition that we shall include refugees from Hungary who fled during the 1956 revolution.

Such discrepancies between certain definitions and actual facts are numerous.

In general, when looking at the phenomenon of refugees, one can sense a discordance between definitions and laws and the undelying social and psychological realities. In fact, what definition and what law can help the person who, without actually being physically persecuted, lives in a constant state of inner fear and turmoil, under constant pressure? The history of defectors, of refugees, is that of a search for human (and personal) dignity and, as such, is difficult if not impossible to "squeeze" into definitions and laws. The grand scale of the phenomenon speaks for itself.

It was Lenin who said that people vote with their feet. Unable to vote otherwise, millions of people have allowed their feet to vote. And even though, as Carel Stenberg said, "The refugee condition, once experienced, does not wash off", many still take this road. They do so in the hope that mcybe their children or their children's children will grow up under more clement skies. As we go through the numbers, we must not forget this human factor, this expression of Mankind's most obsessive and most fragile dream - that of liberty.

Data collecting for present study

We have used two methods of data collecting for this study. For the historical perspective, we have used excellent original sources such as, among others, reports of the League of Nations and of the International Rescue Committee. Also, a certain number of press articles was used.

Information collected for our own data bank was far more difficult to obtain, as there are no "centralized" reports on the subject. We have therefore resorted to the time-consuming method of reviewing magazines, newspapers and books written by or about defectors. In this context, there is only one general study of defectors from the Soviet Union ("Soviet Defectors, the KGB Wanted List", 1985, by Professor Krasnov).

In view of the difficulties in putting together a bank of information concerning in particular the post-war years, it is risky to say to what extent the data presented by us are representative. They are certainly not exhaustive but, for the sake of statistical treatment, a representative sample would suffice. And we cannot say to what extent our samples are representative.

It is difficult to say why there is such a scarcity of information on defectors on refugees from the communist countries of Europe. It is maybe due to the fact that, at this point in time, these are individual cases not involving any more hundreds of thousands and even millions. For those of the communist countries where there had been a post-war upheaval we dispose of fairly exact data. But such upheavals are mostly a one time event, while defections are a continuous process.

Data presentation

In view of the widespread character of the phenomenon, it was necessary, in our mind, to present also the historical context. Generally speaking, escaping or defecting is known throughout the world and throughout history. In this sense, it is one of the many expressions of the human condition. But, in addition to this universal character, there are national and historical specifics. This is why we have treated and presented every country separately.

Further, in addition to the individualized data bank we have collected, we present general historical data without which any such study would be meaningless. For each country thus, there is first a historical perspective with appropriate data, followed by a more in-depth treatment of the data collected by us.

General data

Before we proceed with presenting data for each country separately, it is advisable to give an overall idea of the information collected hereto. We do not, however, include East Germany into this count for reasons which will appear obvious when this country's case will be treated individually. Adding East Germany to the count would greatly bias our data by adding huge numbers and we have therefore considered unadvisable to add it to the general data.

Hereafter we present some general statistics :

- Years covered	1928 - present
- Overall number of defections covered	2942
- Youngest defector*	12
- Oldest defector	84

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* We did not include here children defecting with their parents, as in such cases the decision to defect was not taken by them personally. We have only considered cases where it is the child who had taken this decision.

Russia - Soviet Union

It was in mid-1923 that the Soviet closed their frontiers to all those who wanted to flee. Yet before it was closed hundreds of thousands of Russians and other nationalities fled from the raging civil war. In the first months of 1921, the president of the Swiss Confederation, Gustave Ador, estimated that about 800 thousand Russian refugees were scattered throughout Europe. According to Sir John Hope Simpson's 1939 survey pointed to the fact that there were about 750 thousand Russian refugees in 1922 with the exclusion of those in the Far East. These numbers are in accordance with those of the ILO Refugee Service for 1926 when about 750 thousand Russian refugees were counted in Europe (with the exclusion of Germany).

For that same period, some quote the number of 2-3 million Russian refugees from Bolshevik Russia, but many were counted more than once as they moved about. It is safe to estimate that, up until the moment Soviet borders were closed, there were about 1 million Russian refugees at the highest point. By the late 1920s this number fell substantially.

It is very interesting to see how historical events "make" refugees. The most important political evacuation from Russia took place in 1920, when 130 thousand people were evacuated from the Crimea to Constantinople. These were Wrangel's army and its dependents. Up to that moment this army was considered as a military force. But the Allies argued that this was no longer the case and the evacuees became refugees later dispersed throughout Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and North Africa.

Fridtjof Nansen, high commissioner for refugees at the League of Nations, reported in 1924 that there were over 1 million Russian refugees abroad. Nansen's study, considered by some as giving modest estimates, found that, by mid-1924, there were 60 thousand Russian refugees in China, about 500 thousand in Germany, 400 thousand in France, 80 thousand in Rumania, 70 thousand in Poland, 45 thousand in Yugoslavia and 27 thousand in Czechoslovakia.

These numbers, however, do not provide us with a full picture since they leave out other nationalities living within the boundaries of Russia and subsequently the Soviet Union. Polish authorities, for example, claimed that about 1 million 250 thousand Polish refugees from Bolshevik Russia arrived in Poland in 1920. The second largest group were undoubtedly the Jews leaving Russia. In 1921 alone 100 thousand Jewish refugees were reported in Poland. According to Nansen, there were 200 thousand Jewish refugees in October 1921. And this was only the tip of the iceberg. Other nationalities, such as Czechs, Finns, Ukrainians also fled, thus swelling the numbers of overall refugees.

The inter-war period did not allow for such masses to leave. As mentioned earlier, Soviet authorities closed the frontiers in mid-1923. But the forced collectivization stipulated in Stalin's Five Year Plan of 1929, as well as the Great Purges of 1936-1938 led to the fleeing of "kulaks" and others who felt threatened into Poland, the Baltic States and Rumania. There were so many refugees prior to 1932 that, in that very year, internal passports were introduced. We do not have any precise numbers, but this movement of a desperate population is referred to as "a tide".

In 1935, the Soviets, in yet another movement to keep people from fleeing, introduced the death sentence for flights abroad and put the families of such illegal emigres at great risk. All this made fleeing a very risky undertaking.

World War II brought with it yet another mass movement of populations. By war's end there were 5.5 million captive Soviets in the Reich. These included prisoners of war and laborers. In July 1945 Western Allies pulled back from large areas of Germany and, in keeping with accords, transferred Soviet nationals to Soviet authorities. By the end of September 1945 2,727 thousand people were handed over. The British even went as far as handing over Russian refugees from the World War I period who had never been Soviet citizens. But among those who had been Soviet citizens many were returned against their own will. For example, 120 thousand natives of regions annexed by the Soviet Union refused to return home and denied ever being Soviet citizens. The Allied policy created many human tragedies and, by the end of 1945 this policy shifted. Thanks to this, some 500 thousand Russians escaped the consequences of the Yalta accord.

The post-war period offers a different image. Soviet frontiers are closed and there are no historical upheavals which would allow thousands to escape. Yet they do continue to come. But compared to the numbers quoted above, this movement is hardly noticeable. It is only the very few, the privileged, who can attempt to escape.

Hereafter we present the data we have collected on defectors from the Soviet Union. The overwhelming majority of the defections recorded by us took place after WWII. It would have been practically impossible to collect individualized data for the entire period prior to 1945 as the numbers above can attest.

Data

Total number of defections : 434
Total number of women : 62 (accompanying husbands)
Women alone : 13 (defecting alone or with their children)
Children (with parents) : 32+ (information sometimes states "family" without giving further informaiton)
Families : 49

As we can see from the above, women constitute the smallest group of defectors. They very rarely defect by themselves (or with their children). This pattern is repeated for other communist countries and, in the conclusions, we will try to seek an explanation to this.

Age categories

Age bracket	Number
under 20	49 - including children whose parents defected 19 - having taken the decision themselves
21 - 30	67
31-40	62
41-50	27
51 and over	20

Data unavailable for 228 defectors.

Year of defection

Period	Number
until end of WWII	15
1946 - 50	5
1951 - 55	4
1956 - 60	9
1961 - 65	19
1966 - 70	24
1971 - 75	55
1976 - 80	78
1980 - present	80

Returned to the Soviet Union : 12
Unsuccessful defections : 8
Fake defections : 4 (?)

Education / Profession

In cases where information was available, we have compiled the following educational/professional profile :

Profession	Number
Artists/musicians	40
Merchant navy	32
Scientists	24
KGB/GRU	24
Soldiers	21
Dancers	14
Scholars	14
Writers/journalists	13
Sportsmen/chess players	12
Technicians/engineers	11
Armed forces officers	10
Translators/interpreters	7
Workers	7
Physicians	5
Students	4
Civilian pilots	2
Various officials	14

Place of defection

Independently of the place of defection, the majority of the cases recorded by us have, as their final destination the United States (with 40 defections noted in the United States proper). This may be due to two factors : the image of "America as the land of opportunity" and, in the case of high-ranking defectors as well as all those fearing reprisals, greater security.

Final destination	Number
United States	107
United Kingdom	22
Federal Republic of Germany	20
Sweden	18
France	15
Canada	9
Turkey	6
Australia, Finland, Belgium	4

Final destination	Number
Japan, Mexico, Brazil	2
Israel, Argentina, Venezuela, Greece	1

There have also been 8 defections in Afghanistan, case in which it is doubtful whether this is the final destination and one into PRC (the defector who had hijacked an airplane is serving his term in prison).

Further, in 44 cases where the place of defection is known, the final destination of the defector is not stated.

Place of defection	Number
United States	40
FRG	29
UK	26
France	24
Sweden	19
Japan	16
Canada	13
Turkey, Afghanistan	10
Austria	9
Italy, Spain, Finland	8
Greece, Mexico	5
India, Belgium	4
Danemark, Venezuela	3
Netherlands, Norway, Argentina, Brazil, Philippines	2
Laos, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Poland, South Korea (from N.Korea), Kuwait, Tunisia, Burma, Uganda	1

In addition, 3 cases were noted where the place of defection was the USSR itself.

Fate of defectors

With the exception of defectors such as known musicians, dancers and, in some cases, Soviet officials or former members of intelligence services, the fate of defectors in unknown. In 9 cases the defectors were sentenced to death in absentia and, for obvious reasons, stay out of the limelight. Prior to WWII two of these defectors were executed by Soviet agents; in four cases there have been what appeared to be suicides (in the pre and post-war period).

But cases where the defector's fate is known are extremely rare. As a rule, nothing is known of the lives defectors lead in their new countries. This is regrettable, as it would provide us with a lot of very interesting information.

Motivations

Once again, with only very few exceptions mostly involving high-level defectors as well as artists and musicians, motivations are never dealt with in reports on defections. But in cases where they are given, the following are quoted :

- lack of artistic freedom	6
- disparity between the East and West	3
- love fcr the US	1
- low living standard in the Soviet Union	2
- love affair abroad	2
- hatred on the Soviet Union	1
- marital problems	1
- advancement of career	1
- breaking away from party tyranny	1
- moral reasons	5
- disgust with living in lies	3
- despair of life in the USSR	4
- because of political repression	4
- disillusionment	1
- fear	6
- lack of press freedom	1
- religious reasons - philosophical reasons	2
- to avoid serving in Afghanistan	4

Conclusion

It is difficult to say to what extent the data collected by us are representative of the general population of post-war defectors. Data collecting is difficult. But it seems fair to state that, as far as the post-war period is concerned, we have most probably managed to put together a significant amount of information. Defecting, or escaping, is no longer a mass phenomenon and is translated into numbers much easier to grasp.

East Germany

Among the communist countries of Europe, East Germany constitutes an exception due to the existence of the second German state, namely the Federal Republic of Germany. It is in this other German state that citizens of East Germany who flee come to live. As soon as they arrive, they become West German citizens and this, to a large extent, dissolves many of the fears of other Soviet and East European refugees. And finally, the two peoples share the same culture and language. Therefore, the feeling of uprooting is not as profound and the new life not as different as with other nationalities. It is important to mention these factors as probably the most difficult problem all defectors face is that of leaving behind one's environment and culture. In the case of East Germans, there is certainly a need to adapt to new life styles, but this is far from being the same as learning a new language and adapting to a different culture.

We dispose of fairly exact data concerning defections from East Germany. From the historical point of view, this is an extremely important phenomenon, one which prompted, among other things, the erection of the Berlin Wall, which was to seal up the "hole in the iron curtain".

It is estimated that about 3.5 million Germans fled to West Germany in the years 1949-1961. Of these, about 2 million passed through West Berlin. About half of all those who fled were under the age of 25.

As far as the period following the erection of the Berlin Wall is concerned, sources do not agree (this may be due to the fact that different months are covered) and the number of refugees varies between 47 and 197 thousand. Even so, let us compare this with the numbers of refugees who escaped prior to the building of the wall : 1951 - 165 thousand; 1952 - 182 thousand; 1953 - 331 thousand; 1959 - 144 thousand; 1960 - 199 thousand. In 1961, between the months of January and June, there were from 13 thousand to 20 thousand refugees every month. That same year, in July, there were 30 thousand refugees and, between August 1st and 13th (day the wall was erected) there were 47,433 people who fled to the West. Many of those who escaped were engineers and technicians, as well as physicians. This westward movement was even called the Exodus of Engineers and Technicians.

As we can see, the two years where flights were most massive, namely 1953 and 1960 followed by 1961, were linked to events within the country itself. 1953 was the year when serious riots flared in Berlin, while 1960 saw a harsh collectivization drive. This once again proves the point that the refugee population always grows when serious political or economic upheavals take place.

The Berlin Wall is a phenomenon in itself. Up to August 8, 1986 the West German police has registered 4902 East Germans who have made it safely over or under the Wall (in September 1962 147 people dug under the Wall in the largest successful tunnel escape). Up to December 1, 1986 there were 75 deaths on the Wall, as compared to 110 elsewhere along the border between the two German states.

Yet numbers of successful escapes are constantly dropping and this may express two realities which are not mutually exclusive - the people accept their fate more readily and make their lives within the communist system and/or border controls are better. Probably both are true. This is reflected by the fact that between January 1st and August 14, 1986, only 59 people made it safely to the West. On the other hand, ever since the Wall's erection, some 3 thousand people have been caught trying to pass to the West.

Even though the post-wall period accounts for only a tiny fraction of the pre-wall escapes, the numbers still remain high and discredit the East German state. And even though discrepant data are sometimes quoted (we have given an example of this earlier) we can obtain a more precise estimate of numbers involved. For example, we know that, from August 1961 to August 1964, 19,705 people escaped to the West. In all of 1982, 2,392 East Germans escaped.

1986 saw a slight surge in the number of escapes from East Germany allegedly fueled by false reports according to which East German guards had received orders not to fire at escapees. This proved to be untrue as proved by the latest killing on the Berlin Wall (November 25, 1986). The surge in the number of escapes was not dramatic however - between January and October 1986, 172 people successfully crossed the so-called death strip, as compared to 160 in all of 1985*.

Data for East Germany are thus fairly complete and accurate (with the exception of the above-mentioned discrepancy which we may bypass by searching for data year after year and not given under the form of a lump number).

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* The death-strip surrounds West Berlin. None of these counts include people crossing over to West Germany along the border.

Data

In view of the above numbers, the data we have individually collected can lay no claims to being representative. We do however include it into this paper if only to show how difficult it is to obtain any significant information when one is interested by more than numbers only.

The data following hereafter are to be considered as a minute fraction of the phenomenon's true proportions. It is, at best, a sample drawn at random.

This fragmentary character of the data is due to the techniques of data collection mentioned at the beginning. But disposing of more general and precise data as quoted in the two preceding pages, we must not view what follows as the last word on the subject.

The total of defections for which we have the year of defection is 431 :

Year of defection	Number of defectors
1946-1950	1
1951-1955	1
1956-1960	20
1961-1965	229
1966-1970	33
1971-1975	1
1976-1980	55
1981-present	91 (as compared to the 2392 who escaped in 1982 alone)

Below we present the age groups to which belonged those covered by the Jamestown Foundation data. Once again, we would like to stress the fact that this is the type of information that is not always available. Many press reports state, for example, that a group of "young people" defected, but this is not precise information. We have thus included only those whose precise ages have been given in the reports.

Age group	Number
under 20	32
21-30	53
31-40	8
41-50	5
over 50	1

Group or individual defections

The majority of defections in our data bank are individual ones. We have however documented the escapes of 22 families (couples, couples and children, parent and child(ren), brothers and sisters). Thus among the total of 431 defectors documented by us, there were 22 families.

Professional profiles

Professions are important as they also give us indications as to the education of defectors. In cases where the profession of the defector was stated, we have come up with the following information

Profession	Number
Soldiers including border guards	41
Workers (skilled and unskilled)	22
School children	12
Artists/musicians	9
Sportsmen	8
University students	6
Sailors, seamen (merchant marine)	5
Officials	5
Writers/journalists	5
Army officers	4
Physicians	4
Engineers/architects	3
Scientists	2
Scholars	2
Lawyers	2
Various experts	2
Dancers	1
Officers (merchant marine)	1
Intelligence	1

There have also been three cases of defections of embassy personel and their families.

In practically all the cases, with very few exceptions, all the defections were made either to the FRG or to West Berlin. They did not however necessarily take place from East German territory (although such cases are, again, rare). Such exceptions are listed below :

Place of defection	Destination	Number
Austria	FRG	2
UK	FRG	3
CSSR	FRG	4
Hungary	FRG	3
Poland	FRG	2
Danemark	FRG	6
Italy	FRG	1
Singapore	FRG	1
Argentina	FRG	1
?	Australia	1
?	Canada	1
Canada	UK	1
Cyprus	?	1
CSSR	Austria	1
	Netherlands	1

Poland

Historically speaking, Poland has a long tradition of exile. During the 19th century Polish refugee existence was rather expressed by individual exiles than by large masses of people fleeing some form of repression. The Polish nationalists who fled their homeland after the unsuccessful 1831 uprising were the first to define a distinct refugee identity.

The first wave of Polish exiles came in 1831. Of the 5 thousand Poles who then left their country, the majority went on to settle in France. Paris became the center of Polish culture in exile. It was there that the great Polish Romantic poets lived and wrote.

The second big wave of exiles followed the 1863 uprising, but no exact numbers are available. Though the uprising itself was less important and widespread than the 1831 one, it resulted in greater repression and many more exiles than previously. This time, however, they spread throughout western Europe and some even came to the United States.

In Prussian occupied Poland, the policies of the Prussian government, namely forced settlement of Germans, forced thousands of Poles, mainly peasants, to flee to the Russian occupied territories. Once again, there are no figures which would show the scope of this phenomenon.

As a country, Poland saw the greatest number of refugees during WWI. This was due to its geographical position as well as to the prevalent political situation.

Although it is difficult to classify them as defectors or refugees, there were nevertheless two million Poles who were repatriated to Poland mainly from what was formerly Russia (1920 - 1,250 thousands repatriated; 1923 - 703,250 and 300 thousand anticipated). In a sense, it would be more correct to regard them as refugees from Russia returning to their country of origin.

1939 brought a "torrent" of escapes across Poland's southern border. In addition, the Polish government in exile quotes the number of 1.8 million Poles deported eastward by the Soviets (Nicolai Tolstoy gives the number 1.5 million). The Germans, on the other hand, drove some 750 thousand Polish peasants from their homes (operation Tannenberg). Even though these numbers do not reflect any actual movement of refugees at the precise moment these actions were being carried out, they do account for the big numbers of Poles who were stranded after the war's end and who made up part of the refugee population of Europe.

The fact, for example, that some 140 thousand Poles were evacuated from the Soviet Union through Iran and the Palestine (after the German attack on the Soviet Union) explain in part the big numbers of Poles who found themselves in Western Europe at the war's end.

Immediately after WWII, Poles constituted the single largest mass of people refusing to go home. The new political situation in Poland was the deterrent. All throughout 1945, the Soviets refused to accept Polish repatriates in the Soviet zone of Germany since they were busy repatriating their own citizens and claimed not to have enough transportation. In this situation, 800 thousand Poles spent the first post-war winter in Germany. In the meantime, anti-communist propaganda and events in Poland encouraged many to remain in the West.

In 1946, Boleslaw Bierut, the President of Poland, castigated the West for allegedly retaining 2 million Poles. Warsaw demanded repatriation even if force was to be applied.

In Poland proper, and taking advantage of the turmoil of the post-war years, many Poles moved westward, through what is now East Germany, fleeing the ever-tightening grip of communists over Poland. Most of them sought the American-occupied zone of Germany.

In 1948 the Polish government clamped down and refused to issue passports without the promise of a visa from the country of resettlement. Thereby, the emigration process was virtually halted. In the meantime, Polish anti-communists in the West warned those who still remained outside of Poland not to return.

Although Poland saw a series of political upheavals (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980-81) few precise numbers are available with the exception of the post-"Solidarity" period. In 1968, as some sources say, there was an "increased outflow", but no exact numbers are given. It is also difficult to say how many people left as result of expulsions and how many were defectors per se. One must however mention that it was during this period (following the Six Day War) that the majority of the 30 thousand Polish Jews were expelled from Poland.

Nor are there any numbers for the period following the 1970 Baltic Coast events. It may be that the number of defections did not greatly increase since the situation in the period following these events did not have a hopeless character. Besides, a new government and a new party secretary took over and a wave of optimism swept over the country. In a sense, this was not the right time to defect.

1981 and the crushing of "Solidarity" completely changed the picture. According to an official of the UNHCR there were about 500 thousand Poles abroad when the crisis in Poland became obvious. Many preferred to remain in the West and, one year later, 200 thousand were still in Western Europe. Austria, followed by West Germany saw the greatest numbers of Polish refugees. In their majority, however, they were considered to be economic migrants and were encouraged to return home when the situation there seemed to be less tense. Yet it is difficult to say how many of these 200 thousand remained in spite of this. On the contrary~~, the~~ post-"Solidarity" era led to an increased number of defections and people seeking refuge abroad. And, once again, we do not know what the exact figures are.

In general, it would seem that Poland will continue to see big numbers of people trying to flee its borders. The economic situation is most certainly a major factor; but we should not forget that economy is only one of the multiple facets of a given political system.

Data

Total number of defections : 902+

Total number of women : 30+

Women alone : 3 (defecting alone or with their children)

Children (with parents) : 19+ (information sometimes states "family" without giving further information)

Families : 22

In this total amount of defections there were 522 tourists. Articles carrying this information usually give the number of those defecting without breaking them up by categories of sex and age. We must therefore assume that there are many more women and families (thus children) than we can account for.

Age categories

Age bracket	Number
under 20	26 - includes all those in this age category
	7 - having taken the decision themselves
21-30	app. 119
31-40	13
41-50	2
51 and over	4

Data unavailable for 838 defectors.

Year of defection

Period	Number
1946-1950	-
1951-1955	2
1956-1960	12
1961-1965	15
1966-1970	11
1971-1975	1
1976-1980	32
1981 - present	826 - including pre- and post-"Solidarity"
	768 - only post-"Solidarity"

Returned to Poland - none

Unsuccessful - 10 Fake defections - 1 (?)

Education / Profession

In cases where information was available, we have compiled the following educational/professional profile :

Profession	Number	
Sailors/seamen	25	
Sportsmen	14	
Members of military (incl.officers)	9	
Pilots (civilian)	9	
Diplomatic personnel	8	- including two ambassadors (post-"S")
Artists/musicians	5	
Various officials	4	
SB [secret police] personnel	4	
Electricians/mechanics	3	
Writers/journalists	2	
Scholars	2	
Engineers/technicians	2	
Other professionals	2	
Economists	1	
Trainees	1	
Scientists	1	

In 810 cases (minus the children) no data is available. It is therefore difficult to accept the above as a representative sample. We have however been able to obtain some data from other sources.

In 1968, IRC's German agency studied the professional profiles of East European refugees. It turned out that 23% of the Poles were white collar workers and 63% were manual workers. We do not know whether these proportions have shifted in later years. This would be an interesting subject of study.

Place of defection

In the 1960s, Sweden was the most defected-to place for those Poles who chose the Baltic as their escape route. At present, Austria followed by West Germany have taken over as first choices for asylum. In view of this, the data we have obtained does not reflect the true situation. It must however be mentioned that the first country of asylum is not necessarily the final destination and this may be one of the reasons for the difference in our data. In fact, under "place of defection", we shall see that the greatest numbers defect in West Germany and Austria. But under "final destination", it turns out that they do not always remain there. Needles to say, this type of information is not available for all defectors.

Final destination	Number
Sweden	88
United Kingdom	51
West Germany	38
United States	28
Austria Greece Danemark	12 5 4
Australia	3
Netherlands	2
Spain; West Berlin	1 [in each]
Canada	sources quote "many" Poles who want to go there

In 769 cases the final destination is unknown.

Place of defection	Number
West Germany	174
Austria	127
West Berlin	88
Danemark	64
Italy	40
Netherlands	19
United Kingdom	18
United States	10
Sweden	6
Norway; Greece	5 [in each]
Canada; Japan; CSSR	3 [in each]
Angola	2
Spain	1

In addition, there were 228 defectors in Amsterdam and Travemunde in the month of December 1984.

Fate of defectors

In four cases, death in absentia sentences have been pronounced by Polish authorities. In all the cases documented by us, there have been no suicides and no executions of the said death sentences.

Where hijacking was involved (7 cases), there was only one instance when the defector stood trial (in the FRG).

As far as personal and professional lives in the countries of adoption are concerned, the fate of defectors, as usual, is unknown unless prominent figures or high-ranking defectors are concerned (unless the latter prefer to retain anonimity). 7 out of the over 902 defectors have follow-ups in our files.

Motivations

- lack of freedom & poor living conditions	1
- political persecution	3
- protest against martial law	9
- good future for child	1
- work as double agent	1
- non-political (romance)	1 (17 y.o.)
- nothing to live for	1

In all the remaining cases (885+) the motivations are not cited.

Hungary

As is the case with all of Central and Eastern Europe, Hungarian refugee traditions go back to the 19th century. Thousands fled Hungary in the years 1848-1849 after the defeat of the 1848 uprisings.

Hungarian refugees directly sparkled a confrontation between the great powers over the so-called Eastern Question when Turkey, in 1849, refused to extradite, as demanded by Russia, Hungarian (and Polish) rebels. The tsar backed down only when the French and British moved their fleets.

In the post-WWI period, about 250 thousand Hungarian refugees moved throughout Europe, most of them concentrating in the east.

The 1920 Treaty of Trianon created a Hungarian state which was one-third of its former territory and had one-half of its former population. This led to a massive exodus of Hungarians from areas lost to Rumania, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. 234 thousand Hungarian fugitives arrived in Hungary in 1921 alone. That year, as well as in 1922, Hungary closed its borders to new arrivals, as the country could not handle so many refugees.

In the inter-war period, occasional Hungarian dissidents turned up in the West, but no numbers are quoted.

During WWII, Hungary provided sanctuary to refugees from other countries (140 thousand Poles, Jews, Allied airmen and escaped POWs). The situation changed only in 1944 when Kallay's era ended and the country closed its frontiers. During that period, however, it is not known how many Hungarian refugees there were. What should rather be stressed is Hungary's role as haven for others.

In the post-WWII period, there were many escapes by young men who wanted to avoid military service. Once again, we do not know the numbers.

In 1956, the Soviet Union deported thousands of young Hungarians as a punitive measure for the uprising. The flight of Hungarians in that period was called "the largest spontaneous movement of a civilian population in Europe since the Spanish civil war". Refugees began appearing on October 28, 1956 and, for most part, were non-political and often associated with the communist regime back home. After the first clashes with the Soviets, more youths and politically committed people arrived with the new waves of refugees. Of some 100 thousand refugees in Austria (prior to the end of 1956), 60 thousand were men under 30 years of age. The primary reason for their escape (as quoted to IRC officials) was the fear of being deported to Siberia. By mid-December 1956, some 200 thousand poured out of Hungary, or 2% of the population. 180 thousand of them went to Austria. Yugoslavia granted asylum to about 20 thousand.

Of these refugees, some 18 thousand were repatriated. From among the 154 thousand who left Austria, 50% went overseas and the other half remained in Europe (UK, France, West Germany, Switzerland). The US gave asylum to 35,185 refugees, Canada to 22,575 and Australia to 9,458.

What was notable in the 1956 exodus was the big number of small children who arrived alone, some of them carrying with them written pleas from their parents asking that foster parents be found for them. As one IRC official put it, they were "human packages addressed "to whom it may concern"".

Many of those who fled in 1956 were professionals as can be attested by the 2,466 Hungarian refugees handled by the IRC in the US in the years 1957-1959. 1,162 of them were professionals or students for professions such as : engineers, technicians, physicians, artists, scientists, entertainers, lawyers, teachers, writers, journalists, clergymen, etc.

The period following the 1956 uprising was undoubtedly the "richest" in refugees. The flow did not stop however, although it is incomparable to what took place 30 years ago.

Data

Total number of defections : 176
Total number of women : at least 5
Women alone : at least 2
Children (with parents) : at least 2
Families : at least 3

In some cases, when only a bulk number of defections is given, it is impossible to say how many families, women, children there were. Just as it is impossible to say what the defectors' ages and professions are.

Age categories

Age bracket	Number
under 20	3
21-30	10
31-40	5
41-50	3
over 51	0

Data unavailable for 155 defectors.

Year of defection

1946-1950	0
1951-1955	0
1956-1960	0
1961-1965	13
1966-1970	6
1971-1975	1
1976-1980	139
1981-present	6

Data unavailable for 11 defectors.

Returned : 3
Unsuccessful: 4

Education / Profession

Profession	Number
Sportsmen/chess players	6
Soldiers/border guards	3
Physicians, secret police, blue collar workers	2 [of each]
Engineers/technicians, scholars, officials, dancers, pilots (civilian)	1 [of each]

Data unavailable for 156 defectors.

Place of defection

Final destination	Number
US	5
Italy, UK, Canada, Greece	1 [each]

Place of defection	Number
Austria	9
Iceland, UK, FRG, Libya, France, Japan	1 [each]

Data unavailable in 152 cases.

Motivations

Motivations are quoted in only two cases. They are : opposition to the regime and fear of being forced to return to Hungary (employee of Hungarian embassy in Greece). In the latter case, however, the defector eventually changed his mind and returned to Hungary (his fate is unknown).

Fate of defectors

With the exception of a couple of cases, the fate of the defectors we have in our files is unknown. In one notorious case where the defector was an officer of the AVH (Hungarian secret police), he was poisoned in Austria, on KGB orders, by the Czechs just prior to leaving for the US. Another defector, a prominent psychiatrist, does research and work in a US institution.

Czechoslovakia

As was the case with so many other European countries, the first big numbers of refugees left from what is present-day Czechoslovakia in the post-1848 period. It is said that hundreds of Czechs fled then to the West.

The next and much bigger wave of refugees came nearly one hundred years later, after Hitler's absorbtion of Czechoslovakia. A wave of emigrants settled then in Great Britain.

In 1948, after the communist takeover, 5 thousand people left for the American zone in Germany and 10 thousand entered into Austria. In all, about 50 thousand left before the country's borders were closed.

During the Prague Spring (1968) some 80 thousand Czechoslovak citizens either fled or awaited abroad for the resolution of the crisis. The majority of them became refugees. After August 21, 1968, the Czechs and Slovaks fled mainly to Austria, France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Scandinavian countries, the U.S., Australia, Switzerland and Canada.

From the point of view of their professions, the German IRC studied the Czechoslovak refugees who arrived in West Germany in 1968. It turned out that 54% of Czechs and Slovaks were professionals and white collar workers. 23% of them were manual workers.

Escapes from Czechoslovakia continue although, as is usually the case, they were most numerous in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion. We do not dispose of any numbers for the period after 1968.

Data

Total number of defections : 1328 at least
Total of women : 30 at least
Women alone : 4 at least
Children with parents : 16 at least
Families : 18 at least

We do not have the exact figures, as some news reports mention "a group" or "several". In this case, it is also impossible to know how many among these defectors are women or children with their parents, just as it is impossible to know how many families are included. The same remains true for ages and professions.

Age categories

under 20	16
21 - 30	34 at least
31 - 40	18
41 - 50	0
51 and over	0

Data unavailable for a maximum of 1170 cases.

Year of defection

Period	Number
1946-1950	4
1951-1955	0
1956-1960	15
1961-1965	43
1966-1970	9
1971-1975	12
1976-1980	1142
1981- present	101

Data unavailable in 2 cases.

Returned : 2
Unsuccessful : 19
Unverified : 1

Education / Profession

Sporstmen	15
Workers, artists/musicians, other professionals	5 [of each]
Soldiers/border guards	9
Officials	4
Pilots (civilian)	3
Students	3 + ? [mentioned as "several students"]
Military officers, intelligence, scientists	2 [of each]
Writers/journalists, engineers/technicians	1 [of each]

Data unavailable in a maximum of 1271 cases.

Place of defection

Final destination	Number
US	19
Italy	8 + ? [mentioned as "several students"]
Canada, Sweden, UK	5 [each]
West Germany	3
France	2
Greece, Austria, Switzerland	1 [each]

August 1979 : in all, 196 Czech tourists defected from Yugoslavia to Austria and later went to the US, Canada and Australia.

Summer 1980 : in all, 900+ Czech tourists defected between the CSSR-Austrian and Yugoslav-Austrian borders.

Place of defection	Number
Austria [directly and indirectly]	943
Yugoslavia	209
West Germany	85
UK	15
Canada	13
US	9
Turkey	7
Sweden	5 [incl. 1 through Finland]
Cyprus	4
Italy	3 + ? [mentioned as "several students"]

France	2
Greece, Switzerland	1 [each]

Fate of defectors

In all, with the exception of six cases, the fate of these defectors is unknown. There has been one noted case of a death in absentia sentence (intelligence officer in Austria working under the cover of press attache). For such notorious cases as the defection of Navratilova, the fate of the defector is only too well known. All others however, fade into anonimity.

Motivations

Motivations are quoted only in 23 cases. They are as follows :

Despair (+ fall of "Solidarity" in neighboring Poland)	: 9 [group defection]
Those who "have enough" of the system	: 4
Political reasons	: 2
Desire to lead suitable life + opposition to censorship	: 2
Disillusionment after having lived in the West	: 1 [entire family]
Denial to leave the CSSR legally	: 1
Freedom in sports; economic reasons; political and economic reasons; inability to travel due to previous defection of family member	: 1 [of each]

Bulgaria

In the pre-WWI period, Bulgaria played host to refugees from the Balkan region rather than generating refugees of Bulgarian nationality. In general, the Balkan region abounded in refugees of various nationalities and religions moving from one place to another during the chaotic years of WWI and its aftermath.

After WWII, refugees were once again on the move in the Balkans. Bulgarians, feeling the leftward shift of their government, fled to Greece, particularly after the 1947 peace settlments between Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria which sanctioned the communist regimes in South-Eastern Europe.

The Bulgarian government responded with particular harshness to the defections then taking place by declaring escapees traitors punishable by death. Moreover, their relatives were subject to imprisonment and heavy fines.

In addition, it is proper to mention the Turks forcibly expelled from Bulgaria. In six months of 1950 alone, more than 140 thousand Turks (or Moslems) were expelled from the country.

Most certainly the punitive measures undertaken by the Bulgarian government stemmed the refugee movement. In addition, there have been no political upheavals and mass movements of opposition which, in countries such as Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, led to a virtual exodus of people.

As we shall see from the data collected by us, even the few defectors who came to the West and who are prominent, are harshly dealt with by the Bulgarian special services.

Data

Total number of defections : 42
Total number of women : 8 at least
Women alone : 1
Families : 3
Children with families : unknown

Age categories

Age bracket	Number
under 20	1
21 - 30	2
31 - 40	2
41 - 50	1
51 and over	1

+ group of 13 in the 21 - 45 age bracket

Data is unavailable in 22 cases.

Year of defection

Period	Number
1946 - 1950	0
1951 - 1955	0
1956 - 1960	6
1961 - 1965	20
1966 - 1970	1
1971 - 1975	1
1976 - 1980	9
1981 - present	4

Data unavailable in one case.

Returned to Bulgaria : 0
Unsuccessful : 1

We can see from the above how incomplete our data are. We have not noted any defections in the years 1946-1955. And it was precisely in those years that the majority of defections took place, as can be attested to by the harsh anti-defection measures mentioned above.

Education / Profession

Workers	10
Artists/musicians Military officers	3 [of each]
Writers/journalists Teachers/librarians	2 [of each]
Pilots (civ.); mechanics; sportsmen; secret police	1 [of each]

Data unavailable in 18 cases.

Place of defection

Final destination	Number
Turkey	18
US	3
UK	2
West Germany, Switzerland	1 [each]

Place of defection	Number
Turkey	19
Greece	9
Austria	4
France	2
US, Switzerland, Yugoslavia	1 [each]

In remaining cases, data unavailable.

Motivations

No data as to motivations is available. Taking into account the big proportion of defections to Turkey, we can safely assume that the defectors were representatives of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria and may have fled for either religious reasons or because of repressions of the said Turkish minority.

Fate of defectors

The fate of only three of these defectors is known. One of them, a playwright and RFE and BBC broadcaster was fatally shot by a poison pellet by a Bulgarian secret agent. Another defector, former head of the Paris bureau of the Bulgarian State Radio, was victim of an assassination attempt. The only defector whose death in absentia sentence was officially announced (security police officer) is said to be working in a factory in West Germany.

Rumania

Rumanian patriots in exile existed already in the 19th century.

In 1916, after Rumania joined the Triple Entente, serious fighting broke out in the region and refugees took to the roads. After the capturing of Bucharest, there were still more refugees many of whom later returned to their homes.

During WWI, Turkey expelled many Rumanians, but no numbers are quoted. During the inter-war period, an occasional Rumanian dissident would turn up in the West but, once again, we do not have any numbers.

After WWII, and similarly as in the case of Bulgaria, the number of refugees increased in 1947 after the signing of peace settlements between Italy, Rumania, Hungary and Bulgaria. At that time many Rumanians moved to Greece and many others fled to Western Europe. And once again, no numbers are given.

But, as late as 1961, the IRC-run Children's Home in Hainbach in Austria had a growing minority of Rumanians.

1968 also saw an increased outflow of Rumanians, but we do not dispose of exact figures. In general, we dispose of very poor data for this country.

Data

Total number of defections : 144
Total number of women : 13 at least
Women alone : 4
Children (with parents) : 10 at least
Families : 5 at least

We have recorded the defection of a group of 31 villagers (including the village priest). In this case, no precisions as to the ages, number of families, professions, etc. were given.

Age categories

Age bracket	Number
under 20	21
21 - 30	5
31 - 40	6
41 - 50	3
51 and over	1

In one case, we know that the defector was in the 18-50 age bracket, but we do not know his exact age.
In 96 cases, data is unavailable.

Year of defection

Period	Number
1946 - 1950	0
1951 - 1955	0
1956 - 1960	1
1961 - 1965	3
1966 - 1970	1
1971 - 1975	50
1976 - 1980	40
1981 - present	31

Returned to Rumania	3
Unsuccessful	1
Deported	1

Education / Profession

Sportsmen (including coaches)	6
Diplomats and other Rumanian representatives abroad	5
Dancers/choreographers	4
Engineers; musicians; journalists/writers; sailors	1 [of each]
Secret service	1

Data unavailable in 124 cases.

Place of defection

Final destination	Number
Austria	22
Italy	11
U.S.	11
South Africa	4
France	2
Norway; UK; Belgium; Greece	1 [to each]

Data unavailable in 90 cases.

Place of defection	Number
Austria	58
Turkey	7-8
Yugoslavia	7
Pakistan; UK; Mozambique	4 [in each]
France	6
Italy; US	3 [in each]
Greece	2
Norway; Canada; Switzerland; The Netherlands; West Germany	1 [in each]

Data unavailable in 54 cases.

Fate of defectors

We have noted one case where the defector was sentenced to death in absentia (high-ranking officer in the Rumanian secret service). In the cases of coaches (including the coach of Nadia Comaneci), many of them continue to coach Western athletes. For all others, their fates are unknown.

Motivations

Artistic freedom / freedom in sports	2
To escape communism	1
Disgust with the system	1
Romance	1

General conclusions.

As we can see from the data we have collected, defectors represent a broad spectrum of ages and professions. The overwhelming majority are not the highly acclaimed high-ranking defectors who make headlines in the Western press, but average citizens. Aside of this, every country reviewed presents a particular case.

Times of political upheavals result in tides of defectors who, as in the cases of the Hungarian uprising and the Prague Spring, cross their countries' borders illegally. On the other hand, cases such as Poland, present us with a situation where the majority leave legally (for work or holidays abroad), but become refugees or defectors when they refuse to return.

We have not examined in detail the means of defection in this paper. We propose to do this in another study which could be an annex to the present one. The reason for which we have not done this is a complex one. On the one hand, every country once again presents a different pattern. On the other, this is dictated by each country's "liberalism" and legal provisions. In order for such a study to be meaningful, we would need to examine every country in depth. But, for the sake of examples, we can mention that the most dramatic escapes are made from Czechslovakia and East Germany. Citizens from these countries resort to the most daring and inventive methods of escape such as home-made balloons, home-made airplanes, swimming across icy rivers (in one such case a couple and their three children swam from Czechoslovakia to Austria; both parents and one of the children drowned while two other children arrived to safety); or dashing, under fire, across borders.

Poland presents a case apart. Liberal passport and travelling policies allow many people to leave and not to return which, in itself, is not regarded as a crime and is treated administratively. It is only in the case of high-ranking defectors that treason is invoked and the defection is punished by death sentence in absentia, stripping of Polish citizenship and confiscation of possessions. But for the average citizen it is easy to leave the country and not return. This is why many take advantage of various trips abroad to defect.

In the case of the Soviet Union, those who defect are those who have the opportunity to travel abroad (as we can see from their professional profiles). Soviet borders being extremely well guarded, there are only very rare cases of people illegally crossing them (and the few cases that do exist are indeed dramatic). Therefore, as in the case of Poland, the majority of defections take place from abroad and not directly from the Soviet Union. But the reasons for this are different in each country.

It is also very clear that women constitute a minority of defectors. It is even far more rare for them to defect alone unaccompanied or only in the company of their children. This may be due to two main factors. With the exception of dancers, musicians and sportswomen, women are practically not represented among the groups allowed to travel for professional purposes. And the very few who do travel are reluctant to leave their families behind (contrary to men who do this fairly frequently). Those women who do defect are thus those who are included in the categories allowed to travel alone or those who accompany their husbands (as in the case of diplomatic missions or other official representations) or tourists. As can be seen from our data most women who defect are those who accompany their families.

Although motivations are very scarcely cited, it transpires from the few we have quoted that, in general, whatever their country of origin, defectors tend to give similar reasons for their action. We could resume it as a "general malaise" of those living under communist regimes in Europe.

Contrary to Third World refugees fleeing to the West, the East Eumpeans and Soviets defect to a culture which is their own, away from a system which wants to alienate them therefrom. We must not forget that these peoples are part of the "forgotten Europe", those whom the West only too often tends to set apart from the European civilization and who, to put it dramatically, are the only ones left to suffer for what is widely understood under the term "Europe".

Future Projects

We have outlined our future projects in the paper entitled "Proposal For Research Project About the Phenomenon of Soviet Bloc Defections". The project proposes the creation of a computerized data bank on defections and defectors. It would most certainly be the only such centralized source of information.

The project would concentrate on historical, political, socio-cultural and economic aspects of the said phenomenon. It would attempt to study the underlying motivations and forces. The period to be covered would begin prior to WWII (the first Soviet defections occured in the twenties) to the present.

In addition, as mentioned above, we propose to make an in-depth study of the means of defection in the context of the defectors' country of origin and the specific situation this creates.

It also goes without saying, that we will try to complete the data we have gathered up to this point. As can be seen from their presentation, they are not complete. We do need a more representative sample and need to cover the years which are either not represented or scarcely represented in this study.

December 1986

EXHIBIT NO. 8

RETURN TO THE MOTHERLAND

A Study on Redefection and Reemigration to Soviet bloc countries

by Etienne Huygens

August 1987

(C) by Etienne Huygens

About the author:

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EXHIBITS #1 - 9

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I. INTRODUCTION.

Since November 1985, Georgetown, an attractive and renown district of Washington, DC, has acquired another curiosity. Clients of the French Café "Au Pied De Cochon" will find a thin engraved plaque inserted in the red leatherette backing where Vitaly Yurchenko is said to have been sitting when he told his unsuspecting escort he was going out "for a breath of fresh air." It reads:

> YURCHENKO
> LAST SUPPER IN THE USA
> SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 1985.

On October 24, 1986, four émigrés held a press conference at the Soviet Information Office in Washington, DC announcing that they were returning to the Soviet Union for reasons that included homesickness, a longing for their families and disenchantment with American society (1). On November 4, 1986, a second group of 13 homesick Soviet émigrés told reporters about their wish to return to the USSR because they could not adjust to or were shunned and alienated by US society (2). On December 28, more than 50 Soviet émigrés who no longer wanted to live in the United States gathered at New York's Kennedy International airport to fly back to the Soviet Union (3).

What started out with four unhappy émigrés evolved however into a steady stream since 12 more former Soviet citizens chose to purchase a return ticket home, according to the Washington Post of January 13, 1987 (4). This first wave of more than 80 Soviet émigrés has been presented as the tip of the iceberg. At a news conference in Washington, DC in November 1986, Soviet spokesman Igor Bulav said that about 1,000 émigrés in the United States had already applied to return (5).

This sudden burst of reemigration to the Soviet Union occurred also at a time when the Soviet government had apparently decided to approach some prominent émigrés, including Yuri Lyubimov, the internationally acclaimed Russian theater director, to return to the USSR (6). Others like stardancers Mikhail Baryshnikov and Natalia Makarova were invited to come to the Soviet Union to perform, events which eventually did not take place (7).

From what preceeds, it is obvious that one has to deal with two basic categories of 'returnees': defectors and émigrés. Of course, defectors and émigrés are quite different people in many regards. A Soviet bloc defector (8) is someone who escapes illegally and against the will of his government, while an émigré leaves with permission (9). The difference is still more obvious when one considers high-level Soviet bloc defectors, i.e. with intelligence value. This study will obviously differentiate where appropriate, but a closer look will show that the common aspects are not to be neglected either. The fact that defectors and émigrés chose to return has been usually highly publicized in and by Soviet bloc countries - especially but not exclusively by the Soviet Union - in order to denigrate, discredit and weaken the Free World, its democratic institutions, its way of life and some specific institutions like the Central Intelligence Agency and Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty.

As such, the exploitation of redefections and reemigrations by the Soviets and its allies must be seen in the context of a broad range of measures employed by the Soviet bloc countries against its adversaries with the aim of maximizing the undermining potentialities of each particular situation.

It is important to realize that the phenomenon of people returning (whether redefectors or reemigrants) to the Soviet Union and other Soviet bloc countries does not limit itself to recent years or to a few eye-hitting cases scattered over the last few decades.

One of the main points of this study is to demonstrate that this problem not only is multifaced but also characterized by a longstanding typical approach on the part of both East and West. The Soviet Union and its allies have basically not changed their philosophy towards people who decide to defect, as transpired from Viktor Chebrikov's speech before the 27th Congress of the CPSU. The present head of the KGB stated that

> "In recent years a number of agents of imperialist intelligence services and renegades who have sold important official secrets to foreign organizations have been detected in certain ministries and departments. The aforesaid individuals who embarked on the path of committing state crimes have paid a strict but just penalty in accordance with the law. The same inglorious end awaits anyone who ventures to betray the interests of the motherland." (PRAVDA of March 1, 1986, 2nd ed., pp. 5 & 6)

The basic attitide remains: a crime has been committed and a just punishment will be meted out if that squares with the interests of the Soviet Union and its allies. That much refinement has been put into Soviet bloc attitudes towards defectors that form and contents of the punitive measures will vary in function of meeting aforementioned interests under the most optimal conditions. Assassinations are not conducted anymore in the crude ways Stalin's "wet affairs" squads used to execute his orders, but the Soviet bloc policy has acquired enough flexibility as to adapt itself in function of the particular situation of each émigré or defector. If he / she is considered clearly as an enemy of the regime, it is more than certain that he or she will be integrated, unknowingly, into 'useful' plans and used accordingly. Physical elimination is of course not excluded if the situation requires it, as demonstrated by the "umbrella attacks" on Georgi Markov (Bulgarian dissident and defector who was successfully eliminated by a poisonous pellet projected from an umbrella in London on September 7, 1978) and Vladimir Kostov, Bulgarian journalist and officer of the Bulgarian intelligence who defected in Paris in June 1977. He also, though unsuccessfully, was hit by an identical pellet shot from an umbrella in Paris on August 26, 1978. One will also recall the unsuccessful Cuban attempt to kidnapping in the streets of Madrid in 1986 Manuel Sanchez Perez who had asked Spain for political asylum in November 1985 and had allegedly worked for Cuba's G2 secret service.

On the other hand, although a few Soviet bloc countries (Poland and Hungary) seem to have a more liberal emigration policy, every comparison being relative, the majority and certainly the Soviet Union have had a tradition continuing up to now which considers emigration to the West to be unpatriotic if not close to evil and treasonous.

Glasnost and peroistroika have not changed this basic thrust. The outside presentation might be different but the real hard core remains unchanged. In other words the old wine has been put into a new bottle. The new Soviet emigration policy, as embodied in the new immigration and emigration law effective Jan. 1st 1987, has been seen as a major innovation, but the ultimate goal of this new and refined approached is still to convince (or impose) the Soviet people that going abroad is something an honorable Soviet citizen does not do. As a consequence, emigration is still kept under very tight control which can be manipulated whenever it favors the interest of the Soviet Union. The basic right of th Soviet (bloc) citizen to leave his or her homeland whenever it pleases them to do so, won't change significantly.

Once returnees are seen in this larger perspective, it becomes easier to understand that each return will, if worthwile, be exploited to the maximum exte furthering the Soviet (bloc) interests in one way or another. This is also a constant element that will become clear throughout the study.

The West's attitude in dealing with émigrés and defectors has not wlways been fortunate to say the least, going from the forced repatriations at the end of WW II (see p. 8) to the way the INS (mis)handled the 1981-82 wave of Polish Solidarity refugees (some were émigrés, others were defectors; see p. 59.2) to the West German reaction towards the 1985 and 1986 flood of refugees (3rd World and East European refugees alike (see p. 59.1 & 59.2) to finally the often miserable way of life Soviet bloc refugees have in camps located in the FRG, Austria or Italy. This kind of situations does not go unnoticed by the Soviet bloc authorities which have been greatly exploiting them as a "royal dog bone." This uneasy feeling on the part of the West towards refugees permeates and influences the treatment they will obtain.

It should also be mentioned that returnees have not always taken the decision to go back completely of their own free will. Some varying degree of interference by Soviet bloc authorities at different stages did certainly assist in bringing about "induced returns." The latter were often the result of a systematic repatriation policy and effort decided by Soviet leaders and implemented by the secret services of the USSR and its allies (see p. 10 & follow.).
Some even dare to go as far as to contend that the Kremlin has been pulling the strings on a number of Soviet agents in the United States by organizing the returns of émigrés to Mother Russia that occurred during the winter of 1986.

This should suffice to demonstrate that the phenomenon of "returning" to the countries of real socialism cannot simply be reduced to a decision taken by a disappointed Soviet bloc émigré who decides to return because he or she feels homesick or lonely, or, by a repentful defector going back to more reassuring shores, even if this means trouble with the authorities.

Nor does this diminish in any way the fact that many returnees have faced real personal problems that have led them to take that decision without interference of the authorities of their former homeland. In fact, a separate section in this paper will be dealing with problems that may lead to or have triggered off reemigrations and redefections.

The crux of the matter is that reemigration and redefection are perceived quite differently by the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies. Whereas the former will summarize its position with "This being a free country, people are free to travel to and from the United States whenever they choose, and are free to choose their place of residence" (10), the latter country will not only consider these acts as deeds of treachery against the Motherland, but will also put every redefection and reemigration to good use so as to discredit and undermine its opponents to a maximum extent (11). It will be another goal of this study to demonstrate which role returnees have been and still are playing in this political war game with high stakes.

II. RETURNEES IN PERSPECTIVE.

Before World War II.

Once the Bolsheviks had succeeded in their October 17 coup d'état, it became imperative from their standpoint to clear the political scene of any form of opposition. Lenin considered all émigrés as counterrevolutionaries and a double danger for his regime. On the one hand, they were seen as a threat to Soviet security while, on the other, they formed a serious threat to the infant Soviet regime. Emigrés were indeed a reservoir of potential agents the West could use to penetrate the Soviet Union and, at the same time, only Soviet émigrés, regrouped and united, could set up a provisional government and, under the right circumstances, return to Russia to depose the Bolsheviks and become the successor of the Communist party regime (12).

Therefore, Lenin instructed Dzerzhinsky and his Cheka organization to monitor the Russian émigrés abroad and to neutralize them effectively. In light of those instructions, Dzerzhinsky created the 'Counterespionage Department' in early 1920, whose main task was to conduct 'neutralization' operations against real and potential resistance forces outside the USSR (13).

The policy of destabilization and destruction was implemented through manipulation and penetration of the émigrés and had as main goal to induce the émigré population, and above all its leaders, to return home where they could be disposed of quickly and without notice (14). As such, this was a perfect example of counterintelligence measures aimed at discovering the hostile intentions of the Russian émigrés and executing the necessary actions for their neutralization (15). In the early 1930s another collateral function was added to the means to combat the external oppostion: destruction of émigré circles through kidnappings and assassinations. In 1931 General Kutepov, a White Russian émigré leader was kidnapped by Soviet agents in Paris in broad daylight and in September 1937 the same fate met yet another prominent White Russian officer, General Miller, leader of the Union of Tsarist Veterans.

The earliest reemigration or redefection campaign was initiated during the New Economic Policy (NEP) period of 'peaceful coexistence' as described by the Donovan Emergency Commission (16) in its report of March 1956 on the Communist redefection campaign:

> "An amnesty for exiles was proclaimed in 1921, as a result of which it was later stated that 121,000 émigrés returned in 1921 alone, followed by some 60,000 in the next nine years. Soviet sponsored organizations and publications, penetrated by Soviet intelligence agents, functioned in support of this campaign." (17)

Another well prepared and carefully executed operation was called TRUST. Harry Rositzke describes the operation as follows:

> "TRUST was the code name for the Monarchist Union of Central Russia (MUCR), ostensibly a powerful anti-Soviet organization within the Soviet Union. The operation began when an underground leader came out to the West in 1921 to establish liaison with the Whites outside. He told them what they wanted to hear: that the MUCR was a strong, well-organized resistance movement; that unrest was growing and that the Bolshevik regime was on the verge of collapse.
> The Whites, and the British and the French, were sucked in. First rate up-to-date intelligence came out of Russia in a steady stream. TRUST messages passed from Berlin and Paris to Moscow and back in a week. The TRUST provided border crossing points for agents sent in from the West, and more and more émigré operations were channeled through TRUST facilities. The game went on for several years.
> [...]
> The notorious anti-czarist and anti-Bolshevik terrorist, Boris Savinkov, ..., was urgently invited by his top agent inside to come back to Russia in early 1924 to lead a revolt in Georgia against the Red Regime that had been badly shaken by Lenin's death in January. He returned on a forged Italian passport along a TRUST safe route via Berlin and Warsaw. He was trapped in a safe house near Minsk." (18)

The efforts to neutralize or annihilate the politically active and potentially dangerous exiles continued relentlessly during the thirties, the most spectacular event being the assassination of Leon Trotsky in August 1940 (19).

With regard to pre-WW II Soviet defectors, it must be said that the methods of dealing with them were simple and brutal. Once people like Bajanov, Bessedovsky, Agabekov, Barmine and Raskolnikov had defected, the OGPU and its successor, the NKVD, were put on their trail as bloodhounds, with the aim of eliminating the traitors (20). These attempts at eliminating defectors included traps to lure them back into Soviet power. This was the case with Aleksandr Barmine, who was a diplomat stationed in Athens in the 1930s. He was invited to go to dinner on a Soviet ship, the 'Rudzutak' which had docked at Piraeus (21). An identical trick was being planned to forcefully bring Alexander Orlov, a high-level NKVD officer whose last post before defection in 1938 was adviser to the Republican Government in Spain, back to the Soviet Union for liquidation (22). Stalin indeed boasted about having a very long arm that would catch up with defectors sooner or later. This dreadful image would verify itself in the cases of Ignace Reiss, Walter Krivitsky and Viktor Kravchenko (23).

In June 1937, Stalin also had a law passed subjecting the close relatives of any 'non-returner' to exile in Siberia even if they knew nothing about the non-returner's intention to defect, while a KGB administrative decree subjected close relatives of any KGB officer who defected to a ten year prison term. If any state secrets were disclosed after such a defection, the relatives were liable to execution (24).

The KGB would resume its liquidation of political émigrés with refined murder techniques in the early fifties (25), but the catch-and-kill abroad approach was significantly reduced, adapted and diversified.

Post WW II: Forced Returns at the End of the Second World War.

Although the present study concentrates mainly on genuine or induced returns of Soviet bloc defectors and émigrés, the historical overview would not be complete if one would omit to mention the millions of forced returnees at the end of WW II. Millions of Soviet citizens found themselves in Germany as prisoners of war (over a million), forced laborers (approx. 2 million) or former collaborators who retreated with the Germans troops or simply took advantage of the general confusion to flee to the West (26).

Stalin though, was determined to get back as many Soviet citizens as possible, and, on October 4, 1944, the Soviet Council of Commissars adopted a resolution on the repatriation of Soviet citizens (27). Colonel Goliakov was put in charge of the Soviet repatriation effort (28). Moreover, the Western allies formally agreed to a postwar exchange of prisoners of war and other citizens (29). These tragic events have been dubbed by some as a crime against humanity in itself because these returnees were considered by Stalin as traitors and treated as such upon their return. The result of this massive forced repatriation campaign is succinctly described as follows in the Donovan Emergency Report:

> "At the end of one year of repatriation activities, Colonel General Goliakov reported that 5,236,130 citizens had been repatriated. Of these, 2,229,552 had been turned over by the allies. [...]
> As the work of repatriation progressed, Soviet repatriation teams,

> sometimes assisted by Allied Units, forced refugees to board box cars at gun point and mass suicides and riots became prevalent [...]. (30)

Even after the forced repatriation campaign was over, several hundred thousands Soviet citizens remained in the Allied occupied zone of Germany. The majority of them emigrated, others settled down in Germany and tried to start a new life. Still, they remained a priviliged target for Soviet intelligence services for penetration and neutralization.

The forced repatriation campaign influenced the Soviet immigration towards the United States in a very peculiar manner. Thousands of Soviet citizens entered the US assuming false identities to escape forced repatriation under the terms of the Yalta agreement, a phenomenon later known as the "Berezov disease" (31). As such, they were at odds with the US Immigration law and could be deported. Moreover, they were perfect targets for Soviet blackmail. Senator William Jenner of Indiana introduced legislation that remedied this awkward situation (32).

The Soviet Redefection Campaign of 1955-1957.

— general features —

These and other Soviet bloc émigrés and refugees started to feel increasing communist pressure during the period 1955 through mid 1957, aimed at forcing or luring them back to the Soviet Union and its satellite countries. Although the campaign began first in Europe, it was by no means confined to the "Old Continent" and refugees in the United States and South America reported similar pressures. It rapidly became obvious that one had to deal with a large-scale, well-financed and highly-integrated Communist campaign which applied a wide array of methods in a very flexible way.

But before continuing, it should be mentioned that two important documents were the basic source for the analysis of the Soviet redefection campaign as presented in this paper. First, there is the report of the Donovan Emergency Commission which was created and sponsored by the International Rescue Committee in 1955. The Commission toured several West European countries and published its report at the end of March 1956. (33) Another report was a document produced by the Information Department of Radio Free Europe (New York) in January 1956 (Special Report # 131) covering the redefection campaign in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania. (34)

The Soviet bloc redefection campaign was mainly a weapon in the political warfare being carried on against the West. The Communist morale and propaganda was being increasingly discredited and undermined by the living testimony of millions of refugees (including defectors escaping across the borders) who fled the barbed-wire paradise. (35) Each successful escape was a political victory for the West.

Thus, one of the principal objectives was to destroy the political effectiveness of the emigration by splitting the rank-and-file émigrés from their leadership, defaming and discrediting the latter in the eyes of the émigrés (36) and also in the eyes of Western authorities, while on the other hand, discrediting the West in the eyes of both the rank-and-file émigrés and its leadership (37). For, to discredit and neutralize the émigré communities abroad meant to discourage and destroy the determination of the resistance at home (38).

The Soviet redefection campaign of 1955- 1957 is characterized by 3 distinct phases of which the first one can be called the 'terrorization period'. Unlike the second stage, i.e. the actual campaign of persuasion, the first one was essentially directed towards the émigré leadership and the political émigré organizations and consisted of terrorization and intimidation tactics applied by the MVD in West Germany and Austria. They included kidnappings and murders as well as staged redefections and personal approaches made by Soviet agents (39).

It was against this background of terrorization and intimidation that the actual redefection campaign was launched in the late spring of 1955 using essentially overt tactics of persuasion aimed especially at the rank-and-file émigrés.

A so-called 'private' organization of former returnees was set up to induce redefections. The East German government quickly granted permission to a group of Soviet repatriates to establish a 'Committee for the Return to the Homeland' chaired by Major General Nikolai F. Mikhailov (40). This committee issued its own newspaper 'For Return to the Homeland' and initiated later radio broadcasts from a station called 'Radio Return to the Homeland'. Each broadcast ended with directions to prospective returnees on how to proceed with returning, how to contact the Committee, cross the sector in Berlin or how to help the Committee (41).

The appeal to the rank-and-file was not threatening but mild, forgiving, and highly emotional which can easily be summarized as follows: "A foreign land is the same as a wicked stepmother. Even if you crawl before her on your belly, she remains your enemy. But your motherland is one's own mother, she understands and forgives everyone of her children (42)."
To a large extent, the redefection campaign and its propaganda can be characterized as addressing itself to the human problems of individuals living in difficult economic and psychological circumstances in foreign and not always friendly surroundings. Discussion of the communist system and the role of the Soviet Union was especially avoided in nearly all propaganda (43). Strong appeals to certain basic emotions like patriotism, nostalgia, homesickness and love of the family were played upon.

The third phase of the Soviet redefection campaign began with official pressure from the Soviet government on its West German counterpart when Prime Minister Bulganin requested the return of "more than 100,000" Soviet citizens detained on West German territory (44). This was followed, on September 17, 1955 by the proclamation of an amnesty by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet for returnees "who have in certain circumstances acted in an unworthy manner toward their country (44*)."

— methods and techniques —

The methods and techniques used in order to get back defectors or émigrés cover a wide range varying in intensity. They showed also vigor and imagination exploiting the local redefection possibilities to a maximum extent and focusing upon individuals and groups living under special economic and psychological strains.

The methods and techniques described hereafter were used during the Soviet bloc redefection campaign either one at a time or in combination, the cardinal trait being flexibility and imagination. They would also vary from country to country. They included:

PRINTED MATTER: pamphlets, circulars, newspapers and magazines (45).

The Return to the Homeland Committees published different material. The tone of the newspapers and magazines was very much the same, trying to incite national feeling, paint a picture of well-being at home, dispel any fear of punishment for leaving or other punishable acts (announcements of amnesties); they also dwelled on the pointlessness of being so far from home and loved ones and promised that all will be well upon return.

LETTERS:

Personal letters from family and friends or former refugee compatriots who had returned generally bore the following message: "Come home, we long to see you. Things are different now; you will be safe and well." Most letters were also very anti-US in tone, criticizing refugee living conditions in the West. Many letters were written under compulsion but the writers often found ways to later warn the addressee, in subsequent letters and using hidden words, not to come back (46).

Letters were also sent by diplomatic representatives, among others, explaining amnesty decrees (47).

Chain-letters were used in the Czechoslovak redefection campaign. Anonymous and hand-written in simple Czech, they had a rather sentimental than political content. They were free of any open communist propaganda or even of any undertone of leftist ideology (48).

RADIO BROADCASTS:

included personalized radio appeals, directed, by name, at individual refugees, recorded by members of the family - often the mother - (49), but also talks, commentaries and interviews with redefectors. Discussions of abstract, impersonal issues and of ideology and politics were avoided (50).

PRESS CONFERENCES BY RETURNEES:

for both internal and external propaganda use (51).

PERSONAL CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL REFUGEES:

included sudden phone calls or unexpected visits by agents or diplomatic personnel of Soviet bloc countries (52).
It also involved visits by individuals (usually family members) or delegations representing various professional, academic and cultural groups. During their visits to the West, they relayed written and verbal messages from friends and relatives urging to return home (53).

RUMORS:

rumors were spread by agents who infiltrated the émigré communities. For instance, Polish agents in West Germany had started the rumor that DM 1,000 would be given to each person who redefected (54).

AMNESTIES & OTHER GOVERNMENTAL DECREES:

amnesty decrees proclaimed by the different Soviet bloc governments played a key role in attracting refugees back to their respective Soviet bloc countries since their goal was to alleviate the fears of émigrés and refugees (defectors included) that they would be prosecuted or punished for acts considered inadmissible or criminal in nature by those governments (55).

THREAT OF REPRISAL:

against relatives behind the Iron Curtain creating a moral responsibility. The threat could materialize into economic pressure (loss of job or place to live), jailing and / or torture of relatives (56).

PHYSICAL VIOLENCE:

going from bullying tactics by strong-arm men to kidnappings and murders (57).

— appeals and themes —

The Soviet bloc redefection campaign used basic appeals supported by a number of themes. The interest and value of these appeals and supporting themes is that most of them have retained their actual aspect as have several of the methods and techniques previously discussed. Appeals and themes can basically be reduced to the following categories (58):

SENSE OF FAMILY:

the loneliness of the loved ones at home; the need for help at home; forgiveness for having deserted home; the 'loving arms' of the family; the loved ones are waiting for you; child care at home is excellent; children have the right to be educated in their mother tongue at home.

DISSATISFACTION OF REFUGEE LIFE:

the black-and-white contrast picture of life abroad as opposed to life at home is one of the cardinal arguments during the campaign and has retained its presence as we will see later on. The dark, unhappy side includes the following supporting themes:

loneliness; solitude; rootlessness of life outside the motherland or of people without a homeland; hostile environment surrounding the refugee; the shameful and insulting conditions of a refugee's life; treatment as a foreigner; the waste of human talent outside the motherland; danger of intellectual death for artists and writers (59); attacks on refugee leaders who exploit and mislead the rank-and-file refugee (60).

The sunny and rejoycing side of the picture covered: the warmth of home and the fruitful life at home for writers and artists.

NATIONAL IDENTIFICATION:

the welcoming national home; forgiveness for having sinned against the mother (father-) land; the 'nobility' of the mother (father-) land; the history and folklore of the country; symbols of mother (father-) land = rivers, national soil, ...; the unhappy lot of being a foreigner in a foreign country; patriotic and sentimental works of literature = national cultural homeland; the economic & social growth of the country; the reconstruction of the country; the bright future of the country and there is place for you in the 'new' country.

ECONOMIC SELF-INTEREST:

the material well-being of the returnees; economic prosperity, thus jobs, and expansion at home.

DESIRE FOR NORMAL FREE LIFE:

freedom of choice of employment; freedom of movement and religion; the 'people' will welcome and accept you as one of them (61).

— the effectiveness of the Soviet bloc campaign —

One has to bear in mind that the effectiveness of the Soviet bloc redefection campaign cannot exclusively be judged by the number of the people who decided to return, but also by the enormous propaganda value gained from it for the Soviet bloc countries, however small the percentage of returnees was in reality. Moreover, the campaign had, according to the report of the Donovan Emergency Commission, a tremendous unsettling effect among the members of refugee communities in every free country, generating suspicions and insecurity. Even in the United States, refugees who thought their whereabouts had been well concealed were shocked by a sudden phone call or an unexpected visit from a communist agent. Even contacts were made or letters sent to Soviet bloc émigrés only a few days after they had moved to a new location (62).

Between January 1, 1955 and January 1, 1956, the Donovan Commission reported that 1,158 refugees (excluding East Germans, Poles from France & Yugoslavs) returned to their homeland (63).

Following table gives a breakdown by nationality and by area [(64) See also exhibit # 1 for other breakdowns]:

Summary of total repatriations

Nationality	Returnees
Albanians	12
Bulgarians	75
Czechs	465
Hungarians	88
* Poles	115
Rumanians	151
Russians	245
Unknown	7
	1,158

* Excluding Poles from France.

Summary of repatriations by area

Area	Returnees
Europe	
Austria	206
Germany	298
Greece	36
Italy	77
Turkey	11
W. Europe	188
N. America & Australia	39
South America	236
Other areas	23
Last address unknown	44
	1,158

Source: The Donovan Emergency Commission Report, March 20, 1956 (exhibit 6).

The Soviet campaign continued after January 1956 and hit a new record in March 1956 when almost an entire shipload - 780 men, women and children - of Ukrainians, Byelorussians and Lithuanians sailed aboard the Argentine vessel "Entre Rios" to Odessa (65) and were whisked away on arrival (66).

— exposure and extinction —

It is not easy to say when the redefection campaign ended. Robert Morris, counsel to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, told a public hearing of the same Committee that information had reached the subcommittee at the 'staff level' that the activities had been called off in early June 1957 (67). A small number of returns occurred in the US at the end of the same month (68). On the other hand though, 30 Russians and Ukrainians, mostly married couples who had come to the UK after having been prisoners of the Germans, returned to the USSR in July 1958 (69).

What we are sure of is that the Soviet bloc redefection campaign did not go undetected in the United States. In fact, several initiatives contributed not only to its exposure, but also to its extinction.

> 'During 1955, representatives of the International Rescue Committee (IRC) posted along the Iron Curtain had noticed signs of increasing nervousness and exceptional fear among Soviet bloc refugees. It became clear that the Soviet Union and its satellites had launched an extravagantly financed, carefully planned and centrally directed campaign to bring about redefections.
>
> The IRC organized an emergency commission under the chairmanship of General William J. Donovan, war-time head of the OSS. General Donovan organized and directed the IRC sponsored commission which visited France, Austria, Switzerland and Germany in February and March 1956. It examined reports on the redefection campaigns in Belgium, Sweden, Italy, Greece, Turkey and South America and closely watched developments in the US.

> The Commission made its report public at the end of March 1956.
>
> The Commission's exposure of the methods used by the Communists was in itself a major influence in reinforcing the resolve of the refugees. Awareness that the Soviet approaches were not based on any personal interest in the individual but were part of a mass campaign helped the refugees to understand the political character of the redefection maneuver. They were better able to resist appeals to nostalgia accompanied by threats to relatives left behind, bribes and kidnappings (70)."

The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security in the framework of its hearings on 'the scope of Soviet activity in the United States' was another powerful and successful prosecutor of the Soviet redefection campaign and especially of the role played in that campaign by the members of the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. Several Soviet diplomats were asked to leave or were barred from returning to their UN posts. The Subcommittees's findings were summarized in its 'Internal Security Annual Report" for 1956 and 1957 (71). The Subcommittee issued recommendations for the improvement of several aspects of the internal security of the US.

And last but not least, the Information Department of Radio Free Europe (New York) published a report titled "Recent Aspects of the Redefection Campaign" (Special Report #131) of January 16, 1956 which examines the exile targets, methods and the propaganda appeals employed in the redefection campaigns in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and Rumania since June 1, 1955.

The TUAPSE Sailors: Diplomatic Kidnapping on US Soil (72).

The Soviet tanker 'TUAPSE', carrying jet fuel to Red China on June 23, 1954, was intercepted and brought into port by the Chinese Navy. At the time, the TUAPSE had a crew of 49 men, who were taken to Formosa.

The 49 seamen were given the choice of returning to the Soviet Union or staying on Formosa (73). Of the 49, twenty nine, through diplomatic efforts of the French government, went back to the Soviet Union. The other 20 remained.

In October 1955, on the recommendation of the Secretary of State, nine of the 20 seamen from Formosa came to the United States. Three of the nine seamen obtained jobs in the Washington area, the six others lived and worked in the New York city area. They encountered the problems and economic difficulties to which most people, immigrants and citizens alike, are subjected. They way of life was modest, but their words and deeds reflected the desire not only to become American citizens but to integrate themselves completely into the American society. A few were even considering marriage. In other words, the seamen did not seem to have problems in appreciating life in the US.

Trouble started when efforts were applied by Soviet agents to contact the seamen (74). Some of them were accosted in the New York subway and asked to return. Apparently some threats accompanied these encounters. They were also regularly bombarded with letters from home but refused to be impressed with these communications because they all seemed spurious. The sailors said also that their families were not literate enough to write such persuasive and well-composed letters (75).

In February 1956, Soviet ambassador Zaroubin asked, through the State Department, to talk to the sailors with the view to persuading them to return home. At this time, the sailors wrote letters in reply. One of the sailors' letters is quite representative of all the others and reads as follows:

> " [...] All of us, particularly speaking for myself, are now living in America. Here I have found asylum and pleasant human relationships. At the present time I am attending classes studying the English language. I am getting accostumed to life in America and I like it here. The only thing disturbing me is the fate of my dear ones whom I left behind in the Soviet Union. Since I am not in a position to help them, I pray to God for their protection. I want to live and work in peace. I understand perfectly that there is no road back to the past. I believe that any discussion regarding the subject will lead to no good whatever [...] (76)."

But this did not end the matter in the eyes of the Soviet authorities. Several of the New York based sailors got visits at home or at work from Soviet representatives bearing letters from relatives and were urging them to return or to report to the home of Arkady Sobolev, the Chief Delegate of the Soviet Union to the United Nations (77).

During the four days preceding the forced departure of 5 of the six New York based sailors for the Soviet Union they were subjected to a combination of persuasion and threats at the headquarters of the Soviet UN delegation on Park Avenue. Exactly how the five were lured to the headquarters is not entirely clear. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security points out that on April 5, 1956 at least 2 and probably 4 teams of Soviet strong-arm men, who had obtained entrance to this country under diplomatic status, descended upon Russian refugee seamen in New York City, Paterson and Clifton, New Jersey with the clear purpose of terrifying the seamen into returning to the Soviet Union (78).

When 5 of the six seamen finally cracked and agreed to return to the Soviet Union, they were whisked off on the afternoon of April 7, 1956, accompanied by a large number of Soviet officials (15 to 20 people) to Idlewild Airport (NY), where they were interviewed perfunctorily at the Immigration office about their willingness to return to the Soviet Union. Friends of the 5 young men said they had no intention of returning to the Soviet Union up to the time Soviet agents started to close in on them. Two of them had told friends only a few days before they disappeared that it would be suicide for them to go back. One of them, as mentioned earlier, was planning to be married the Sunday after he vanished (79).

The whole operation of rounding up these five sailors and spiriting them out of the US was conducted with military precision and was obviously carefully organized. The Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, which held a two week long hearing on this case, called it "the boldest activity entered upon by Soviet officials here in this country (80)."

On April 27, 1956 Moscow released a statement purportedly signed by the five seamen who returned to the Soviet Union. It contended that the sailors had been threatened and beaten on Formosa; that they had been planning, throughout their stay on that island, ways and means of escaping to some country where there was a Soviet diplomatic representation; that they had learned from a newspaper report of the Soviet representative's address in New York and that, while in the United States, they were surrounded by agents and people hostile to the Soviet Union. Some of these arguments have been repeated by Oleg Bitov and Vitaly Yurchenko when explaining their 'stay' in the West (Bitov returned in Sept. 1984, Yurchenko early November 1985). Both said that they had been forced (by drugs) to stay in the West and that they constantly were looking to escape to Soviet diplomatic representations.

The strong-arm men tactic of evacuating defecting Soviet citizens back to the Soviet Union had also been applied to Evdokia Petrov, the wife of Vladimir Petrov, 3rd secretary and Consul at the Soviet embassy in Canberra. He defected in and to Australia on April 2, 1954. When two weeks later Evdokia attempted to join her husband, she was forcefully accompanied by 2 Soviet bullies to the airplane leaving for Moscow. Australian police rescued her from forceful repatriation when the plane arrived on the tarmac in Darwin (81).

The Barzov - Pirogov Defection and its Mysterious Ending.

Disillusioned with life under communism and encouraged by broadcasts of Voice of America, Peter Pirogov and Anatoly Barzov decided to flee to the West. On October 9, 1948, their twin-engine bomber landed at Linz in the American occupied zone of Austria. Pirogov, a navigator and Barzov, a pilot, had been stationed as lieutenants in the Soviet Air Force at Kolomaya in the Ukraine.

After requesting and obtaining political asylum from the United States, both came to this country in February 1949. But Barzov returned to the Soviet Union in August 1949. Several factors can explain his reaction. Barzov had defected to the West leaving his wife and 4-year old son behind. Obviously less able and skilled to adapt to the American way of life, he drifted from one job to another, nursing a growing homesickness on alchohol. Part of his problem seems also to stem from his difficulties in learning

English. And finally, once in the US he definitely had been softened up by Soviet agents.

Barzov tried to convince Pirigov to return with him, saying that if he returned alone, he would get 2 years in jail; if he managed to return with Pirogov, neither one of them would be punished at all. This was an official promise transmitted to Barzov by the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Panyushkin (82). This sentence was completely at odds with the one the 'resuscitated' Barzov mentioned during a press conference held in Moscow on May 15, 1957 (83), where he declared that he had been treated humanely after his return and had only received an insignificant term of 5 years in Siberian corrective labor camps (Omsk & Vorkuta). The whole press conference, including the 5 year term in labor camps seems to have been a complete hoax since several subsequent defectors confirmed that Barzov had been executed in 1950, after having been milked because he had so much interesting information to supply and because so many senior MVD officers wanted to check up on various points in his story (84). In fact, Vladimir Petrov, the MVD head in Australia until his defection in April 1954, pointed out that no one told Barzov, while he was still in the US, that he had already been sentenced to death (85).

But this was not the end of the story for Pirigov. Pirogov, who always had been intersted in discovering what had really happened to Barzov, got the opportunity in 1955 when a Soviet Agricultural delegation was visiting the United States. While speaking with his wife in Russian, a representative of the Soviet embassy, by the name of Zigal (86) approached them and started a talk. Pirogov described this encounter to the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security as follows:

> " [...] He asserted that after Stalin's death everything has changed for the better in the Soviet Union. But I decided to ask him the

> main question about Barzov.
> He told me that he knew about the case, and that he is sure that Barzov is still alive, although he doesn't know where he lives. In order to prove his statements, he has given me the following example. He said that in 1946 he met a man, a former Soviet citizen, who killed a Soviet officer and went to the Germans during the war. In spite of this, he met him 2 years later in 1948 in Riga, where this man has married and is living happily. He told if this man who killed a Soviet officer during the war and went over to the Germans was pardoned for these crimes, what reasons do you have to doubt that Barzov, who didn't commit such a crime, was pardoned too? [...] (87)."

Now the wagon was rolling as Pirogov would discover on March 8, 1957. Pirogov, who had just moved into a new home the day before, got a phone call from a man who was speaking as a Soviet embassy official and who had some business to discuss with him. When visiting the Pirogovs on March 11, the official introduced himself as Gennadi Mashkantzev, 2nd secretary of the Soviet embassy. Mashkantzev seems to have been well informed about Pirogov's problems. Pirogov had just been refused naturalization because of his former membership in the Communist party. Consequently he had lost his job at the Library of Congress. In order to survive, Pirogov made a precarious living as a house painter, later started to build and refurbish houses on his own. Apparently Pirogov's wife was ill at the time of the first meeting. This was the background Mashkantsev had chosen to hand over a letter from Barzov to Pirogov describing his new life in Southern Siberia and asking Pirogov to come back and share it with him. Moreover, all travel expenses of the Pirogov family would be paid for.

The letter turned out to be forged. Although the handwriting was similar to Barzov's, the prose style was not. Worse, Barzov's name had been spelt Borzov (with an o instead of an a).

Mashkantzev visited the Pirogovs a second time on March 22, 1957 and reassured them of the guarantees he gave during his first visit. He was even ready to put them in writing. Before leaving, the Soviet diplomat hinted that the American security agencies knew of his visits and that therefore, being compromised Pirogov had no other alternative but to return to the Soviet Union (88).

On April 17, the State Department sent a note to the Soviet embassy stating that Gennadi Mashkantzev "had engaged in highly improper activities and that his continued presence in the United States was no longer considered acceptable." It also added that, without further precising, Mashkantzev had not only tried to lure Pirogov back, but also had been involved in other attempts (89).

The Soviet embassy reacted vehemently to the expulsion and denied the version of the State Department by stating that it "does not persuade" any one to return but "just explains" to them (90). Moreover, the Soviets organized a press conference on May 15, 1957 in the Moscow House of Journalism where ... Anatoly Barzov appeared telling everyone that he was very much alive, that the American press which reported him as executed had indulged in anti-Soviet propaganda and that he had merely served a 5 year sentence in Soviet labor camps and that his term had expired in September 1954.

Barzov, whom the American press introduced as the man who had been shot said that Pirogov had planned the escape and had lured him into desertion with liquor and stories about the unfaithfulness of his wife. After a few months in the US, Barzov said he had seen enough unemployment and dependence on wealthy bosses. Therefore he had asked the Soviet embassy for his repatriation (91).

The main purpose of this show-off seems to have been multiple: to denounce the expilsion of Mashkantzev as 'an unfriendly act against the Soviet Union' and to defend him against charges of having abused his diplomatic status. Furthermore, to knock down reports that Barzov had been executed and to use his example to persuade refugees to return and finally, to use Barzov to spread propaganda about unemployment and humiliations to human dignity (92).

The previous examples highlight special campaigns or particular individual or collective cases of returnees (defectors and / or emigrés). Certain of those cases happened toward the end of the Cold War period. Of course, redefections have continued to occur in more recent times, each being more enigmatic than the others (See exhibit #2 for a short description of the 1970 defection and redefection of Anatoly Chebotarev, a GRU officer), but it is still more instructive to analyze and dissect the perceptions and philosophy maintained by the Soviet Union and the other Soviet bloc countries with regard to Soviet bloc citizens who, for whatever reason, decided to leave their country by defecting or emigrating. Only recently with 'glasnost' and 'perestroika' as background has a certain evolution begun to occur. Whereas before Gorbachev's coming to power requests of former Soviet citizens to return to the Soviet Union were automatically turned down, the reemigration to the Soviet Union was suddenly facilitated, encouraged and cleverly exploited after the change of Soviet leadership in March 1985. But it is becoming increasingly clear that the Soviet authorities are serving the same old wine from a new bottle (See the segments on 'Glasnost and returnees' p.60 of this study and 'Propaganda & Other goals' p.63)

III. THE MOTHERLAND AND COMMUNIST MORALITY.

In order to fully understand the phenomenon of people returning to Soviet bloc countries, it is necessary to expose the basic philosophy that underlies the attitude of Soviet bloc authorities towards émigrés and defectors, as propagated extensively by the media of those countries and hammered into the minds of Soviet bloc citizens.

TASS, the official Soviet news agency, once said that for a Soviet citizen to emigrate to the US was to 'betray the Motherland'. In other terms no attitude to her other than one of blind faith is admissible. Moreover, the Motherland being the Soviet state and the Soviet state representing the Motherland, the representative state organs consider themselves as the sole and exclusive holder of the power to decide who will leave the country. This exclusive decision-making prerogative includes the right to force its own citizens into external exile if so desired (e.g. Solzhenytsin), but also the impossibility for Soviet citizens to decide of their own volition to leave the country and to return to it (93).

As far as leaving the country is concerned, the Soviet citizen has to apply for emigration (94), which is very restricted, or he can opt for defection by escaping across the border or staying behind and refusing to return home. Whatever choice he will make he definitely will be considered on the wrong side of the fence by most Soviet bloc authorities (94). The Soviet state, and most of its satellites, have used a wide variety of methods and themes emphasizing the concept of the "All-Mighty Motherland." The latter is omni-present and pervasive in Soviet bloc societies and cleverly exploited to stress that the Motherland knows what is good for its citizens which implies at the same time that the citizens are not allowed to to know and decide what is good for themselves. Consequently, to decide for an individual Soviet bloc citizen, of his own free will, to emigrate, or even worse - to defect, is considered in most Soviet bloc countries as an attempt to defame and blacken the sacro-saint Motherland and its representative, the state. Invariably it is shown, especially through the media of those countries, that Soviet bloc citizens acting in such ways end up in misery and tragedy, fate that is represented as as an inescapable punishment. The Soviet media have played and still continue to fulfill a distinct and important role in propagating this basic attitude in the collective mind of the Soviet people. Several satellite countries have followed suit.

So, it is evident that a large variety of arguments are used by the Soviet bloc media in order to convince that emigrating, and worse, defecting will inflict tremendous damage to the individual both abroad or after having returned to the Motherland. Those acts are considered proof of either moral decay or immaturity but above all, lack of patriotism. Following cases highlight quite well the official position.

An article very indicative of this philosophy was published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA of January 25, 1984 (95) under the title "On The Foreign Shore. The Spiritual Collapse Suffered By The Man Who Deserted The Motherland." First the article underlines the fact that "a man is like a tree in one respect. Cut a tree's roots off and it will wither. Uproot a man from his native land and the same fate awaits him." Once this basic principle established, the article narrates the story of 'Slavik':

> "We were sailing slowly, and the man walking along the pier was keeping up with us. He appeared to be 35-40 years old, and he may have looked older because of his unshaven chin and his torn and worn clothes. Not taking his eyes off us, he was walking quickly along the coast, as if

> trying to catch up with the departing ship. [...] A few years ago, while in a foreign post, Slavik failed to return to his ship. Now one can only guess at what he has gone through in all this time, but one thing is clear - his mind could not take it. [...] Here was a man who had lost his mind through homesickness."

Another article, illustrative of the official position on the issue of breaking with the Motherland, appeared in PRAVDA of August 10, 1985 under the form of a book review titled "Ruined Lives" (96). Object of the review was a "White book containing new facts, evidence and documents about a great number of human tragedies." The reader is presented with a succession "of life stories of people who cursed the day and the hour they found themselves in a foreign land." It tells stories "about people enticed abroad, separated from their Motherland and their home, and whose human rights and dignity were trampled." The review continues:

> "What lines, some more bitter than others, should be selected from, for example, the letters contained in the White Book? The following perhaps? 'I cannot tolerate the system in this country; if I manage to return home I will kiss the ground in the Motherland.' Or this? 'All our people who came from the USSR weep, live like paupers, and cannot go home. Some are ashamed, others have fallen into debt, others are in the psychiatric hospital, and some have had their children taken into the army. This is Israel."

The article further describes the miserable life in America with "homeless people on the street, unemployment, uncertainty about the future, and universal crime. [...]" The fate of former Soviet citizens in Italy is not better according to the same Pravda article: they "are leading a miserable existence in the small town of Ostia near Rome. [...] The stories of the inhabitants of this latter-day ghetto call to mind figures from Gorkiy's play 'The Lower Depths'. [...] The future is barren."

The same typical attitude was reflected in an article published in August 1986 by RUDE PRAVO, the official organ of the Czechoslovak communist party, under the title "Crimes and False Dreams." It illustrates this point with several cases of emigrants "who expected to get rich easily in the West but later turned to crime when confronted with the harsh reality of life under capitalism." The article cites several cases of Czechoslovak émigrés who received publicity in the West recently — the story of a Czechoslovak refugee who help up a bank in Austria; the fate of a Czechoslovak scientist in Great Britain who, unable to find a job, committed suicide; and the story of Czechoslovak girls who advertise in West Berlin, soliciting male customers. (97)" The article is sophisticated enough to recognize that there are émigrés who 'made' it in the West, but they are people with dubious or no morals at all. Starting with Martina Navratilova, the journalist, Stanislav Oborsky, writes that "although no one in our country can deny that she really is a star on the tennis scene", Navratilova cannot deny that "she received her first racket in our country and that she had gone through the world-famous Czechoslovak tennis school." Already here transpires the argument that if Navratilova became a great star, it is thanks to socialist Czechoslovakia. Another point is driven home, when it states that Navratilova was warmly applauded for her performance but that there were people in the crowd who, in a provocative manner, cheered not the sportswoman Navratilova but the émigré Navratilova. "Could it be", wonders the article, "that standing there, at tennis court they too dreamt about the great possibilities and big money in the capitalist world?" Concluding the article chastizes right out two Czech hockey players, Frantisek Musil and Michael Pivonka, for their defection: "There is no point talking about their morals, because they — like anyone who sees nothing but profit and money — do not possess any morals." (98)

TASS related another 'horror' story centering around the dramatic events that occurred when Boris Amarantov returned to his homeland. Having had a devastating experience in "Free America" that left his health and mind irreparably damaged, he was allowed to return home where he was affectionately taken care of by his brother and sister who hoped to save his sick soul. But to no avail, because soon after his return he threw his elder sister out of the window and committed suicide (99).

The need for fidelity to the Motherland (Fatherland or Homeland) as opposed to the lack of patriotism and even right out betrayal by émigrés and defectors was further developed in the Slovak publication SMENA (August 1986) in an article titled "Sports Discourse. (100)" The points stressed were again revealing of the basic official way of thinking towards émigrés and defectors. After stating that sportsmen and -women cannot leave the country without the authorization of the team or the Czech Psysical Culture Union and that most of them do it for the money, the article clearly indicates that "an honorable person does never leave his homeland; does not betray his fatherland in which he has opportunities enough to make himself comprehensively useful." Striking a patriotic note, the author of the article points out that 40 years ago so many Czechoslovak citizens made the ultimate sacrifice of dying for the fatherland so that "everyone in the CSSR would have such opportunities."

Staying home serving the country was also repeated by General Jaruzelski who said that "wandering through foreign countries is not the fate of Poles; their fate is the honest patriotic service to the nation, here in their own Fatherland (101)."

The Motherland is omni-potent not only as far as the living are concerned, but it is also accentuated that the deceased persons owe a debt to the Motherland or only can rest in peace in the native soil. Of course, whatever was done in the past to the individual by the Motherland is of no importance and is conveniently swept under the rug.

The body of Feodor Chaliapin, the great opera singer who died in 1938 in Paris, was returned in the Fall of 1984 from a grave in Paris for reburial in Moscow. The event was greated with an outpouring of sentiment for the Russian diaspora and ties to the Motherland. Old friends appeared on television to report that the singer, who left the Soviet Union in 1927 and had become a French national, never knew a happy moment abroad, talking about "toska", the Russian word for melancholy, a longing (102).

LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in its January 7 issue of this year (1987) published an obituary in memory of Andrei Tarkovsky, the well known movie director who died at the end of December 1986 in a Paris hospital. "His creative work," wrote the Soviet weekly, "flourished on his native soil. [...] In recent years - a difficult, critical time for him - Andrey Tarkovsky lived and worked outside the Motherland, a fact which had to be viewed with grief and regret. It was impossible to agree with this or to become reconciled to it (103)."

Of course, it should be mentioned that there is nothing wrong to love and long for the Motherland, but this noble feeling has been used, misused and monopolized by the communist state for its own reinforcement and to give itself an aura of legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens who can be more easily mobilized.

IV. THE MAGNANIMOUS MOTHERLAND AND THE ERRING INDIVIDUAL.

Although art. 13,2 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights stipulates that "everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to it", this basic human right so evident to citizens of free world countries is not compatible with the notion of the 'All-Mighty Motherland' as held up in most Soviet bloc countries.

As previously stated, the Motherland-State decides not only who may or will leave the country, it possesses the full power to determine for whom return will be possible if at all. Moreover, it should be clear by now that an honorable citizen never leaves his homeland and does not betray his fatherland in which he has opportunities enough to make himself comprehensively useful (104).

Bearing this in mind, it is not surprsing to find stories in the Soviet bloc media mentioning that the authorities of Soviet bloc country X allowed citizen Y to return or that a petition requesting help for facilitating the return to the homeland was transmitted to the embassy in country Z.

LIKE SINNERS COMING BACK TO CHURCH

Of course, if the Motherland allows its former citizens who defected or emigrated, to return, it is because the former is magnanimous and is forgiving her erring sons and daughters. One cannot escape the comparison with the old biblical story of the Prodigal Son who returned home to his forgiving father after having squandered that part of the family fortune that was assigned to him. "I ask very much that my error be pardoned, that I be given an opportunity to return home" said one of the returning émigrés in November 1986 (105).

In a recent "Declaration of Bulgarian Citizens Who Returned From Turkey" its authors acknowledged that they "had been met with understanding and compassion upon their return to Bulgaria (106)."

Svetlana Alliluyeva even went as far as to describe her own return and reception in biblical terms: "I was received with magnanimity and friendliness I did not expect. We were given a welcome comparable to that received by the biblical prodigal son." (107)

Another testimony reported in the morning edition of IZVESTYA of May 30, 1984 tells the story of Andrey Kovnatskiy, a former emplyee of one of the all-union associations of the USSR Foreign Trade Ministry who requested and obtained assistance from Aeroflot to return home. He wrote to the editorial board: "I felt the full effects of the tragedy of someone wrested away from everything most near and dear ... and I am greatful to my homeland for the opportunity to return. Having been in the position of a refugee ... I have returned to the Motherland and wish to say a big thank you to it for not abandoning even its most errant sons (108)."

ERROR AND RESPONSIBILITY

The causes or reasons for the original act of emigration or defection, as stated in the Soviet bloc media, are acknowledged by the perpetrator himself upon his return as being a wrongful act; they can vary widely from case to case. It usually ends up as a mixture of personal problems centering around immaturity, inexperience, selfishness at home or on the job with the ever present and unresistable pull of capitalist propaganda and lies. Furthermore, the notion of the "Omnipotent Motherland" implies in this context that the error of leaving the country, by emigration or through defection, is always attributed to and the responsibility of the individual citizen. Implicitly the message is not only "never to act against the omniscient Motherland" but also that she never errs, her citizens are the sinners. Indeed, one seldom finds a critical analysis about the fact that the communist state bears the main responsibility for not letting its citizens leave their country and return to it, which is, as we know, a basic human right. Nor is it mentioned that many thousands of other Soviet bloc citizens who emigrated or defected, have had a successful integration in foreign societies.

Stalin's daughter explained her defection in India in 1967 by saying that "I did not intend to remain here [in India]. I hoped that I would be back home in a month's time. However in those years I paid tribute to the blind idealization of the so-called 'free world', which I had previously known by hearsay, a world totally unknown to my generation (109)."

Oleg Tumanov who until his return to the Soviet Union, was editor of the Russian service at Radio Liberty in Munich, explained his betrayal of the homeland as follows: " [...] If I tell you that I was about 20 years old at the time, that I wanted to take my destiny into my own hands; that there was perhaps a bit of selfishness in the act and a failure to realize the future consequences of such action - all of this played a part (110)."

The Soviet Union allowed Tumanov to return to the Motherland because of 1) his sincere repentance; 2) his voluntary acknowledgement of his fault; 3) his desire to expiate his guilt by taking part in the exposure of the activity of foreign ideological subversion centers and 4) the importance of the information he had supplied. Subsequently, a representation was sent to the Supreme Soviet for Tumanov's release from criminal responsibility through a pardon (111).

It is interesting to note that Tumanov's defection and subsequent work at Radio Liberty was clearly considered as bringing about criminal responsibility: he was considered a criminal until the pardon issued by the Supreme Soviet. Furthermore, it is also obvious that a "pardoned return" is a luxury not granted to every redefector and seems to depend quite a lot on the "desire to expiate through anti-Western activities" and "the importance of the information supplied." And who knows what is in store for Tumanov once his desire to expiate and the supplied information will have dried up? [See exhibit #3 for "the exposure by Oleg Tumanov of activities of foreign ideological subversion centers"]

Other more common citizens decided to stay in the West "misled by propaganda broadcasts of the Liberty and VOA radio stations (112)." Still another Soviet émigré had growing problems on the job which led to immature actions thus preparing for him the most bitter fate that could ever befall a person, namely the loss of the Motherland. "From the first day on, I realized that I had made a fatal mistake" said Kovnatskiy (113).

A Bulgarian émigré returning from Turkey in the middle of 1986 said he emigrated in 1978 urged by "up-and-coming" relations and believing in delusive promises (114). A group of 200 Bulgarians returning in early 1987 were quoted as admitting their mistake of leaving their homes "under foreign influence and ill-intended propaganda.(115)"

A 1985 book review in PRAVDA got more specific in "unmasking the organizers and inspirers of sabotage and subversive actions against the USSR who cynically trample human rights and ruin people's lives." More precisely the review continues "Imperialism and Zionism, those very transatlantic and other services and gentlemen who cynically don the guise of philantropy, enticed them [émigrés] there, separated from their motherland and their home, and trampled their human rights and dignity. [...] [Those émigrés] are also victims of a single-minded policy pursued by the ruling circles of the United States and other imperialist powers, real fishers of men. The insinuating radio voices and other ideological subversion centers in the West invent malicious fables about our life and promise a land of milk and honey in the 'free world'. Documents published in the White Book give a clear picture of how such fictions are fabricated.(116)"

The causes or reasons for defection, as "advertized" by certain special returnees will markedly differ from the previously described cases because "special evil forces" were operating against certain 'honorable and loyal' Soviet citizens. Examples of such widely exploited dramas have been the Bitov* and Yurchenko affairs, regardless whether they are genuine or not , as well as the less milked instances of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva, and the returning Soviet soldiers who, while being in Afghanistan, defected to the West: Igor Ryhkov and Oleg Khlan (to the United Kingdom) and Nikolay Ryzhkov (to the US) (117).

In both form and content Bitov and Yurchenko issued similar statements containing sensational charges that they did not defect, but while on a business trip, had been kidnapped, drugged and coerced to create a phony defection and make slanderous statements against the Soviet Union. Both said that they immediately conceived the idea of escaping the intensive surveillance they were under and as soon as possible had contacted Soviet diplomatic personnel.

Contrary to Bitov, Alliluyeva and Yurchenko, the soldiers Ryhkov and Khlan did not appear at a press conference or on TV. Their statements were reproduced in an IZVESTYA article with only two direct quotes, under the headline "The Return" (118). Following the usual routine IZVESTYA declared that both soldiers had not defected but had been captured (in the West they talked about their desertion) and subsequently drugged, beaten and chained after trying to escape. Resisting physical and psychological pressure from Western intelligence agencies to be blackmailed and to twist facts so as to betray their motherland, they went at the first opportunity to the Soviet embassy in London.

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* Oleg Bitov, foreign cultural editor of Literaturnaya Gazeta defected to the U in Sept. 1983 and turned up in Moscow on Sept. 18, 1984, a few weeks before Sve lana Alliluyeva, Stalin's daughter returned to the USSR.

Very little was made public by the Soviets about the return of Nikolai Ryzhkov who had deserted from the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in June 1983 and arrived in the US in November 1983. He returned to the USSR in December 1984. The official Soviet news agency TASS, deviating from the customary scenario, said that Ryzhkov's case was exceptional and recognized that he had deserted. It also alleged that he had been drugged, nearly starved and visited by lovers of both sexes and with links to the CIA in an attempt to get him to make anti-Soviet statements (119).

V. THE FATE OF THE RETURNEES.

Although it is difficult if not impossible to know what really happens to returning defectors, some fragmentary but interesting information is available.

Simas Kudirka, the Lithuanian seman who jumped from the Soviet vessel "Sovietskaya Litva" and who obviously wanted to defect to the US Coast Guard vessel "Vigilant" off Martha's Vineyard on November 23, 1970, was beaten and forcibly dragged back to the Soviet ship by Soviet sailors with permission of the US captain. Kudirka served 3 years and 9 months of a 10 year sentence in the hell of the Soviet Gulag for having attempted to defect to the US (120).

Moreover, Kudirka addressing on November 7, 1985 the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East inquiring about the Medvid incident, said that

> "From the experience I shared with my fellow prisoners in the Gulag, I can testify ... that:
>
> Victor Shchibalkin defected in Spain in the late sixties. Political asylum was granted by the Spanish Government. The Soviet embassy tracked Shchibalkin down at his residence and showed him letters from his mother imploring him to return home. They even paid for phone calls to his mother. The Soviets granted him freedom from any persecution if only he returned home. Upon return, he was met at the airport by the KGB, arrested, put on trial and sentenced to 10 years in the strict regime concentration camp. He never saw his mother. Shchibalkin told this to me in the summer of 1971 in the concentration prison camp no.3 located near the village of Barashevo, Mordavia, USSR.
>
> Victor Zaitsev, attached to the fishing fleet, who in the late sixties attempted to defect to the US off the coast of Alaska, was caught lowering a lifeboat, arrested and transported back to the Soviet Union in handcuffs. There he was secretly tried for treason and sentenced to 10 years in a strict regime concentration camp. I met him also in Mordavia in the summer of 1971.
>
> Peshchany, a Ukrainian Soviet fighter pilot, betrayed by a fellow pilot as he prepared to fly his plane to freedom, he was tried for treason and sentenced to 10 years in a strict regime labor camp. When I met him at the camp no.3 in Mordavia in 1971 he had already contracted tuberculosis following 8 months of intensive interrogation and torture by the KGB.

> I have every reason to believe that the same fate awaits Medvid, a long path to a slow death (121)."

Nikolay Ryzhkov, who had deserted the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in June 1983 arrived in the US in November 1983 and returned to the Soviet Union in December 1984, has been said, according to stories published in September 1986 in the American press to have been sentenced on December 11, 1985 to 12 years in a labor camp for high treason and was allegedly serving his term in a camp for political prisoners in Barashevo (Moldavia) (122).

Not all returning defectors will necessarily be treated the hard way. Svetlana Alliluyeva, who returned to the Soviet Union in the Fall of 1984, was apparently too well known and too valuable for public relations purposes to undergo harsh treatment. It was obvious that her father's name protected her from any possible prosecution, despite her renunciation of the Soviet citizenship and sharp criticism of Stalin and other communist party leaders.

In fact, the quality and length of the treatment given to returning defectors will very much depend on how the interests of the Soviet Union are best served. Whatever lenient treatment will have been granted today, can be taken away tomorrow by discretionary decision of the authorities. In reality, discretionary power to decide the fate of a returning citizen in the best interest of the country, will be the guiding principle behind whatever decision is taken.

A very common pattern applied in this context has been and still is, is to promise the returning defector easy treatment; further, to use him for propaganda advantage and eventually to send him to prison. The fact that such cases are publicized without mention of punishment for acts considered a crime, allows the homeland to encourage others to return, to give assurances that they will not be automatically subject to prosecution after returning.

No wonder that Igor Ryhkov and Oleg Khlan were greeted in the Soviet press as 'heroes' who had withstood pressures to betray their motherland (123). Nothing has been heard about either one of them since then.

Meanwhile Evgeny G. Kutovoy, a Soviet counselor, issued a statement on February 9, 1987, saying that Mr. Medvid recently married. "He is well and satisfied with his job. Due to these circumstances, he would like to avoid any undue attention", Dr. Kutovoy told investigators [of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, a Congressional agency] (124). It would be safe to say that no independent source has been able to confirm Medvid's marital status, nor for that matter, any other status. Finally, we have some additional indications about the fate of some returning Soviet defectors in Prof. Krasnov's book "Soviet Defectors, ..." (p.207-210):

Vladimir Balakhonov, an employee of the World Meteorological Organization in Geneva, obtained political asylum in Switzerland, but returned to the USSR and was sentenced to 15y. in labor camps;

Nikolay Cherkov, a sailor, twice sentenced to labor camps (2 + 3 y.);

Nikolay Gilev and Vitaly Pozdeev, hijacked a small plane to Turkey; they were returned, reportedly at their own decision, to the USSR and got 10 and 13y respectively in Sept. 1972;

Georgy Ivanov, a worker, crossed the border with Finland in 1967, was returned by the Finnish police and served 15 months in jail; he later redefected in 1976 successfully to Sweden where he got political asylum;

Mikhail Karpenok, crossed over to Turkey in 1974 or 75, was returned by the Turks and served a 7y. term in labor camp;

Andrey Novozhitsky, defected to FRG in mid-1950's, returned in 1958 and got 12y.

Aleksandr Shatravka, escaped to Finland in 1974, returned by the Finns and interned in mental hospital from 4 to 5 years; apparently now in labor camp;
Mikhail Shatravka who defected with his brother, shared the same fate as him;

Valery Yanin, engineer, asked for political asylum after crossing the Black Sea In August 1973; was later seen in Soviet mental hospitals in 1974-1978.

VI. INFLUENCE ON RETURNEES.

That Soviet bloc countries will go to great lengths to 'recuperate' defectors and émigrés has been shown clearly throughout this study. Obviously the propaganda and publicity value, both for internal and external consumption, represent an enormous stake for the Soviet system which has been plagued continuously by large amounts of defections since its inception, acting on the communist regimes like a hemorrhage to a hemophiliac (125).

The methods and techniques used in order to cause defectors and émigrés to return to the homeland cover a wide range of possibilities and vary in intensity and sophistication. Usually there is a combination of several tools, the main rule being flexibility, imagination and playing on the usual tense feelings of the defector.

Very often LETTERS —fake or written under supervision— of family members in the Soviet Union are used in an attempt to bring about a psychological situation that makes him / her doubt about the initial decision to defect. The recipient of the letters can be the defector himself, or, as in the case of Viktor Belenko, the Soviet fighter pilot who flew his MiG-25 to Japan in September 1976 the authorities of the host countries (See exhibit #4). In the former case, such letters can be delivered during a MEETING requested by Soviet bloc diplomat who want to ascertain the motivations and feelings of the defector and at the same time, see in such meetings an opportunity to "work" the defector's mind in the hope to change his decision (126). It also occurs very often that the defector is asked by Soviet diplomats, by phone or letter or through friends, to come to the embassy or consulate in order to obtain the letter from the family (127).

A letter with devastating effect was sent to Igor Ryhkov, a Soviet soldier who defected in Afghanistan and lived in London with a fellow soldier-defector, Oleg Khlan. The letter contained pleas from his close family, especially from his 3 year old daughter, asking for her daddy to come home. Several family pictures were enclosed, one of them showing his daughter sitting on a tricycle. Ryhkov got into a state of emotional turmoil and in a very agitated condition walked for about a day together with Khlan through the streets of London before deciding to go to the Soviet embassy to review his status. Three days later both went back to the Soviet Union (128).

Arranged TELEPHONE CALLS to family members, especially in the Soviet Union, and paid for by the embassy or the consulate are also used in an attempt to bring about a psychological situation that would make returning inevitable (129).

Another technique used in order to entice the defector back or to intimidate, dupe or cajole the authorities of the host country into delivering him is the PRESS CONFERENCE held in a Soviet bloc capital by family members with the assistance of the authorities. The emotional scenes displayed by the families are astutely exploited by the authorities so as to produce the maximum havoc within the defector if possible. At the same time it is another chance to influence the authorities or public opinion in the host country to pressure their authorities to solve this family drama by returning the defector. This is well illustrated by the press conference held in Moscow by Viktor Belenko's wife and mother on September 28, 1976 (See exhibit #5).

And last, but not least, there is the PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE or right out BLACKMAIL applied in different shades depending on the individual defector involved. Yuri Stepanov, a ballet dancer who defected to the United States in 1980 but returned to Moscow less than three months later, said he came back only because of reprisals against his wife, mother and brother (130).

A sample out of Yelena Mitrokhina's meeting with 2 Soviet diplomats at the State Department is very indicative of the psychological pressure and blackmail applied by Soviet diplomats in certain meetings with defectors:

> "As soon as Kavalerov [one of the two Soviet diplomats] started to speak, I understood their game plan. He talked almost nonstop; in the most fatherly manner he told me that nobody held a grudge against me; that I probably had gotten upset over something, but whatever it was it could be straightened out, and the embassy stood ready to help me with any problems I may have had. [...]
> Meanwhile, the younger man [second Soviet diplomat] leaned over the table and, with an impassioned face talked directly to me. [...] in the short ten minutes he had, he packed a big punch. 'Do you really think you can get away with it?' he said. 'We'll find you anywhere, provided you do not starve or end up on a street corner first. You think you can spit on us, you spiteful little bitch? You're pathetic. Cold-blooded, too -don't you know what will happen to your parents? Remember, they are still there, and will be there forever. We can do whatever we want with them. And just remember -we never forgive traitors. Sooner or later you will get what you deserve.' "(131)

Two other vivid encounters between a defector and Soviet diplomats are told by respectively Arkady Shevchenko in his best-seller "Breaking with Moscow" and by Viktor Belenko in "MiG Pilot" written by John Barron (132).

Some defectors will refuse to expose themselves to this kind of pressure and will decline any meeting with representatives of their Soviet bloc country (133).

Sometimes, Soviet bloc authorities are aware of certain personal problems of individual defectors and after having exacerbated them try to induce the person to return. This happened to one Soviet soldier who had defected from Afghanistan and was residing on the West coast. He had a difficult time adjusting to his new life. Part of the problem was also his depressed personality and a well known drinking problem, common to many Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. The Soviet authorities tried to exploit it. An agent contacted the defector and persuaded him to have a few drinks. Luckily for this Soviet defector, he became too unruly even for the KGB so that the agent couldn't convince him to come back to the consulate (134).

More subtle methods or techniques have been applied in order to create a favorable atmosphere for (former or not) Soviet bloc citizens to return to the Motherland.

After the state of war in Poland was eased and later on abolished, certain "regularization" measures were taken with the aim of facilitating the return of Polish citizens who had decided to stay abroad after the events of December 13, 1981. In an interview to ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI, the daily of the Polish armed forces, General Wladislaw Pozoga, vice-minister of internal affairs declared in April 1984 that

> "The overwhelming majority of Poles who,for this or that reason, have extended their stays abroad or who have even sought asylum, have remained loyal to the Fatherland, have not tarnished themselves with treason of the country and, in spite of the difficult situation in which they sometimes find themselves, have not lost their dignity and national conscience. Our relation to these people has been described, in the Sejm, by the First Secretary of the PUWP, General Wojciech Jaruzelski. I shall recall his words: 'Every person who has not deliberately sold his or her Polish-hood and his or her personal honesty to foreign powers, will find the road [back] to the country open. Wandering through foreign countries is not the fate of Poles; their fate is the honest patriotic service to the nation here, in their own Fatherland.'
> Those who are engaged in activities harmful to the Polish state cannot, of course, count on such an attitude of the Polish authorities. I am talking here about the activists of the so-called foreign representations of former 'Solidarity' and of other centers of foreign diversion headed by foreign intelligence services. They have become a convenient basis of the anti-Polish activities of the CIA and intelligence services of other NATO countries. [...]" (135)

Another way of increasing the return of Polish citizens who traveled abroad and stayed [overstayed] there, contrary to what they had declared when applying for passport, was to change the passport issuance policy towards those people. Such persons would not return to Poland for fear they never again would receive a passport, since their overstay had infringed upon passport regulations. Colonel Romuald Popowski, deputy head of the Passport Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs made the following statement to TRYBUNA LUDU, the official publication of the Polish Workers Party:

> "The persons who at one time failed to return home will be able to return to Poland at any time without having to fear that they will never be able to go abroad again. These changes, which have been primarily prompted by humanitarian and social considerations, should put an end to separations of the closest relatives and make it possible for all those who at one time decided to look for success abroad to reexamine their future prospects.
>
> However, this change does not apply to the persons who have failed to return from an official trip and who continue to stay abroad. Nor does it apply to a situation involving a crime. [...]" (136)

VII. PROBLEMS AND MOTIVATIONS LEADING TO RETURN.

To give an overview and describe the reasons why émigrés and defectors return to their countries is in a way a complex undertaking because it involves for most of them a real human drama that has its roots in a multitude of deeply anchored feelings, emotions and expectations, which are usually put upside down by the destabilizing emigration and defection experiences.

To return under those circumstances seems to many people of free and democratic countries a normal and acceptable choice. That 'normalcy' is also recognized in international declarations and treaties, but the failure to "make it" outside the Motherland and to return home is exploited and misconstrued by communist regimes so as to show that life on the native soil, shaped and determined by their principles, is superior to that of the so-called 'free world'. This additional political and ideological twist given by communist authorities to such returns transforms a basically human drama into a political game with high stakes.

The problem does not become any easier when a high-level Soviet bloc defector reverses his decision to defect and gives his hosts the pink slip. One cannot deny that such defectors go through very tense moments, which again underlines the human aspects of the problem, but cloak-and-dagger considerations are not absent either. Unavoidably one ends up facing the 'bona fide' of the original defection, leaving behind a persistant question mark as to whether the defector was genuine or a plant.

— émigrés —

Many problems seem to stem from a distorted and utopian vision of life in the West in general and in the US in particular. This vision has its origins mainly from the bleak picture of the West that has been painted in the official Soviet (bloc) press. The individual's reaction is often that such reports are twisted and that the West (or America) must be the opposite of the official propagated version: a perfect place with full employment, roads paved with gold where making money is easy and without too much effort.

Many Soviet bloc émigrés do not realize the help they will need in their adjustment and how complex, alien, hostile and unfamiliar the new place can be at times. Reared in a paternalistic world that found the jobs and doled out their livelihood from birth to death, many such adults are at sea outside the managed Soviet (inspired) system, facing particularly a hard transition to a society that demands initiative and prizes property. Many of those émigrés have developed an 'entitlement mentality' that makes it harder to understand that they can get more in Western societies, but that they have to do it on their own.

Not only do Soviet bloc émigrés find the freedom they were dreaming of but also indifference and the freedom to fail (or the constitutional right to be wrong). Problems are very often compounded by serious difficulties or an impossibility to find the old professional and social status back. This can vary greatly from one job category to another. Moreover, the past education turns out to be often worthless or of little value. Older émigrés stay 'eternally' in low-level positions or keep on reschooling themselves. Sometimes, the newly found freedom is not really trusted because of fear of oppression by the system (authorities), something that was inherited from living in Soviet bloc societies.

For a minority of Soviet bloc émigrés and defectors this will lead to disillusionment, despair and failure of human courage. This, on its turn, will produce social ostracism or withdrawal into small, tight communities where people keep to themselves ("America is too big an experiment").

Not only are hopes for a better life seemingly not fulfilled, but old sores are revived or strenghtened; less positive aspects of life in the free-world societies are overblown and ideas about the latter are very often put in black-and-white perspectives:

- * nostalgia for security and camaraderie of Soviet (bloc) life;
- * homesickness = missing of country, culture, language, people, memories, etc...
- * divided families = separation from mother, father, wife and children;
- * loneliness;
- * unacceptable and unbearable crime rate;
- * violent and permissive society will destroy children, transform them into criminals;
- * shocking pornography that turns freedom of speech into license for excess.

For some returning émigrés living in an alien culture has also arisen feelings that Soviet bloc propaganda failed to inspire: a sense of being Russian (or other Soviet bloc nationality); a duty to the Motherland and a sense of guilt or shame for having left.

Needless to say that the KGB keeps close tabs on the émigré community and KGB 'spotters' continuously are looking for disenchanted expatriates who might be persuaded to work for the Soviet Union (other Soviet bloc country in case of other nationality) or who are willing -knowingly or not- to return in the frame of a big repatriation campaign as obviously has been the case with the returning émigrés at the end of 1986 and early 1987.

It should be stressed though -and it is seldom done by the Soviet bloc media- that most Soviet bloc émigrés have integrated themselves well into their new societies repeating an American story: the first generation of immigrants arrives and struggles to establish itself; the next one assimilates and worries about losing touch with its roots. A minority though cannot adjust and gets disenchanted. But as Alan Dershowitz noted recently, this is nothing new:

> "Every large-scale emigration -from the American colonists who came over on the Mayflower, to the pioneers who moved West in covered wagons, to the Irish, Italian and Polish immigrants who arrived at our shores in the late 19th century, to the Asians and Latin Americans who seek refuge here today- has included a small proportion of nostalgic returnees who can't cope with change. Some go back. The majority suffers through a difficult transition." (137)

According to data obtained from the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (also called the Helsinki Commission), an independent agency of Congress, approximately 100,000 persons emigrated between 1973 and 1986 from the USSR to the US: less than 1% returned.

— defectors —

Soviet bloc defectors distinguish themselves from émigrés in more than one aspect. Emigrés have usually been authorized to leave the country, while defectors went off of their own free will, a decision often considered a crime in most Soviet bloc countries. Returning entails a big, sometimes life-threatening risk, even if Soviet bloc authorities have promised otherwise.

Problems and motivations that lead Soviet bloc defectors to change their mind and choose the way back home span a wide variety of situations, characters and personalities that very much acts like a wilderness of mirrors. Reality is very often blurred with real intentions masked or phrased as a Delphic oracle. Sometimes, the reason for returning will be apparent, although it should never be taken at face value, nor does it represent necessarily the whole truth. The real motives for redefection can be -as it also can be in the case of defection- hidden and never revealed, surrounded by vagueness and generalities. In other cases, the guiding hand of some Soviet bloc authorities will be present in a subtle way in either creating or exacerbating existing problems that will form the fertile ground for the decision to return.

Finally, there will be cases where the defectors battling with their own psychological problems and feelings, will cause the redefection on their own.

Some observers of the redefection phenomenon, such as Colonel Vernon Hinchley, consider redefectors, especially the high-level ones, as fake or plants:

> " [...] with the exception of a few such psychopaths as Lee Harvey Oswald, I believe that the majority of East-to-West defectors who became redefectors are not genuine. [...]" (138)

Of course such view might seem too simplistic, however, the higher the Soviet redefector is on the 'value scale', the more questionable his bona fide becomes with regard to the original defection.

In the cases of Igor Ryhkov and Oleg Khlan, the two Soviet soldiers who defected from the Soviet army in Afghanistan in the summer of 1983, the return mechanism seems to have been triggered off in Ryhkov by a letter received from his wife, mother and brother that also included pictures of his little girl he had never seen. Very likely, homesickness, a possible guilt of having left close family behind compounded by the terrifying prospect of never being able to see them again , formed a precarious balance easily broken by an emotional letter from home.

Nikolay Ryzhkov, who left the US after a year at the end of 1984, was described by friends as "a homesick and undisciplined youth who showed little interest in working or in learning English, not responsible in his behavior, wishy-washy about assuming responsibility (139). After his return, he was sentenced to 12 years labor camp (140).

Oleg Tumanov, until February 1986, editor of the Russian desk at Radio Liberty, formulated the reasons for his return as follows:

> "My road back home has been tortuous. [...] The road back to my homeland was for me the natural and logical one. At a difficult time, and the world is going through a difficult time now, every honest person should with his own people. This is why I am here." (141)

That a defection may carry in itself the seeds of redefection is not unthinkable. The psychological stress faced by a defector can be overwhelming to the point of pushing him towards redefection. Following passage is very significant and revealing and describes how Viktor Belenko had to cope with certain stressful moments:

> "[...] As it was early when he went back to his room, he switched on the television and turned the knob from channel to channel until he saw something very familiar. How wonderful! In progress was a superb public television performance of Anna Karenina.
> [...]
> Primordial impulses seized and held and pushed him, and he could not resist them. He wanted to feel the mud of the streets, smell the stink in which he had grown up, be among the desolate, cold huts, hear Russian, be in the land of his birth, his people, his ancestors. He was hearing and being drawn by not only the call of the Mother Country, but the Call of the Wild.
> [...]
> He left his flight jacket, his flight suit, and everything else in the apartment and started north toward Washington -and the Soviet embassy. Great stakes rode with him. His voluntary return would prove to millions upon millions within and without the Soviet Union that the Party was right, that Soviet society was superior to American society, that it was the beacon lighting the way to the future of man.
> [...]
> But in all other crises, he tried to be Spartacus, to summon forth the best within himself, to think logically.
> [...]
> About 2:00 am north of Richmond the fever broke, ..."(142)

However good a treatment a defector may receive, return to the Motherland is not excluded. This is what US intelligence officials experienced with a KGB colonel known under the cover-name, Rudolf Albert Herrmann.

Herrmann had been groomed by the KGB to become the illegal resident in the US whose role would have been to run and control Soviet espionage activities in this country in case the official relations between the Soviet Union and the US would break off. In 1980, Herrmann agreed to cooperate with the FBI "because he lacked diplomatic immunity, had only one other choice: jail and, above all, because he wanted to save his skin and that of his family." (143) Whatever the real reasons were, Herrmann got a yearly FBI bonus of $35,000 and managed to become a successful home builder and remodeler which would earn $300,000 in six years (144).

However, in November 1986, Rudolf Herrmann explained in an interview to the Los Angeles Times, that he wanted to return to his native Czechoslovakia for several reasons:

* life in America forced him into a "straitjacket"; all the news in this country was processed to reflect a single viewpoint;
* the poor in this country are treated so shabbily that he could no longer tolerate it;
* living under a false name in a foreign culture left him with a sense of gallows humor but little sense of identity;
* intense dislike of the US political climate.

The article ends saying that Herrmann expects to make it all the way to Czechoslovakia (See exhibit #6 for the LA Times article on Rudolf Herrmann).

The Bitov and Yurchenko cases are murky at best. No wonder that the opinion are very much divided about the genuine character of their respective defections Nevertheless, it is not the intention of this study to disentangle the riddles and enigmas surrounding both cases. The official Soviet version is that they never intended to defect but were kidnapped, drugged and forced to make differen statements slandering the Soviet Union. As soon as possible they escaped the surveillance of their captors and reported to the closest Soviet diplomatic post.

But it is obvious that -whatever the real explanation of both cases is- the Soviet Union scored some impressive points, embarrassing at best for the West.

One major advantage such a high-level redefection entails is that is sows confusion in the intelligence and counterintelligence services of the opponents, not only concerning the particular redefector ("was he now real or not?") but also because it enhances suspicions and mistrust regarding future defectors ("are they genuine or sent as a plant?"), adversely affecting their handling.

Another serious advantage for the defector-turned-redefector is that during his interrogation he is able to deduce from the nature of the questions he is asked what kind of information is not kwown or half known to his questioners; and he can deduce from what he is not asked what sort of information is already known by the opposite party. Back home the returning defector can tell how the CIA and the FBI are operating. He can tell East bloc intelligence officials about the interrogation techniques being used. This latter aspect is vital in case East bloc intelligence services want to send other people to the West as spies. Errors made by the Center in the past can be rectified and intelligence officers sent out on a specific mission can be better prepared and know what to expect in case things would go wrong.
In this context, the redefector -and certainly the fake defector who returns- must be considered as an very effective weapon that can paralyze the opponents' services for a certain length of time and possibly can cripple their morale.

And last but not least, the simple fact that the redefection of Yurchenko triggered off an in-depth analysis by Congress, the Executive branch and the intelligence community about how the US handles its defectors, will without any shadow of a doubt be used by the Soviet bloc countries to try to dissuade strongly its intelligence officers, diplomats and other high-level public officials not to defect lest they will be treated like Yurchenko.

Cases about "strolling" defectors are not uncommon between the two Germanies. Mysteriously, several border guard officers and public officials of the GDR recently decided to stay in West Germany only to show up in East Germany after a short while with some bizarre or incredible explanations.

In June 1981, a lieutenant-colonel of the East German border troops, Klaus Dieter Rauschenbach came over to West Germany, where he barely stayed 48 hours and returned of his "own volition". The West German ministry for inter-German affairs had agreed to a meeting between Rauschenbach and his wife. A West German public official accompanied him on his trip home. Later Rauschenbach was shown to a Western television correspondent in Leipzig. It has been said that Rauschenbach committed suicide afterwards (145).

Another colleague of Rauschenbach, Lt.-Col. Dietmar Mann, also a border guard officer, who commanded the 3rd battalion of communist East Germany's 24th Border Guard Regiment, went over to the West on August 31, 1986 (146). Mann had transmitted confidential information on the East German surveillance of the inter-German border and had given several lectures to West German officers. Then Mann had withdrawn from sight with the help of the BND, the West German intelligence service (147).

In a December 1986 program on the West German television (ARD), Mann had declared that he expected every day to be kidnapped by the East German services and to be brought back to East Germany. Nevertheless, he accepted to live with that risk. He further declared that he was convinced that they would do everything to get hold of him or to convince him to come back to East Germany. "When you act like I did", he added, "one must face the possibility in the East of a life term in prison or capital punishment." (148).

On April 14, 1987, ADN, the official East German news agency, reported that Lt.-Col. Dietmar Mann had returned to the GDR of his own free will on April 11, escaping from the care of the West German intelligence service, taking with him "comprehensive documents."(149)

The case of Herbert Meissner, Deputy Secretary General of the GDR Academy of Sciences and a noted economist, is still more theatrical and full of question marks.

While in West Berlin, Meissner got arrested on July 9, 1986 for shoplifting. The coveted object was a part of a bathroom shower hose whose price was around $12 - $14 (150). Only willing to talk to the West German intelligence authorities, he volunteered information about his spying activities for the GDR since 1978 (151).

But several days later Meissner apparently changed his mind and fled to the East German diplomatic representation in Bonn. Things got worse when the West German prosecutor filed spying charges and launched a warrant for immediate arrest. Meissner was suddenly unable to leave the East German mission.

Lothar Gliencke, acting head of the GDR's permanent mission in the FRG reacted very strongly saying that

> "Herbert Meissner had been arrested under false charges while on a business trip to West Berlin, then taken forcibly to Munich and held and interrogated there by the FRG's BND. The BND had confiscated his diplomatic passport and personal papers. Prof. Meissner was to be forced into betraying the GDR by means of pressure and blackmail measures. However, he was able to escape from his guards and went to the GDR permanent mission in Bonn in order to secure his personal safety. ..." (152)

Meissner stated also in the East German television that "he had been kidnapped, drugged and blackmailed." He asserted that he had been abducted by the West, drugged so that he would confess to spying and pressed to betray East Germany (153).

Eventually, the impasse was resolved because the federal prosecutor agreed to cancel the legal proceedings against the economist on suspicion of espionage and dropped a warrant for his immediate arrest (154). According to ADN, Meissner was back in East Germany in the afternoon of July 21, 1986 (155). Later it was reported that Meissner had lost his job and had been replaced by Peter Sydow (156).

Following the Meissner incident, the GDR has been prohibiting travel to the West for those persons caught shoplifting on visits to the West, if the pertinent proceedings are transmitted to the GDR authorities by the legal authorities in the FRG (157).

Another East German public official, Klaus Hennig, director of the Mechanics Institute in Karl-Marx-Stadt, affiliated with the Academy of Sciences, had also chosen to stay in West Germany in February of 1987. After a short sojourn, he returned to East Germany officially because of "a change of hart". Hennig was also sacked from his job after his return (158).

****

As we have seen earlier in this study, it is unavoidable that a number of Soviet bloc émigrés and defectors -for a variety of reasons- cannot "make it" in their new host country. Returning seems then to be a legitimate and understandable reaction, after having experienced 'the right to fail, the right to be wrong'. However, Soviet bloc regimes like to put such returns in a special, propagandizing light that doesn't fail to conclude that life as governed and guided by communist principles is superior to the false illusions and mirages of the "so-called free world."

A next step is that some Soviet bloc countries have adopted more lenient policies and corresponding legislation that makes return less risk-ful or not punishable under certain qualified circumstances. The Hungarian penal code provides in its art. 217, Ib that "staying abroad = not returning" will only be punishable if the Hungarian national involved has injured in a considerable manner the interests of the Hungarian republic. Although this concept is open to broad interpretation by the Hungarian courts, absence of harming in a considerable manner the interests of Hungary will mean absence of persecution and consequently, no real basis for an asylum request in a Western country.

Poland eased the rules on issuing passports (see p. 46 & 47 of this paper) in such a way that when a Polish citizen fails to return home at one time, he still will be able to return home without having to fear that he won't be able to go abroad again (see footnote 136), with the exception of persons on official trips who fail to return and those involved in a criminal situation.

Finally, one cannot escape the fact that Soviet bloc countries have found a propaganda bone in the 'malaise' that has gotten hold of West European countries and the US, each in their own way, when it comes to dealing with large refugee waves as they occurred throughout the 1980s. The present trend in Western Europe is characterized by increasing restrictions on the right of asylum and cutting drastically back on the numbers of 3rd World refugees. Traditionally West Europeans have felt the first obligation to East European fugitives, but even that has been seen as a heavy burden. Illustrative of the increasing frustation among West European politicians was Chancellor Kohl's comment: "We are not a country for immigration." (TWP, Aug. 16, 1986, p. A1) Burdened with flagging economies and millions of unemployed, most Western European governments feel strained to the limit. Two measures underscore the problem of staying in the FRG and West Berlin for Polish citizens. Warsaw Domestic Service broadcasted in Polish on Oct. 4, 1986 that the Federal Administrative Court in Kassel had decided that "Polish citizens cannot be considered to qualify for asylum [in the FRG] if they leave Poland legally and then remain in the West longer than the time allowed." (FBIS, Eastern Europe, Daily Reports, Oct. 6, 1986, p. G8)

The content of the second measure was also announcedon the air by Warsaw Domestic Service on April 13, 1987 and concerned a decision taken by the West Berlin authorities stating that "from May 1, 1987, all Polish citizens arriving in the city with the intention of remaining there for a lengthy period, will have to take formal steps to obtain asylum, which will only be granted on political grounds." (SWB, Part 2, BBC, April 15, 1987, p. EE/8543/A1/3)

On November 13, 1986, the Bundestag (= lower chamber of the West German Parliament) ratified also a new law on asylum proceedings along the same lines as the decision of the authorities of West Berlin. (DER TAGESSPIEGEL, West Berlin Nov. 14, 1986).

One cannot escape the feeling that, in this specific case, the message to the Poles who intended to come over for a long period of time without asking for political asylum, was to stay home, while for those who were already there, compliance with the new regulations was imperative lest they would have to pack up and return.

Bonn must have been so terrified by the human refugee waves of 1985 (especially Tamils from Sri Lanka) and 1986 (Lebanese, Turks, Iranians, Ghanaians, etc...) that the West German Foreign Ministry summoned Bulgarian and Polish diplomats at the end of September 1986 asking that those countries take steps to prevent refugees without visas from reaching West Germany before October 1, 1986 (on that date new East German regulations went into effect that would allow only travelers with valid visas for their final destination to transit through the GDR see: TWTi, 9-29-1986, p. 6A). Meanwhile the message to certain Soviet bloc refugees remains: "Stay home" or "Go back". One wonders if that is not what the authorities of certain Soviet bloc countries wanted the West Germans to state loud and clear, without asking explicitly for it. In other words, a perfect example of that type of active measures that aims at creating and influencing situations in such a way that Western political leaders (or governments) adopt ideas and projects, make political decisions that are conform to the Soviet interests (Vladimir Kostov, Le Parapluie Bulgare, Paris, Stock, 1986, p. 186).

On the other side of the Atlantic, the US treatment of certain groups of political refugees seems to have suffered some serious hiccups in the past. Under the title "Rounding Up Poles In America", columnists Evans and Novak wrote a very critical article in the Washington Post (Aug. 31, 1984, p.A21) stating that the INS was rounding up Poles and deporting them despite the fact that upon their return in Poland, those refugees could be charged with numerous offenses, including treason. These round ups and deportations not only "belied the Reagan Administration's impassioned praise for the bravery of Poland's outlawed Solidarity movement", ... , they also went against the fact that "political emigres from Poland are covered by a presidential policy called Extended Voluntary Departure, automatically protecting them from premature deportation by overzealous INS agent The same tune ran through another article published in the New York Times in its April 1, 1985 issue under the title "No Way To Treat Solidarity Refugees", which stated that "Poles were battling the INS on three fronts: forced deportations to Poland; low approval rates for asylum and unjustified threats and harassement." The article continued that "Despite Mr. Reagan's repeated assertions that 'we wil show our solidarity with Solidarity', the Service rejected 77% of Poles who applied for asylum between 1981 and 1984. By contrast, about 75% of Poles' applications for asylum were 1948 and 1980." Can one imagine better grist to the Polish communist propaganda mill? Another word for a deported person is "returnee" which is the central notion studied throughout this paper.

VIII. GLASNOST, PERESTROIKA & RETURNEES.

The world has by now become well accustomed to its daily dose of glasnost and perestroika. This carefully planned and selective operation has even had its impact on returnees, especially on émigrés.

Since the end of November 1986 dozens of ex-Soviet citizens have chosen to return to the Soviet Union and according to Soviet officials more than 1,000 requests would have been filed (159).

Several prominent artists have been quietly approached at the beginning of 1987 about returning to their old post (the case of Lyubimov) or were asked to return to the Soviet Union for a certain number of performances (Baryshnikov, Makarova, Neizvesty, ...) (160).

To open the "in-door" to a certain number of émigrés was clearly a turn around in policy with regard to Soviets who had abandoned their homeland but now wished to return. The previous Soviet attitude had been quite drastic and clear-cut: to leave the Soviet Union by emigration or through defection was considered close or equal to a treasonous act and punished accordingly for most defectors. Requests from émigrés to return were pure and simply refused (161).

The new policy was described by Gennadi Gerasimov, spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry as signaling a relaxation of the Kremlin's attitude towards Soviets who have abandoned their homeland but want to return. "Last year [1985] we decided to treat more favorably requests from former Soviet citizens to return to their homeland." (162)

However, it is important to bear in mind that while the "in-door" was opened under the new reform policies of Gorbachev for a certain number of former Soviet citizens, the use of the "exit-door" was more severely regulated under that same policy by the new Soviet emigration law that went into effect on

January 1, 1987 (163).

In other words, the internal policy of glasnost and perestroika has not been extended to the openness of the Soviet borders.

However, it should be stressed that the right to emigrate, as Alan Dershowitz formulates it, "has little to do with whether the United States is 'better' or 'worse' than the Soviet Union. It has everything to do with choice. Every human being should have the right to choose where he or she wants to live. Given that, some will prefer the regimented security of Soviet society, while others will prefer the risky freedom of America." "In that perspective", adds Dershowitz, "Gorbachev's policy to let former Soviet citizens return enhances the freedom of choice. No one should ever be forced to remain in a country against his will." (164)

But that same policy will quickly loose its credibility if it isn't accompanied by opening the "exit-door" as well, which signifies in itself not only an experiment with real choice for both immigration and emigration, but above all a serious test as to whether glasnost and perestroika are for real or only a camouflage ("maskirovka") masking this Soviet action to camouflage its real intent. (165)

To establish a real choice in matters of emigration and immigration might be a unacceptable task for the Soviet leadership, which might not accept the full extent of the consequences of such a free 'come-and-go' policy. It would mean that the Soviet Union would have to accept "competing for the allegiance of its citizens." (166) That implies that the Soviet citizens would have a real choice to decide where he or she would prefer to live. But unfortunately, this means also that the pre-eminence of the communist party deciding what is good for its fellow citizens would be replaced or seriously challenged by the independent and real choice of those citizens to determine their place of living.

This poses serious problems for the Leninist state which is based on basic and unchallengeable rules. The first being that once power is won, it must never be let go and it must be used to win control of every aspect of the economy and society. Lenin's second rule centers around 'democratic centralism' which stipulates that orders within the party come from the top and must be obeyed without question further down: an ideal tool for preventing open political debate. "This is the rule that has to be bent and probably won't", wrote THE ECONOMIST, adding that "the road to a more democratic form of communism will probably in the end seem too dangerous to be pursued with the zest it deserves." (167)

And finally, one should never forget that another unwritten rule applies in every situation under communism: "Whatever is granted today, can be taken away tomorrow."

Gorbachev's new style of management was apparently partly responsible for the return of several émigrés "who perceived a liberalization" of society under the new secretary-general of the Soviet communist party.(168)

Even for the ex-KGB colonel, Rudolf A. Herrmann, "the notion of returning to Czechoslovakia turned into a plan of action after the summit meeting in Geneva last year [1985] between Gorbachev and Reagan."Gorbachev," Herrmann stated "is a reformer in the style of (former Czech party leader Alexander) Dubcek. Since Lenin's time, no big leader would go to a factory and discuss problems with workers as Gorbachev has done. Once it starts with Big Brother, it is only a small period before such change comes to little brother." (169)

For different kind of reactions by Soviet citizens who remained in the Soviet Union to the return of former Soviet citizens, see exhibit #7.

Finally, it should be noted that of the approximately 150 people who returned to the Soviet Union in October, November and December 1986, already 5 families (if not more) or 10 to 12 people returned quietly to the US; See exhibit #8.

IX. PROPAGANDA & OTHER GOALS.

As previously stated in this study, the basic official Soviet bloc attitude towards émigrés and defectors has consisted in emphasizing that 1) an honorable citizen does not leave his homeland; 2) emigrating, and a fortiori, defecting are an insult to the Motherland and therefore, 3) if a citizen emigrates or defects, he or she will achieve only misery, decadence and sometimes death; often will he or she have to sell his or her soul to the enemy and blacken the name of his / her Motherland. As for the ones who have succeeded, very often they will be characterized as "persons without any morals looking only for profit and money."

These basic points are of course fully affirmed and substantiated by émigrés and defectors -genuine or fake, high-level or not- during public appearances, at press conferences, on talk shows or at round tables and very often in articles for the written press, under the supervision or inspiration of Soviet bloc authorities. As will appear in this segment, the internal and external propaganda value and other gains at stake are worth it.

The intensity and the methods of propaganda will differ in function of the historical circumstances and will also vary among the different Soviet bloc countries.

The Soviet redefection campaign of 1955-57 had different overall objectives and also more specific ones tied to the individual East European countries. This well-financed and organized campaign was mainly a weapon in the political warfare being carried out against the West. The communist morale and propaganda was being increasingly discredited and undermined by the living testimony of millions of refugees (including defectors) who fled the barbed-wire paradise. Each successful escape was a poltical victory for the West. Also the communists were trying to promote at that time the idea of peaceful coexistence between East and West. Consequently, the many thousands mute -and not so mute- Soviet bloc citizens who were arriving in the West were rather an extremely embarrassing presence proving quite the contrary, i.e. the fallacy of the idea of coexistence (170).

Thus a logical consequence was to try to destroy the political effectiveness of the emigration by splitting the rank-and-file émigrés from their leadership, defaming and discrediting the latter in the eyes of the émigrés and also in the eyes of the Western authorities, and on the other hand, by discrediting the West in the eyes of both the rank-and-file émigrés and its leadership (171). At the same time, to discredit and neutralize the émigré communities abroad would discourage and destroy the determination of the resistance at home (172). Finally, if life in the West was so miserable, an argument still used today, Soviet bloc authorities might convince their citizens not to emigrate or defect to the West.

The propaganda exploitation goals had sometimes more nationalistic connotations. The first amnesty in Czechoslovakia concerning anti-communist refugees was granted by communist President Clement Gottwald on June 19, 1948. The regime had at least three good reasons for this policy decision (173):

First, it was necessary to halt, or at least to slow down, the flow of refugees from the country, for the exodus in the late spring of 1948 was assuming mass proportions.

Secondly, it was an attempt to offset the effects of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 promulgated by the US Congress. This law contained a special quota of 2,000 visas for Czechoslovak escapees.

And thirdly, there was the wish to make Gottwald appear as a kind man and a popular president. Accordingly, the amnesty was announced five days after his inauguration.

It would be wrong to dismiss Cold War events and attitudes as "old stuff" that happened 30 to 40 years ago. It is still in the highest interest of Soviet bloc countries to combat the image of their countries as being places that many people want to leave for a variety of reasons. The still prevailing approach is to put severe restrictions on emigration, mingled with press articles about the evils of capitalist societies, how life in the West is over and over again cruel and oppressive and how perfidious the people are who leave. The story of a Soviet man who became a broken person by emigrating to and living in the US and, after his return in the Soviet Union, threw his elder sister out of the window and committed suicide, is still very much predominant (174).

It is only recently that a certain experimental approach was tried on Soviet television where a an uncensored, uncut American television documentary titled "The Russians Are Here" was shown about the life of Soviet émigrés in Brighton Beach (Brooklyn, NY), openly discussing their problems not only with the society they joined but also with the one they had left.

The theme stressed by the Soviet anchorman and correspondents in the US, was that the idealized America to which émigrés believed they were headed often proved to be a complex, alien and even hostile land, in which someone reared in the security of the Soviet system felt lost or shunned. Although the theme was not new, the open discussion of both the American and the Soviet systems, with the pluses and minuses spelled out in terms not heard before was. In the commentary that followed the program, the journalist who presented the documentary concentrated on the disappointments and difficulties of life in America and on the nostalgia for the security and camaraderie of Soviet life (175).

Whatever propaganda method is used -the older one stressing the evils of capitalism, the cruelty and oppressive life in the West, or, the more sophisticated one just described- the Soviet leadership's decision to let émigrés return was part of a larger effort to make the point that emigration may not be the solution (panacea) for discontented Soviet citizens and an official attempt to justify on humane grounds the severe restrictions on emigration from the Soviet Union.

Of course this attitude forgets to mention that most discontented Soviets who choose to go abraod to look for a better life do also succeed in finding it, even if this means struggling in the beginning to survive and establish oneself. Secondly, one must point out that this reemigration wave was organized in such a way that the émigrés left 'en masse', in front of television cameras, just as the publicity about the "democratization in the USSR" was gathering steam (176). Those returns could have been easily spread in time as the requests were coming in, but of course the propaganda impact would have been small and not interesting for exploitation.

However enthusiastic the official Soviet reaction about the return of the émigrés was, the situation underscores a certain inescapable irony as was pointed out by Richard Schifter, US Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights: "By calling attention to these cases, they demonstrate the freedom in the West where people can leave at will as distinct from the situation they have in their country where people cannot leave at will." (177)

Finally, it is worthwhile to point out the "propaganda" atmosphere that purposefully surrounded the returning of the former Soviet citizens to the Soviet Union and to contrast it with the almost completely unnoticed return to the US of at least five families that had left for the USSR at the end of 1986: no flags no band, almost no articles, no demand to be pardoned for their mistake to leave for the Soviet Union, not one ounce of propaganda exploitation, ... (See exhibit #8)

With regard to defectors in general, Soviet bloc propaganda will of course picture life in the West as dismal, but more specifically the Western intelligence agencies will be held responsible for abominal treatment given to Soviet bloc defectors who returned. Drugs, sex, isolation, blackmail, beatings and starvation are, according to Soviet statements, only a few examples of flagrant violations of the elementary human rights Soviets bloc defectors will have to undergo at the hands of Western intelligence services.

The image of the victimized defector, hero of the Motherland, who resists every possible pressure by Western intelligence agencies to slander his homeland changes suddenly when the spectacle becomes too incredible and the interests of the Soviet Union might be tarnished by its own game.

From the moment on that it was obvious that Viktor Belenko, after having received political asylum in the US, was adamant about not returning to the Soviet Union, his image of "son of the working class, elite officer, patriot, loving father and husband and above all, prototype of the New Communist Man", changed dramatically into that of "a thief, a common criminal who obviously could not qualify for political asylum." (178)

A clear message for internal consumption is to dissuade potential defectors to make it to the other side lest they will be treated like subhumans by the Western intelligence services (e.g. Bitov, Yurchenko, Ryhkov, Khlan, ...). The importance of succeeding the dissuasion increases of course with the caliber of the defector: if high-level Soviet bloc officials or intelligence officers abandon their plans of defection because of "what happened to previous high-level colleagues", a worthy result will have been achieved.

The publicity surrounding the Yurchenko case may successfully discourage other defectors from dealing with an "inept" agency. Beside the fact that such an incident can be in itself damaging to the morale of the host agency.

Another public relations advantage of the Bitov and Yurchenko cases was to show that defectors can come back to the USSR without fearing of being prosecuted when returning. If it is not possible to prevent defections ahead of time, one can at least try the recuperation tactic.

And finally, as already pointed out earlier, other advantages of high-level redefections is that the returning defector will have produced a lot of confusion not only with regard to himself, but also concerning the handling of future defectors. The other sizable advantage is that those redefectors will also be capable of describing the interrogation methods, the level and quality of knowledge of the interrogating party about certain topics relating to their country and eventually will be able to describe what possibly went wrong in his case (e.g. KGB colonel Rudolf Herrmann) or other ones.

X. CONCLUSION.

Many aspects of returning to the Motherland, either as defector or as an émigré, have been touched upon in this study. It should be clear by now that the phenomenon of returning to Soviet bloc countries is usually more complex than commonly accepted. This study has hopefully sufficiently made clear that this phenomenon must be seen in a longer-term perspective, which allows to discover some interesting constant elements in a broader picture. One of those elements that seems evident is that, from whatever perspective one looks at the process of returning, Soviet bloc influence or manipulation in or another form and in varying degrees is always at work. Nothing is let unplanned, every opportunity - even if it has only a remote chance of materializing itself - will be seized upon and transformed, if possible and worthwile, into a result that will defend or enhance the interests of the Soviet bloc community or of a particular member of it.

This "functional" attitude displayed by the Soviet bloc countries towards returnees is based, as has been plentifully shown in the paper, on a quite constant negative philosophy that in the first place basically doesn't accept that Soviet bloc citizens leave their country: it is regarded as an unpatriotic, often a treasonous act, regardless whether it concerns an émigré or a defector.

This negative approach towards émigrés and defectors in general, but also towards returnees in particular, is fed by its own logic and above all, by the interest the communist system has to condemn those people. Another element that strengthens this philosophy is the unfortunate attitude of malaise developed over the past decades by the West when it comes to deal with refugees in general, Soviet bloc defectors and émigrés in particular. As demonstrated earlier in this study, such an uncertain and often restrictive attitude transforms itself quickly into grist on the Soviet bloc propaganda mill, which is able to skillfully and in a subtle way build up arguments against the West that are not necessarily and always false.

On the other hand, contrasting with this attitude of putting any return to a "good use", is the stance taken by the West in general and the US in particular. Whether one considers the return of Svetlana Alliluyeva or the coming back to the US of at least 5 families who decided to return to the Soviet Union at the end of December 1986, one cannot avoid being stricken by the total absence of publicity around such events, stressing the value of individual freedom and the right to be wrong, to make mistakes. Even the American media was more active and interested in being part of the "big hoopla" that the Soviets set up whenever a group of Soviet émigrés was put on the return track to the Soviet Union in the last 3 or 4 months of 1986. One barely noticed any media activity around the "quiet return" of those five families, who came back through the little back door.

As Alan Dershowitz puts it in one of his articles quoted in this study, it is not even a question of one country or system being better or worse than the other; it is a question of choice for the individual to decide where he or she will feel best at home, where he or she wants to live. In fact, that nobody should be forced to remain in a country against his will. It is barely advertized as if that freedom of choice is given to everyone all over the world.

Another point that would merit a separate study and that goes beyond the concept of the individual to choose his or her place of living, is that certain returns seems to have their place in the global Soviet strategy to use every overt and covert means (political and others) to destabilize Western societies in general and certain West European countries in the first place. To flood West Berlin and the FRG with more than 150,000 refugees of 3rd World countries can under no circumstances be construed as an temporary event, an accident due to a sudden outburst of love on behalf of those refugees for West Germany and the values it stands for. There are enough indications that it was a deliberate plan cleverly put together by the Soviet bloc to strain the political, economic and social tissue of West Germany with automatic repercussions on other neighbors of the FRG. The self-defensive actions taken by the West Germans authorities, including their decision to recast their very liberal asylum policy into a more restrictive mold, can be seen as a logical reaction to a perceived threat, but it is also very conceivable that this was exactly the West German reaction the Soviet bloc was hoping to bring about by unleashing the human refugee waves through East Germany into West Berlin. In other words, this is an application of what is called in the 'language' of active measures, reflexive control.

One of the short-term advantages of this Soviet bloc initiative has been to stop or at least slow down significantly the arrival of certain Soviet bloc citizens into West Berlin and the FRG, but also, through the new West German asylum policy, to send the message to citizens of certain East European countries already on the territory of West Berlin or of the FRG to better shape up and comply with the new law or else to return. Since no Soviet bloc country likes the image of being a place that many of their people want to leave, the consequences of the new West German asylum policy are certainly not to be rejected by them, quite to the contrary, it is more likely a result those countries were hoping for, at the same as it was serving their more long-term plans of sapping the morale and will to resist of Western societies.

Other returns, like the cases of Yurchenko, Bitov and Tumanov, serve other purposes in the general political warfare launched against the West. To exploit such cases gives the opportunity to the Soviet Union to place some good punches under the American belt, continuing to project the image of the US as the vilain to the Soviet people and to whatever 3rd World country wants to believe in it.

In fact, the bottom line is that every return will be made to fit the larger puzzle in one way or another contributing to achieve short, medium or long term goals. No return will be left untouched: each one will serve some purpose determined by the Soviet bloc authorities.

FOOTNOTES.

(1) New York Times (further in text: NYT), October 25, 1986, p.9 and The Washington Post (further in text: TWP), October 25, 1986, p. A20.

(2) TWP, November 5, 1986, p.A4; NYT, November 5, 1986, p.A6 and The Washington Times (further in text: TWTi), November 5, 1986, p.6A.

(3) TWP, December 29, 1986, p. A5; TWTi, December 29, 1986, p.8A; NYT, December 30, 1986, p. A3; TWP, December 30, 1986, p.A13; Newsweek, January 12, 1987, p. 31.

(4) TWP, January 13, 1987, p.A18; In addition, 25 Soviet émigrés who went to Israel returned to the USSR in early February 1987, see: TWP, February 7, 1987, p.A12.

(5) TWP, November 5, 1986, p. A4.

(6) NYT Magazine, December 21, 1986, p.34; TWP, December 25, 1986, p.C1; The London Times, December 31, 1986, p.6 as reported in FBIS of January 5, 1987, USSR-Annex, p.2; TWP, January 4, 1987, p.G1; TWTi, January 7, 1987, p.1B; TWP, January 9, 1987, p.B2; TWTi, January 21, 1987, p.1B.

(7) TWTi, 1-20-1987, p.3B; NYT, 1-20-1987, p.A1; TWP, 1-20-1987, p.E1; TWTi, 1-21-1987, p.B1; NYT, 1-26-1987; Newsweek, 2-2-1987, p. 73; TWP, 2-12-1987, p.C1 and NYT, 2-12-1987.

(8) For a detailed article about the definition of the word "defector", see: Etienne Huygens, "What is a defector?", IQ (Intelligence Quarterly), Vol.3, No.1, May 1987, p. 10-13.

(9) Emigration with permission is especially characteristic for the Soviet bloc countries as opposed to emigration (without permission necessary) as practiced in most Western countries.

(10) TWP, 10-9-1986, p.A29; TWTi, 10-9-1986, p.6A; NYT, 10-9-86, p.A6: declaration of State Department spokesman Peter Martinez after Arnold Lockshin, a US cancer researcher, requested and obtained for him and his family political asylum in the Soviet Union.

(11) See the chapter on "Propaganda and Other Goals".

(12) William Corson & Robert Crowley, The New KGB, Engine of Soviet Power, New York, William Morrow & Company, 1985, p.44.

(13) Corson & Crowley, p. 44-45.

(14) Corson & Crowley, p. 45.

(15) Corson & Crowley, p. 45.

(16) For a short presentation of the Donovan Emergency Commission, its origins, its investigative work, see p. 18-19 of this study.

(17) Report of the Donovan Emergency Commission, March 20, 1956, Exhibit 1, p. 1-2.

(18) Harry Rositzke, The KGB: The Eyes Of Russia, Garden City, NY, Doubleday & Co, 1981, p. 98-99.

(19) About Leon Trotsky's murder, see: Robert Conquest, The Great Terror, Stalin's Purge of the Thirties, Toronto, Macmillan, 1968, p. 439, 441-449.

(20) Boris BAJANOV, Stalin's one time personal secretary, crossed the border between Soviet Turkestan and Iran on New Year's Day of 1928. He settled in France as most Soviet defectors and émigrés would do at that time.

Georges AGABEKOV, the Chief Soviet spy in the Middle East, who led the manhunt for Bajanov, defected himself in France in June 1930.

Grigory BESSEDOVSKY, acting Soviet ambassador to France, escaped from the embassy in October 1929 in a spectacular fashion.

Alexander BARMINE was Chargé d'Affaires at the Soviet legation in Athens Greece when he defected in July 1937 first to France, then came to the US in 1940; he became a US citizen in July 1945.

Fedor RASKOLNIKOV, former Commander in Chief of the Red Fleet, later ambassador in Sofia, Bulgaria, was recalled from Sofia in 1938 but rather then to meet a sure death, he defected to France where he died in 1939 (poisoned by the GPU according to Alexander Barmine).

* The stories of Bajanov, Bessedovsky and Agabekov can be read in more detail in: Gordon Brook-Shepherd, The Storm Petrels, The Flight of The First Soviet Defectors, New York & London, Harcourt-Brace-Jovanovich, 1977, 241 pp.

* Alexander Barmine wrote his biography: One Who Survived, The Life Story Of A Russian Under The Soviets, New York, G.P.Putnam's Sons, 1945, 337 pp. He also several times deals with Raskolnikov's curriculum vitae: p. 214, 77, 159, 274, 285.

(21) Barmine, p. 12.

(22) Testimony of Alexander Orlov, before the Subcommittee to investigate the administration of the internal security act and other internal security laws of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 87th Congress, September 28, 1955, p. 10-11.

(23) Ignace REISS, one of Stalin's more important illegals in Western Europe, broke openly with Moscow on July 17, 1937. Stalin ordered Reiss and his family killed as a warning to any of his colleagues who might decide to defect; See: Rositzke, p. 111-112 and Brook-Shepherd, p. 140-144.

Walter KRIVITSKY, a colleague of Reiss, and illegal resident in Holland coordinating spy operations in half a dozen countries, had no intention of becoming another victim of Stalin's great purge that had reached the Soviet secret police itself in 1937 and defected in October 1937. He came to the US in November 1938. He was found shot to death in a Washington hotel room in February 1941; See: "Who killed Krivitsky?", TWP, 2-13-1966, Outlook section, p. E1.

Viktor KRAVCHENKO, chief engineer of a number of large steel plants and construction projects during the Stalinist industrialization, he was sent in 1943 to Washington as a member of the Soviet Purchasing Commission. He broke with his government on April 3, 1944. In February 1966, Kravchenko was found shot in his NY apartment.

(24) Rositzke, p. 111.

(25) Two Soviet hit squad leaders, Captain Nikolai Khkhlov and another officer, Bogdan Stashinsky, defected later to the West, the former in February 1954 the latter in April 1960.

(26) About the forcible repatriation to the Soviet Union by the Western Allies, see: Michael R. Marrus, The Unwanted, European Refugees in the 20th Century, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1985, p. 313-317.

(27) Donovan Emergency Commission, Report, exhibit 1, p.2.

(28) Col. Gen. F.I. Goliakov was a general of the tank corps,was head of the Soviet repatriation effort and used over 10,000 members of the Red Army to implement his mandate. See: Donovan Emergency Commission Report, exhibit 1, p. 2.

(29) The Yalta agreement of February 12, 1945.

(30) Donovan Emergency Commission, Report, Exhibit 1, p.2-3.

(31) The "Berezov disease" is described in detail by Rodon Berezov in his testimony before Senate Judiciary Subcommittee On The Internal Security, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, on the scope of the Soviet activity in the US, part 25, p. 1349-51;
Also before the same Subcommittee: Testimony of Alexander Barmine on the "Berezov disease", same document, p. 1339-46. Barmine's testimony deals also with the broader subject of 'forced repatriations'.
Another witness about the "disease" was Alexandra Tolstoy, same document, p. 1323.

(32) Senator William E. Jenner, Republican from Indiana, Senate bill, S.3935 during the 84th Congress. Since it reached the Senate floor too late for action, Sen. Jenner's legislation was enacted as Public Law 85-269 during the 85th Congress; see:
* Internal Security Report for 1956, Report of the Sen. Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security (Report #131), 85th Congress, 1st session, March 4, 1957, p. 14;
* Internal Security Report for 1957, same Senate subcommittee, Report #1477, 85th Congress, 2nd session, April 28, 1958, p. 186-188.

(33) The Report includes an introduction, recommendations, a description of the communist purpose, the methods used during the redefection campaign, and the effectiveness of the campaign. The Report has 2 appendixes: one about existing counter-measures and another about a survey of methods used. The report lists then 12 exhibits describing various aspects of the

the Soviet redefection campaign in detail. See also: NYT, 3-28-1956, p.1.

(34) The Report is titled "Recent Aspects Of The Redefection Campaign". The document was prepared by the "Free Europe Committee, Inc." of Radio Free Europe - New York, Information Department and carries the No.131; publication date = January 16, 1956. The report "summarizes the principal activities in the field of redefection undertaken by the Czech, Hungarian, Polish and Romanian government in the last six months." It has 41 pp.

(35) The Donovan Emergency Commission's Report, p.13. [further DEC-Report]

(36) The Czechoslovak campaign was based among others on the clear distinction between "the rank-and-file" of the emigration and the prominent political figures in exile. The Czechoslovak regime devoted considerable energy to singling out and bitterly attacking the leading political exile figures as a tactic in its attempt to make contact with the average Czechoslovak exile; See: RFE-Report #131, p.16.

This was also characteristic for the Polish redefection campaign, which repeatedly used systematic attempts to discredit the political leadership of the emigration; See: RFE-Report #131, p. 38

In contrast with the Czechoslovak and Polish redefection campaigns, the Hungarian one had comparatively few references to leading exiles; See: RFE-Report #131, p.2.

(37) idem as (36).

(38) The DEC-Report, p.15 and more specifically applied to the Czechoslovak campaign, DEC-Report, exhibit #2, p.12

(39) On April 13, 1954, Dr. A.R. Trushnovich, head of the Russian Rescue Committee, was abducted in West Berlin [Remember, there was no Wall at that time between East and West Berlin]. Traces of violent struggle were found in front Trushnovich's house. On April 14, the East Berlin radio announced that Trushnovich had crossed voluntarily in the Eastern sector and on the 20th of April, it was announced that he had decided to go to the USSR. Nothing was ever heard of Trushnovich. See: DEC-Report, exhibit #1, p.3 and also Nikolai Khokhlov, In The Name Of Conscience, The Testament of a Soviet Secret Agent, NY, David McKay Co., 1959, p. 313-314.

Khokhlov was scheduled to assasinate Georgy Okolovich, leader of NTS, a Russian émigré organization haedquartered in Frankfurt. Instead of killing him Khokhlov decided to tell his victim the purpose of his mission and defected; See Khokhlov's story in his book, mentioned in the 1st part of this footnote.

On November 21, 1954, the chief editor of the Azerbaijani section of Radio Liberty, Abdurakhman Fatalibeyli (real name = Dudanginski) was murdered in Munich by a Soviet agent; See: DEC-Report, exhibit 1, p.3

An example of direct approach was made to Boris Yakovlev, Director of the Institute for the Study of History and Culture of the USSR, Munich. He was approached by a Soviet agent, Elizabeth Reinhold who showed him letters from his wife asking to return home. When Yakovlev called the police, it turned out that the Soviet agent's real name was Kluchevakaya, known as a high official of the Soviet secret police who had participated in other kidnappings. The approach occurred on August 12, 1954; See: DEC-Report, exhibit 1, p.4

* There are strong indications that the redefection of prominent émigré leaders to the East was organized and set up from the beginning. It concerns the redefections of Iosif Krutiy (See also: NYT, 5-20-1954, p. 2), Igor Pitlenko and Shalva Maglakelidze in 1954 and the redefection of Vladimir Vassilaky in the spring of 1955; See: DEC-Report, exhibit 1, p.5.

* About kidnapping and murder as a KGB tool, see: John Barron, KGB, The Secret Work Of Soviet Secret Agents, 1974, 1st ed., respectively p.78, 308-310 & 312 and for murder: p. 23, 78, 306-331.

* Also about kidnapping by the Soviets: Internal Security Report for 1957, Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Internal Security, Report # 1477, April 28, 1958, p.6 & following.

(40) For a more comprehensive story of that Repatriation Committee, see: DEC-Report, Exhibit 1, p.5-6; Also: The Report of the Tolstoy Foundation on "Soviet activity to encourage repatriation among Russian escapees" introduced as exhibit #272 during the testimony of Alexandra Leo Tolstoy before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal security, Scope of Soviet activity in the US, part 25, May-June-July 1956, p. 1131-1132.

(41) DEC-Report, Exhibit 1, p. 7-8.

(42) DEC-Report, Exhibit 1, p. 10.

(43) RFE-Report #131, p.2

(44) DEC-Report, Exhibit 8, p.1-2;
The Soviets maintained that 100,000 Soviet nationals were forcibly detained in the West; See: NYT, 9-18-1955, p.6 & NYT, 12-2-1955, p.3

(44*) About the Soviet amnesty: DEC-Report, Exhibit 8, p.1-2 and also NYT, Sept. 18, 1955, p.6, "Moscow Amnesty Move".
See also footnote (55) about amnesty measures in other Soviet bloc countries at that time.

(45) The Soviet Repatriation Committee issued its newspaper "For Return To The HomeLand" immediately after its creation. It became the main vehicle of propaganda; see: DEC-Report, Exhibit 1, p.6-7; Also the Report of the Tolstoy Foundation as mentioned under footnote (40), p. 1332.

The Hungarian campaign seems to have used less the written press than other media; see RFE-Report #131, p.7.

The Czechoslovak press gave an extensive coverage to the Czech redefection campaign. Moreover, a special magazine, Hlas Domova (Voice of Homeland), was published and circulated abroad; see: RFE-report, #131, p.17, 18-20 & DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.11.

The Polish campaign used leaflets and publications, especially, the Kraj Bulletin which contained mostly reprints of program broadcasts. The Bulletin was probably the most important vehicle for dissemination of the redefection propaganda; see: RFE-Report #131, p. 29-31.

The Rumanian campaign published "Glasul Patriei" (Voice of the Homeland) three times a month and was mailed to Rumanian exiles in Europe and the US; see: RFE-Report #131, p.40.

For the Baltic campaign aimed at refugees of those countries: DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p. 14.

(46) Hungarian redefection campaign, DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.1 & 5 and p. 3-4, for letters written under instructions of the Hungarian political police (AVH). RFE-Report #131, p. 7-8 about abandoning 'forced letters'.

(47) Letters from the Czech embassies in Paris and Stockholm were sent to individual exilees, explaining the amnesty decree of May 1955; see: RFE-Report #131, p.21.

(48) DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.10.

(49) DEC-Report, Appendix "Survey of Methods Used", p.3.

(50) Soviet Radio Broadcasts: DEC-Report, Exhibit 1, p. 7;
Hungarian Radio Broadcasts: RFE-Report #131, p.6;
Polish radio Broadcasts: RFE-Report #131, p.28-29;
DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.8;
Czechoslovak Radio programs: DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.11.

(51) Press conferences by induced redefectors: DEC-Report, Exhibit 1, p.6;
by group of returning Czechs: DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.1

(52) Hungarian campaign: RFE-Report #131, p. 9-11; Polish campaign, idem, p.33.

(53) The Soviet secret police brought relatives from the Soviet Union to Germany in efforts to lure or kidnap victims back to the Soviet Union, see DEC-Report, Exhibit 1, p.4;

Polish individuals and groups of professional, scholarly and cultural natu visited several Western capitals where they made numerous contacts with exi lees, see: RFE-REport #131, p.35-36.

(54) DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.8; RFE-Report #131, p. 31-32.

(55) USSR: proclamation of an amnesty by the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet on September 17, 1955, see: DEC-Report, Exhibit 8, p.1-2;

BULGARIA: on November 9, 1954 the Bulgarian government extended the deadline for the return of refugees under the pardon provisions of the Criminal Code of Feb. 10, 1953 by another 12 months, see: DEC-Report, Exhibit 3, p. 1 & 2;

CSSR: proclamation of an amnesty decree of May 9, 1955; On January 1, 1956 Premier Zapotocky extended the provision of this decree ad infinitum see: DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p. 10 & Exhibit 3, p. 1-2.

HUNGARY: amnesty decree published on April 3, 1955 in Hungarian press, see, DEC-Report, Exhibit 3, p.1, 2 and 3.

RUMANIA: amnesty decree of June 25, 1955, see: DEC-Report, Exhibit 3, p.1 and 3.

POLAND: never proclaimed an official amnesty; the Council of Ministers issued a decree on September 10, 1955 granting far-reaching privileges and benefits to persons choosing to return to Poland, see: RFE-Report #131, p. 34-35.

(56) DEC-Report, Appendix "Survey of Methods Used", p. 4-5.

(57) -DEC-Report, same appendix as (56), p.5;
-See also footnote (39);
-The Soviet redefection campaign and the spiriting out of Tanya Romanov, a 2½ year old child born in the US and American citizen, see: Internal Security Annual Report for 1956, Senate Subcommittee on the internal security, 85th Congress, 1st session, Report #131, March 4, 1957, 86-88.

(58) RFE-Report #131, p.14-15; 21-25 and 37-38.

(59) Especially in the Polish campaign, RFE-Report #131, p. 37.

(60) Especially in the Czechoslovak campaign, RFE-Report #131, p. 16; Also in the Bulgarian campaign (" exile politicians are corrupt "), DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p.13; Polish campaign: RFE-Report #131, p.38.

(61) Although the return home was always depicted as "euphoric" and having the support of the population, dissatisfaction among the "natives" was not uncommon. A traveler to Poland stated upon his return that "while ordinary Poles had a hard time finding good jobs, returnees were assigned good positions ... . Returnees were viewed as people who have resigned themselves to the existing situation." RFE-Report #131, p.35.

(62) DEC-Report, p.15; Testimony of Michael Mischaikow before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Internal Security, 84th Congress, 2nd sessio
Scope of Soviet activity in the US, part 24, May 1956, p. 1282-87;
About the unsettling effects on Hungarian émigrés caused by the return of a prominent Hungarian refugee leader, Miklos Szabo, see: NYT, 9-15-1957, p.3.

(63) DEC-Report, p.15.

(64) DEC-Report, Exhibit 6, p.4

(65) NYT, April 17, 1956, p.12.

(66) NYT, April 27, 1956, p.13.

(67) NYT, June 6, 1957, p.1.

(68) NYT, June 25, 1957, p.8.

(69) NYT, July 12, 1958, p.19.

(70) Aaron Levenstein, Escape To Freedom, The Story of the International Rescue Committee, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1983, p. 46-47.

(71) Senate Report #131, 85th Congress, 1st session for the year 1956 & Senate Report #1477, 85th Congress, 2nd session for the year 1957.

(72) For a detailed overview of the TUAPSE incident, see: "The Episode of the Russian Seamen", Report of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, 84th Congress, 2nd session, May 24, 1956, 22pp. and Newsweek, April 23, 1956, p.21.

(73) The Christian Science Monitor (CSM), Sept. 21, 1973, p.5: "Taiwan holds Russian Seamen -forgotten victims of cold war."

(74) Newsweek, December 26, 1955.

(75) Newsweek, 4-23-1956, p.22.

(76) Senate Report as mentioned in footnote (72), p.2.

(77) Some of those visits turned violent: Senate Report as in footnote (72), p. 2-3.

(78) Senate Report #1477 as in footnote (71), p.8.

(79) Newsweek, 4-23-1956, p.22.

(80) Senate Report #131 as in footnote (71), p.85.

(81) Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov, Empire of Fear, NY, Praeger, 1956.

(82) Testimony of Peter Pirogov before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security, 84th Congress, 2nd session, Scope of Soviet Activity in the US, part 25, p. 1356-57.

(83) NYT, 5-16-1957, p.8 & New York Herald Tribune of May 16, 1957.

(84) Excerpt of "Empire of Fear" by Vladimir and Evdokia Petrov as reprinted in the testimony of Pirogov before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Internal Security as in footnote (82), p. 1357.

(85) idem as in (84), p. 1357.

(86) According to Robert Morris, Chief counsel for the Subcommittee, Victor Zegal was probably 2nd Secretary at the Soviet embassy [in Washington, DC] at the time of the hearing: Senate hearing as in footnote (82), p. 1358.

(87) Senate hearing as in footnote (82), p. 1358.

(88) Newsweek, 4-22-1957, p. 39.

(89) NYT, 4-18-1957, p.9 and NY Herald Tribune, 4-18-1957.

(90) NY Herald Tribune, 4-18-1957 and TWP & Times Herald of 4-17-1957.

(91) NY Herald Tribune, 4-16-1957.

(92) NY Herald Tribune, 4-16-1957.

(93) Art. 13,2 of the UN Declaration on Human Rights.

(94) The Soviet government has adopted new regulations regarding the entry to the USSR and the exit from the country, applicable from January 1, 1987 on, see: Moscow TASS International Service of Nov. 13, 1986 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, Nov. 14, 1986, p. R4-R5.

Also, Le Monde, Dec. 5, 1986, p. 3, "New Soviet Emigration Law Causes Anxiety", as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, Dec. 12, 1986, p. R11-R12.

NYT, Nov. 8, 1986, p. 1, "Soviet Union Lists Formal New Rules On Who May Leave."

(95) Komsomolskaya Pravda in Russian of Jan. 25, 1984, p.2 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, Jan. 30, 1984, p. R14-R16.

(96) Pravda, in Russian of August 10, 1985, 1st ed., p.5 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, August 20, 1985, p.R3-R4.

(97) Rude Pravo in Czech of August 19, 1986, p.2 as summarized and reported in FBIS, Eastern Europe-Daily Report, August 22, 1986, p.D5-D6.

(98) idem as (97), p. D6.

(99) Tass in English, April 24, 1987 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, April 28, 1987, p.A6-A7.

(100) Smena (Bratislava) in Slovak, August 4, 1986, p.1 as reported in FBIS, Eastern Europe--Daily Report, August 6, 1986, p. D1-D2.

(101) Zolnierz Wolnosci, April 20, 1984 as quoted by Vice Minister of Internal Affairs, Gen. Wladyslaw Pozoga.

(102) Toska: a longing especially for those who are away from home, an anguished yearning for the Motherland, in NYT, Dec. 18, 1984.

(103) Literaturnaya Gazeta in Russian, Jan. 7, 1987, p.8 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, Jan. 9, 1987, p. R16-R17.

(104) idem as in (100), p. D2. and (101).

(105) TWP, November 14, 1986, p. A30.

(106) BTA (= Bulgarian Telegraph Agency) in English, Jan. 15, 1987 as reported in FBIS, Eastern Europe-Daily Reports, Jan. 16, 1987, p. C3.

(107) Moscow News in English, Nov. 25, 1984 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, December 7, 1984, p. R9.

(108) Izvestya in Russian, May 30, 1984, morning edition, p.6 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, June 12, 1984, p. R4-R6.

(109) Tass in English, Nov. 16, 1984 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, Nov. 19, 1984, p. R1-R2;
Moscow News in English, Nov. 25, 1984, p. 1,3 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, Dec. 7, 1984, p.R8-R9.

(110) Moscow Television Service in Russian of April 28, 1986 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, April 29, 1986, p. A2.

(111) Moscow Television Service in Russian, June 3, 1986 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, June 6, 1986, p. A2.

(112) Moscow World Service in English, Nov. 2, 1984 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, Nov. 5, 1984, p. R8.

(113) Izvestya in Russian, May 30, 1984, morning ed., p.6 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, June 12, 1984, p. R4-R6.

(114) BTA in English, May 29, 1986 as reported in JPRS (published by FBIS), Eastern Europe, June 25, 1986, p. 28-29.

(115) BTA in English Jan. 15, 1987 as reported in FBIS, Eastern Europe-Daily Report, Jan. 16, 1987, p. C2-C3.

(116) idem as (96), p. R4.

(117) About Nikolay Ryzhkov: TWP, 12-18-1984; NYT, 12-18-1984; Chicago Tribune, 12-18-1984; NYT, 12-20-1984, p.A15; NYT, 1-17-1985; NYT, 9-20-1986, p.5 and TWP, 9-19-1986, p. A23.

About Igor Rykhov and Oleg Khlan: TWP, 11-11-1984, p. A30; NYT, 11-12-1984
NYT, 12-2-1984, p. 13 and The London Times, 12-3-1984 and TWTi, 7-5-1985.

(118) NYT, Dec. 2, 1984, p. 13.

(119) NYT, Jan. 17, 1985.

(120) For a detailed description of the Kudirka case, see: "Attempted Defection By The Lithuanian Seaman Simas Kudirka", report of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives, 91st Congress, 2nd Session (1971).

(121) Testimony of Simas Kudirka in the Medvid case before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, US House of Representatives, 99th Congress, 2nd session, November 7, 1985, p. 9.

(122) NYT, Sept. 20, 1985, p.5 and TWP, Sept. 19, 1986, p. A23.

(123) NYT, Dec. 2, 1985, p. 13.

(124) TWTi, May 15, 1987, p. 1A.

(125) Vladislav Krasnov, Soviet Defectors, The KGB Wanted List, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1985, p. 165.

(126) Five Soviet soldiers who defected from their troops in Afghanistan obtained asylum in Canada. They met for more than 30 minutes with 2 Soviet representatives who told them that they could return home without punishment. The soldiers did not believe that statement and declined the offer, see: NYT, 11-26-1986, p. A6 and TWTi, 11-26-1986, p.6A.

(127) Yuri Shapovalenko said that men identifying themselves as diplomats attached to the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco had tried to get in touch with him twice in Jan. 1986 because they wanted to tell him that they had a letter from his mother to be delivered only if he came to the Consulate, see: NYT, Feb. 2, 1986, p.6.

(128) TWP, Nov. 11, 1984, p. A30; NYT, Nov. 12, 1984; NYT, Dec. 2, 1984, p.13 and TWTi, July 5, 1985 (letter to editor).

(129) Testimony of Simas Kudirka as in (121), p.9.

(130) Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 1985.

(131) Alexandra Costa, Stepping Down From The Star, A Soviet Defector's Story, NY, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1986, p. 180-181;

(132) Viktor Belenko's encounter with the Soviet diplomats is described in: John Barron's "MiG Pilot, The Final Escape of Lieutenant Belenko", NY, Reader's Digest Press & McGraw-Hill, 1980, p. 168-171.

Arkady Shevchenko's encounter with the Soviet ambassador to the UN, Oleg A. Troyanovsky and with the then Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatoly Dobrynin, is described in Shevchenko's book "Breaking With Moscow", NY, A. Knopf, 1985, p. 349-351.

(133) "I don't want any contact. I want to live here and become an American citizen", said Shapovalenko after two Soviet diplomats from the San Francisco consulate tried to invite him to its premises in order to deliver a letter from his mother, see: NYT, Feb. 2, 1986, p.6.

(134) Personal information.

(135) Zolnierz Wolnosci, April 20, 1984.

(136) Trybuna Ludu in Polish, July 4-5, 1987, p.2 as reported in FBIS, Eastern Europe-Daily Report, July 10, 1987, p. P13-P14.

(137) Alan Dershowitz, "Why Not Open The Door Both Ways", TWTi, Jan. 8, 1987, p. 3D.

(138) Colonel Vernon Hinchley, The Defectors, London, George G. Harrap, 1967, p. 234.

(139) NYT, Dec. 20, 1984, p. A15.

(140) NYT, Sept. 20, 1986, p. 5 and TWP, Sept. 19, 1986, p. A23.

(141) Tass in English, April 28, 1986 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, April 29, 1986, p. A2.

(142) John Barron, MiG Pilot ..., p. 215-216.

(143) The Los Angeles Times, Nov. 2, 1986, part I, p.1.

(144) idem as (143), p. 1.

(145) Le Figaro, RDA-RFA, Les Transfuges Balladeurs, April 16, 1987, p. 3.

(146) TWP, East German Colonel Flees To West, Sept. 2, 1986, p. A16; Le Figaro, April 16, 1987, p. 3.

(147) BND = Bundesnachrichtendienst, created in April 1956; General Reinhard Gehlen was the first head of the Federal Intelligence Service.

(148) as in (145), p.3.

(149) Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), part 2, Eastern Europe, BBC, April 15, 1987, p. EE/8543/i.

(150) According to the FRANKFURT ALLGEMEINE, professors and members of the GDR Academy have indicated that while on official trips they do not receive a sufficient amount of per diem in West German Marks to enable them even to spend as small an amount as would have been required in Prof. Meissner's case. If they were to spend a single day in West Berlin, they are allowed all of DM 8. Seeing the long desired object without having enough money in one's pocket can trigger a panic action, see: The Frankfurter Allgemeine July 19, 1986, p.3 as reported by JPRS (published by FBIS) Sept. 5, 1986 30-31.

(151) Meissner's spying activities apparently consisted in sending reports to East German intelligence service after returning from trips to the West; Meissner was especially seeking to recruit young Western academicians for East German intelligence work and to explore drinking habits, marital situations and other personal traits of key Western academicians on his occasional trips to Western countries including the US; see: NYT, July 19, 1986, p.2

(152) ADN (= East German News Agency) International Service in German, July 15, 1986 as reported in FBIS, Eastern Europe-Daily Report, July 16, 1986, p. E

(153) Meissner Interview on East Berlin Television Service in German, July 18, 1986 as reported by FBIS, Eastern Europe-Daily Report, July 21, 1986, p. E E4.

(154) Under West German law, the FRG government can request that an investigatio be dropped if pursuing would damage the national interests, see: NYT, July 22, 1986.

(155) ADN International Service in German, July 21, 1986 as reported by FBIS, Eastern Europe-Daily Report, July 22, 1986, p. E1.

(156) Le Figaro, as in (145), p.3.

(157) West Berlin, IWE TAGESDIENST in German, No. 112, July 23, 1986, p. 1-2 as reported by JPRS (published by FBIS), Sept. 6, 1986, p. 32.

(158) Le Figaro, as in (145), p.3; also TWTi, Feb. 12, 1987.

(159) TWTi, Dec. 29, 1986, p. 8A and TWTi, Dec. 31, 1986, p. 1A.

(160) See footnotes (6) and (7).

(161) Alexander Cherkasets, who had left the USSR in 1979 after leaving his job at a Moscow travel bureau, wanted to move to the land he considered a bulwark of truth and justice. But once in New York City, driving a taxi for a living, he watched his dream turn sour. In 1982 Cherkasets went to the Soviet embassy in Washington, DC and asked for his return home. His request was refused, as happened to so many other demands, see: Newsweek, August 19, 1985, p.63.

But all ended well for Cherkasets, since he was among the 50 or so émigrés who returned to the USSR on Dec. 28, 1986, see: TWTi, Dec. 29, 1986, p. 8A.

(162) TWTi, Dec. 31, 1986, p. 1A.

(163) See footnote (94).

(164) TWTi, Jan. 8, 1987, p. 3D.

(165) Arnold Beichman, "Maskirovka Lurking Amid The Glasnost", TWTi, June 17, 1987.

(166) idem as (164).

(167) The Economist, August 30, 1986, p. 13.

(168) NYT, December 30, 1986, p. A3.

(169) LA Times, Nov. 11, 1986, part I, p.1.

(170) DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p. 12-13.

(171) See footnotes (36), (37) and (60).

(172) See footnote (38).

(173) DEC-Report, Exhibit 2, p. 9 & 10.

(174) See footnote (99).

(175) NYT, October 9, 1986, p.4.

(176) Stanislav Levchenko, "Désinformation façon Gorbatchev", Le Point, #749, January 26, 1987, p. 48.

(177) TWP, Nov. 5, 1986, p. A4.

(178) John Barron, MiG Pilot, ... p. 125 and 142.

EXHIBIT #1

STATISTICAL DATA ON THE SOVIET REDEFECTION CAMPAIGN OF 1955 - 1957.

Report of the Donovan Emergency Commission
of the International Rescue Committee
to Investigate Communist Redefection Campaigns,
March 20, 1956.
[Exhibit 5, p. 6 & 7]

NATIONALITY OF RETURNEES BY EACH AREA:

Austria

Albanians......................	0
Bulgarians.....................	9
Czechs.........................	38
Hungarians.....................	27
Poles..........................	0
Rumanians......................	122
Russians.......................	10
Unknown........................	0
	206

Germany

Albanians......................	0
Bulgarians.....................	1
Czechs.........................	227
Hungarians.....................	3
Poles..........................	31
Rumanians......................	8
Russians.......................	26
Unknown........................	2
	298

Greece

Czechs.........................	–
Bulgarians.....................	14
Rumanians......................	9
Russians.......................	12
Others.........................	0
	36

Italy and Trieste

Albanians......................	12
Bulgarians.....................	27
Czechs.........................	10
Hungarians.....................	17
Poles..........................	5
Rumanians......................	2
Russians.......................	3
Unknown........................	1
	77

Turkey

Bulgarians.....................	9
Poles..........................	2
Others.........................	0
	11

Western Europe

Albanians......................	0
Bulgarians....................	3
Czechs........................	60
Hungarians....................	35
Poles.........................	61
Rumanians.....................	10
Russians......................	18
Unknown.......................	1
	188

North America and Australia

Czechs........................	29
Poles.........................	6
Russians......................	4
Others........................	0
	39

South America

Albanians.....................	0
Bulgarians....................	10
Czechs........................	54
Hungarians....................	1
Poles.........................	3
Rumanians.....................	0
Russians......................	168
Unknown.......................	0
	236

Other Areas

Czechs........................	17
Russians......................	6
Others........................	0
	23

Last Address Unknown

Albanians.....................	0
Bulgarians....................	2
Czechs........................	25
Hungarians....................	2
Poles.........................	7
Rumanians.....................	0
Russians......................	5
Unknown.......................	3
	44

EXHIBIT #2: The Chebotarev case.

In October 1971, Anatoly Chebotarev, member of the Soviet trade mission in Brussels and a Soviet military intelligence major specialized in electronics, defected in in Belgium. After arriving in the US, he exposed a Soviet spy network at NATO headquarters. He identified thirty-two Soviet intelligence officers in Brussels, many employed by Skaldia-Volga, Aeroflot and other firms in which the Soviets had an interest. Chebotarev also disclosed that some of these spies had monitored the telephone conversations of senior Western diplomats and generals assigned to NATO and SHAPE (John Barron, KGB, The Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents, 1974 (1st ed.) p. 21).

On December 21, 1971, Chebotarev unequivocally stated, in the presence of a Soviet official, that "he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union." However, few days later he disappeared from a safe house. The next day he turned up at the Soviet embassy and on December 26, after a brief interview with a US official, he was flown to Moscow. The full story of what happened has never been disclosed (Vladislav Krasnov, "Giving Defectors The Back Of Our Hand", The Wall Street Journal, November 7, 1985).

An interesting observation, made by a specialist on KGB/GRU affairs, is that the ratio of returnees among these two Soviet intelligence organizations is roughly 2 - 1 in favor of the GRU, meaning that twice as much GRU people return to the USSR compared to the KGB. He also mentioned that the GRU is not interested in making a lot of publicity around its returnees for propaganda purposes as does the KGB, since stressing discipline among its officers is more valuable to them than anything else.

(Conversation with Robert Crowley, co-author of "The New KGB, Engin of Soviet Power, New York, William and Morrow, 1985, 560 pp.)

EXHIBIT #3

OLEG TUMANOV'S PROPAGANDA ACTIVITIES AFTER HIS RETURN IN MOSCOW.

THE TUMANOV CASE.

Oleg Tumanov was a 21 year old seaman in November 1965 when he jumped ship off the coast of Libya. His last job, before his redefection, was editor of the Russian Service at Radio Liberty. Two months after his disappearance (± the end of February 1986) from his job in Munich, Tumanov popped up in Moscow.

During the press conference he gave on April 28, 1986 in Moscow [See:

TWP, April 29, 1986, p. A11 and also, Tass in English, April 28, 1986 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, April 29, 1986, p. A1-A2, plus Moscow Television Service in Russian, same issue of FBIS, p. A2-A4; Tass gave later on the same evening a summary of the press conference, same issue FBIS, p. A4-A5.]

Tumanov gave no details on how or when he made his way back to the Soviet Union, neither gave he a full explanation of why he chose to return. He also stressed that he had returned of his own free will; that he had not been an agent of the State Security Committee (KGB) and that he had not been kidnapped by the KGB.

The second part of his press conference was related to attacking Radio Liberty (RL). Tumanov emphasized that

* RL/RFE are branches of the US Secret services and a convenient front for covert operations against the USSR and other socialist countries;
* RL's executive staff invariably included US intelligence officers;
* RL has remained a mouth piece of the warlike group of politicians to whom peaceful cooperation with the USSR and peaceful co-existence are more frightening than the aspen stake.

Tumanov's exposure of the activities of foreign ideological subversion centers translated itself into following actions on his part:

1) A meeting (roundtable) with a group of Soviet journalists in Moscow on May 19, 1986, during which he called Anatoly Shcharansky a "decoy duck" of the CIA, adding that even before Shcharansky's arrest in the Soviet Union, RL had repeatedly used information supplied by him in its inflammatory broadcasts. Shcharansky's information was received for processing and editing from CIA staff working for RL.

Shcharansky's spying activities, Tumanov continued, were only camouflaged as "dissident" activities [Tass International Service in Russian, May 19, 1986, as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, May 20, 1986, p. A1-A2].

At the same roundtable, Tumanov continued his anti-RL campaign stressing the creation of RL under CIA guidance and described the RL activities of intelligence gathering as executed by RL's research departments, its "Red Archive" and "Samizdat Archive", ...

He also specifically underlined the intelligence affiliation of several RL executive officers and RL links with branches of the US military intelligence [Tass Int'l Service in Russian, May 19, 1986 as reported in FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, May 22, 1986, p. A3-A4].

2) A roundtable with Soviet journalists on May 20, 1986 during which Tumanov told them in detail about the close ties of the US embassy in Moscow with RL and RFE, both identified as CIA branches in Europe [Tass in English, May 20, 1986 as reported by FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, May 23, 1986, p. A2-A3].

3) A roundtable discussion on June 3, 1986 entitled "The Truth About The Corporation Of Lies." Topics discussed with several Soviet journalists were:

* RL activities (broadcasts and campaigns) are subordinated to anti-Soviet propaganda;
* RL's links with the US embassy in Moscow;
* The audience Research Department of RL whose main task it is to gather information about the Soviet Union from Soviet & non-Soviet travelers;
* RL departments operating directly for the CIA such as the Research Department (with military subdepartment) or the Red Archives;
* Specific and detailed information about RL's executive staff officers;
* The practice of direct cooperation by RL and RFE with branches of American intelligence schools;
* The Connections between RFE, RL, VOA, Vatican Radio and the BBC (Russian Service) with detailed examples;
* Foreign correspondents accredited in Moscow and their operating practices;
* RL and RFE connections with political parties or émigré organizations (ex. the links between RL and NTS);
* The cooperation between RL and various anti-Soviet centers such as Keston College in the UK and Amnesty International;
* RL's links with various press organs of émigré groups: Grandi, Posev, Kontinent);
* The use made by the CIA through RL of individual Soviet citizens calling themselves dissidents;
* The Human Rights situation at RL itself;
* Methods and sources for preparing information about Soviet discrimination against persons of Jewish nationality and persecution of those who wish to go to Israel;
* The way RL uses to reflect in its broadcasts the numerous facts about anti-semitism in the West;
* The interference of Western Radio stations in the internal affairs of other countries.

[Moscow Television Service in Russian, June 3, 1986 as reported by FBIS, USSR-Daily Report, June 6, 1986, p. A2-A15].

EXHIBIT #4

LETTERS OF BELENKO'S MOTHER AND WIFE TO PRESIDENT GERALD FORD AND TO REPR. DANTE B. FASCELL.

* The letter to President Gerald Ford:

Translation of original letter written in Russian by Belenko's mother and wife to President Ford, October 5, 1976, CO 158 - Oct. 1, 1976 to Oct. 31, 1976, General, WHCF, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

* The letter to Representative Dante Fascell, then Chairman of the Helsinki Commission:

Courtesy of the Commission On Security and Cooperation (Helsinki Commission), Congress of the United States.

1976 OCT 20 PM 12 41

HAND DELIVERED
RECEP. AND SECURITY UNIT
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

To: Brent Scowcroft
10-20-76
[illegible]

RUSSIAN EMBASSY

GENERAL
C0158

Translation from Russian

Moscow

October 5, 1976

Dear Mr. President,

We earnestly request you to assist us in having a telephone conversation with the Soviet pilot Viktor Belenko who is now in the United States.

We cannot believe that Viktor is not willing to hear our voices. Indeed, it's hard to believe that a son could forget his mother and that all of a sudden she becomes a complete stranger to him. Our Viktor is not that kind of a man!

Our temporary residence is in Moscow and our phone number is 305-9166.

We kindly request you, Mr. President, to advise the USSR Embassy in Washington of the phone number which we can use to contact Viktor from Moscow.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Belenko's wife

Belenko's mother

[illegible]

THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington, D.C.

[illegible]

Translation from Russian

RECEIVED
OCT 20 1976
DANTE B. FASCELL

Moscow

October 5, 1976

Dear Mr. Fascell,

The mother and the wife of a Soviet pilot who got into trouble appeal to you.

Now Viktor Belenko is in the United States. We are sure he is there not on his own will. We do not believe that Viktor decided to become a political emigrant. He could not just during a few days come to a decision to leave his family, his friends, his Motherland, everything that he loves so much. No he is not that kind of a man! And we regard as inconceivable the very thought that Viktor is not desiring to be back home with his wife, his mother and his son.

We appeal to you, Mr. Fascell, as the Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to use all your influence and authority and help us to bring Viktor back home.

We hope that you will pay proper attention to our request and help us to find our father, husband and son again.

We thank you in advance.

Sincerely

Belenko's wife

Belenko's mother

The Honorable
Dante B.Fascell
United States House
of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

EXHIBIT #5

PRESS CONFERENCE BY BELENKO'S MOTHER AND WIFE.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, September 29, 1976, p.2

Wife and Mother of Soviet MIG Pilot Appeal for His Return

By CHRISTOPHER S. WREN

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Sept. 28—The wife and the mother of a Soviet pilot who flew his jet fighter to Japan were brought forward today by the Soviet authorities to plead for him to come home without fear of punishment.

At a news conference for Soviet and foreign reporters, Lyudmila Petrovna Belenko said she had been assured "at a sufficiently high level" that her husband, First Lieut. Viktor I. Belenko, would be forgiven, "even if he had made a mistake." A Foreign Ministry spokesman present, Lev V. Krylov, added that "official guarantees have been given by competent Soviet bodies."

Mrs. Belenko and her mother-in-law, Lyudmila Stepanovna Belenko, said they sent a cablegram to President Ford 10 days ago asking him to return the pilot to his family.

Comments Are Widely Publicized

Lieutenant Belenko landed his MIG-25 fighter on the Japanese island of Hokkaido three weeks ago and, according to Japanese authorities, requested asylum in the United States. It was promptly granted by President Ford. The plane, believed by some to be the most advanced of its kind, is being dismantled by Japanese experts with American assistance.

The women's comments figured prominently in Soviet radio and television newscasts, injecting an emotional element into Moscow's campaign to get the plane and pilot back and presenting the United States with an implicit challenge to present Lieutenant Belenko publicly. He has not been heard from since he arrived in the United States on Sept. 9.

George Bush, the Director of Central Intelligence, said in a television program in the United States on Sept. 19 that the defection was a "major intelligence bonanza" and that the debriefing of the pilot was "going well."

The incident has brought a chill to relations between Moscow and Tokyo, with repercussions for Washington. In a statement made public today, the Soviet Union warned Japan a few days ago that failure to return the plane promptly would affect relations between the two countries.

The Soviet version of the affair is that Lieutenant Belenko lost his bearings on a training flight and, after having landed in Hokkaido for lack of fuel, was kidnapped by the Japanese authorities with the collusion of Washington.

Today the two women stuck to this version as they read from prepared statements and then answered questions. Both dabbed at their eyes with handkerchiefs. At one point Lieutenant Belenko's wife broke down in tears when she said, "I reject the thought that he did this deliberately."

Associated Press

Lyudmilla P. Belenko, left, wife of Lieut. Viktor I. Belenko, the Soviet defector, appears with the pilot's mother at press conference in Moscow.

Wife Says Marriage Was Happy

The two women painted a portrait of Lieutenant Belenko as a "patriot" as well as a devoted son and husband. They said he "had excellent marks at school," was a party member and had nurtured the hope of becoming a test pilot.

His wife, who is 25 years old, said they were married five years and had been living happily in the Soviet Far East. A dispatch from Tokyo, published Sept. 22 in The New York Times, quoted intelligence sources as having said that Lieutenant Belenko had an unhappy marriage.

In the news conference, his wife frequently referred to their 3½-year-old son, nicknamed Dima, for Dmitri. The day before the flight to Japan, she said, the pilot played with his son and read him fairy tales.

In their cablegram, sent from the Far Eastern city of Khabarovsk, the two women said they had asked President Ford as "father of a family" to "understand our great sorrow and help as far as possible." Copies of a cablegram and of an intimate letter to Lieutenant Belenko from his wife were distributed today.

Mr. Krylov, who presided at the news conference, called the affair "tantamount to splitting a family by force" and said it contradicted the Helsinki accord signed by President Ford last year.

Japan Pledges Early Talks

UNITED NATIONS, Sept. 28 (Reuters)—Japan told the Soviet Union today that talks could begin soon in Tokyo on the return of the MIG-25 jet, Japanese sources reported.

They said the plane was one of the issues discussed at a 75-minute meeting between Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka of Japan and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union.

Both men are in New York for the United Nations General Assembly. The meeting took place at the Soviet mission.

The sources said Mr. Gromyko had called for the speedy return of both the plane and the pilot, who is now in the United States.

Mr. Kosaka was said to have replied that talks for the return of the MIG could begin shortly in Tokyo between Ambassador Dmitri S. Polyansky of the Soviet Union and the Japanese Foreign Ministry. He expressed the hope that the incident would not affect the basic friendship between the two countries.

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE (FBIS)
Soviet Union -- Daily Report, September 28, 1976, p. M1-5.

MOSCOW PRESS CONFERENCE HELD ON BELENKO DEFECTION

Organised by Foreign Ministry

Moscow TASS in English 0905 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

[Text] Moscow, September 28, TASS--A press conference, given in Moscow today, was devoted to the incident connected with the forced landing made in Japan by Senior Lieutenant Viktor Belenko on a Soviet Air Force plane. The press conference was organised by the press department of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

Regular training flights were being conducted at an airdrome in the Soviet Far East on September 6. The plane piloted by flier Belenko lost his bearings and made a forced landing at the airport of Hakodate, Japan. The pilot was later taken to the USA.

The actions taken by the Japanese authorities in relation to the Soviet plane and pilot cannot be qualified otherwise than unfriendly towards the Soviet Union and contemptuous of the basic international laws, it was said at the press conference.

Defection Story Called 'Lie'

Moscow TASS in English 0927 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

[Text] Moscow, September 28, TASS--A press conference, devoted to the forced landing of a Soviet Air Force plane in Japan, was held in Moscow today.

A plane, piloted by Senior Lieutenant Viktor Belenko, made a forced landing under obscure circumstances at the airport of Hakodate, Japan, on September 6.

The Western press started a propaganda campaign featuring Belenko as a political emigre, who undertook the flight for political reasons and does not wish to live in the USSR. "All this is a lie from beginning to end", declared USSR Foreign Ministry representative Lev Krylov at the press conference.

Some of the circumstances of the case were made known at the press conference. Belenko's behavior after landing in Japan testified that the forced landing had not been pre-planned. If that were not so, how is one to explain his warning shots when unauthorised persons tried to approach the plane and his protests against the plane being photographed. The Japanese authorities used force on Belenko: He was handcuffed and had a bag over his head and was hidden on the back seat of a car when he was moved.

Lev Krylov said that numerous demands made by Soviet representatives of a meeting with Belenko were refused by the Japanese authorities who gave no reasons. But when they were forced to organise such a meeting on September 9, they undertook everything to prevent the Soviet representative from communicating with Belenko. Only one Soviet representative was allowed at this so-called meeting and he was separated from Belenko by a distance of 25-30 metres. The participants in this meeting were surrounded by a circle of policemen.

It was said at the press conference that, by their actions, the Japanese side made it extremely difficult to clarify the case, which the Soviet people see as an unfriendly act that goes against the interests of the continued advancement of goodneighbour relations between the USSR and Japan.

It was underlined in statements made by the Soviet Government to the Government of Japan that the Government of Japan is entirely responsible for the arbitrary actions and lawlessness undertaken in relation to the plane and the Soviet pilot.

Belenko's 'Immediate Return' Sought

Moscow TASS in English 1003 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

["Inhumane Actions Against Soviet Pilot"--TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, September 28, TASS--"The actions by the Governments of Japan and the United States against the Sovet Air Force pilot Viktor Belenko and the plane cannot but arouse the legitimate indignation of all Soviet people", said USSR Foreign Ministry representative Lev Krylov speaking at a press conference here today. It was held in connection with the forced landing of a Soviet Air Force plane, which had lost its bearings, in the airport of Hakodate, Japan, on September sixth. Airman Belenko, who had piloted it, was later carried to the United States.

At the press conference the relatives of pilot Belenko utterly refuted the allegations concocted by the Western press that he had deliberately flown to Japan.

"The stand taken by the authorities of Japan and the United States runs counter to generally accepted standards of international relations, and thus in no way facilitates a further consolidation of relaxation of tension and progress in the development of relations in the spirit of the All-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Helsinki", stated Lev Krylov.

He recalled that the final act of the conference had also been signed by the President of the United States.

The TASS statement of September 15 this year clearly set out an evaluation of the United States actions. The Soviet Union's position is clear-cut and unequivocal. The American authorities must facilitate the immediate return of Belenko to the homeland, to his family.

Lev Krylov announced that the USSR Embassy in Washington has raised the question of arranging a meeting of Soviet representatives with Belenko.

Family's Letter to Ford

Moscow TASS in English 0947 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

[Text] Moscow, September 28, TASS--The mother and the wife of the Soviet pilot Viktor Belenko, who made a forced landing in Japan on September sixth, sent a letter to President Gerald Ford of the United States, asking him to return the son and husband to the family. Belenko was carried to the United States from Japan.

"We do not believe and will never believe that he is voluntarily abroad," the letter says among other things. The letter from the mother and the wife was circulated at a press conference here today.

Wife Doubts Defection

Moscow TASS in English 0936 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

[Text] Moscow, September 28 TASS--The wife of the Soviet pilot Viktor Belenko declared here that she rejects the thought that her husband had deliberately gone abroad. Lyudmila Petrovna Belenko, spoke at a Moscow press conference, organised by the USSR Foreign Ministry in view of the forced landing made in Japan by a Soviet Air Force plane. (Belenko's plane lost its bearings on September 6 and made a forced landing in Hakodate, Japan).

"On Sunday, one day before the terrible event, Viktor spent the entire day walking and playing with our son, as he usually did on his free days," said Lyudmila Belenko at the press conference. "They worked figurines out of plasticine and read fairy stories. I baked pies and Viktor helped me to do it. We had supper in the evening and went to bed. Before going to sleep Viktor reminded me that our friend's birthday was several days away and proposed that we give him several crystal glasses at his birthday party. On the morning of September 6, he told me he would be back early from the flight and would take our son from kindergarten. He kissed me and Dima and went off, as he did every day."

"Nothing bode us ill", Lyudmila continued. "I am sure that something happened during the flight and he was forced to land the plane on foreign territory. I firmly believe that Viktor was and will continue to be a Soviet man. It was his dream to be a test pilot. On September 3, actually three days before the incident, he sent the necessary papers for appointment as test pilot to the command."

"I do not doubt Viktor's love and loyalty. And this gives me the absolute right to declare that something terrible has happened to Viktor and that he needs assistance which I request all of you, present here, to give him," declared Lyudmila.

Wife Predicts No Punishment

Moscow TASS in English 0958 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

[Text] Moscow, September 28, TASS--"Western press reports that my husband requested political asylum in the USA are a deliberate lie." This statement was made, at a press conference in Moscow today, by Lyudmila Belenko, wife of the Soviet pilot who flew an air force plane on September 6th and made a forced landing in Japan after he lost his bearings. Viktor Belenko was later taken to the USA.

"I am absolutely sure that such a statement was fabricated against his will", said Lyudmila Petrovna Belenko." We have no news from Viktor to this day. Is this not testimony that he is under coercion?"

The wife of the Soviet pilot and his mother--Lyudmila Stepanovna Belenko--told about their husband and son in answer to questions from the pressmen.

Viktor Belenko was under constant medical control like all other pilots. "He was very careful about his health and for that reason it never happened that he was not allowed on a flight for health reasons," said the wife.

Belenko's ability as a flyer was highly appreciated by the commanding officers. He received only commendations during his service. It was Viktor's dream to be a test pilot. He sent all the necessary papers to be appointed a test pilot several days before the incident, his relatiges revealed. Belenko's wife said that Viktor's workmates think that there were unforeseen circumstances, which made him land in Japan. "Nobody thinks he did it deliberately," she emphasised.

"Our family is well off, we live in a good apartment with every convenience. My husband is well paid", said the pilot's wife.

Will Belenko be punished if he returns home? When they answered this question the relatives of the Soviet pilot revealed that they had received official assurances at a sufficiently high level that Viktor is not threatened with any punishment. He will be forgiven even if he made a mistake.

Belenko's relatives told the press conference that they have written a letter to U.S. President Gerald Ford, asking him to return a son and husband to his family.

Wife's Letter to Belenko

Moscow TASS in English 0950 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

[Text] Moscow, September 28, TASS--"Take all steps and ensure your return to the homeland", Lyudmila Belenko wrote to her husband Viktor Belenko, whose plane made a forced landing in Hakodate, Japan, on September 6. Later he was carried to the United States.

This letter was circulated at a press conference here today. "Darling, I am convinced that some incredible misfortune happened to you", she wrote.

"My dear Viktor, we are waiting for you at home, return sooner. I was officially reassured at the highest level here that you will be forgiven, even if you have made a mistake."

Lyudmila Belenko told her husband that she had asked U.S. President Gerald Ford to return him to the homeland. "I rely on his humaneness. Though this is a personal matter for us, he is also a father and must understand our sorrow, help me, you and our son to be together."

Mother Calls Pilot Patriot

Moscow TASS in English 0930 GMT 28 Sep 76 LD

[Text] Moscow, September 28, TASS--The mother of the Soviet pilot Viktor Belenko declared here today: "My son Viktor has always been a patriot. In the family and in his service, he was single-minded and level-headed."

Lyudmila Stepanovna Belenko was speaking at a press conference held by the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in connection with the forced landing in Japan of a Soviet plane, piloted by Senior Lieutenant Belenko.

"I am convinced, the pilot's mother said, that some misfortune happened to him. And I, as mother, am deeply pained that someone wants to take advantage of my son's trouble, to prevent him from returning home. Who but a mother knows her child best? That is why I say that my Viktor is honest before the homeland, before myself.

EXHIBIT #6

KGB COLONEL RUDOLF A. HERRMANN

WANTS TO RETURN TO CZECHOSLOVAKIA.

THE LOS ANGELES TIMES, November 2, 1986, part I, p.1



Made $300,000 in Six Years in U.S.

Former KGB Agent Wants to Go Home With His Cash

By RONALD J. OSTROW, *Times Staff Writer*

WASHINGTON—To his FBI captors, KGB Col. Rudolf Albert Herrmann was "a big fish"—one of the highest-ranking spies they had snared in decades.

When they displayed him to reporters in 1980 behind a murky glass screen, a modulator disguising his voice, he had already put them on the trail of a top Soviet agent in Canada and pinpointed "dead drop" sites where other Soviet operatives relayed intelligence secrets and picked up their pay.

By that time, Herrmann had outlived his usefulness as a double agent. So the FBI gave him a false identity and staked him to $35,000 a year, and he became a home builder and remodeler who has amassed $300,000 in savings in just six years.

But this "practicing capitalist," as one U.S. intelligence official described him, proved also to be "a committed Marxist." And now, $300,000 in hand, he wants to go back to his native Czechoslovakia.

In two days of interviews conducted in the presence of FBI counterintelligence agents, Herrmann insisted that life in

Please see SPY, Page 12

America, for all its advantages, forced him into a "straitjacket." All the news in this country is "processed" to reflect a single viewpoint, he said.

Herrmann, a squarely built man whose gray-rimmed glasses match his close-cropped gray mustache and hair, contended that the poor are treated so shabbily here that he can no longer tolerate it. And from a personal standpoint, he said, living under a false name in a foreign culture leaves him with a sense of gallows humor but little sense of identity.

Speaking in a voice that betrayed his Eastern European origins, Herrmann said he had agreed to cooperate with the FBI only because he lacked the diplomatic immunity of many other East Bloc spies and had only one other choice—jail. He said he decided "to save my skin and that of my family;" his wife and older son also had worked as KGB agents.

Illustrates Difficulties

His decision, beyond representing another step in the odyssey of a KGB colonel, illustrates the difficulties faced by U.S. officials as they try to make defectors feel at home in the United States. Although Herrmann rejects the label "defector" on the grounds that he always intended to go home, his departure will represent a setback for U.S. counterintelligence.

Back in Czechoslovakia, Herrmann can provide the KGB and Czech intelligence with valuable pointers about how the CIA and FBI operate.

He can relate, for example, how FBI agents constantly tailed him after he agreed to cooperate with them, using methods that he was unable to identify even with his intelligence training. "Once I fiddled with the battery in my car, and they appeared immediately," he said. "So I concluded it was something they had put on the battery."

He can tell East Bloc intelligence officials of the techniques used by the FBI to interrogate him. That, he said, would provide "a big value if you want to instruct other people" being sent as spies to the United States.

He can detail mistakes the KGB made in supervising his conduct as an agent in the United States. In this category is the KGB's order that his older son gain admission to a costly Ivy League college when Herrmann was ostensibly working as a free-lance photographer with relatively modest earnings.

Graduate of Georgetown

That son, who eventually was graduated from Georgetown University in Washington, could give Communist Bloc intelligence insights into the thinking on U.S. college campuses, Herrmann said.

As it happens, Herrmann and his family may never get such a chance. Czechoslovakia, which confiscated his bank accounts and stripped him of his citizenship after he collaborated with the FBI, rejected his application to return with his wife and two sons.

The 18 pieces of luggage that Herrmann sent ahead to Prague, full of everything from $450 skis to his younger son's comic book collections, have disappeared. "All of this you cannot get in Czechoslovakia," he said.

Herrmann is convinced that the Czechs turned down his request to return primarily because bureaucrats in the state security police, who lent him to the KGB, do not want to confront mistakes they and the KGB made in handling him. "The bureaucrats can't face me," Herrmann said. "That's it."

The Czechs, however, say that Herrmann, whom they know under the name Valousek, cannot return because he is no longer a Czech citizen. "I cannot tell you how he lost his citizenship," said Gabriel Brenka, second secretary and consul at the Czech Embassy here.

Herrmann said Brenka told him: "You are stripped of Czech citizenship because of collaboration with anti-socialist activities."

U.S. intelligence experts suggest that the Czechs may fear that Herrmann is a triple agent who would continue cooperating with the United States once back in the East Bloc. Herrmann, discounting that opinion, noted that "anyone exposed to the West is put in a category of people never accepted for a position of importance."

Herrmann's roots in communism date to his teen-age years when he joined the Communist Party in postwar Czechoslovakia at age 17, a year before he reached the minimum age for membership. A brilliant student—he has a genius IQ level—Herrmann studied at Charles University in Prague, was assigned to intelligence while in the Czech army and was sent to East Germany to master German.

In 1962, already promoted to captain, Herrmann was sent with his wife, Inga, to Toronto. As a cover, he operated a delicatessen. Displaying his entrepreneurial flair, he sold the business a year later for a profit of nearly 80% and began making advertising and promotional films.

Met Ex-Prime Ministers

At one point, the KGB directed Herrmann to make contact with Prof. Hugh Hambleton of Laval University in Quebec City. Hambleton was one of its top agents in Canada. Ten years later, after Herrmann was caught by the FBI, he put them on the trail of Hambleton, who was convicted in Britain and is serving a 10-year prison sentence.

Soon after gaining Canadian citizenship and meeting such important Canadian political leaders as former Prime Ministers John Diefenbaker and Lester Pearson, Herrmann was reassigned to the United States in 1968. He and his wife and sons—Peter, who was born in East Germany, and Michael, who was born in Canada—settled in Hartsdale, N.Y., about 15 miles north of New York City.

Herrmann, returning to film making, attracted such major clients as IBM Corp.

Herrmann also undertook a variety of intelligence assignments, some successfully, some not. In 1969, he tried without success to abort a Cape Kennedy space flight by sending an anonymous letter warning of sabotage. He selected espionage drop sites around sensitive research facilities and military bases.

His double life as an agent, with its ever-present threat that his cover might be blown, took its toll. He said he always had difficulties in casual conversations in which the subject turned to old times.

"When you meet people," he said, "they always go back to their youth with recollections. They tell fish stories that have some truth. But if you don't have any history and everything about you is made up for the 'legend,' you cannot participate. If I would tell stories about girls in my prep schools, it would create tremendous pressure. Everything you say is like evidence against you. This is what drives you crazy."

Mother's Maiden Name

The fear persisted even after Herrmann quit working for the KGB and took on yet a new identity as he cooperated with the FBI. Not long ago, for example, he tried to open a checking account and was asked for his mother's maiden name. "Oh my God," Herrmann, a committed atheist, said to himself. "I've had five mother's maiden names."

He is caustic about the way the KGB oversaw his work, recalling with considerable bitterness, for example, that the KGB criticized him when he added a room to his Hartsdale house at a cost of $6,000. "It was an extremely modest place—a house a postman would have," he said. "They reprimanded me, told me to stop living the *dolce vita*."

He criticized the KGB for giving him the "legend" of a working man with no college education and then asking him to infiltrate "think tanks" and associate with highly educated Americans. "It was absolutely ludicrous—how Maxwell Smart (the bumbling secret agent of the TV series "Get Smart") would have handled things," Herrmann said.

Herrmann said that from the day he began cooperating with the FBI, he had intended to return to the East. The notion turned into a plan of action after the summit meeting in Geneva last year between Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev and President Reagan.

Gorbachev, Herrmann believes, "is a reformer in the style of (former Czech Premier Alexander) Dubcek. Since Lenin's time, no big leader would go to a factory and discuss problems with workers, as Gorbachev has done. Once it starts with Big Brother, it's only a small period before such change comes to little brother."

He knew he would be subject to punishment back home for cooperating with the FBI, but the successful redefection to the Soviet Union a year ago of KGB spy Vitaly Yurchenko eased those fears. "Most predicted he would be shot in two weeks," Herrmann said.

He expected more trouble from American authorities over returning than he actually encountered. "They tried to convince me I was doing the wrong thing" Herrmann said, but they raised no other impediments.

Reunite Family

Returning would reunite Herrmann's immediate family with his 90-year-old mother and his brother, who works for a Prague television station. And his $300,000 in savings would translate into about 9 million Czech crowns, a tidy sum in his native land. The average college professor's income is about 50,000 crowns a year, he estimated, and "a nice house" sells for 400,000 to 500,000 crowns.

He said he has been repeatedly reminding his sons that the kind of material wealth they see in the United States will not be found in Czechoslovakia. "At 16, my son Peter had a car," Herrmann said. "At that age, I was still wanting a bicycle. When I tell my sons this, they don't believe it."

Herrmann conceded that he found much to like in the United States—the easy crossing of class lines, the positive attitude toward work, Americans' "ingenious way to solve problems."

Spoke With IBM Chairman

He recalled how no less powerful a figure than former IBM Chairman Thomas Watson spoke with him repeatedly while he was filming an IBM ceremony. "In our country, you immediately smelled the importance of a person," Herrmann said. "In this country, it's not so. There's a lot positive about America."

But Herrmann's intense dislike of the U.S. political climate convinced him he could never remain here permanently.

"What I consider unbearable in the U.S. and convinced my family would be superior in Europe is the way you treat your lowest element," he said. At least once a week, he said he drove his sons to a run-down part of town to see "people lying down on newspapers in the cold rain. Then they would hear people talk about all the bums getting too much welfare."

"Everything in this country is individualistic, not social as it is in Europe," Herrmann said. "This is not an atmosphere you can live in."

As Herrmann describes his life in the United States, however, other, more personal reasons for wanting to leave emerge.

For example, he told of resisting his older son's involvement with a Chinese woman, whom Herrmann described as "good looking, smart, a good skier, very sporty"—but lacking in ideological commitment. He told Peter "how bad it was if people didn't represent any ideology, whatever it was." The couple eventually broke up.

But Herrmann worries about his sons' future in the United States. He called Michael, now 23, "very average," uninterested in his father's passions of ideology and politics and inclined to run with a "non-achieving, fast crowd."

Now, rejected by his homeland, Herrmann plans to leave soon for Europe and work his way toward Czechoslovakia. Once in Europe, he says, it will be possible to at least get together with his brother in some third country.

But Herrmann expects to make it all the way to Czechoslovakia. And when he does, he said, he wants "to get close to a Czech brewery and have one or two beers from the tap, not from bottles, and talk in a barbershop kind of conversation about football."

EXHIBIT #7

SOVIET CITIZENS REACTING TO THE RETURN OF SOVIET EMIGRES

NEW TIMES, February 2, 1987, p. 17 (Issue #4).



M • COMMENT • READERS' FORUM •

CONFLICTING OPINIONS

The Self-Exiles...

CAN'T UNDERSTAND IT

Some Soviet citizens, for various reasons, leave the Soviet Union for good in search of happiness elsewhere.

It is regrettable that they believe capitalist propaganda and do not heed sensible arguments. But I feel even worse when such people are allowed to come back after "seeing the light" and deciding to return. I can't understand it. To regain one's homeland is as impossible as to love one's mother after one has betrayed her. The people who leave know what they are doing. And here we are forgiving them everything. Is this your idea of justice?

A. ZHOVNIR
Zaporozhye Region,
U.S.S.R.

SORRY FOR THEM ALL THE SAME

Lately I have read a great deal about people who have experienced the bitterness of losing their homeland and had a hard time abroad. I understand with my mind that they have only themselves to blame for their hard lot. But I feel a pang of pity when I see tears in their eyes. I say to myself: let them come back as long as they haven't done much harm to our country while in exile. Many of them have children. I can't bear the thought of children being raised without a homeland.

P. VASILYEVA
Irkutsk, U.S.S.R.

LIKE PLANTATION SLAVES

Our family came to California in 1905 when my father, a Ukrainian, emigrated from Russia. After coming to the United States he was out of work for a long time until at last he hired himself out as a labourer in a copper mine. He died in 1929 from silicosis. So I had to go to work at 14. And I have slaved away, often without a holiday, until the age of 62. I worked six days a week, ten hours a day to be paid $2.50 a week. I slaved for less "pay" than the Negro slaves got here in the 18th century. I have long realized that only socialist society gives life and a future. In the world I have lived in there is no organization that gives real protection to people's rights and interests. I was worn out, never having had a future—and never would have one unless I could get out of the U.S.A. and go to the U.S.S.R.

Katherine SENICK
California, U.S.A.

I Welcome This

In recent years the press over here has often written about those who left the Soviet Union for the West. Now that dozens of them have gone back our papers report such facts with puzzlement, if at all.

I welcome the Soviet government's step in allowing those of them who wished to return to their homeland.

Jim WHEELER
Toronto, Canada

EXHIBIT #8

SOVIET EMIGRES RETURNING TO THE USSR,
COMING BACK TO THE US.

THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
June 24, 1987, p. 3

5 families who returned to Russia change minds, come back to U.S.

NEW YORK (AP) — At least five families of Soviet emigres who returned to their homeland from the United States in recent months have quietly come back, according to the State Department.

The departure of the emigres from the United States was widely publicized here and in the Soviet Union, where the media hailed them as the vanguard of hundreds of disillusioned Soviets who wanted to leave America.

Since November 1986, only 146 emigres have been repatriated to the Soviet Union from the United States, said Aleksey Zhvakin, vice consul for the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

Of those, at least five families, or 10 to 12 people, have returned to the United States, said Ruth van Heuven, a spokeswoman for the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs. Others may have returned, she added, but the State Department knows only of those who contacted it for assistance.

The returnees left the Soviet Union again because "they have relatives here in this country and problems with children who grew up in this country," Mr. Zhvakin said.

"The reasons are more or less understandable," Mr. Zhvakin said. "They decided it was better for their children to come back."

The largest single group to return to the Soviet Union was 50 emigres who left New York on an Aeroflot jet for Moscow on Dec. 28, 1986. In other group departures, 17 emigres returned in October and November 1986, and a group of 12 returned in January.

Abstract painters Valery and Lidia Klever, their teen-age daughter, Irina, and 2-year-old son, Nikita, returned to the United States in May. They had left in the December group, which Soviet officials called the largest repatriation from the United States.

Mr. Klever, who left Leningrad with his family initially in 1977 after the government closed exhibits of their paintings, said Monday he came back to the United States "because it is the greatest country in the world."

"I made a mistake" in returning to the Soviet Union, Mr. Klever said in a telephone interview from the Los Angeles area. He said his family had to wait two months for a two-room communal apartment in Leningrad that they shared with another family of returnees, Yuri and Irina Galetsky.

When they left the United States in December, Mrs. Klever had complained about money problems.

"You have to worry about your life, your apartment, your monthly bills, everything. Every month, every day, I was waiting for the next dollar to pay bills," she said at the time.

Her husband had said that in the United States, "a man has to become a wolf to survive."

In November, Faina and David Gonta and their two teen-age sons returned to Jersey City, N.J., deciding to return to the United States after six days in Moscow. Mrs. Gonta had said they realized immediately they had made a "serious mistake" because they had become "too Americanized."

The double emigres, who held American passports, apparently encountered no difficulties from the Soviet authorities when they decided to come back, or else the U.S. Embassy in Moscow would have known about it, a spokesman for the embassy said.

Mr. Zhvakin had said in December that if any of the returnees changed their minds, they would be free to come back to the United States.

The publicity that surrounded the December returnees coincided with articles in the Soviet press on the difficulties faced by Soviet emigres.

At one time, emigres were castigated as traitors. Western diplomats have said the decision of the Gorbachev administration to allow emigres to return was part of a larger effort to depict emigration as no panacea for the discontents of Soviet life.

EXHIBIT #9

LISTING OF SOVIET BLOC DEFECTORS WHO RETURNED.

It would be quite a gargantuan task to enumerate as many defectors as possible who chose (or not) to return to their respective Soviet bloc country. In his book "Soviet Defectors, The KGB Wanted List", Prof. Vladislav Krasnov gives a list of 50 known, lesser known or totally unknown Soviet defectors "who returned or were forced to return to the USSR" (p.207-210).

Names as Svetlana Alliluyeva, Anatoly Barsov, Oleg Bitov, Anatoly Chebotarev, Aleksey Golub, Aleksandr Istomin, Sergey Kozlov, Simas Kudirka, join others like the three Soviet soldiers who defected from their troops in Afghanistan (Oleg Khlan, Igor Rykhov, Nikolay Ryzhkov) in 1983.

Other names that can be added are:

YURCHENKO, Vitaly	SU	Nov. 1985	KGB officer
TUMANOV, Oleg	SU	Feb. 1986	Editor Russian desk at RL
MEISSNER, Herbert	GDR	July 1986	Dep. Secr. Gen. of the GDR Academy of Sciences; noted economist
HENNIG, Klaus	GDR	Fe/Ma 1987	Head of the GDR Academy of Sc. Institute for Mechanical Sc.
RAUSCHENBACH, Klaus-Dieter	GDR	June 1981	Lt.-Col. in GDR Border Guard troops; stayed 48h. in FRG.
MANN, Dietmar	GDR	Apr. 1987	Lt.-Col. in GDR Border Guard troops
GROCHOWSKI, Joseph	PL	Ma/Apr. '82	Polish diplomat in Japan.
ZAGUIRNIAK, Alexander	SU	July 1977	Hijacked a plane to Finland; Finns returned hijackers to SU
TSELOUCHKO, Gennadi	SU	July 1977	
SHCHIBALKIN, Victor	SU	late 60's early 1970	was lured from Spain & ended up in labor camp for 10 y.
BRYN, Jerzy	PL	1958	Polish diplomat in Tokyo; also MSW officer (Min. of Int.); On his way back to Pol. disappeared, after 6 mo. changed hi mind and resurfaced in Tokyo a ledging kidnapping by the CIA.

			He was flown to Poland where he was sentenced to death, which was commuted into life imprisonment; Bryn died in jail in 1978
GUERRA, JIMENEZ, Eduardo	Cuba	1979	He was a Cuban military official who had flown his MiG 17 to a base near Miami in 1969. In 1979 he hijacked a Delta Airlines plane from New York to Havana.
SHUVALOV, ?	SU	March 1986	Leading employee of a mixed Sov.- West German enterprise; Asked for protection of BfV = W.German FBI; on March 5, he told everyone he wanted to go home.

EXHIBIT NO. 9

THE NOTION OF DEFECTOR: ATTEMPT TO DEFINE AND COMPARE.

Etienne M. Huygens

1st edition: Etienne Huygens
Research Director
Jamestown Foundation
Washington, D.C.
October 1986.

Revised: Etienne Huygens
August 1987.

About the author:

Belgian citizen, Etienne Huygens arrived in the US in April 1982 and resides in Northern Virginia. He holds a law degree of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium and specialized in European and International Law at the Graduate Institute of European Studies in Strasbourg, France and at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, Switzerland.

He was research director at the Jamestown Foundation, June 1985 to January 1987 and is currently a free lance researcher and writer on matters concerning Soviet bloc defections.

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For the Soviet regime, a defection is like a hemorrhage to a hemophiliac. For the United States, on the other hand, it is like an injection of antibiotics that provide it with greater resistance, if not total immunity to Soviet propaganda.

Vladislav Krasnov

One of the not-well-known organic weaknesses of communist regimes is their rulers' almost paranoid fear that their subjects will somehow escape or 'defect'.

The fear of defection is the Achilles' heel of the communist rulers.

Lev Alburt

I did not betray my country. I betrayed a regime which has oppressed and is oppressing my country. I no longer wish to serve the regime which acts in a merciless fashion internally against the workers and is dangerous and aggressive in its external policy to the outside world. To defend such a regime is treachery, to fight it, no.

Aleksei Myagkov

Introduction.

On May 28, 1987, a freshly-painted twin-engine Cessna 402 marked CU-T118 belonging to Aerocarribbean Airlines landed about 2 pm EDT at the Key West Naval Air Station. No one on the American side could have imagined at that time that this plane was carrying Brigadier General Rafael del Piño Diaz, the former deputy chief of staff of the Cuban air force (1).

On June 6, only nine days after the defection of Gen. del Piño, did another important Cuban defector cross over to the US. Major Florentino Aspillaga Lombard, 40, was until his defection chief of Cuban intelligence in Czechoslovakia. He crossed the border into Austria (2).

On August 26, 1987, a 31 year-old East German engineer, tossed two meat hooks to the 9 ft steel-mesh fence and pulled himself up with ropes attached to them. It was the 115th border crossing between East and West Germany in 1987 (3).

An Ethiopian pilot requested political asylum in Sudan after his military helicopter, belonging to the Ethiopian ait force, landed in the eastern region of Sudan on August 21, 1987 (4).

A family of 11 North Koreans (all civilians) defected early February, 1987 by escaping by boat to Japan; they arrived later on in South Korea (5).

Four Iranian weightlifters, who took part in the Asian Games held in Seoul, South Korea between September 20 and October 5, 1986, defected there to the Iraqi embassy, where they requested and obtained political asylum (6).

The South African Press Agency (SAPA) reported on August 3, 1987 that a Soviet diplomat, Vadim V. Prokhonov, based in Maputo, Mozambique had defected to the US (7).

The New York Times reported on August 8, 1987 that a Soviet scientist (zoologist), Dmitri Vinogredov had asked for political asylum in Seattle (8).

Edward Lee Howard, 33, who had been fired by the CIA in June 1983, disappeared from his home in New Mexico on September 21, 1985. Two days later, he would be charged by the FBI with selling US intelligence secrets to the Soviets in Austria in 1984. According to TASS, Howard was granted political asylum by the Soviet Union for he had to "hide from the US secret services which were persecuting him without foundation (9)."

North Korea announced at the end of November 1986 that a South Korean Private 2nd Class, Kim Jong-un of Infantry Battalion No. 23.1 crossed the western sector of the military demarcation line between the two nations (10).

TASS announced that the Soviet Union had granted political asylum to a US Army Private, Wade Roberts, a Californian who had served in Giessen, FRG (11).

The essence of this study is to determine in the first place what the term "defector" means in general and more specifically what its significance is in the context of the Soviet bloc countries. The analysis of the different constitutive elements of the definitions (defector & Soviet bloc defector) will show the complexity of the reality behind the notions involved.

But it will also become clear that as above-mentioned examples indicate, the great majority of defections do occur between Soviet bloc countries and the West, although it is not excluded that they will occur elsewhere too.

Secondly, defections from East to West have become a mass phenomenon, whereas defections from West to East are very low in quantity and most of these people are spies. As Prof. Krasnov points out in his book "Soviet Defectors; The KGB Wanted List" ... "defection is a uniquely 20th century phenomenon, characteristic of totalitarian communist regimes.(12)" Indeed, Communism has given it a unique and unprecedented outlook, unequaled in history. From the Soviet Union and its traditional East European allies to the People's Republic of China, from Afghanistan to Ethiopia, from Cuba to South Yemen, defectors are a living testimony of something fundamentally 'defective' in those countries and not the other way around.

Furthermore, as the examples underscore clearly, East-West defections are characterized by a great diversity and consequently not confined to "intelligence" defectors, who represent only the tip of the iceberg, although they are, without any doubt, the most interesting and useful to the West. Soviet bloc defectors in other words can range from the engineer who climbs successfully over the Berlin Wall with meat hooks to the family who crashes with a truck through a checkpoint along the Berlin Wall to a highly important general or intelligence major coming over (13).

It should finally be mentioned that any attempt to define a notion is very often not easy, usually complex, quite often controversial and certainly not waterproof. Indeed, reality is seldom so that it allows itself to be boxed in into nicely delineated categories. But on the other hand, attempting to define a situation or term is very helpful because it clarifies better the subject one wants to study or talk about. Moreover, a tool or yardstick can be created which can later be applied for research purposes. And last but not least, attempting to define terms is also an opportunity to eliminate myths and incorrect perceptions which often die hard.

And last, following definitions are 'generic definitions' as opposed to functional definitions which are definitions that serve a particular purpose. Generic definitions enable to study a phenomenon in its entirety, to break it down into its different components and to set out the implications of such generic analysis. Functional definitions are of course not wrong, they only cover part of the global picture. That certain organizations, private or public, will prefer a functional definition is perfectly understandable. An institution like the CIA has its own well-determined goals and only part of the generic group of Soviet bloc defectors is going to help it reach these goals. Hence, its definition will be crafted in function of its specific purposes.

PART I THE CONCEPT OF DEFECTOR.

I. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

A. Breaking an existing link.

Although the terms "defector" and "defection" have been used to cover a wide range of situations, most dictionaries present definitions which show one important common element:

> a conscious decision to break an existing link, bond or relationship.

Since many situations or phenomena can be described as "breaking an existing link or tie"(breaking off a contract or negociations between given parties), additional characteristics have to be brought into the picture.

B. Nature of the link: allegiance.

The nature of that bond (or link or existing relationship) is one of fidelity or allegiance.

The term "allegiance" has its origins in the feudal and autocratic societies and denoted subjection and obedience(14). Loyalty and military service on the part of the vassal were exchanged for economic and military protection by the lord. The mutual obligation was sealed by a formal exchange of kisses(15).

Allegiance is still an actual concept though it evolved. Americans know the pledge of allegiance to the

Flag (16) and naturalized Americans have to take the Oath of Renunciation and Allegiance (17).

The tie of allegiance can exist in a variety of forms: towards a person or a leader, a cause, a party, a doctrine or a state (18).

Furthermore, the same type of allegiance can have different contents. The allegiance towards a state will differ from state to state. It is also obvious that different types of allegiance can come together in one and the same person.

A Soviet bloc defector can break his ties of allegiance not only with the state to which he or she belongs, but also with the Communist party of his country (assumed he or she was a member) and with Communism as a doctrine (19).

The type of allegiance relevant to this study is the tie of allegiance between citizens and their respective states.

Now the obligation of the state to protect its citizens embraces certain political, economic, social and legal rights which, as mentioned before, can vary greatly from state to state (20). In return, the citizens have to fulfill a certain number of obligations towards the state: the latter is called the tie of allegiance. In fact, it represents nothing else than the sum of obligations of a citizen towards his state (21) .

In the case of defectors, it is this tie of allegiance towards a state which is ultimately broken.

C. The illegal component of defecting.

A third and important element of the general definition is that defectors leave without the consent or permission of the state: defecting is illegal (22). The nature of the illegality, though, will differ markedly when it comes to distinguishing Soviet bloc defectors from West-to-East defectors. In the former case, it is the act of leaving (or not returning) which at the same time materializes breaking the tie of allegiance, which is illegal.

In the case of West-to-East defectors, it is not illegal in and of itself to break the tie of allegiance, for this can be done legally and without defecting: one can simply emigrate [a specific way of emigrating is expatriation (23)]. Defectors, by contrast, have committed an illegal act, espionage usually, and will therefore be unable to leave their country with permission and consent. In this type of defections, the act of breaking the tie of allegiance follows the illegal act. Both cannot be equalized as in the case of Soviet bloc defections.
A recent example is the defection of Edward Lee Howard in in late 1985.

Howard committed two criminal acts: conspiracy to deliver national defense secrets to a foreign government and unlawful flight to avoid prosecution (24) .

If a person breaks his tie of allegiance to the state and leaves the country with the consent of the state authorities (i.e. legally), he is not a defector per definition. What he is depends on the particular circumstances of his case. If he legally changes his nationality and allegiance to another state, for instance, he is an expatriate. If he is permitted to leave (this applies to Soviet bloc citizens) or if he just leaves openly (as happens in the West), he can be classified as an emigrant.

A good example of someone who emigrated freely to the Soviet bloc is Dean Reed (25) . An American singer attracted to the leftist cause, he decided one day to leave his native Colorado and continue his career in the Soviet bloc countries where he became the Johnny Cash of Communism.

Likewise Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn cannot be called a defector since he was forced into exile (external). Yuri Orlov is also an exilee, though first an internal one (he was sent to Siberia in 1984), later an external one (Orlov arrived on October 5, 1986 in New York).

Under the title "American Scientist Defects to Moscow", the Washington Post announced early October that Arnold Lokshin, 47, had sought and obtained political asylum for himself and his family (26). The Washington Times (27) and the New York Times (28) used the right term in writing that "an American cancer researcher had emigrated to the Soviet Union ...". As far as is known Mr. Lokshin had not committed any illegal act as Howard had done, so that one has to subscribe fully the State Department's declaration that Mr. Lokshin "as an American citizen, is welcome to travel to and from the United States whenever he chooses, and is free to choose his place of residence" (29).

D. A general definition.

Combining the various components discussed above, we can offer a general definition of the term "defector":

> "A person who has taken a conscious decision to leave or break the tie of allegiance towards his state without consent or permission, thus illegally".

II. WHAT IS A SOVIET BLOC DEFECTOR?

> "A Soviet bloc defector is a citizen of a Soviet bloc country who illegally escapes the authority and control, and against the will of a Soviet bloc government."

This definition contains 4 basic elements analyzed separately hereafter:

A. CITIZEN OF A SOVIET BLOC COUNTRY.

This definition restricts itself to citizens of the Soviet Union, the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania. This choice is an arbitrary one, based on the traditional picture of the Soviet Union and its six traditional allies in Eastern Europe. It is obvious, nonetheless, that other Communist totalitarian countries can be added to the traditional list of Soviet bloc countries: Cuba, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, etc ...

This restriction does not exclude of course that non-Soviet bloc citizens did or still might defect from the Soviet bloc ranks. It concerns mainly non-Soviet bloc citizens who were agents for the Soviet intelligence services in the past. One such case was the defection of Alexander Foote in 1947. Foote was working for the GRU and had been entrusted with the mission of rebuilding a GRU network in the USA from Mexico. On his way to Mexico he defected to his native Britain and offered his services to MI5 (30).

Another earlier example was the defection of Hede Massing. She had, like her German-born American husband, Paul, joined the Communist Party before World War II. Both were sent after 1934 to the USA to lay the administrative foundations for a full-scale, legally camouflaged espionage network. Hede Massing had been working on a number of assignments for Ignace Reiss, the NKVD resident for Stalin in Switzerland. The latter was supposed to head this legal spy network in the USA, but his defection in July 1937 and his murder in Switzerland in September 1937 changed the course of events and started Massing's break with Stalin's Soviet Union and specifically with the NKVD. She denounced the latter just after WW II (31).

B. THE ILLEGALITY OF ESCAPING / NOT RETURNING.

The illegality of escaping the authority and control of a Soviet bloc government -regardless of time, place and circumstances- resides in the fact that most Soviet bloc authorities consider leaving or not returning to their respective countries, on one's own initiative, as unauthorized and thus illegal.

Usually the criminal codes of these countries provide stipulations that deal with this kind of behavior. Examples are art. 64 CC of the RSFSR which considers border-crossing and not-returning as high treason (see exhibit #1), section 213 of the GDR criminal code; art. 109 CC of the CSSR; art. 279 and 280-281 of the Bulgarian CC; art. 245 and 253 of the Rumanian CC and section 217,Ia-b of the Hungarian criminal code. It must be added that not-returning to Hungary (sect. 217, Ib) is considered a crime only if a Hungarian national has injured in a "considerable manner" the interests of the Hungarian republic. This is subjected to a broad interpretation of the Hungarian courts. Both forms of defection are not necessarily a crime but rather an administrative violation according to Polish law and practice. Other crime labels can be used to condemn defectors. This more "liberal" attitude of the Polish authorities was highlighted by general Pozoga, vice-minister of Internal Affairs who in an April 1984 interview stated that

> "the overwhelming majority of those Poles who, for this or that reason, have extended their stays abroad or who even sought asylum, but remained loyal to their Fatherland and did not tarnish themselves with treason of the country have lost their dignity and national conscience, ... will find the road [back] to the country open.(32)"

Lately, Colonel Romuald Popowski, deputy head of the passport office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs indicated a change in the passport issuance rules explaining that

> "the persons who at one time failed to return home, will be able to return to Poland at any time without having to fear that they will never be able to go abroad again. These changes, which have been primarily prompted by humanitarian and social considerations, should put an end to separations of the closest relatives and make it possible for all those who at one time decided to look for success abroad to reexamine their future prospects.
>
> However, this change does not apply to the persons who have failed to return from an official trip abroad and who continue to stay abroad. Nor does it apply to a situation involving a crime. (33)"

The crime of going abroad in an unauthorized manner occurs, according to RSFSR criminal law, when the USSR frontier is crossed illegally. The place of departure, from Soviet territory and the method used are of no importance. The act of treason is completed when the individual reaches the territory of a foreign state (34). The action taken when an individual asks a foreign state for asylum or expresses a final decision not to return to the USSR in any other form is also deemed a crime under this law.(35).

In addition to section 213 of the East German CC (36) other legal provisions can be implemented. The East German parliament passed a law on March 25, 1982 instructing border guards to shoot fellow citizens trying to escape into West Berlin and elsewhere into West Germany. The shoot-to-kill order given to border guards still stands (37).

The fact that it is illegal for the citizens of most Soviet bloc countries to leave their country freely and to return whenever they choose, is not only, as Prof. Schroeder points out, a characteristic feature of feudal absolutism whereby people were bound to the soil of their master (38), it also transforms the phenomenon of Soviet bloc defections into a fundamental Human Rights problem as is underlined by Prof. Krasnov in his book on "Soviet Defectors" (39) .

Indeed, the UN Declaration on Human Rights stipulates in its art. 13,2 that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country".

C. AGAINST THE WILL OF A PARTICULAR SOVIET BLOC GOVERNMENT.

This is another important part of the definition, alluded to earlier in this paper.

When a citizen of one of the Soviet bloc countries leaves with permission or is forced to do so, he no longer can be identified with the term defector. In the former case, the appropriate term to use is "emigrant", while in the latter, the person involved is rather an "exilee" (banished person). Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Yuri Orlov have been mentioned in this context as (external) exilee, while Andrei Sakharov is an internal exilee.

D. ESCAPING THE AUTHORITY AND CONTROL OF A SOVIET BLOC GOVERNMENT.

This element of the definition makes it possible to include not only citizens of Soviet bloc countries who are escaping across the borders, but also people of those countries who left in a legal way, but decided for whatever reason not to return. Prof. Krasnov calls them simply "non-returners" (40). The origin of this term seems to go back to the days of the ARCOS (= All-Russian Cooperative Society) affair which darkened the British-Soviet relations in May 1927. A sizable British police force had raided the offices of ARCOS in London, finding truckloads of compromising files. The British-Soviet relations were suspended and the Soviet chargé d'affaires, Ivan Maisky, and his staff got ten days to pack and go home. Once the officials who represented the Soviet authority had gone, the ordinary employees of ARCOS and of the Soviet embassy without diplomatic immunity, asked the British government for asylym. This group came to be known as non-returners (nevozvrashchentsy)(41).

The cross-the-border-defectors were especially "in" before the construction of the Berlin Wall on August 13, 1961 and the fortification of the East-West German border. The "one-way-ticket" defections have mushroomed after that date.

E. DEFECTOR: NO LEGAL TERM.

The term "defector" has no real legal existence as have other notions such as political refugee and asylee (42). The term defector is only indirectly traceable in US legislation such as the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and Public Law 110.

The terms "political refugee" and "asylee", to the contrary, have both a very precise contents, defined on national and international levels.

The person, who defects, takes a highly personal decision . By implementing that decision, the person involved creates the circumstances that one calls "defection."

In other words there are no legal conditions set up in one or another legal document to "become" a defector as one has to meet the legal conditions in order to become a political refugee or asylee.

F. DEFECTION AND MOTIVATION.

It is obvious that the definition of the term "Soviet bloc defector" used in this paper does not limit itself to Soviet bloc citizens who have defected for ideological reasons.

In fact, the nature of the motivation does not interfere with the basic constitutive elements determining what a Soviet bloc defector is. This point is underscored in Henry Becket's definition of the term "defector", who is " a person who for political or other reasons has repudiated his country (43) and who may be in possession of information of interest to an enemy government" (44) .
This point is also stressed by Prof. John and Carol Garrard: "Defectors should not be taxed because they do not appear to have highminded reasons for their actions... Why should they not enjoy the opportunity to pursue their careers when, where and how they wish?" (45) (46)

But another more interesting analysis can be made at this point. It has been previously stated that the tie broken by defectors is the tie of allegiance towards the state and that this tie is in fact nothing more than the sum of obligations of a citizen towards the state to which he belongs (47). In return, the state has to protect and guarantee a number of basic rights (48) . This "two way exchange" of duties and obligations has a real significance in Western democracies, because their governments are dependent on the people. Indeed, a government can be voted out of office and its place taken by somebody else who appeals more to the people, who are free to choose. The majority of the people elects those who according to them are most apt to defend their interests.

This is not so with Communist totalitarian regimes. The basic rights of Soviet bloc citizens - so much acclaimed in their constitutions - are far from being protected and guaranteed: purges, the omni-presence of the secret police, psychiatric abuse in order to reduce any form of opposition, the impossibility for citizens to monitor compliance with international treaties concerning Human Rights, etc...

Two testimonies of prominent Soviet defectors illustrate best this state of affairs.
Victor Kravchenko, who defected in 1944 in Washington, DC, wrote a letter to the New York Times stating that

> "The Russian people are subjected, as before, to unspeakable oppression and cruelties, while the NKVD [Soviet secret police], acting through its thousands of spies, continues to wield its unbridled domination over the people of Russia. In the territories cleared of the Nazi invaders, the Soviet Government is re-establsihing its political regime of lawlessness and violence, while prisons and concentration camps continue to function, as before.
> The hopes of political and social reforms cherished by the Russian people at the beginning of the war have proved to be empty illusions.
> This war is not yet ended, but already the rulers in the Kremlin are preparing a new generation for the next war. An enduring and genuine peace after

> the conclusion of the present war and the interests of my people require a different policy than that now pursued by the Soviet Government.
>
> [Demands Political Liberties]
>
> I maintain that more than any other people the Russian people require that they be granted elementary political liberties - genuine freedom of press and speech, freedom from want and freedom from fear. What the Russian people have had from their government has been only lip serice to these freedoms. For years they have lived in constant dread and want. The Russian people have earned a new deal by their immeasurable sacrifices, which have saved the country as well as the existing regime itself, and through which they have dealt such decisive blows to fascism and have determined the course of the war"(49).

Arkady Shevchenko, the former Undersecretary General of the United Nations for Political and Security affairs, who defected in April 1978, described the relation between the Soviet State and its citizens before the US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in following words:

> "I slowly came to understand that the Soviet regime represents the antithesis of the ideals which it professes at home and abroad. I discovered that all power in the Soviet Union is in the hands of a restricted circle of Party elite, top state functionaries, and the KGB. I saw that neither the working class nor the peasantry have any influence or even basic rights.
>
> I saw that under the domination of the Party bureaucracy, the KGB has so penetrated every aspect of Soviet life that the words "freedom" and "privacy" are words which could be stricken from the language with no effect. Respect for

> elementary human rights does not exist.
> I saw that democracy in the Soviet Union is a mockery, that the Soviet people have no free elections, no freedom of thought or opinion, no freedom of intellectual or artistic creation or expression, no freedom of religion. Soviets are not only imprisoned within their national borders, they are not free to travel from city to city within the Soviet Union.
> In a society which proclaims that invincible communist ideas will march triumphantly over the globe, I saw a leadership which was deadly afraid of information and ideas from the "degenerate" capitalist West.
> I saw an economy which cannot produce the quantity and quality of goods and services produced in the West. The list of deficit items of consumer goods and food in the Soviet Union is endless and growing. I asked myself, where is the long promised abundance of the so-called "advanced socialism"? (50)

Since the Soviet bloc states do not honor, i.e., guarantee and protect, their part of the constitutional deal with their citizens, the latter have been, are and will be enclined to make a conscious decision to break their tie of allegiance towards their state, in other words, to defect.

G. DEFECTION AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection has several sources, one of them being defectors. High level Soviet bloc defectors can provide valuable information concerning the organizational structure, personalities, methods of operation and foreign agents of Soviet bloc intelligence

services (51).
Subsequently, it is understandable that Western intelligence services are interested in the first place in Soviet bloc defectors who bring this kind of intelligence information with them when defecting to the West.

However, as was mentioned when dealing with the motivation and defection, it is not necessary to possess intelligence information, when coming over to the West, in order to be a defector (52).

On the other hand, when one looks at the West-East defections, one cannot escape the conclusion that the vast majority, if not all the defectors, were or are spies. This, contrary to the East-West defectors, where only a minority of defectors can be said to belong to the same category.

H. DEFECTOR IN PLACE.

The term "defector-in-place" is a term which has stirred controversy in the intelligence literature. Some, like Col. Vernon Hinchley, think that the term shouldn't exist and that the person being called a defector-in-place, is nothing more than a spy and should consequently be called that way (53). The person must, according to Hinchley, not only have changed his allegiance, but also he "must have travelled to the country of his choice" (54).In other words,

there is no defector as long as there is no physical act of escaping to the "other side".
Though this criticism is not completely unfounded, to write off the term "defector-in-place" is equally farfetched. It is true that the person called a "defector-in-place" (sometimes also called an "agent-in-place" or "spy-in-place") is basically a person who spies in his own country against his own state (government) on behalf of a foreign government. But on the other hand, the defection-in-place precedes the fullfledged defection in time. The moment the defector-in-place feels that it becomes too hot for him, he hopefully will be able to make it to the other side safely. This happened to Michal Goleniewski, who defected from the Polish UB to the CIA in West Berlin in December 1960. Other defectors-in-place were not so lucky. The cases of Col. Penkovsky and Lt.-Col. Popov are well known. More recent was the case of "Farewell", a defector-in-place inside the KGB, working on behalf of the French secret services (55) .
The term "defector-in-place" can also be considered as a term established per analogy with the notion of (fullfledged) defector. As the latter escapes physically and makes that stèp to the other side, so does the defector-in-place make an important step inside himself to the other side by spying on behalf of the "other side". This analogy is in perfect harmony with the fact that one type of defection precedes the other in time.

PART II THE TERM "DEFECTOR" COMPARED.

The second part of this study centers mainly around the relationship of the term "Soviet bloc defector" with other commonly used concepts such as political refugee and asylee, escapees and refugee-escapees, displaced persons, expellees, exilees and deportees, emigrees and immigrants.

The interest of this part is that the term defector somewhere crosses the others once or several times, sometimes covering each other partly or totally. A Soviet bloc defector will necessarily come in touch with the Immigration and Nationality regulations or with other American legislation that influence his entry status, and once he is on American soil, his status will evolve and he has the option of becoming an American citizen eventually.
Though the following analysis will go somewhat into the details of the defector's status, it is not the intention of this paper to give a description of that status from A thru Z, with its inherent problems. Whatever is useful to clarify the comparisons will be mentioned.

I. REFUGEE AND ASYLEE.

A. Common aspects.

According to American law, more specifically, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 [(8 USC) (further called the INA of ..., (56)] the notions "refugee" and "asylee" are legally defined in identical terms (57) . The different elements of that definition are:

- * Any person who is outside (58) any country of such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided ...
- * and who is unable or unwilling to return to ...
- * and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country ...
- * because of persecution or a well founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

To be complete the INA of 1952 excludes from the term refugee any person who ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

In using this definition, the INA of 1952 (as amended) conforms to the definition used by the United

Nations in its Convention relating to the status of Refugees of July 1951 (59) and its subsequent Protocol of January 1967 (60).

Another common feature is that for those who can qualify as bona fide refugees or asylees, an important protection comes into play. It is called the principle of non refoulement which entails protection from forcible return or deportation to the country of origin (61).

As Michael Teitelbaum points out, the legal meaning of the terms "refugee" and "asylee" are quite different from that used by the media in everyday language: " A person fleeing earthquake, flood, drought, civil or international war, abject poverty, discrimination or indeed any terrible condition cannot qualify as a refugee or asylee unless he has been persecuted or has a well founded fear of persecution. Hence in legal terms, there cannot be refugees from an earthquake in one country or asylees from random violence of a civil war in another, since neither 'acts of God' nor generalized violence are usually considered to constitute persecution" (62).

B. Differences.

The primary difference between the terms "refugee" and "asylee" is as simple as the distinction between here and there (63) : Refugee status is granted to those who are somewhere else, but want to come to the United States by requesting permission to enter this country (64).

An asylee is here on US soil and is requesting permission to stay (64) . Thus, an asylum applicant applies having already entered the USA, legally or illegally (65) . The asylum procedure under US law (66) establishes asylum privileges for an alien (67) physically present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status [legal, illegal, temporarily or on parole (68)].

It should also be mentioned that the term "asylum" mentioned in this paper, refers to 'territorial asylum', which involves refuge sought by foreign persons within US territory. The related concept of 'diplomatic asylum', involving refuge in diplomatic missions abroad is strictly limited by the USA. In fact, the current US policy on granting political asylum abroad was summed up by William T. Lake (70) in a statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29, 1980:

> "The United States does not grant asylum at its embassies or at other installations within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign state. Likewise, diplomatic and consular affairs officers are not authorized to extend asylum to persons who are not members of the officers' official or personal households. Any request

> for asylum that is received in the field must be reported immediately to Washington, but the policy is not to grant such requests.
>
> At the same time, US embassies are authorized to grant temporary refuge for humanitarian reasons in extreme or exceptional circumstances when the life or safety of a person is put in immediate danger, such as pursuite by a mob"(69) .

The United States has adhered to that policy and only two examples have made an exception to that policy: the case of Cardinal Mindszenty (1956 to 1971) and the long stay of the Pentecostals at the US embassy in Moscow (71)

C. Defector and asylum.

1. General characteristics.

A Soviet bloc defector can defect to the United States in several ways. The basic ones are:

* to defect to the United States while being in this country; political asylum can be requested immediately.
* to defect to the USA by leaving his post abroad, traveling to this country on a simple tourist visa, and once arrived at a US port of entry (e.g. JFK in New York) political asylum can be asked.
* to defect to US authorities abroad.

As has been indicated earlier in this paper, the United States has kept itself very strictly to its policy of not granting political asylum abroad; so, necessarily the American authorities will consider the request for political asylum once the applicant has entered the USA. The term "entry" into the United States covers not only people who come from abroad into the USA, but also persons who were on US soil under another status (e.g. diplomatic) and who through their act of defection lose that specific status (72) .

The asylum procedure itself is regulated by section 208(a) of the INA of 1952 as amended by section 201(b) of the Refugee Act of 1980 (73). This section directs the Attorney General to establish a procedure for asylum procedure whereby the Attorney General grants asylum in a discretionary manner to an alien physically present in the USA, irrespective of such alien's status.

The burden of proof is on the applicant to establish that he is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality or, if he has no nationality, the country in which he habitually resided, because of persecution (or a well-founded fear of persecution) on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.

An asylum claim cannot be based merely by citing a foreign regime's policies and practices or general economic conditions in the country of nationality.

There must be also evidence supporting a well-founded fear that the applicant would be subject to persecution on one or more of the five grounds (race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group) mentioned in the law. Such proof usually will consist of two elements:

a- the general oppressive character of the foreign regime and

b- the specific basis for the applicant's belief that he himself (as an individual) would be subject to persecution (74) .

2. Parole.

Another procedure for handling asylum requests by aliens seeking to enter the United States is the parole device (75). Under the Refugee Act of 1980 the parole device is only authorized for individual refugees if the Attorney General determines that compelling reasons in the public interest with respect to that particular alien require that the alien be granted parole rather than be admitted as a refugee under section 101(42)(A) of the INA of 1952.

The parole device is a discretionary authority at the disposal of the US administrative authorities (= the Attorney General). It does not grant any legal residence status. However, it allows temporary harborage in the USA for humane considerations or for reasons rooted in the public interest. It is a device with flexibility.

As such the term "parole" is nowhere defined and it may encompass a variety of situations in which temporary entry or stay in the United States is authorized. A lot will depend on how the Attorney General will interprete the notions "emergent reasons" or "reasons deemed in the public interest". Vitaly Yurchenko entered the US under parole (76)

3 . Public Law 110.

A still more powerful procedure to handle the entry of Soviet bloc defectors in the United States is the "admission of essential aliens" (77) . This important piece of legislation reads as follows:

> "Whenever the Director, the Attorney General and the Commissioner of Immigration shall determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States for permanent residence is in the interest of national security or essential to the furtherance of the national intelligence mission, such alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the United States for permanent residence without regard to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws and regulation, or the failure to comply with such laws and regulations pertaining to the admissibility: provided, that the number of aliens and members of their immediate families entering the United States under the authority of this section shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any one fiscal year".

In other words, a defector can be deemed so important to the national security or national intelligence mission of the USA, that his entry status can be solved by granting permanent residence to him and his family. Again this is a discretionary device at the disposal of the Executive branch of this country.

Whether a defection occurs abroad or on US soil the entry status of a Soviet bloc defector can be solved in different ways. The following legal instruments, the parole device, the grant of permanent residence under Public Law 110, are means to regularize the admission of a defector into the United States. The asylum procedure will be applied concurrently at a certain stage. But as mentioned previously, the United States as host country remains fully in control of the procedures to admit whatever alien on its territory (78).

Since parole and the permanent residence (P.L. 110) device are means used at the discretion of the Executive branch of the USA, it is perfectly possible that a Soviet bloc defector, defecting abroad to US authorities and asking them for political asylum, will have only the option to apply for the REFUGEE status as set forth under section 101 (42)(A) of INA of 1952, or, that his case can only be dealt with according to the normal immigration procedure. Both procedures are subject to a number of restrictions which can considerably limit the chances to be allowed into the USA (79) .

D. Additional remarks.

It is also interesting to note that the grant of asylum by the USA to a refugee who has previously resettled in another country is precluded by law. In other words, firm resettlement by grant of refugee status by another country will preclude the grant of political asylum by the United States. An alien is considered to "firmly resettled" if he was offered resident status, citizenship or some type of permanent resettlement by another nation and traveled to and entered that nation as a consequence of his flight of persecution, unless that alien proves otherwise (80) .

One of the important features of the Refugee Act of 1980 is that it eliminated ideological and geographical restrictions that previously favored refugees from communist countries and the Middle East. The 1980 definition of the terms "refugee" and asylee" is consistent with the more ample and more expansive definition of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and its Protocol of 1967.

According to an New York Times article of March 30, 1986, the Justice Department was drafting new procedures that would make it easier for citizens of Poland and other communist countries to gain asylum in the United States. The new procedure would be based on a presumption of persecution and citizens of those countries would thus be presumed to be refugees within the meaning of the law. Officials of the Justice Department said the US Government's acknowledged mishandling of the Medvid case dramatized the need to establish a "factual presumption" that people fleeing communist countries had a well-founded fear of persecution.

II. ESCAPEE AND REFUGEE-ESCAPEE.

Another term which is very close, if not identical with the notion of "Soviet bloc defector" is the word "escapee".

U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Cabot Lodge, defending US military and economic aid to war-torn Europe in a committee meeting of the General Assembly on March 23, 1953, used the term "escapee" as follows:

> "An escapee is a person who has escaped from the Soviet dominated world ... and has not been granted citizenship in his country of refuge. ... The person we are helping has literally no place in this world. But he yearns for a freedom which has been denied him -- freedom to speak, to write, to vote, to worship as he pleases and build his life in his own way. He also yearns for freedom from speed-ups, labor disciplines, the internal passports which make Soviet life a hell for the ordinary person, and freedom from the threat of the secret police, the mass deportation, and the forced labor camp.
>
> This person -- this stateless man -- has given up his home, his possessions, his friends and often his family. Heroically, he has cracked the Iron Curtain, even though that curtain is constantly being strengthened, because as life becomes harder and harder behind the iron curtain, more and more people want to escape. More armed guards may be watching from observation towers, vicious dogs may be patrolling the frontiers, yet people continually get through"(81).

As one can see, the notion of "escapee" covers quite well the contents of the term "Soviet bloc defector". Indeed, whether escaping across the border, or whether not returning after a trip or stay abroad, the act of defection often has the characteristics of an escape. Since Soviet bloc citizens cannot emigrate in the normal way and since that simple fact, the ancient common prerogative of all people - as Krotkov calls it - is, according to Soviet law, a form of treason, a betrayal of the motherland, escaping remains the only efficient way for many defectors to break with the regime and for a certain number of them, to join the struggle against it.

The term "escapee" appears also in conjunction with the term "refugee". Indeed, the double notion "refugee-escapee" appears in an Act of Congress, approved September 11, 1957 (82) and later repeated in section 1 of the Act of July 14, 1960 [the so-called 'Fair Share Refugee Act' (83)] :

> "... the term 'refugee-escapee' means any alien who, because of persecution or fear of persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion has fled or shall flee
> - from any communist, communist dominated or communist occupied area or, ...
> - [.... area of the Middle East] ".

The definition of refugee-escapee corresponds closely to the definition of the notion "refugee" as used in the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and its subsequent Protocol of 1967. Both ~~Convention~~ and Protocol were the basis for the refugee definition used in the INA of 1952 section 101,(42),(A) [as amended,(84)].

There is a definite relation between the notion of "Soviet bloc defector" and the double term "refugee-escapee". The 1957 and 1960 immigration legislation used the double term as recipient of a special category of immigrant visas. In order to obtain such a visa, the basic conditions for refugee status had to be met. But contrary to the present legislation on refugees, which does not specify a geographic origin, the 1957 and 1960 legislation was targeted towards refugees escaping (= defecting ?) from any Communist, Communist-dominated or Communist occupied areas (another area indicated in this legislation was the Middle East). In as far as those refugees were escaping from Communist areas and probably corresponded to the criteria of what a Soviet bloc defector is, one can say that they were defectors in that sense.

III. DISPLACED PERSONS.

The term "displaced persons" was used extensively during and in the aftermath of World War II. It applied to persons who as result of actions of the Nazi, fascist or similar regimes had been deported from, or had been obliged to leave their country of nationality or former habitual residence. This included persons who were compelled to undertake forced labor or who were deported for racial, religious or political reasons (85) .

An interesting question is to determine whether some displaced persons could be labeled "Soviet bloc defectors"? Once the four basic elements of the definition are positively identified, a DP might also be identified as a Soviet (bloc) defector:

* Being a citizen of the Soviet Union;
* Escaping illegally;
* Escaping the authority and control of the Soviet Government;
* Escaping against the will of the Soviet Government.

The term Soviet bloc government has here been transformed into "Soviet government" because that was the only country being communist during and at the end of WW II. Beside the fact that it was the Soviet government which at that time was controlling vast territories even if they didn't belong to the USSR.

Following example will illustrate the problem:

> "The woman, Irina Karsavina, was taken by the Germans from Kiev to Germany for forced labor. When Germany surrendered she looked with alarm into the future. As she writes:
>
> 'I knew the Soviet system with its far reaching insidious system of force and coercion. I had long before comprehended and condemned its crimes

> against my people. The thought alone of returning to the USSR made me shiver. ... I knew that I could not go back to the Soviet Union. But how to escape repatriation? Soviet officers were all over Würtemberg. They could grab me and put me behind bars without asking the French authorities. The French were of no help either. They arrested at least one Russian, an engineer, who lived across the street from us and handed him over to the Soviet Repatriation Mission ... The last contingents of Russian repatriates were going East. The Soviet Repatriation Mission sent order after order instructing me to report to the nearest camp ...
> The French shrugged their shoulders in answer to my request, the Germans threatened me with arrest. The Burgomaster called me in and announced that if I didn't leave for camp the next day, he would call the police'.
>
> This woman finally went back with the last repatriates to the Soviet occupation zone where she was interrogated by the NKVD filtering commission. She hoped to find another chance to escape. She managed to survive in a Soviet repatriation camp as a member of an entertainment troop. Letters from home gave clear hints that repatriates were being persecuted and exiled. The message was clear: do not return. She was later recruited for a job at a chemical factory in Germany. Finally, she and a few others managed to cross the border under very risky and dangerous circumstances into the American zone with the help of a German guide.(86)

Following points can be made in favor of considering her as a Soviet defector:

* This DP was a Soviet citizen;

* She was escaping illegally, since escaping without any official documents was equal to being shot if apprehended leaving the Soviet sector.
  All Soviet citizens were under strict orders of the Soviet Repatriation Mission to return to the Soviet zone and in addition to that, could be arrested by Soviet officers, even inside the French zone (in this case).

* This DP was certainly escaping the authority and control of the Soviet Union since the Soviet officers of the Repatriation Mission had the power to grab every Soviet citizen, even inside the French zone, without asking the French for any authorization and that escaping from the Soviet zone was punishable by death or long prison terms if caught.

* The same arguments prove also that escaping as in this case, occurred against the will of the Soviet government.

We may thus contend that at least for a certain number of DPs the term Soviet (bloc) defector would be appropriate.

IV. DEPORTATION, EXPULSION, EXILE AND BANISHMENT.

Deportation, expulsion, exile and banishment can all be defined as an administrative measure by which a person is either removed from a country by its authorities to another country or taken away from one place of residence and confined in another place, still inside the same country.

This broad definition covers the external as well as the internal exile or deportation in addition to the deportation regulations and practices of countries as opposed as the USA and the USSR.

A. Exile: self-imposed or government imposed.

Exile can be understood in the first place as an action imposed by a government (or other administrative authorities) of a country upon one of its nationals, whereby that person is banished to another country or removed to another part of his country of nationality.

But it also covers a decision taken by an individual to leave his country as a way of protesting a particular regime or situation in his country, or because that person feels threatened. This latter form of exile can be called self-imposed exile.

B. Exile: internal or external.

The United States doesn't know the concept of internal exile and certainly not the way it has been practiced before and after the October revolution in the Soviet Union. Andrei Sakharov is a well known example of internal exile in Gorki as was Yury Orlov until he release and travel to the United States in October 1986. Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn can be considered (as well as Yury Orlov since his arrival in the USA) an external exile.

Another important feature is that in principal only nationals of a country are exiled. When it comes to foreigners, one rather would speak of expulsion or deportation.

C. Deportation, Expulsion, Banishment.

The nature of deportation, banishment or expulsion is not as uniform as the concept of exile is. The Soviet practice of deportation covers not only the expulsion of aliens (= non-Soviets), but also the forceful "relocation" of entire groups of people (e.g. the forced removal of the Tatars from the Crimea area during WW II. (87)

According to American law, only aliens can be deported from US soil. An alien is defined by the INA of 1952 as "any person not a citizen or national of the USA" (88). That implies that no American citizen (= born with the American citizenship) can be deported whatever the type of misconduct with which he is chargeable. The only but important exceptions are when an American loses his citizenship through expatriation (89) and secondly, through denaturalization. Denaturalization relates only to naturalized citizens and entails a judicial process premised on impropriety in the naturalization process (90). In June of 1986, a federal appeals court in Philadelphia ordered a Lithuanian born immigrant stripped of his citizenship for lying about his activities during WW II. This immigrant had made material misrepresentations about his background when he entered the USA in 1948 and obtained citizenship in 1954 (91). After his denaturalization, this person becomes an alien, subjected to deportation.

V. EMIGRE & IMMIGRANT.

According to Black's Law Dictionary, an immigrant is someone who leaves a country to permanently settle in another (92) and an emigre is someone who leaves his country for any reason with the intention not to return, with the design to reside elsewhere (93).

The INA of 1952 defines in section 101 (a),(15) an immigrant as an alien , i.e. any person not a citizen or a national of the United States.

Even if Soviet bloc defectors escape their countries, they nevertheless are a special type of emigré. And from the US standpoint (including and especially the immigration legislation), Soviet bloc defectors are immigrants.

CONCLUSION.

The identification, description and analysis of the different basic elements has made clear that the generic definition of the term "defector", presented in this paper, covers an amount of people that becomes quite sizable when applied to the Soviet bloc countries. This as such is a characteristic of totalitarian communist regimes.

The definition of the notion "Soviet bloc defector", as set forth at the outset of the study, consequently underscores the fact that Soviet bloc defections are not confined to high-level people valued in the West (and especially by the intelligence services) for their experience and knowledge acquired in the upper strata of the communist regimes (party officials, intelligence and military officers, etc ...), but also reflects a phenomenon that permeates all social layers of communist societies.
Whether one is a Soviet bloc ambassador, an intelligence offcer, a simple conscript, a physician or a locksmith, most citizens of the Soviet bloc are not allowed to exercise the ancient common prerogative of all people, the freedom to leave his own country his/her own country and to return to it freely. In this context, exhibit #2, a Radio Liberty document entitled "Twenty Reasons For Not Granting An Exit Visa", on the inability for Soviet citizens to leave the country. It is a compiled list of formulations used by Soviet officials instead of explaining the reasons for the refusal to grant exit visas. Although new Soviet legislation has been introduced with regard to entering and leaving the USSR as of January 1, 1987, it is doubtful that above-mentioned right will get full recognition.

Furthermore, it also implies that if the right to leave and return freely to its own country (art. 13,2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) would be fully recognized by the Soviet bloc countries, defection would not be a mass phenomenon as it has been over the past decades, although the main reason for the mass defections continue to be the type of society created by totalitarian communist regimes and their management of it.

The generic definition does not of course diminish the value and usefulness of the more functional type of definition, which is construed for more specific reasons. The advantage of the generic approach is that it creates a total picture, which in itself promotes a better understanding of a complex reality.

But formulating this global definition with regard to Soviet bloc defectors also has its consequences as far as defector's handling is concerned. Indeed, defector's handling will be commensurate with the size of the definition, though it is obvious that the nature of the handling will differ in function of the different categories of Soviet bloc defectors. A high-level military or intelligence official defecting will have to be treated differently than a 19 or 20 year old soldier or student who defects to the West. But it is obvious that defector's handling is not confined to just the high-level defectors. It encompasses a whole range of different people of unequal value, importance, having very contrasting experience and knowledge but nevertheless deserving a fair treatment.

Another main point that appears more distinctly is the link between "defector" and "political asylum". Both notions are closely related to each other although not necessarily identical. Most Soviet bloc defectors will request and obtain political asylum in the

US. As such political asylum becomes part of their status in this country which might evoluate into US citizenship after a certain number of years.

This paper does not attach too much importance to the distinction that has been made between "escapees" and "defectors", whereby the former would cover those Soviet bloc citizens who physically escape from their country by crossing into the West, and the latter term would only indicate those Soviet bloc citizens who decided not to return once legally arrived in the West. Both are considered in this study as defectors since it is not important how and where Soviet bloc citizens came to stay in the West, but rather the fact that they decided to break their bond of allegiance with their country.

A last important remarque is that this study has directly and indirectly shown that Soviet bloc defection being such a large phenomenon is in reality is the embodiment of Soviet bloc countries not respecting the basic human rights, one of them being the right to leave and return freely to one's own country. If people were not denied basic rights such as the freedom of speech, religion, press, of assembly and above all, the freedom to choose their own politcal system and the right to take their own destiny into their hands, the need to defect would not be felt, if at all. Soviet bloc defections would be down to a trickle.

EXHIBIT #1
ART. 64 Criminal Code of the RSFSR

EXHIBIT #1.

Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR reads as follows:

a)

High treason, i.e., an act deliberately carried out by a citizen of the USSR, to the detriment of the sovereignty, territorial inviolability or state security and defense capability of the USSR; desertion to the side of the enemy; espionage; transfer of a state or military secret to a foreign government; flight across the border or refusal to return within the border of the USSR; rendering to a foreign government of assistance in carrying out hostile activities against the USSR, and equally, conspiracy with the goal of seizure of power,

is punishable by imprisonment for a period from 10 to 15 years with confiscation of property and / or with or without exile from one to five years, or by execution with confiscation of property.

b)

A citizen of the USSR, enlisted by a foreign intelligence service for carrying out of hostile activities against the USSR, is freed from criminal responsibility, if he, in executing his assigned criminal act, does not carry out any sort of action and voluntarily informs the organs of authority of his connections with a foreign intelligence service.

Law of the RSFSR of July 25, 1962 as amended by the Decree of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR of January 30, 1984, published respectively in the Register of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, no. 29, 1962, p. 449 and no. 5, 1984, p. 168.

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RL 426/86 November 10, 1986

TWENTY REASONS FOR NOT GRANTING AN EXIT VISA*

Julia Wishnevsky

Summary: This summer, a group of Soviet citizens who had been refused permission to leave the Soviet Union to live with their spouses and children in the United States compiled a list of formulations used by Soviet officials instead of explaining the reasons for the refusal to grant them exit visas.

On November 5, members of the Soviet delegation to the thirty-five-nation Helsinki follow-up conference that opened in Vienna on November 4 announced that the Soviet government had decided to publish new legal measures governing the procedures for travel abroad by Soviet citizens. A USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gennadii Gerasimov, explained that a decree to this effect had been adopted and would come into force on January 1, 1987. It would obligate officials of the Soviet agency concerned to issue a ruling on an application to leave the country within one month of the application being submitted. In the case of a death in the family, foreign travel requests would have to be answered within three days. Gerasimov said special restrictions on traveling abroad would apply only to citizens privy to state secrets, involved in unresolved property disputes, or charged with a crime.[1] Reporting from Moscow on November 8, Serge Schmemann of The New York Times stated that, under the terms of the new decree, in the event of an application for an exit visa being refused, the applicant would be informed of the reasons for the refusal.[2]

---

* Translation of RS 182/86.

[1] AP, November 5, 1986. The decree was also mentioned by the chief Soviet delegate to the Vienna conference, Yurii Kashlev, at a press conference in Moscow on October 29, 1986; see RL 412/86, "Yurii Kashlev to Head Soviet Delegation to Helsinki Follow-Up Conference in Vienna," October 30, 1986.

[2] The New York Times, November 8, 1986.

Whether the decree will actually make it easier to emigrate from the Soviet Union remains to be seen. The clause regarding "special restrictions" obviously leaves the Soviet authorities plenty of leeway for arbitrary decisions. In the past, "being in possession of state secrets" and the lack of a financial waiver from the would-be emigre's parents or divorced spouse were the most frequent grounds for refusing permission to emigrate.[3]

Nevertheless, the very fact that a decree of this kind is to be published represents a big step forward. Until now, no law of any kind governing travel abroad by Soviet citizens existed. The procedure for traveling abroad either as a tourist or for permanent residence in another country was hitherto regulated exclusively by departmental directives, most of them secret.[4] Those directives that have found their way into samizdat make fairly depressing reading.[5]

One of the most interesting points in the new decree is that applicants will now be told why their application has been refused. Previously, people who have asked why their applications have been refused, have as a rule, been fobbed off with some brusque reply. Some months ago, a group of Soviet citizens who had been refused permission to join their foreign spouses and children abroad compiled a "Phraseological Dictionary of Refusals." The dictionary contains a list of twenty formulations employed by officials at both the Moscow and republican branches of OVIR in reply to inquiries why applications have been refused.[6]

According to the authors of the dictionary, a copy of which recently reached the West through samizdat channels, officials at OVIR most frequently use the formulation "Your emigration to join your wife (or husband) is undesirable." The officials never, however, explain for whom their emigration is undesirable or how long their emigration will remain undesirable. The other formulations in the dictionary are used with more or less equal frequency:

> "Your emigration to join your wife (husband) in the USA runs contrary to the interests of the state."
>
> "We do not need such families."

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[3] See RL 197/86, "Some of the Formalities Soviet Citizens Face in Exercising Their Right to Go Abroad," May 20, 1986.

[4] See RL 197/86 and RL 409/86, "Izvestia Condemns Unpublished Directives," October 29, 1986.

[5] AS 1083, 5053, and 5054. These and other samizdat documents concerning the procedures involved in obtaining permission to travel abroad are summarized in detail in RL 197/86.

[6] AS 5802.

"You will leave, but we don't know when."

"You cannot leave because of the bad international situation."

"You will never be able to leave."

"Of course you will be able to leave eventually."

"Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are bad at the moment."

"You yourself know the reason for the refusal."

"You don't have to know why you have been refused, it is enough that we know."

"The reason for the refusal is a state secret."

"No matter whom you ask, no one will tell you why you have been refused."

"You should forget your husband, and your son should forget his father."

"No one has ever been able to leave the Soviet Union easily or quickly."

"For you no laws exist in this country."

"If it were up to us, we would gladly have given you a passport for foreign travel."

"Your wife (husband) knows the reason for the refusal."

"If you had come to us (OVIR) before you got married, we would have told you how many years you would have to wait. Now we cannot tell you."

"You may leave only by special order."

"Your case may be resolved more quickly in the event of the birth of a child or a serious accident."

With regard to the last formulation, the compilers of the "Phraseological Dictionary of Refusals" point out that many of the divided families have children, ranging in age from four months to thirty years. In no single case, however, has this led to them being reunited more quickly. With regard to a serious accident, the OVIR official has in one case proved to have been telling the truth. In 1985, Lidiya Agapova, a Soviet citizen, married a Swede, Kim Botvalde. In April of this year, Botvalde committed suicide. Agapova was promptly granted an exit visa to go to Sweden to attend her husband's funeral.[7]

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[7] AS 5802, p. 2 (footnote).

FOOTNOTES

(1) The Washington Post (TWP), May 29, 1987, p. A1; The New York Times (NYT), May 29, 1987, p. A1; The Washington Times (TWTi), May 29, 1987, p. 1A; See also notes for press release on General del Piño's interview with Radio Marti, made available by Radio Marti on June 30, 1987, 7pp in English.

(2) TWP, August 10, 1987, p. A11; NYT, August 10, 1987; TWTi, August 10, 1987 and also, Summary of comments by Major Florentino Aspillaga made in his interview with Radio Marti, Radio Marti, 5 pp. in English.

(3) TWTi, August 28, 1987, p. A6.

(4) SUNA in Arabic, August 23, 1987 as reported in FBIS, Near East and South Asia, August 25, 1987, (Sudan), p. G2.

(5) TWP, Feb. 9, 1987, p. A19; TWTi, Feb. 9, 1987, p. 7A; NYT, Feb. 9, 1987, p. A1 (picture) & article, p. A5 and TWP, Feb. 11, 1987, p. A23.

(6) Four Iranian weightlifters who took part in the Asian Games (Sept. 20 - Oct. 5, 1986) in Seoul, South Korea, defected to the Iraqi embassy. They requested and obtained political asylum from Iraq. See: TWTi, October 3, 1986, p. 6A; TWTi, October 9, 1986, p. A33; TWTi, Oct. 14, 1986, p. 6A.

(7) SAPA in English, August 3, 1987 as reported in FBIS, Soviet Union-Daily Report, August 4, 1987, p. F3.

(8) NYT, August 8, 1987, p. 8.

(9) NYT, August 8, 1986, p. A1; The Chicago Tribune, August 8, 1986, section 1, p. 1; TWP, August 8, 1986, p. A1; TWTi, August 8, 1986, p.1A; The Philadelphia Inquirer, August 8, 1986, p. 1-A; The Baltimore Sun, August 8, 1986, p. 1A.

(10) TWTi, November 26, 1986, p.6A.

(11) TWTi, April 28, 1987; La Libre Belgique (Brussels), April 3, 1987, p.8.

(12) Vladislav Krasnov, Soviet Defectors, The KGB Wanted List, Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, 1986, p.8.

(13) "Three In Truck Ram Through Berlin Wall", TWP, August 30, 1986, p. A1.

(14) Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure, Vol. 3 (Nationality), New York, Matthew Bender, April 1986, p. 11-7 (sec. 11.3a).

(15) For examples of feudal oaths see "Great Issues in Western Civilization", edited by Brian Tierney, Donald Kagan & L. Pearce Williams (Cornell University), Vol. I, New York, Random House, 1967, p. 257-258.

(16) The pledge of allegiance to the Flag reads as follows: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all".

(17) The generally prescribed form of the oath taken by applicants for naturalization, as set forth in 8 CFR 337.1, goes as follows:

" I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the armed forces of the United States when required by law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God ".

(18) The distinction between the words "state" and "country" are of great importance for Soviet bloc citizens in general and for Soviet bloc defectors in particular. As can be seen from the quote of Aleksei Myagkov at the beginning of this paper, the defectors break with the regime, the government, the state. They do not want to break with the country, which they consider the victim of the communist state. They do not consider themselves traitors towards their country. Quite the contrary, many defectors continue the struggle against the Communist state and regime with the hope that their efforts will bring about better days for their country and fellow citizens.

(19) Many European and American intellectuals were attracted by Communism ever since its appearance in the Soviet Union. Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Richard Wright and so many others believed that Communism would solve the problems of their own time and societies and bring universal relief. Koestler, Silone and Wright were all members of the Communist party (respectively the German, Italian and American one). Others were not members of a Communist party but were strong supporters of Communism as a doctrine. One among many was French writer André Gide who until his travel in the Soviet Union in June 1936 was greatly impressed with the achievements of Communism. After his return he was utterly disillusioned.

Koestler's, Silone's, Wright's and Gide's experiences with Communism (party and/or doctrine) are described in "The God That Failed", A Confession, edited by Richard Crossman, Harper and brothers, New York, 1949, 273 pp.

(20) American Journal of International Law, vol. 23, Special number, April 1929, p. 23 (draft conventions and comments on nationality, ..., prepared by the Research in International Law of the Harvard Law School).

(21) idem as (9), p.23.

(22) The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1973, p, 345.

(23) Expatriation has been defined as the voluntary surrender or abandonment of nationality or allegiance:

Gordon and Rosenfield, Vol. 3 (Nationality), p. 20-40 (sec. 20.7a);

Black's Law Dictionary, 1968 (4th rev. ed.), p. 685;

Expatriation relates to any citizen (born with US citizenship or acquired through naturalization). It presupposes that he acquired his citizenship properly. It entails no judicial process, but rather a finding that loss of citizenship occurred as the result of the citizen's voluntary action.

Denaturalization relates only to naturalized citizens and entails a judicial process premised on impropriety in the naturalization.
Gordon & Rosenfield, Vol. 3 (Nationality), p. 20-4 (sec. 20.1).

(24) The Miami Herald, August 8, 1986, p. 1A and 10A.

(25) The New York Times (further: NYT), January 10,1984 and the NYT, July 12, 1986, p.27. The latter article announced the death of Dean Reed under suspicious circumstances. According to his manager, however, (and some Western diplomats stationed in East Berlin) Mr. Reed would have died with a little help from the security apparatus because of a fear that he would turn on his socialist masters and "defect".

(26) The Washington Post (further: TWP), October 9, 1986, p. A29.

(27) TWTi, October 9, 1986, p. 6A.

(28) NYT, October 9, 1986, p. A6 and NYT, October 10, 1986.

(29) NYT, October 9, 1986, p. A6; TWTi, October 9, 1986, p. 6A; TWP, October 9, 1986, p. A29.

(30) Chapman Pincher, "Too Secret, Too Long", St Martin's Press, New York, 1984, p. 120;

John Ranelagh, "The Agency, The Rise And Decline Of The CIA, From Wild Bill Donovan to William Casey", New York, Simon & Schuster, 1986, p. 163n.

(31) Gordon Brook-Shepherd, "The Storm Petrels, The Flight Of The First Soviet Defectors", New York & London, Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1977, p. 141-142.

(32) Zolnierz Wolnosci (Daily of Polish Armed Forces), April 20, 1984.

(33) Trybuna Ludu, Daily of the Polish United Workers Party, in Polish, July 4 - 5, 1987, p.2 as reported in FBIS, EEU-DR, July 10, 1987, p. P13-P14.

(34) Zigmas Butkus, "Major Crimes Against the Soviet State", Law Library of the Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., 1985, p. 15.

(35) Idem as (34), p.16.

(36) For a short description of section 213 of the East German Criminal Code, see: Friederich-Christian Schroeder, "Das Strafrecht des Realen Sozialismus, Eine Einführung am Beispiel der DDR, Opladen, Westdeutscher Verlag, 1983, p. 90;

For the original text of section 213 CC, see: Gesetz zur Änderung und Ergänzung straf- und strafverfahrensrechtlicher Bestimmungen und des Gesetzes zur Bekämpfung von Ordnungswidrigkeiten (3. Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz), June 28, 1979 in: Gesetzblatt der DDR of July 2, 1979 (Teil I, no. 17), p. 143-144.

(37) For the text of the order-to-shoot stipulations, see: Gesetz über die Staatsgrenze der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (Grensgesetz) of March 25, 1982, par. 27 in Gesetzblatt der DDR, March 29, 1982, (Teil I, no. 11) p. 197 and following.

(38) Fr-Chr. Schroeder,"Das Strafrecht..." as in footnote (36).

(39) Idem as (12), p.5.

(40) Idem as (12), p.35.

(41) William R. Corson and Robert T. Crowley, "The New KGB, Engine of Soviet Power", New York, William Morrow and Company, 1985, p. 283-286;

Gordon Brook-Shepherd, "The Storm Petrels ...", as in (31), p. 80-82.

(42) See further in this paper, p. 22 and following.

(43) For the distinction between "country" and "state", see (18).

(44) Henry S.A. Becket, "The Dictionary of Espionage, Spookspeak into English", New York, Stein & Day, 1986, p. 52.

(45) Carol and John Garrard, "Defectors: The Soviet Achilles' Heel", draft paper, University of Arizona, January 1986, p.13.

(46) Bela Karoly, former trainer of Nadia Comaneci and of the Rumanian national gymnastic team cited as one of the reasons for his defection in March 1981, his long dissatisfaction with the Rumanian State Central Federation of Athletics. He could not tolerate chronic interference by the federation with his training methods, including those for Ms. Comaneci: NYT, April 12, 1981.

The East German swimming champion, Renate Vogel-Heinrich, defected because "we were guinea pigs. In East Germany sport is the means to an end. Successes were as exactly planned as the production of People's factory" : The Daily Telegraph, September 19, 1979, p. 36e.

Jan Czeberkus, a Polish sailor who jumped ship in Cleveland, Ohio, early August 1986, declared that the terrible living conditions and local and economic pressures forced him to defect : TWTi, August 7, 1986, p. 4A.

(47) American Journal Of International Law, vol. 23, spec. number, April 1929, p. 23.

(48) This basic relationship between a state and its citizens was expressed clearly by Justice Irédell in a Supreme Court decision of 1795 in the case Talbot v. Jansen: " ... As every man is entitled to claim rights in society, which it is the duty of the society to protect; he, in turn, is under a solemn obligation to discharge all the duties faithfully, which he owes, as a citizen, to the society of which he is a member ...": 3 US (3 Dall.) 162 , separate opinion.

(49) NYT, April 4, 1944, p. 1A.

(50) Statement by Arkady Shevchenko before the Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Human Rights and International Organizations and International Operations, October 29, 1985.

(51) Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Ballinger Co., 1985, p. 183.

(52) See p. 15 and following of this paper.

(53) Colonel Vernon Hinchley, The Defectors, London, George G. Harrap & Co. Ltd, 1967, p. 9.

(54) Col. Vernon Hinchley, The Defectors, p. 10.

(55) The story of "Farewell" is told by Thierry Wolton in Le KGB en France, published by Grasset, Paris, 1986, 310 pp.

The story appeared also in a two part series in Le Point, No 694 of January 12, 1986, pp. 75-79, and Le Point, No. 695 of January 19, 1986, pp. 74-80.

See also for details: The Washington Times, KGB at doorstep, Paris paper warns, January 13, 1986, p. 1A.
Time, Secret Admirer, A book exposes a double life, January 20, 1986, p. 31.
TWTi, Three in Congress once with KGB, says author, February 24, 1986, p. 2a.
TWTi, Bulgarian truckers run French vehicles off the roads, March 5, 1986, p. 8B.

(56) The basic statute, the INA of 1952, was amended in Sept. 1957, Oct. 1965, Oct. 20, 1976, Oct. 1978, the Refugee Act of 1980 and INA amendments of 1981. Another immigration bill passed Congress in the last days of the regular session of the 99th Congress.

(57) For the definition of REFUGEE: INA of 1952, sec. 101,(42),(A) as amended by sec. 201(a), Refugee Act of 1980.
For the definition of ASYLEE: INA of 1952, sec. 208,(a) as amended by sec. 201,(b), Refugee Act of 1980.

(58) The INA of 1952 as amended, does not make any difference any longer between a person inside or outside his country of nationality or habitual residence. But the person who is recognized by the President of the USA as a refugee inside his country, is only so under special circumstances, INA of 1952, sec. 101,(42),(B).

The 1951 UN Convention on Refugees and the 1967 UN Protocol on Refugees apply only to the people outside the boundaries of their own nation, SEE: Kathleen Newland, Refugees: The New International Politics of Displacement, Worldwatch paper # 43, March 1981, Worldwatch Institute, Washington, DC, p.9.

Prior to the Refugee Act of 1980, a refugee must have fled from the country of his nationality or habitual residence, SEE: Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration law ..., vol. I, 1986, pp. 2-187 (sec. 2.24Aa) and 2-188.6

(59) The Convention relating to the status of Refugees, signed in Geneva on July 28, 1951, United Nations - Treaty Series, 1954, vol 189, p. 150.

(60) The Protocol relating to the status of Refugees, New York, January 31, 1967, United Nations - Treaty Series, 1967, vol. 606, p. 267.

(61) See art. 33 of the UN Refugee Convention of 1951 and art. 3 of the Declaration on Territorial Asylum. The latter was adopted by unanimous consent by the General Assembly on December 14, 1967. A declaration does not have the binding value of a treaty. It expresses principles and serves as guidelines for national policies of UN member countries.

See also: Michael Teitelbaum, "Political Asylum in theory and practice", Public Interest, no. 76, Summer 1984, p. 75.

(62) Michael Teitelbaum, "Political Asylum in ...", p. 75.

This conservative definition has been criticized for its limitations. A more broader definition has been elaborated by the Organization of African Unity in its Convention on Refugees adopted in September 1969. This definition extends beyond the persecuted individual to whole groups of people fleeing from dangerous circumstances, SEE: Kathleen Newland, "Refugees: The New International Politics ... ", p. 9-12.

(63) Barry Stein, The United States and Asylum Policy: history and current approaches, paper presented at a conference on Refugees and the right of asylum in France and the United States, Paris, 14-15 March 1985, p. 2.

(64) Warren Christopher in his address before the Los Angeles County Bar Association on November 6, 1979 in: The Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 80, # 2034, January 1980, p. 36, 2nd col. bottom.

(65) Michael Teitelbaum, "Political Asylum ...", p. 74-75.

(66) About the US Asylum procedure, SEE: INA of 1952 as amended sec. 208 (a);
Also: Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration law ..., vol. I, 1986, p. 2-188.22(1) [sec. 2.24Af].

(67) The term "alien" means any person not a citizen or national of the United States, INA of 1952, sec. 101,(a)(3), 8 USC 1101,(a),(3).

(68) Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration ..., Vol. I, 1986, p. 2-188.22(2) [sec. 2.24 Af].

(69) William T. Lake, Statement before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on April 29, 1980, Department of State Bulletin, October 1980, p. 50, col. 1.

(70) Mr. William T. Lake was Deputy Legal Adviser at that time.

(71) The Pentecostals entered the US embassy in Moscow on June 27, 1978; see: NYT, July 4, 1978, p.2 and the NYT, August 12,1978, p. 107-108 and NYT, June 24, 1979, p.3

(72) The entry or admission into the country can be dealt with through the parole device or Public Law 110. See further in this paper .

(73) For a detailed description of description of the asylum procedure, see: Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration ..., Vol.I, 1986, pp. 2-188.22(1) to (25) and 2-188.23

(74) Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration ..., Vol. I, 1986, p. 2-188. 22(12) [sec. 2.24 Af].

(75) Gordon & Rosenfeld, Immigration ..., Vol.I, 1986, p. 2-368 to 375 [sec. 2.54].

(76) Grounds for legal struggle: US law on aliens & defectors, NYT, Nov. 6, 1985, p. A12.

(77) 50 USC 403h. This section was enacted as part of Act dated June 20, 1949, known as the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 (also known as Public Law 110).

(78) No alien can claim a right to enter the United States. Congress has sovereign and plenary power to determine which alien shall come. And even after he is permitted to enter, the alien acquires no vested right to remain, since he is subject to expulsion on grounds fixed by Congress, SEE:
Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration ..., 1986, p. 1-164 (sec.1.32).

Art. 1,3 of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum reads:
" It shall rest with the State granting asylum to evaluate the grounds for the grant of asylum".

(79) About the eligibility for refugee status, see:
INA of 1952, sec. 101,(42)(A);
Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration ..., vol. I, 1986, p. 2-188, (2.24 Ab).

(80) 8 CFR 208.14.

(81) Department of State Bulletin, vol. 28, #720, April 13, 1953, pp. 539-540.

(82) 71 Stat. 639, 643.

(83) 74 Stat. 504-505.

(84) See pp. 22-23 of this paper.
Section 101,(42),(A) of the INA of 1952 [as amended] reads:

" The term refugee means: Any person who is outside any country of such person' nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion".

(85) Constitution of the International Refugee Organization ..., United Nations Treaty Series, 1948, vol. 18, p. 19.

See also: Black's Law Dictionary, 1979, 5th ed., p. 423: A displaced person is "a person left homeless in his own country because of war".

(86) "Thirteen Who Fled" , a compilation of stories of Displaced persons, edited by Louis Fischer, New York, Harper & Brothers, 1949, p. 40 - 54.

(87) An estimated 800,000 Crimean Tatars were deported en masse to Central Asia in May 1944 as potential traitors. They presently are still denied the land they called home for centuries. Though formally rehabilitated in 1967, Tatars seeking restitution of their farm land on the Black Sea are, with a few exceptions, forcibly blocked from returning to it. SEE: Report transmitted to the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives by the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, titled "Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings & Recommendations two years after Helsinki", September 23, 1977, p. 33.

(88) INA of 1952, sec. 101,(a),(3), 8 USC 1101,(a),(3).

(89) For general consideration about expatriation: Gordon & Rosenfield, Immigration ..., Vol. 3 (Natioanlity), 1986, p. 20-4 [sec. 20.1] and p. 20-40 [sec. 20.7].

See also the definition in Black's Law Dictionary, 1968, 4th ed. rev., p. 685.

(90) For general remarks and the procedure of denaturalization See: Gordon and Rosenfield, Immigration ..., Vol.3 (Nationality), 1986, p. 20.4 and following [sec. 20.1 thru 20-6].

(91) The Washington Post, June 22, 1986, p. A14.

(92) Black's Law Dictionary, 1979, 5 ed., p.666.

(93) Black's Law Dictionary, 1979, 5 ed., p. 469.

EXHIBIT NO. 10

STATEMENT OF
VLADISLAV G. KRASNOV
TO
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
AT HEARING ON
U.S. HANDLING OF SOVIET DEFECTORS

SOVIET DEFECTORS: AN UNDERUTILIZED AND NEGLECTED HUMAN RESOURCE

Thank you very much for inviting me to testify concerning how to improve U.S. handling of Soviet defectors. Prior to my defection in Sweden in 1962 I served as an editor at Radio Moscow's Foreign Broadcast Division. I have been U.S. citizen since 1976 and am presently professor and associate of the Center for Contemporary Russian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California.

As a former Soviet propagandist I am acutely aware that Soviet leaders view the problem of defection with utmost alarm. They are always anxious to silence, to downplay, and to distort the true nature of every case of defection as well as to conceal from their adversaries that the problem worries them. Ever since my own defection I have been wondering why the free world, and the United States in particular, is so uncertain, inept and apologetic in its handling of Soviet defectors? It seems to me that Soviet defectors are the only wind-fall of information that the West can ever get from the USSR. So, why turn it down? Why not use this God-given human resource in the interests of U.S. national security and for the advancement of the cause of liberty throughout the world?

Since 1978 I have been able to study the phenomenon of defection professionally. My study resulted in a book, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List, which was published last year by the Hoover Institution Press. The purpose of my study was to assemble all factual information about post-World War Two defectors in a book that would "break the monopoly of government bureaucrats on dealing with defectors and [...] open the matter of defection... to public scrutiny." I expressed the hope that my book "would do what the government has failed to do: it would help (1) to establish a public tally of past, present, and future defectors; (2) to emphasize their importance for our understanding of the USSR; and (3) to assure future defectors all the publicity they deserve, since publicity has proved to be the only guarantee that their human rights are not tossed into a bureaucratic wastebasket... (p. 4)."

The subtitle of the book, "The KGB Wanted List," refers to one of my major sources, a KGB document smuggled out from the USSR by a prominent emigre organization, the NTS (Alliance of Russian Solidarists). The full name of this document, in my English translation, reads: "The Alphabetical List of Agents of Foreign Intelligence, Traitors to the Motherland, Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Collaborators, and Other Wanted Criminals." It is more than just a list, for each entry contains an about half-a-page summary of the KGB files on these "criminals." Having found my own entry and convinced of its authenticity, I selected 470 cases of post-war defection (1945 - 1969) from among other "criminals" and subjected them to a computer-assisted statistical analysis, the discussion of which forms the bulk of my book (Part Two).[1]

Among my major findings are the following:

(1) Defection, defined as leaving the country or staying abroad contrary to the wishes of the Soviet government, is inherent in the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime and thus a consequence of a fundamentally defective system;

(2) Defection has plagued the regime from its very inception; during the post World War Two period it became part and parcel of popular discontent, a form of protest that seeks an outside outlet because there are no provisions for its domestic expression;

(3) Unlike the dissident and human rights movement which have been mostly confined to Soviet intellectuals, defectors come from all walks of life, all social, professional, and ethnic groups, including members of the Soviet elite, Communist Party, KGB, and the Russian ethnic majority;

(4) Before August 1961 when the Berlin Wall was constructed and the Western borders of the Soviet empire fortified, the majority of defectors were ordinary conscripted soldiers (mostly

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[1] Part One contains an overview of what has been written about Soviet defectors, of what defectors have written about themselves, and of the State Department interviews with defectors during the 1950s. Part Three, based on newspaper accounts, discusses defections between 1969 and 1984.

of peasant and workers' background) from Soviet troops in Germany;

(5) Since 1961, members of the Soviet elite (intellectuals, artists, and officials permitted to travel abroad), merchant sailors, and fishermen have displaced soldiers as the predominant defecting groups;

(6) Despite a sharp drop in the number of death penalties meted out by Soviet courts, in absentia, for the mere act of defection (prior to 1961 virtually all soldiers and many civilians were routinely sentenced to death), the Soviet government has continued to strengthen preventive and punitive measures, such as fortification of the borders, stricter laws, tighter selection procedures for travellers abroad, hostaging of relatives, keeping tabs on defectors, coaxing them into returning home, seeking a speedy return of would-be-defectors by foreign authorities, and making propaganda lessons of their return;

(7) In spite of the above, there seemed to be, at least until November 1985, a trend toward a higher annual rate (an average of about 20 for the entire period, with about 25 defecting in 1984) and higher social caliber of defectors. Unless the Soviet regime is fundamentally reformed so that basic human rights, including the right of emigration and freedom of expression, are respected, defection will continue to afflict it as a hemorrhage afflicts a hemophiliac.

Although the handling of Soviet defectors on this side of the iron curtain was not a primary focus of my study, I found ample evidence to suggest that such treatment has been usually less than satisfactory, often inept, and sometimes abominable. I drew particular attention to a number of questionable practices employed by U.S. officials in respect to would-be Soviet defectors during the era of detente, beginning with the scandalous return to the USSR of the Soviet sailor Simas Kudirka on November 23, 1970. In spite of the new regulations issued on the order of President Nixon in the wake of the Kudirka incident, subsequent handling of Soviet defectors continued to show signs of ineptitude.

I questioned, for instance, the handling of Anatoly Chebotarev, a GRU major, who defected in October 1971 in Belgium. After being brought to the United States and exposing a Soviet spy network at NATO Headquarters he unequivocally stated on December 21, in the presence of a Soviet representative, that he "had come to the United States of his own free will and had no desire to return to the Soviet Union." Yet, two days later he disappeared from his Washington area safe house, and the next day the Soviet Embassy phoned the State Department that Chebotarev was in their custody and eager to return to the USSR. On December 26, after a brief interrogation by a INS officer at Kennedy Airport, Chebotarev was allowed to be flown to Moscow. Why were U.S. officials so cooperative with the Soviet efforts to sweep the incident under the rugs?

I also questioned the handling of and attitude toward such other defectors and would-be-defectors as Nikolay Artamonov, Valentin Zasimov, Aleksandr Kruglov, Irina Mamedova, and Andrey Berezhkov. Pointing out that the above cases took place under four different administrations, both Democratic and Republican, I noted "the same pattern of negligence; ineptitude; incompetence; and lack of sensitivity, compassion, and political will that characterized Kudirka's case (p.156)." I concurred with the conclusion of Smith Simpson, a retired U.S. diplomat, that there has been no improvement of our handling of defection since Kudirka and that "attitudes, not the lack of organizational devices... are at the root of many of our serious problems (p. 146)."

Some of the most pervasive attitudes that harm both defectors and U.S. national interests result from a general ignorance about the Soviet system, and about the phenomenon of defection, in particular. This ignorance often breeds suspicion and fear within our government agencies that many defectors are really Soviet spies in disguise. The combination of ignorance, suspicion and fear encourages the common bureaucratic tendency to play it safe and to pass the buck whenever possible. This is especially true if a defection occurs at the time when a host country is about to start some " delicate negotiations" with the USSR. The would-be-defector is liable to become a hostage to those negotiations.

To be sure, the Soviets would want to plant their "moles" in the guise of defectors, and we should always be on guard against such a possibility. However, my research, based on a internal Soviet document and non-classified Western accounts, shows very little evidence of Soviet success in this area. Moreover, our excessive suspicion often prevents us from taking full advantage of the invaluable information and insight defectors can give us about Soviet society. As long as the law of the land is "innocent until proven guilty," I fail to see why this principle should not be used to decide the fate of Soviet defectors whose return to the USSR is tantamount to years in the gulag and even death.

After climbing over a nearly insurmountable wall at the risk of death, Soviet defectors presently run into a number of stumbling blocks which few of them are prepared to face. I am not speaking here only of such usual hardships, as cultural shock and linguistic barriers, which all immigrants and refugees have to go overcome. I am rather speaking of those stumbling blocks which Soviet defectors have to face as a distinct group among all other immigrants and refugees. Some of those stumbling blocks are a consequence of Soviet defectors' ignorance of the outside world, others stem from the West's ignorance about the nature of the Soviet system. It is in the interest of the Soviet regime to foster and perpetuate these both kinds of ignorance, as it is in the interest of the United States to dispel them.

As far as would-be-defectors are concerned, their attempt at defection is always a jump into the unknown. Their information about the outside world is both scant and distorted by Soviet propaganda. They may not know anything about the country in which they defect as an opportunity arises. They know little about immigration laws and procedures in the West. For fear of being discovered, they must avoid any systematic planning and preparation. Having heard so much from Soviet propaganda about "the anti-Communist designs" of Western governments, some defect on the naive assumption that they will receive a hero's welcome in the West and treated as cherished allies in a common struggle. In addition, Soviet citizens have lived under Communism for so long and became so used to a total dependence on the state, that they find it extremely difficult to adjust to a free society where self-reliance and individual initiative are indispensable. Victims of the Soviet system, Soviet defectors easily submit to the mercy of Western bureaucrats who handle them. They frequently find themselves caught in the vise of having exposed themselves as the "traitors" to the Soviets, but without gaining the trust of their Western handlers. Lacking an awareness of their individual rights, they resign themselves to fate if the decision is negative. The crafty Soviet diplomats are eager to snatch them back in the nick of time, whereas Western bureaucrats seem to cooperate with the Soviets by default, by simply agreeing to have the incident "closed" quickly and irrevocably.

The bureaucratic ignorance about defectors reflects the prevailing public misconception of the USSR as a just another social system or another national state which, whatever defects it might have, is essentially a "mirror image" of our own. Hence, on the one hand, the tendency to treat defectors as "traitors" and "turncoats," as they have been indeed listed in some Western reference books. The very term "defector" is pejorative in origin because it suggests that there is something "defective" about the person who chooses to flee at the risk to his life. On the other hand, there is a tendency to lump defectors with other categories of refugees and immigrants. There are, however, compelling reasons to treat Soviet defectors as a distinct group not to be confused with others trying to enter the United States.

First, Soviet defectors should not be confused with illegal immigrants. By defecting they act in conformity with the U.N.Declaration of Human Rights that "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." By seeking asylum in the United States they act in conformity with U.S. laws and long-standing tradition of helping those fleeing from persecution. If they violate any law it is a Soviet law which in itself is a violation of international law.

Second, Soviet defectors should be distinguished from legal immigrants from repressive non-Communist countries, such as Chile, Haiti, or South Africa. If they return or are made to return to the USSR, they will be severely punished and blackmailed to the rest of their life for the mere attempt at defection, even though they may have never engaged in any anti-government activities in the USSR or abroad.

Third, Soviet defectors should not be confused with the legal Soviet emigres of predominantly Jewish (and also some of Armenian and German) origin, of whom over 300,000 have left the USSR since 1970 and about 100,000 settled in the USA. These emigres are selected by Soviet authorities from among a large pool of applicants; defectors, by contrast, seeing no chance for legal emigration, decide to flee at great risk to their life and well-being.

Fourth, defectors should not be confused with Soviet World War Two refugees who often and en masse found themselves outside Soviet borders against their own will.

Fifth, although the plight of Soviet defectors is similar to that of defectors from other Communist countries, it is still in many ways more difficult. For one thing, it is more difficult to obtain a chance for defection because of stricter Soviet rules at the border and for travelling abroad. Also, Soviet defectors often face considerably greater difficulties in adjusting to their new countries because Russia has lived under Communism for a much longer period. Moreover, Soviet defectors of ethnic Russian background often have to face an additional psychological problem of being perceived "unpatriotic" and even "betraying" Russia rather than the Soviet regime.

Finally, Soviet defectors should be distinguished from others because they come from the most secretive society in the world, the one which constitutes by far the gravest threat to the national security of the United States and to the cause of liberty throughout the world. Therefore the United States should make every effort to obtain the maximum possible benefit from these "natural allies."[2] Incomparably smaller in number than any other category of refugees and immigrants, Soviet defectors deserve the highest priority for both humanitarian and national security reasons. Soviet defectors are the one group which, being in the greatest need for help, also has the greatest potential of helping the United States in a number of crucial ways.

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[2] Further confusion is introduced when the media routinely apply the term "defectors" to those in the West who choose to live in the Soviet Union. A recent example is the Lockshin family. The public is fed the distorted notion that free travel from the West is the equivalent of escaping from the Soviet Union.

The usefulness of Soviet defectors to the United States must not be measured solely in terms of the contribution some of them are making to our intelligence-gathering apparatus. I can easily imagine that some Soviet defectors with the KGB or GRU connection have saved the United States billions of dollars by providing intelligence information on Soviet military planning, weapons technology, and spy operations. But the greatest contribution to U.S. national security should be sought in the insights into the nature and the mode of operation of the Soviet system that all defectors (of whom the KGB operatives are but a tiny minority) can provide, individually and collectively. Although their contribution to our knowledge of the USSR cannot be measured in dollars, it is crucial to our survival as a free nation.[3]

My concerns about U.S. inability to handle Soviet defectors were woefully justified by the Miroslav Medvid, Aleksandr Sukhanov, and Vitaly Yurchenko incidents in Fall 1985. All three cases showed signs of professional incompetence and insensitivity to the would-be-defectors' situation. All three cases demonstrated the lack of a coherent political will. As a result, they greatly embarrassed the United States and, conversely, saved a lot of problems for the Soviet Union. They happened at the time when my book was being printed, but in the book I warned that such incidents are bound to happen and called for a new policy toward Soviet defectors that would both assure their human rights and maximally satisfy U.S. national security needs. More specifically, I recommended that the United States should:

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[3] I am leaving aside for the moment the importance of defectors in undermining the image of societal unanimity projected by Soviet propaganda both at home and abroad. There is much room for improvement here in the work of such government sponsored outlets as Radio Liberty and the Voice of America, as well as in private media coverage.

> 1. Proclaim and implement a genuine open-door policy [according to which Soviet defectors] would be exempt from regular immigration procedures and allowed an immediate entry, residence, and work permit in the United States;
> 2. Encourage our allies to do the same;
> 3. Champion defectors' rights in the U.N. Human Rights Commission and other international organizations;
> 4. Make sure that every defection is publicized, whenever a defector does not have serious objections;
> 5. Provide free legal counsel to any would-be defector;
> 6. Encourage and facilitate contacts between a new defector and local emigre communities;
> 7. Encourage and stimulate the creation of a public [or private, I would now add . - V.K.] agency with the aim of facilitating practical details of resettlement and adjustment (such as job referral, language training, and loans for re-education) as soon as all national security precautions had been taken (p. 164).

The need for a new approach to defectors was underscored by the fact that while my book was being written, a group of concerned Americans founded the Jamestown Foundation with the expressed goal of providing "a private support system to enable [defectors] to lead a productive life." The creation of The Jamestown Foundation was a very positive development, and I am glad to acknowledge its efforts. However, in as far as the Jamestown Foundation has chosen to limit its activities to the "cultivation and utilization of high-level defectors" and to refrain from questioning our present policy as a whole, it can be helpful only in alleviating the problem, not in solving it.

By restricting its assistance to "high-level" defectors, the Jamestown Foundation belies its own historical name. Never since its first settlement in Jamestown in 1607, was America meant to be a sanctuary "for big wigs only." I am afraid that by rejecting those whom it finds at lower levels, the Jamestown Foundation is sending the wrong message for present and future escapees from the USSR, namely, that even in America some are more equal than the others. One cannot help thinking that the course of history would have been quite different, had the ancient Egyptians turned Joseph and Mary away at the border for not being "high level" people.

But even if one were to accept the notion that, because of lack of funds, more important defectors should be given priority, I doubt whether the Jamestown Foundation can make such selection, simply because it is not familiar with the total pool of defectors. Therefore, the most urgent task is the task of taking stock of all Soviet defectors living in the free world. This is a task for which my book was but a beginning.

Furthermore, we need to have more definitive answers to such questions as: How many Soviet defectors are there world-wide? How many are in the USA? (According to my data, by 1971 less than one-third were settled here, p.84). Where do they live and what do they do? Is there anything they know that we don't but ought to? What kinds of expertise each of them can possibly offer? What do they think about the way they were handled? What specific recommendations for improving our handling of defectors do they have?

In order to answer these and other questions, a unified Data Bank system, that includes computerized files on all defectors, ought to be created . Secondly, all new defections should be monitored, a task which can be best carried out in cooperation with U.S. government and our allies. (Tracking down all newspaper accounts is not enough because there may be some defections that are unreported). After establishing the Data Bank and Monitoring systems, all defectors from the USSR, including those who do not wish to settle in the USA, should be interviewed in a systematic and scholarly fashion. Only on the basis of such interviews can their relative importance for U.S. national security needs--and not merely for our intelligence-gathering agencies--be properly assessed. Interview questions should be carefully selected by a team of sovietologists and government officials in close consultation with qualified former defectors. All interviews should be entered into a permanent public record and disseminated to scholars, government officials and the public at large. Even though some of these interviews may prove irrelevant to the immediate U.S. national security needs, collectively and over a longer period they will undoubtedly serve as an important source for understanding and predicting Soviet behavior. More than anybody else, Soviet defectors can help us feel the pulsebeat of the Soviet system. At the same time, hearing them out will certainly have a therapeutic effect on those who had been driven to defection by a desire to tell the truth but never had a chance to do it.

Since the events of Fall 1985 which caused the present hearing, there were over thirty Soviet defections world-wide, according to my admittedly incomplete tally. This number suggets a reversal of the previously observed trend toward a higher annual rate of defection. The reversal seems to be due chiefly to three factors. The first one has to do with the improvement of Soviet domestic climate under Mikhail Gorbachev in so far as the policy of glasnost' offers a hope for those would-be-defectors whose actions are impelled by a desire to express their thoughts and feelings on Soviet domestic problems. The second has to do with a more mature, more sophisticated, and more effective KGB approach to defection (and emigration, in general) which found its expression in such gestures as inviting Mikhail Baryshnikov and Natalia Makarova to perform in the USSR, as well as in the flirting with a number of prominent emigres. The third factor deterrent to the post-October 1985 defections is of our own making. It stems from the failure of U.S. government to match the above Soviet actions with a more sophisticated approach of its own. The U.S. handling of Medvid, Sukhanov, and Yurchenko has manifested that failure by signalling to the Soviets that the Reagan administration is long on anti-Communist rhetoric but short on action.

In spite of the above, Viktor Gudarev, a KGB officer in Greece, defected in February 1986; Oleg Agraniants, another KGB officer, fled from the Soviet Embassy in Tunis in May 1986; Vladimir Morozov, a Moscow journalist, defected in West Germany in October 1986; Yuri Krasnov and Liubov' Pisarenkova, circus artists, sought political asylum at U.S. Embassy on Seyshell Islands in September 1986; Valery Polianin, a sailor, and Viacheslav Polozov, a singer, defected in Japan during Spring of 1986; two Soviet soldiers attempted to defect to Finland in June 1986, a third one crossed the border to West Germany in May 1987, while Roman Svistunov, a young collective farmer, flew his crop-dusting plane to Sweden also last May. This is just a sample pf the kind of people who are not satisfied with the narrow limits of Gorbachev's _glasnost'_. This is the kind of people who can best help us read the pulsebeat of the Soviet system at the crucial time when it stands at the threshold of possibly fundamental changes to which this country cannot be indifferent.

Speaking of the necessity to stop Soviet expansion, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn once said that "today even a fully united Western world can no longer prevail except by allying itself with the captive peoples of the communist world." Those who have managed to escape from the captivity against the greatest odds have certainly gone more than half a way toward the West. They have the right to expect the West take some demonstrable steps toward them.

Respectfully submitted on September 4, 1987 by

Vladislav Krasnov

Vladislav Krasnov

EXHIBIT NO. 11

STATEMENT BY THE FORMER KGB MAJOR STANISLAV LEVCHENKO

1. Importance of defectors for the national interest of the USA.

In my view, this country benefits from Soviet bloc defectors for the following reasons:

- Defectors, especially those who had been Soviet intelligence officers or had held official position in the Soviet hierarchy are a unique source of human intelligence. Sometimes information obtained from them is more valuable than that obtained from the "assets" still working inside the Soviet system, because operational contract with such assets is risky and meetings with them always are limited in time.

Defectors provide government of this country with in-depth insight of various aspects of the Soviet decision-making process, analysis of history and current development of various problems from the point of problem's origin; defectors have provided and continue to provide the American government with unique knowledge of methods of operations of Soviet intelligence, structure of the Soviet intelligence and counter-intelligence services, analysis of past and present agent cases, personality profiles of Soviet officials, information on the current level of the Soviet technology, morals and degree of combat readiness of the Soviet armed forces, tactical and strategic goals of the Soviet military establishment and other information vital to the national security of this country.

- Many defectors contribute to education of the members of American government, and academic and business communities on all abovementioned subjects, and also on the mentality of the Soviet leadership, Soviet socialist bureaucracy, the national psychology of the peoples of the Soviet Union. With the few exceptions, there are no people working for the U.S. Government, members of the academic community or researchers working for government or private "think tanks" who have truly deep understanding of the Soviet mentality and the motivation of Soviet bureaucrats. To have precise understanding of such things one has to be born, grow up and work in the Soviet Union.

- Whenever possible, at least some defectors are in a position to enhance the awareness of other free world countries of the threat the Soviet leadership presents to the rest of the world and on many aspects of domestic and external policy of the Kremlin.

- A number of defectors, if they choose to do so, can enhance the awareness of the American public and the citizens of other free world countries on the threat of the Soviet espionage, on the methods of operations of the KGB and the GRU, and on the methods of Soviet overt and covert propaganda efforts.

- Drawing on their knowledge of the Soviet decision-making mechanism and the problems inherent to the Soviet system, defectors can be quite instrumental in projecting future actions of the Soviet leadership in political, economic and military arenas.

- A variety of books written by defectors have already been written, and the number of such books is growing. These books are a useful source of information for anybody involved in Soviet research or simply interested in Soviet-American relations.

- Many defectors are capable of working as consultants for the numerous U.S. think tanks or of teaching in colleges and universities, thus making a contribution to the field of Soviet research, which is still quite inadequate in this country.

- And, finally, every successful defection of a Soviet official or intelligence officer to this country encourages other people still working for the Soviet system and who are secretly disenchanted with the Soviet socialism and with its leadership, to follow the example. That is why a single defection usually causes a "chain reaction" -- within a short period of time more defections take place.

2. Problems defectors experience in this country.

- Generally speaking, the attitude towards Soviet defectors in this country is quite positive. Individuals who are disappointed with the Soviet system and who want to become part of the free democratic society are welcomed to the United States. When I asked for political asylum in the United States during my stay in Japan in October 1979, the decision to grant me asylum was made within six hours, despite the fact that it was the middle of the night in Washington. Every government official I met at that time was genuinely friendly and concerned about my safety and well-being.

However, on broader basis, a lot of misunderstanding in regard to defectors still exists. Until a few years ago, some individuals working for the U.S. Government insisted that most defectors were double agents and should not be have been trusted. This attitude has never been substantiated by facts and, as is well know, this point of view have been repudiated by several U.S. Government agencies since then. Still, there are some people -- most of them are retired but still maintain considerable contacts in the government and in the media -- who still subscribe to this point of view and continue spreading it. The idea has also been picked up and perpetuated by some writers, both in fiction and non-fiction.

- Another serious problem is the lack of understanding of moral, cultural and psychological ordeal that most defectors go through during their first years in this country -- the time often called an "adjustment period". Many government officials and private individuals look upon defectors as some kind of "wackos", "different people", "unpredictable individuals", "people difficult to deal with." It is not unusual that cultural differences lead to serious misunderstandings and misjudgments. Sometimes these officials seek advice from psychologists or psychiatrists, not realizing that these professional also lack the understanding of such ethnic and cultural differences. Quite frequently these people forget that they are dealing with individuals who have spent most of their life under the dictatorial regime which proscribed them what to do, where to work, where and how to live. Most defectors had never dared to express their political views even to close friends, for fear of being persecuted. Unfortunately, many people in this country fail to realize that transition from being a slave of the socialist system to being a citizen of a free country can be an agonizing process.

All it takes to resolve this problem is to entrust contacts with the defectors to specialists on the Soviet Union, preferably Russian speaking, selecting people who are genuinely eager to help the defectors and to spend enough time and mental effort to understand their troubles. Formal, bureaucratic approach causes more damage than anything else.

- Most defectors experience serious difficulties in finding meaningful employment in this country. I am lucky because I an involved in a variety of professional activities which are morally satisfying and which make me feel as a useful member of the American society. But in the beginning of my new life here I had a disastrous experience with one of my first jobs here. In effect, I was hired as "bait" because my unusual background could attract clients for the company that hired me. It is true that I was a grown up man capable of making my own judgement. On the other hand, I did not have any experience in the business community in this country, and I had no means to find out that I was intentionally misled about my prospective job until it was too late. A routine check by my sponsors would have revealed that my qualifications and past experience did not have anything to do with this company's activities, which would have warned me to stay away from it.

Some of the Soviet defectors, especially those who had been KGB or GRU officers, have been tried by Soviet authorities in absentia and sentenced to death. I myself have been under this death sentence since 1982. Such individuals face a very specific problems in finding meaningful employment. Using their original name would give them credentials in professional circles, but would also jeopardize their security, especially if it is a full-time job that requires their presence in an easily identifiable place. Using the new name makes it difficult for them to prove their qualifications since they cannot refer to their past experience. Such defectors need constructive, thoughtful help in finding their place and reasonable prosperity in the United States. Some defectors, including myself, chose to take a calculated risk and lead a public life. Other prefer to keep low profile. Both groups, however, need better understanding of their problems and better and broader help in finding a meaning in their new life.

- Among many possibilities open to defectors in this country, teaching in a college or a university would seem to be a logical and desirable choice, beneficial both for the defector and the academic community. I, among others, tried to get such a job — all in vain, despite my qualifications and skills. I did not understand the futility of my attempts until after I had talked to some other defectors who had had similar experiences, and after I had had some frank discussions of this subject with my friends in academia. The reasons for my failure to find a teaching job were as simple as they were depressing — the faculties of many colleges and universities prefer not to employ defectors for fear that the defector, by virtue of his background and detailed knowledge of the Soviet system, would create an unfair competition for the more established members of the faculty. I don't want to imply that all American Sovietologists are incompetent -- some of them are the best in the world -- but it is true that many members of American academia would not look good in such "competition" because their knowledge of the Soviet Union is superficial, to say the least.

Given such resistance, some help for defectors who want to get teaching jobs or obtain academic grants is needed.

- Many defectors need assistance in obtaining health and life insurance. It is becoming increasingly difficult to get an individual health insurance which would provide reasonable coverage of medical expenses. It is even more difficult for people who have no a record of health problems. In such cases, insurance companies often issue policies with waivers for "pre-existing conditions" that often make policies meaningless. I've been trying to get medical insurance myself for several years, without success. Group insurance would be a solution, but one can only get such insurance from being a full-time employee of some company.

Without effective life and health insurance many defectors feel insecure, and such situation should be eliminated.

- I have a personal experience of being "used" by many people, especially during my first years in this country. Members of academia, writers, journalists, representatives of many think tanks had sought my expertise and then felt free to use the information I provided as their own ideas or findings, without bothering even to quote me. The reason for my falling into that trap was the fact that I was quite naive about the business relationships in this country, and also quite eager to show my gratitude for being accepted by this country. I would still gladly share my knowledge as a service to

American public, but in most situation I had found myself in, the result was only a benefit to private individuals who had used my knowledge for personal gain. Nobody ever advised me to get a lawyer to protects my interests and my rights. As far as I know, many other defectors have had similar experiences.

The point is that this exploitation not only deprives defectors of potential income -- many of these contributions should have been paid for on a consulting basis -- but it also deprives defectors of credit for their contributions that could be of great value in their potential search for employment. Another danger is that by extracting such knowledge but at the same time keeping the defectors from participating in the actual research projects, the defector finds himself being locked in the past, without any incentive to further his expertise and skills. Some defectors become professional "horse mouths", repeating the same thing as an old record.

- As far as I know, many defectors have legal right to get some help from the U.S. Government in case they experience legitimate difficulties. And, as I understand, such help is guaranteed by law and certain regulations. The problem is that in most cases defectors are not informed of their rights, and for a very simple reason: the bureaucracy does not want them to know about it so that they would not become "too demanding". As a consequence, it takes the bureaucracy weeks, months, and sometimes years to resolve simple problems, and some problems are never resolved. In my view, such practice should be changed.

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In my opinion, this country does more than any other country in the free world to make lives of defectors as productive and as prosperous as possible. Such an effort is a valuable contribution to the interests of the free world. United States of America always welcomed people who wanted to escape Communist oppression and persecution for their political and religious beliefs.

This is why it is important to overcome certain difficulties and misconceptions in handling defectors that still exists within the system.

Stanislav Levchenko
8/8/87

STATEMENT OF
IGOR LUKES

EXHIBIT NO. 12

Defectors

"The Warrant Officer who debriefed me was a nice and intelligent man. And he was a good linguist," recalled an Eastern European defector. "The only problem was he kept on asking me questions appropriate for a company commander. And I was a General at the Defense Ministry." Another defector complained that he was debriefed in German, a language neither he nor those who interviewed him spoke well. Having lived through World War II, he felt uncomfortable about most things German even when he was calm and relaxed. Other defectors could not help feeling they were thought of as traitors by the debriefing party. "That hurt me," complained one several years later, "I thought the real traitors were those who stayed behind serving the system."

In all fairness, the interviews I have conducted with defectors from Soviet bloc countries [1] in no way indicate that the system which currently deals with new arrivals is fundamentally wrong. Obviously, every debriefing team is in a difficult situation. No matter how knowledgeable and sensitive, debriefing officers or agents usually have to work with individuals who are culturally and linguistically alien. Many are quite emotional: even after a defector arrives in the United States he feels dangerously exposed to manipulation, or worse, by the security services of his former country.[2] Under such circumstances, a flawless debriefing system would be unrealistic to expect. The purpose of this statement is to identify areas in which improvement, particularly in the attitude toward defectors, can be realistically expected.

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[1] The interviews were part of the Oral History Project. The program is headed by Professor Uri Ra'anan, Director of the International Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

A defector is someone who escapes to the West having worked in a relatively high position within his country's political, economic, military, or intelligence elite. He had access to high level classified material and he will share his understanding of the system he rejected with the U.S. Government.

Derived from the Latin verb deficere, meaning to depart but also to fail, I suspect that our use of the term "defector" demonstrates our ambivalence about these people. While it is true that they must "depart" the country of their origin to acquire such status, it is ironic that we should be using the term defector when it is a label appropriately applied by the country and political system they left. They are not failures to us. In fact, their readiness to start a new existence in the West, under often complicated and adverse conditions, demonstrates the failure of the regimes in East Berlin, Warsaw, Prague, Budapest, Sofia, and Bucharest, the regimes they repudiated and left behind. Every genuine defector is of benefit to the United States and a failure only for the Soviet bloc. What matters to us is their arrival and what they have volunteered to bring to us.

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[2] The authoritative Great Soviet Encyclopedia does not find enough space in its many volumes to explain the term defector. The Soviet state treats such people, called perebezhchiki, as traitors, sentences many to death, and puts them on the KGB Wanted List. For more information on this list, see Vladislav Krasnov, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986). This is a pioneering work.

What do we reveal about ourselves when we freely accept the language, and with it the perspective and concepts, of our adversary?

Since defectors are important personalities their arrival in the West is often publicized and sometimes much debated. What does he know? What is he going to reveal to the West? Does he know anything about some of the controversial cases, for instance, Nosenko, Hollis, Oswald? What impact is his defection having where he escaped from? And in Moscow? Most recently, the arrival in the West of Colonel Ryszard Jerzy Kuklinski caused a sensation. As an officer of the Polish Army, Kuklinski had worked on preparations for the imposition of martial law in Poland, but disappeared before the actual crackdown on 13 December 1981.

Equally famous were the defections of many other Eastern European notables. For instance, Jan Sejna, whose defection in February, 1968, anticipated the dramatic Prague Spring. Or Ladislav Bittman, whose escape from his post in Vienna was a response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. Reacting to another Warsaw Pact crisis, Ambassador Zdzislaw Rurarz left the Polish Embassy in Tokyo in protest against the martial law regime of General Wojciech Jaruzelski, and Ambassador Romuald Spasowski did the same in Washington, D.C.

When such people vote with their feet and escape to the West it is often the result of a difficult, and perhaps even painful, decision. The action which follows the decision becomes particularly impressive when one considers that Eastern European defectors had often led quite comfortable lives at home. As members of the elite, they hardly ever knew the economic hardships and shortages for which centrally-planned economies are notorious.

Undoubtedly, some defectors escape to the West to sidestep a personal problem. But many are driven by the desire to tell the truth. Several have brought with them classified material of significant value. Others come here seeking a refuge from the intermittent purges of the elites which characterize many Soviet-style political systems. Still others can no longer put up with the cynicism and lies which are the essence of the official life.

Without losing sight of the fact that each defector is unique and differs from others in many ways, I want to emphasize that they also agree on crucial points. For instance, all are very patriotic. "I am two hundred percent American," is how one puts it. While some of this may be an expression of their hitherto pent up resentment of their lives in the Soviet system, anyone who has spent time with Eastern European defectors will agree that their patriotic sentiment is genuine. This tends to be further strengthened by the fact that, for obvious security reasons, defectors isolate themselves from emigre communities and try to live for the future rather than the past. Consequently, they think of themselves as Americans, they are Americans, and want to be treated acordingly.

Importantly, there is another point on which most Eastern European defectors I have spoken with concur: more could have been achieved with their knowledge of the systems they escaped from. The tactical and operational level information they provided was welcome by their debriefers. But virtually all agree that their efforts to elucidate the long term strategic planning, which they claim is characteristic of the Warsaw Pact countries, were unsuccessful. The debriefing teams, defectors argue, were very interested in names, addresses, types of weapons, details of personnel policy, and vignettes from the hidden private lives of Warsaw Pact politicians, intelligence officers, and military personnel. But the debriefers were markedly less enthusiastic or openly disbelieving when matters pertaining to ideology, the long term strategic plan, or global strategy were to be discussed.

In the defectors' opinion, such an approach was justified whenever time was of the essence. In the absence of any time pressure, the refusal seriously to examine Soviet ideology and long term planning, i.e., strategy, struck them as putting the cart before the horse.

Another observation often expressed during the Oral History Interviews conducted by the International Security Studies of the Fletcher School is that defectors ought to be worked with on a long-term basis. Under the current policy, the end of debriefing often marks the end of the defector's ability to have an input, a forum for his views, analyses, suggestions. This works against our interests. For instance, one Eastern European defector recently recognized an Eastern European military attache at a Washington area shopping center. "I recognized him immediately," he told me, "because we started together in my first regiment as junior officers." Another defector learned that a man whom he had once done a great favor (he protected his party membership) was now at an official capacity attached to an Eastern European Embassy.

Under such circumstances, the two defectors ought to have been consulted. At the very least, their information would have had a significant counterintelligence value. Long-term utilization of defectors is a policy that makes sense.

Further, defectors often complain that the intelligence community sometimes seems to resent their differing opinions. Of course, no analyst is happy when his figures and orderly charts, and with them sometimes years of work, are challenged. But to allow, indeed encourage competition between different opinions, methods, conclusions is a way of improving the vital system of information gathering. Let us allow that those who have lived and worked within a system know something valuable about it.

Every piece of information which comes from the Soviet bloc must be carefully checked. This applies to every defector: their data must not be accepted without further assessment. But let us not look at defectors as troublemakers who came to upset our nice and cozy assumptions. Instead, we should encourage them and welcome them for they have come to help. The least we can do is accept their help.

Political Refugees

Before they escaped, defectors were powerful and sometimes famous. Their arrival in the West probably made the front page news. But what about all the other political refugees? They were not members of the elite, now known as nomenklatura. They did not lose a power struggle against another political faction. They are not liberal communists. They are not even dissidents. Can the West learn anything from them? It can. Eastern European political refugees represent an underutilized resource of information on the Warsaw Pact countries.

First of all, we can learn about life in closed societies. Despite more than four decades of indoctrination, communism in Eastern Europe has failed to win acceptance. In hypothetical free elections, of those under thirty-five years of age, only 1% would have voted for the ruling party in Poland, 2% in Czechoslovakia, and 6% in Hungary.[3] Such sentiments contrast sharply with the political reality of Eastern Europe: the whole region from the Baltic to the Adriatic Seas is subject to mostly unrestricted Soviet control.

Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that large numbers of Eastern Europeans are prepared to seek political freedom and greater economic opportunities in the West. Many have observed that the Soviet empire is perhaps the first one to build a massive wall around its borders not to keep invaders out but to prevent its own people from fleeing.

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[3] Henry O. Hart, If Eastern Europeans Could Vote (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, April 1984).

Nevertheless, scores of East Germans, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Hungarians, Bulgarians, Albanians, and Romanians have successfully escaped. These refugees demonstrate to the sometimes skeptical Western world that the pursuit of happiness is impossible where political freedom does not exist.

From the beginning of the Cold War until the 1960s, political refugees from the Soviet bloc were welcome in the United States. Those entering refugee camps in Europe were routinely debriefed while they awaited their U.S. immigration visas and some were recruited to work for the Government in one capacity or another. Refugees and political asylum seekers were generally encouraged to give press conferences and make public statements, in the contemporary idiom, about life behind the Iron Curtain and the advantages of the Free World. The State Department used to interview political refugees arriving in the United States.[4] The result of this project was a useful information bank on the Soviet system as well as an instrument of propaganda.

Now, it may well be the case that we no longer need empty declarations about the virtues of our side and the faults of the other. But no one could argue that we do not need any more information about the Soviet system. Clearly it is in our interest to know as much as possible about our self-proclaimed adversary. Therefore, it makes no sense whatever that in 1960 the State Department discontinued its program of interviewing refugees.

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[4] See, for instance, "The Soviet Union as Reported by Former Soviet Citizens, 1951-1960," released typewritten by the Department of State for limited distribution among Soviet specialists.

But this was only the first step along the wrong path. As one author summed it up, "During the days of the cold war, a refugee from Eastern Europe was welcome in the West as live ammunition in the great propaganda battle...In these days of detente, he is viewed as an embarrassement, a liability, a factor that can adversely affect the precious balance of U.S.-Soviet negotiations over a wide range of issues. U.S. officials no longer keep a tally of defectors; guidelines call for minimizing their importance, avoiding publicity." Ideally, one ambassador declared, there should be no refugees and defectors, "they are too messy." [5]

Messy or not, every Eastern European refugee ought to be debriefed. Because military service is compulsory in all Warsaw Pact countries, many political asylum grantees could provide a lot of information otherwise not obtainable.

Most Eastern European refugees come to the United States in search of political and religious freedom. Of couse, they expect to do better economically as well. But none is escaping the backbraking poverty or famine which motivate other refugees, who are no less worthy of America's attention. Most are very patriotic. Given their large numbers, Eastern European emigre communities have had a very small number of penetrations by hostile intelligence services, despite their attractiveness as targets of such efforts. The emigres' knowledge of life in the Soviet system, their linguistic skills, and their patriotism ought to be put to work for the United States.

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[5] Charles Fenyvesi, "The Unwelcome Defector: An Embarrassment to both Sides," New Republic 178 (22 April 1978), p. 9.

EXHIBIT NO. 13

STATEMENT BY ANDREW W. MARSHALL
DIRECTOR OF NET ASSESSMENT
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I welcome the opportunity to make a statement on the ways in which the US Government might improve its use of Soviet defectors and emigres. This is only a small part of the broader question that you are addressing but it is the one with which I have some experience.

The Office of Net Assessment has developed assessments of the Military Balance in a variety of geographical and military mission areas. The assessments attempt to include all relevant dimensions of these military balances and of the major trends that affect the balance. As part of our efforts, we use contract study funds to supply us with inputs to current assessments or for studies designed to improve the state of the art of making such assessments. As part of this contract studies program we have used a number of emigres. We have considered using some of the defectors but have not in fact used them. The emigres we have used almost exclusively have academic backgrounds. The areas in which we have found them most useful are in studies of the Soviet economy and Soviet society.

There are great uncertainties in our understanding of the Soviet economy, its size relative to that of the United States, its rate of growth, etc. The emigres have made an important contribution in improving analyses of the economy and in improving our understanding of the Soviet data. Also the emigres have been very important to me in calling attention to and assessing the credibility of recent writings by some of the economists within the Soviet Union that describes defects and deficits in the Soviet economy. The emigres also provide unique insights as to how various aspects of the Soviet government and economy work.

In another case a Soviet emigre who was trained as a sociologist in the Soviet Union has supplied interesting and special insights into the changing social and political situation in the Soviet Union. He has a feel for the internal dynamics of developments there that make his insights and judgments of special value. These are the sorts of things that can come only from someone who has actually grown up and lived in a particular society.

Despite the special competence of a number of these emigres I am struck by how difficult a time they have in establishing themselves and finding appropriate positions. Indeed some of them never seem to find an appropriate niche. On the whole they have not benefited very much from the recent increase in funding for Soviet and East European studies in the United States. Most of the programs are aimed at the support of existing US organizations and people in universities. The relations of a number of emigres with their academic counterparts are uneasy. Some American academics see these people in part as competitors, people they would like to use as sources of information but whom they do not really welcome in many cases as colleagues and collaborators in analyses.

Most of the current US government funding of the field of Soviet studies is aimed at providing general support for the field and is only weakly targeted at areas of major governmental interest. When it is targeted on government interests its focus is often too short term to support longer term research on important areas in which prior analyses are deficient.

Of course the small group of emigres that I am focusing attention on is only a limited set of the total group of emigres. They probably are the people with the greatest potential for improving our understanding of the Soviet Union by means of their own analytical work. The bulk of the emigres can provide interesting and important information. They have been increasingly used to do so by a variety of programs. The defectors are a different category. I have reviewed several times what they might contribute and have met with two of them to discuss possible projects. The problem from my perspective is that they are in the main not trained analysts and therefore not in a good position to undertake the kind of studies that I am primarily interested in. They are in general, however, of higher rank within the society they come from and clearly offer interesting insights in some cases. I am sure more could be done in particular to try to understand how Soviet organizations really function. I am not sure defectors are adequately exploited from this point of view--partly because people do not understand the value of the sorts of insight they might provide on the functioning of the decisionmaking processes.

Current developments in the Soviet Union may in several ways increase the flow of people who could allow us to improve our understanding of the functioning of Soviet society. A future relaxation of tensions might allow an increased flow of emigres. The restructuring of the Soviet economy is likely to be a period of great stress within the Soviet system. There might be an increased flow of defectors. Now is the time to think about how we might improve the way in which we can make effective use of the talents of these people to improve our understanding of Soviet society. One measure that deserves consideration is the provision of designated funds for the use of the most qualified of these people.

EXHIBIT NO. 14

STATEMENT OF

PETER NICOLAE NICHOLSON

before the

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
United States Senate

U.S. Government's Handling of Defectors

Defection and defectors as itinerant agents in contemporary international social life constitute a relatively new phenomenon. The fact that this defection is essentially a one-way stream - from the totalitarian countries to the democratic free countries - confirms the superiority of democracy as the inherent right of people to exercise freedom of expression and to be free of oppression. Therefore, defection is an expression of the struggle between the two main systems in the contemporary world.

One of the questions arising in connection with this issue is: Does democracy take care of this stream of defectors? Does it encourage it or not? In my opinion, there would be at least two great advantages to be gained if this stream were to be stimulated:

First, it would help the people in the totalitarian system to determine in their minds the real situation in the democratic system and thus to enable them better to counteract the noxious everyday propoganda. Secondly, an intelligent use of the presence of defectors will help the people of the democracies to understand the real goals, and face the real danger of the totalitarian system.

Those persons coming to the West and known as defectors here are very different. They come from virtually all segments of society: diplomats, military men, scientists, scholars, bureaucrats, researchers, etc. Their advent here forms a large spectrum of interest and concern. However, notwithstanding this multiplicity of backgrounds, one common denominator is apparent: they all want to tell the free world about their experiences under the totalitarian system, what is the real situation there and so to neutralize the propaganda coming to the West in many different ways. At the same time, they want to use their expertise and knowledge to rebuild their lives here and to become decent, useful citizens of the country which has adopted them.

But before saying something about all our troubles, may I be permitted to tell you, in my opinion, how the defectors can be categorized.

There are at least two main categories:

First, there are the intelligence defectors. These are the group who had contact with the American Government agencies before their defection. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to understand that here we have a typical contractual relationship between this group of defectors and the Government agencies. The question is whether or not the Government agencies keep their word in this respect. I respectfully suggest that criteria or standards be established by law to take care of such defectors.

Secondly, there is the group of defectors which I will call the naive or neophyte defectors. That is to say, those people who, being deeply disappointed by the totalitarian system, have decided to come to the United States, albeit with no previous contacts with the American authorities.

I am in the position of telling you about this second category of defectors, based on my personal experience. When, in August 1981, I stepped into the American Consulate in Belgrade, the Consul, a young lady, was so surprised and confused (more than I was) that she did not know what to do with me as a person asking for political asylum. After some tense moments, she introduced me to someone I supposed to be an intelligence man. He explained to me that, because Yugoslavia was also a Communist country, the American Embassy could not protect me, and the best way, in his opinion, was for me to go to Vienna, Austria, where somebody would meet me. But I knew that in the American Embassy in Moscow there was a group of pentecostals, Soviet citizens who were living there and were protected by the American Government, and I understood that the American Consulate in Belgrade did not want to have the same trouble with people asking for asylum. I had no choice but to go to Vienna. I knew that the Yugoslav administration's behavior was not constant. Sometimes they would permit Romanians to escape to the West and sometimes they would catch them and send them back. In the last 10-15 years a lot of Romanians have risked their lives by escaping through Yugoslav territory. In my situation, I used a stratagem: having diplomatic status and a permanent visa for all the member countries of CMEA-COMECON as an international officer of the Secretariat of CMEA, where I worked for many years as a department deputy chief, I bought a train ticket to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, using the shorter route thru Vienna, Austria, where I stepped out of the train. It is true that in Vienna, at the American House, they knew of me and two very amiable gentlemen took care of me. I learned that, as promised to me, Belgrade had sent them information about me. But there was the real possibility that such information would have been useless if the Yugoslavs had caught me. Anyway, from Vienna a telex was sent to the Department of State for permission to protect me and to move me somewhere in the West, since I felt very unsafe in Austria. Permission was received to move me to West Germany, where I waited until November 10.

In this period, those who took care of me did everything possible to make my life easier. They started to teach me English, to introduce me to the American way of life and at the same time to ask me some questions about the world from whence I had come. But I realized their interest was very narrow. As I now recall, two questions seemed of great importance to them: they asked me for a description of the personalities of the leaders in the Soviet Bloc countries and whether, on the roof of the CMEA building some intelligence equipment was installed. (This latter question was indeed legitimate since the CMEA building is located in the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy.)

The question of how this man's experience could be of use to the United States was not included in their agenda.

Within a month or so I received a visa and they formally introduced me to the Tolstoy Foundation branch in Frankfurt which became my official sponsor.

My hdnest intention was, and continues to be, not to have come here and decry the Soviet type of government, since I can no longer be arrested and put in jail. I want to engage in scholarly debate on the two systems. But how is this possible if, after reading my Curriculum Vitae, an executive of my official sponsor, the Tolstoy Foundation, very candidly and seriously told me: Dr. Nicolae, I cannot understand why, when you had a very good position, you decided to come here. And later I was told by the case holder: I am so sorry, but if you were a carpenter, I could get you a job at once.

I understand that at present there is nothing organized to assist such kind of defectors as I and temporarily at least, I have to forget about the possibility of using my knowledge for the benefit of the United States.

In my reference to the Tolstoy Foundation, it is not my intention to denigrate them. With their help, I must say, I contacted an organization called the Program for Soviet Scholars Emigres in New York, which unfortunately closed its doors because of lack of financial resources. This organization helped me to participate in the Annual Convention of Slavists in the U.S. (AAASS), where I met Professor M. Montias from Yale University who recommended me to Delphic Associates Inc. in Falls Church, which offered me a contract to write a monograph, which I did. By the way, Delphic Associates is doing a tremendous work to help people coming from the Soviet Union to write about their experiences.

But because of the struggle of day to day living, my time has been very limited to search for the right organization to assist me in seeking work in my field.

As I now look back on my odyssey from the moment I stepped into the American Embassy in Belgrade until this moment when I have the opportunity to talk to the Honorable legislators as an American citizen, I would like to call your attention to the fact that, in the life of a defector such as I, we see three distinct periods: the first is the initial contact with the American representative, at which time such persons receive protection and status of political asylum; the second is the period of clearance and waiting for a visa to come to the United States; and the third is the initial period of the new life here in the United States.

Based on my experience, the first two segments (excluding the Belgrade episode) worked very well. I received protection and support immediately I stepped into the American House in Vienna and I received permission to move to West Germany after only approximately one week. The visa to come to the United States I received within six weeks or so.

The major difficulties started in the third period. However, taking into account the time constraints of the Honorable Permanent Subcommittee, I would like to omit the details of my adventures and troubles as I started my new life here and move forward respectfully to submit my proposal as to how the handling of defectors can be improved upon. I submit this proposal not only as a former defector, but as a citizen of the United States of America, which I became earlier this year.

The proposal is as follows:

1. To establish a year-long grant for the defectors who escape from Soviet Bloc countries and have no other Government, Church or private supportive sponsorship;
2. To establish a Government Commission, composed of 3 - 5 members, representing such agencies as, for example, the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Defense, the CIA, or FBI, etc.

   The functions of this Commission might include:

   a. the question of eligibility for a Government grant (See 1 above);
   b. formulation of a succinct questionnaire to be completed by the defectors;
   c. formulation of detailed instructions to all Government agencies or organizations which could be potential contacts for such defectors;
   d. a monthly review of the dossiers of recent defectors to determine their eligibility for the Government grant and which Government agency will benefit from the knowledge, expertise, etc. of the particular defector, such agency then becoming the official sponsor of the defector for the one-year period;
   e. issuing guidelines to Government agencies instructing them how to act as a defector's sponsor, including:
      (i) advising the defector on where and how to take courses in the English language to the extent required (I knew not a word of English before I defected);
      (ii) advising the defector on housing possibilities and integration in his particular field, etc.; and
      (iii) requiring a report by the grantee at the end of the year specifying the manner in which the grant was used and what the grantee foresees as future possibilities.

The Commission proposed above should have a minimum staff to permit it to fulfil its goal and to program an agenda for monthly and annual meetings.

It is my belief that such kind of organized assistance to defectors will not run counter to the new orientation of relaxing the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Rather, it will help to establish a true, realistic and reciprocal basis for better knowledge and understanding of each other's goals. At the same time, such act will have a tremendous resonance in the hearts of potential defectors from Soviet Bloc countries.

EXHIBIT NO. 15

STATEMENT OF
THOMAS POLGAR
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

* * *

Until my retirement from the Central Intelligence Agency in December, 1981, I have served continuously as an intelligence officer in the Office of Strategic Services, the War Department, and the C.I.A. for 37 years. I have held a series of senior staff and command assignments and had the honor of receiving two Distinguished Intelligence Medals, the Intelligence Star and the Department of State's Award for Valor.

I first became exposed to the problems of defectors and defector handling in the early post-war period in Berlin, where the physical proximity between the Soviet and U.S. military forces permitted not only close observation of each other, but created a climate and opportunities for defections the like of which we have never seen since.

Later, in the early '50s, I served as staff officer to the then-Chief of the C.I.A.'s German Station, the late Lt. General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., whose responsibilities included an organized defector program and the establishment of a Defector Reception Center designed to combine optimum physical security, humane treatment, psychological conditioning, and effective interrogation. To the best of my knowledge, in the years during which I was associated with that effort, we have had no redefections. I recognize, of course, that we cannot recreate the past, nor could we reassemble today the facilities, experience, linguistic qualifications, and operational environment of those simpler days when our intelligence services could draw from the vast reservoir of manpower funneled into the armed services from the American melting pot by the draft.

Subsequently, as a C.I.A. Chief of Station, I served in several important capitals, where my official functions included the chairmanship of the Embassy's Defector Committee. While I have never seen duplicated the intensity and numbers of the defector experience of the early post-war years, throughout my long career in intelligence I had the opportunity to keep abreast of the problems of defectors and their handling. The record is clear, I believe, that there have been great successes; but there were also some, perhaps avoidable, accidents leading to loss of intelligence information, loss of prestige, and, much more importantly, human suffering.

The process of obtaining information from defectors comes under the heading of Human Source Intelligence Collection, or HUMINT. We must never forget that a defector, regardless of his nationality, service, background, race, creed, or color, is first of all a human being who must be treated with consideration and respect if only because that is the best way to get the most useful contribution from him.

I do not doubt the good will in our handling of defectors, but the experience of the most recent years suggests that some of the difficulties which have crept into our intelligence collection and covert actions in recent years are perceivable also in the defector area. I refer in particular to the loss of linguistic qualifications and resulting lack of understanding of the psychological and cultural mechanisms affecting the perception, judgment, motivation, and action of foreigners.

Ten years ago, I had the honor of serving as Chief of Personnel Management for C.I.A.'s Operations Directorate. Problems of loss of linguistic qualifications and resulting consequences were casting their shadow even then. Most recently, as investigator of the Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, I was in a position to conclude that the lack of foreign area and linguistic expertise continues to represent obstacles to the achievement of our intelligence and covert action objectives. Since defector handling will never have the same priorities as the more pressing operational tasks--and this is so for perfectly understandable and logical reasons--it follows that personnel weaknesses in the operational program will be reflected and keenly felt also in the defector handling area. It is, however, easier to bring about immediate improvements in the latter, because many of the difficulties which inhibit foreign operations need not apply. Thus, there is room and opportunity to improve defector handling without any cost to the ongoing, essential, and higher priority operational programs.

Defectors--Well Worth the Trouble

There is a lot of loose talk about defectors--for example, at any international sports competition where teams from Eastern Europe or Cuba participate. A tennis player, a gymnast, or circus performer who changes his or her place of residence for personal convenience or in hope of greater professional opportunities or earning capacity is not a defector, even when such a person comes from Cuba or from the Soviet Union.

In more general terms, people who merely wish to emigrate to another country, even if they eventually do so illegally, are not necessarily defectors and in most cases they are not defectors in the intelligence meaning of the term.

To consider the problem of defectors in a reasonable manner, we must distinguish between defectors on the one hand and refugees, emigrants, and economic opportunity seekers on the other.

The word "defector" derives from the Latin and in its original from denoted a shortcoming or imperfection. When used as a verb, the work means desertion of party or cause, especially in order to espouse another, or a conscious abandonment of allegiance or duty.

As used in the language of international relations and intelligence, the term "defector" is applied to persons who, having held a position of some significance in one country, abandon that position and country and carry privileged, protected, secret information in documents or in memory to the other side. A defector may also offer unusual qualifications and professional potential for exploitation by his new masters against his old.

Defectors represent a very tiny fraction in the mass of humanity who change their countries of residence. The history of the world reflects a continuous movement of individuals, families, religious or ethnic groups, tribes, and nations.

The movement of people over the centuries has been generally from East to West. No doubt, if the people of Eastern Europe had their choice, there would be a migration of many millions each year, following traditional patterns established long before the advent of the Communist regime in Russia.

"Go West, young man, go West!" was not merely Horace Greeley's advice to ambitious young Americans. The same sentiments guided millions of people in the Old World who sought a happier, freer, more prosperous life and greater opportunities for their children in the direction of the setting sun. This pattern was true not only in the migration from Europe to the Americas; it was equally true in the migration trends in Asia and Europe. People from the steppes of Siberia wanted to move to European Russia; Poles, Hungarians, and Czechs were moving into Germany, France, and across the sea, as did the Greeks, Italians, Scandinavians, and the Irish.

Before the Second World War, some 14 million Russians crossed the Ural Mountains in their move from Asia to Europe, while more than 60 million Europeans crossed the atlantic Ocean. In the peak years of immigration, between 1880 and 1910 some 23 million Europeans came to the United States. During the first decade of the twentieth century, 1.4 million came here from Russia. Historically, the Russian Empire was among the principal contributors of people to the United States, along with England, Ireland, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy.

This massive movement of humanity came to an end after the First World War because of the new immigration laws of the

United States and the population movement controls established by the Soviet Union.

After the Bolsheviks consolidated their power in what is now the Soviet Union, emigration from that country was sharply restricted or prohibited altogether. In this the Soviet Government followed an old Russian tradition: Free movement of the population was never allowed within, into, or from Russia during the many centuries of the Czarist regime.

Even so, during the nineteenth century and until the First World War, ambitious and enterprising people with money could arrange, negotiate, buy, or create opportunities to depart Mother Russia or the territories she controlled. Although emigration as such was seldom authorized, those wishing to travel could find the means to do so.

This rather lax state of affairs changed drastically under Communist rule. Except for those who travel with the permission of the Government, Russians--even today--are prevented from leaving the Soviet Union by an interlocking web of administrative procedures, police controls, passport restrictions, prohibited zones along the borders, scarce transportation facilities to and within the frontier zones, and strict document checks at airports, highways, and railroad crossing points. The relatively few who are permitted to travel outside the Soviet Union include diplomats and other Government officials; personnel of the intelligence agencies, foreign trade specialists, scientists, and technicians attending meetings abroad, selected journalists, competing athletes, ship and airplane crews, and a smattering of well-screened tourists in group tours.

In recent years foreign travel has also been authorized to members of special groups, such as ethnic Germans, certain Jews in response to U.S. pressures, individual Russians married to foreigners nd a few prominent dissidents from whose exit the Soviets hoped to gain political or trade advantages.

Normal emigration, which would permit a continuing, calculable--even if regulated and limited--travel of people abroad to follow their individual pursuits and preferences, simply does not exist for citizens of the Soviet Union.

The prevailing system of restrictions has given rise to a peculiar phenomenon, that of the defector.

A Merger of Interests

Immediately after the Second World War, the Western Allies found themselves first as the unwilling and later as only too willing hosts of Soviet personnel who did not wish to return to their country, at that time still under the absolute control of Josef Stalin. On the one hand, these Soviets presented difficult administrative and even political problems. On the other hand, as the atmosphere of the Cold War spread over Europe and the Iron Curtain became a reality, it was recognized that reliable information on conditions in the Soviet Union was a scarce commodity. The Western allies had to develop, and rapidly at that, a substantial amount of information on the capabilities of the forces which were confronting them along a demarcation line from the Baltic Sea to the Adriatic. Defectors from the Soviet Union, and from other Eastern European countries, could conceivably help fill the information gap. This assumption then led to the encouragement of defections and to the creation of bureaucratic structures for the interrogation and handling of defectors.

Of the more than 250 million Soviet citizens, only a tiny percentage would ever have the opportunity to travel abroad or find themselves in circumstances where "jumping ship" represented a realistic possibility. The Western intelligence services naturally focused their interest on those who could travel and, preferably, stay abroad for extended periods which in turn would permit a continuing assessment of the possible defectors' frame of mind, emotional stability and intelligence value.

Among the Soviets meeting the criteria of the Western services most were diplomats or intelligence officers. They not only had authorized reasons for being abroad, but held positions which permitted contacts with foreigners, thus creating both temptations and opportunities.

Of course, of the large number of Soviet officials abroad, only a very few would consider defection. It is well to remember the original meaning of the word. Most Russian officials have no desire to break the bonds created by love of the Motherland, ingrained loyalties, family ties, sense of obligation, satisfaction with achieved position or simply, fear of the unknown. Most are patriotic servants of their country.

Among Russian defectors intelligence officers have been represented in disproportionately high numbers, undoubtedly influenced by the peculiarities of the trade. Both the State Security Service (K.G.B.) and Military Intelligence (G.R.U.) have been hit by several purges and internal turmoil, with discouraging and demoralizing effect on personnel abroad.

Also, intelligence officers have a better than average opportunity to inform themselves about the cricumstances that may await them after defection. They can establish communications with their Western counterparts or potential employers before taking the final, irrevocable step. They have bargaining chips in the knowledge they carry of Soviet operations, which can be exchanged for protection and for continuing financial support.

Dealing with Defectors

The motive to defect is usually a complex of negative and positive forces, the interworking of fears and anxieties with envisioned incentives and expected rewards, along with disillusionment, hatred of the system, revenge, craving to exploit one's talents in a new direction, a new love interest, or desire for better life style.

At times, the defector, or would-be defector, is simply crazy, drunk, or under such emotional strain that he lacks the customary inhibitions or powers of judgment. Whatever the combination of motivations, very few defect for purely ideological reasons.

However valuable the information that the defector brings, he also travels with a heavy load of psychological problems--conscience, loneliness, feelings of loss, insecurity, physical or emotional malfunctions, great uncertainty about the future--which require understanding and patient handling by his new associates.

Quite a few defectors change their minds and return to Russia. They just could not adjust to life in the West. They prefer their previous experience with family ties and close social integration, albeit in discomfort and without political freedom, to the problems of coping on their own with foreign culture, in loneliness and without social status. Their emotional problems may heavily outweigh the satisfaction of the envisioned freedom and economic opportunities.

Western intelligence services welcome defectors but experienced their experienced hands recognize that the costs of handling and resettling defectors can be high and that there may be also an unbudgeted cost factor of political embarrassment should the erstwhile defector change his mind or turn out to be something different from what he was thought to be.

The Problem of Bona Fides

Establishing the true nature and good faith of a person claiming to be a defector--the bona fides--is probably more art than science. The defector's bona fides determine the extent to which the host community can be satisfied that the reasons for the defection are substantially as were claimed and the defector is who he says he is. This has a vital bearing on his subsequent utility. Everything the defector claims must be verified to the greatest possible extent. This is not necessarily a pleasant process.

Discrepancies, however innocent, lead to suspicions and a microscopic examination of motives, with search for the truth taking place at times in a less than pleasant atmosphere.

The problems that can arise when doubts remain about motivations are amply illustrated by the Nosenko affair of the '60s. K.G.B. defector Yuri Nosenko has been the subject of intense controversy for two decades, propelled C.I.A. into legally and humanely questionable activities and gave rise to fairly outlandish theories.

If bona fides can be established, a defecting intelligence officer can assist his new masters in crippling the operations of his former colleagues for many months. He can identify spies and other covert operators, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities among his former associates, Soviet penetrations of Western government and societies and the operating methods of his old service. He can make a major contribution to the ability of Western services to understand, identify, and contain Soviet secret operations.

Defector Handling

As other forms of human source intelligence collection, defector handling can be tricky. We are dealing with a delicate and perishable product which must be treated with care, in accordance with careful planning and the utilization of tradecraft, or know-how, with help of a good infrastructure and adherence to adequate security requirements. The handler must understand the thought processes of the defector, bearing in mind that defectors are not always pleasant people, but they always require tender, loving care.

A person changing sides leaves behind allegiances, cultural values, family, possessions, and the many intangibles that contribute to personality formation. He cannot but feel lost and insecure and may well fear for his life. He feels uncertain about his new environment, may not like his food or the hours of the meals, he is concerned about his future, about the fate of loved ones he may have left behind and is bound to have second thoughts about the wisdom of his choice.

If he is a typical Russian, he is alone more than ever before in his life. This by itself can be a trying experience and can lead to new, unforeseen personal crisis.

Most defectors from Soviet Bloc countries--and almost without exception Soviet intelligence officers--want to be resettled in the United States, in Great Britain, in Canada or in Australia. This is logical, because it is in these countries that they feel most confident about the protection of their physical security. Ironically, it is precisely in these countries that the way of life, the daily customs and the habits of the people, including those charged with the custody of the defector, differ most from the Soviet model. This can become a source of friction, of disillusionment and a spark toward redefection.

In simplest terms, the defector may reach the conclusion that he is being treated inhumanely, without consideration for his importance and previous accomplishments, by persons of lower social rank than he perceives appropriate and in an unfriendly setting. Objectively, this may not be the case at all, but what counts are the defector's impressions and conclusions about his status.

History, organizational developments, and bureaucratic considerations of and within the U.S. intelligence agencies have led to the situation that defector handling is not necessarily or primarily the job of those who can establish empathy with Russians, or who have intimate knowledge of Soviet realities, social mores, culture, history, or living conditions. Handlers may have insufficient understanding of the Russians' emotional requirements including the extent to which Russians depend on human contact for entertainment.

The need to provide defectors with appropriate human relations and psychological as well as material support has been of continuing concern to those handling defectors in the United States, but recognition of the problem is far easier than its resolution.

The redefection of Lt. Colonel Vitali Yurchenko in 1985 brought the C.I.A.'s competence in defector handling once again into the focus of public attention. This is not the time or place to determine the degree, if any, of C.I.A.'s culpability in the affair, but there have been sufficiently disturbing aspects surrounding the Yurchenko case that questions were bound to arise with respect to the adequacy of integration of the various elements required for the secure and efficient exploitation of defectors.

A spectacular redefection like that of Yurchenko hurts our cause in more ways than one. Apart from the loss of benefits because of prematurely terminated interrogation, there is loss of prestige, demoralization, and time-wasting search for blame within our own ranks. More importantly, however, a potent weapon is provided to the Soviet state security services with which to discourage further defections.

The latter is of ever-present concern to the Soviets whose concepts of state security, even in these more open days of Gorbachev, remain at the quasi-paranoid level. Careful screening, special indoctrination, psychological preparation, testing, even keeping de facto hostages are routinely employed measures for securing the good behavior of those given permission to travel abroad. Soviet delegations are accompanied by security personnel to monitor the foreign contacts and activities of delegation members. The Soviet practice of having most of their people in foreign countries housed in Soviet compounds and the virtual sequestering of groups of traveling Russians, whether tourist, athletes, or economic delegations, are influenced by security considerations as much as by the desire to minimize the expenditure of hard currencies.

I do not mean to suggest that in the absence of such security measures most Russians who have the opportunity to travel abroad would defect, but the record shows that all the protective measures have been unable to prevent a tiny but significant and continuing trickle of defections. There always have been and there will continue to be people who will free themselves of all the restraining factors. This is not necessarily or solely the result of Communist pressures. As we suggested earlier, the urge among Eastern Europeans to move West has been a motivating force over many centuries, reflected in the movements of many millions of people long before the establishment of the Soviet Union or of the so-called Peoples' Democracies. What is different today is that because of travel restrictions most of the defectors are from among the ranks of the selected few who are abroad with official permission.

What Is to Be Expected

It is a certainty that defections from East to West will continue and that defectors will provide human drama and valuable intelligence along with occasional headaches and frustrations.

Regardless of the American Administration in office in Washington, the Western World and the United States in particular remain a magnet and a dream, best symbolized by the Statue of Liberty known the world over. Many, many millions can identify with the concept so beautifully expressed by Winston Churchill on May 3, 1941, in the darkest hours of Great Britain at war:

> . . . and not by eastern windows only,
> When daylight comes, comes in the light;
> In front the sun climbs slow, how slowly!
> But westward, look, the land is bright.

As long as that land in the West is seen to be bright, there will be defectors. Our task is to match the quality of our handling of them with their potential.

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EXHIBIT NO. 16

STATEMENT OF
PROFESSOR URI RA'ANAN
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

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In order to comprehend fully the significant contribution that may be made by Oral History Projects, it is essential to grasp the problems and the scope of other, more traditional, approaches practiced by Sovietologists, as well as the constraints within which the art of interpreting the functioning of the Soviet system operates:

Analysts of the USSR are obliged to grapple with two fundamental misconceptions concerning the modus operandi of the Soviet leadership:

One of these was articulated by that otherwise most admirable of statesmen, Winston Churchill, for whom the USSR was "a riddle within an enigma inside a sphinx." This was a recipe for abandonment of any attempt to decipher the workings of the Soviet system, since there is no point, obviously, in making efforts that are foredoomed to failure.

The other misleading concept, which is no less damaging to the art of analyzing Soviet affairs, belongs essentially to the category of "mirror imaging." In that particular case, one has to proceed from the assumption that "the USSR is not much of a mystery, since it functions, in all probability, pretty well as we do, with a few cultural idiosyncrasies, to be sure." Such an approach may not be a prescription for giving up, but, regrettably, it is simply misleading. Those who subscribe to such a view habitually resort to gems of media oversimplification, with considerable emphasis on terms like "hawks" and "doves," "moderates" and "hardliners," with a particular penchant for "resource allocation," usually preceded by the words "lobbying for." The imagination boggles a little at the thought of Admiral of the Fleet Vladimir Chernavin "lobbying" members of the Supreme Soviet for "naval allocations." Such an approach, of course, fails to take into account the fundamental "cultural" peculiarities of the Soviet leadership -- and here the reference is less to anthropology, language, literature, and history than to profound differences between open societies and the type of polities to which the Soviet state belongs.

EVIDENCE AND METHODOLOGIES

The modus operandi (and the related operational jargon) of the USSR reveals startling similarities with other closed societies, of the past as well as the present, at the state and even the sub-state level, producing analogies which appear to be no less relevant than lessons learned from Russian history under the Tsars or the Grand Dukes of Moscow.[1]

These analogies suggest that "mirror imaging" does not provide us with useful criteria for the comprehension of Soviet affairs, and also that, despite Winston Churchill and others who have followed in his path, there are methodological keys for opening the locks of the doors behind which the Soviet leadership conducts its business.

Biography

One of these keys, paradoxically, relates to the inability of "monolithic" systems to terminate the workings of the political process altogether by means of a fiat or ukase. Whatever the

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[1] This is not to suggest, of course, that Russian history is unimportant -- merely that there are other factors that play a crucial role.

Program of the CPSU may say, factions, although outlawed, must arise, precisely because of the very nature of the closed society. The simple fact is that a struggle for the succession tends to become inevitable whenever the "number one" leader is ailing or worse, since it has been demonstrated, time and again, that the nomination of an heir apparent, or "crown prince," is an act fraught with great peril for the "boss" (whether we are speaking of a state or of an Organized Crime "Family"). The designation of such an heir, unconstrained by taboos imposed by ties of blood (unlike a monarchy), ensures that power will gravitate inevitably toward him, as the "rising sun," and away from the current "boss," who represents the "setting sun." This poses dangers that are both political and physical.

For similar reasons, it is not in the interests of the preeminent leader, whoever he may be, to permit a potential rival to monopolize authority and power in any of the key sectors of the polity, such as the security police and intelligence functions, the military arena, or control of the economy. As a result, closed societies tend to produce deliberate duplication and overlap of authority in such areas, so that the "Numero Uno" may rely upon the inevitable conflict, one rung below him, between competitors whose parameters of jurisdiction are left deliberately vague. Thus, the Party statutes of the CPSU may sternly ban factions, but the very nature of the system ensures their emergence and prevalence.

The same factors explain also why the "bureaucratic models," preferred by analysts familiar with Western societies, are misleading with regard to the USSR. Given the nature of the Soviet system, much of the fiercest infighting occurs inevitably among rivals contesting the same functional "turf" rather than between separate bureaucratic institutions. Consequently, it is not so much the table of organization that influences internecine cleavages as the personal linkages between functionaries during significant periods of their careers.

In other words, biography of the elite, rather than bureaucractic location, should guide analysts in establishing the "lineup" of various factions. For the reasons given, competing groups are motivated to infiltrate as many as feasible of the key sectors of power and authority, and, in these efforts, their criterion for choice of suitable personnel is likely to be personal allegiance and loyalty. This reflects the historical propensity of the Soviet elite to promote (or purge) leaders together with all of their supporters and acolytes, and, for that matter, even clients further down the line. Thus, the key for ascertaining who belongs to whose faction is provided by such biographical details as who served together with whom during what period and in which place (and was brought by his sponsor to the center of power from their former provincial stronghold).

Thus, a curious analogy to Soviet political alignments is provided by the baronies of the feudal period, in which magnates provided protection and support for their tenants-in-chief, and they, in turn, for their tenants, in return for allegiance and loyal support. This aspect of the Soviet scene explains other characteristics. Since the glue holding together the various members of each faction is of a highly personal nature, they are not (despite the assumptions of Western analysts) motivated primarily by support for (or opposition to) a particular issue or policy, as tends to be the case in open societies.

Textual Analysis

Lack of basic policy orientation, however, does not mean necessarily that political issues are disregarded as potential "ammunition" which can be used by one group to defame and undermine its rivals. Since legitimacy, in the Soviet system, is provided by the established ideology, policy questions can be exploited to suggest that an adversary is a schismatic or heretic, by demonstrating, for instance, that decisions he has espoused reflect either an "adventuristic" or a "capitulationist" deviation (i.e., either are fraught with unacceptable danger and therefore irresponsible, or neglectful of beckoning opportunities because of undue timidity in exploiting them, thereby depriving the Soviet state of realizable gains).

That utilization of policy issues is merely a tactic, along the lines suggested, rather than a causative factor in establishing factions, is indicated by repeated historic episodes in which, once a group of Soviet leaders had clearly defeated, humiliated, ousted, or even eliminated (politically and/or physically) its adversaries, it felt perfectly free to "pick up the fallen banners of the enemy from the battlefield," so to speak. To mention just one example, Khrushchev vehemently opposed Malenkov's espousal of consumer industries, only to become the strongest supporter of that preference, once he had forced Malenkov to relinquish the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers.

However, while a factional conflict is at its height, the issues that are utilized for tactical reasons are likely to be articulated in a lucid, coherent, and consistent manner. Obviously, each side attempts to present its "platform" in as credible a fashion as possible, since usually there are nonaligned elements in the leadership to be won over. This consideration, however, requires not only cogent presentation, but, even more importantly, proof of the power and influence needed to ensure exposure in public for the "line" advocated by either of the contending groups. To use the medieval analogy once more, followers and potential allies are likely to be heartened by the sight of one's banner held high on the battlefield and, conversely, to be demoralized, once that flag is no longer visible.

To be sure, the appropriate slogans usually are articulated in terminology that is esoteric for the non-initiated, but easily comprehended by the cognescenti -- i.e., the Party and State elite. This phenomenon may be explained as follows: After all, there is supposed to be only one single, correct Party Line, expressing, as it were, the Will of History. Thus, essential respect for the official ideology requires that opposing views be aired in a "proper" manner, i.e., avoiding blatant and overt displays of (illegal) factionalism. Consequently, it is highly unusual to find an open attack, by name, upon a contending group in the leadership, admitting, in so many words, that the respective approaches being advocated reflect fundamental antagonism. Overt denunciations appear only once an adversary is dead -- physically or politically, i.e., has been defeated, ousted, and/or "unmasked" as a deviationist, so that his propositions can be brushed off as simple transgressions of an erring individual, without admitting that several mutually conflicting approaches could supercede a single "Party Line."

Since, for the reasons presented already, these internal tensions cannot persist without some degree of reflection in publications (however oblique that may be), and because the regime must give operational guidance to the Nomenklatura, a task requiring resort to open literature, at least in Aesopian language, considering that communication through classified material with an elite numbering half a million is hardly feasible, Sovietologists are provided with an important input. In addition to the clues offered by biography, they can avail themselves of the "footprints" discernable through a "qualitative content analysis" of Soviet publications, broadcasts, and slogans (carried in each year's parades on May Day and the anniversary of the October Revolution), and of the Soviet "iconography," i.e., "body language," communicated through the camera which reveals the precise order in which individual leaders enter, stand, or are seated on festive occasions. The sudden omission of a few words employed habitually, heretofore, in a particular context, or, for that matter, the addition of a term not utilized previously, can provide important signals. (Communist leaders are very precise and, usually, consistent in their use of language to convey operational directives and to legitimize their side or to delegitimize adversaries; were the situation in Afghanistan reversed, they would never call the Mujahedeen "rebels" rather than "freedom fighters," unlike the Western media.)

To take an illustration from another closed society: in 1965, during the period leading to China's Great Cultural Revolution, one group, led by Lin Piao, accepted Mao's description of nuclear weapons as a "paper tiger," implying that the PRC could cope with this problem, while Lo Jui-ch'ing, heading a rival faction, added the significant phrase, "what is more [to the point], the atomic monopoly was broken years ago." Stated 16 years after the USSR's first nuclear test, but merely months after China's entry into the nuclear club, Lo obviously meant that such weapons could be treated as a "paper tiger" only if Moscow extended its atomic umbrella over the PRC, i.e., at the price of a rapprochement with the Kremlin.

Pictorial evidence also can be very revealing, and provides a further source of relevant data. A few months after Stalin's death, the whole Soviet leadership, with one exception, gathered, essentially for a "camera opportunity," but ostensibly to watch a thoroughly unremarkable artistic event, namely, a performance at the Bolshoi -- however, not of its classical ballet, rather of dances by meritorious milkmaids and other Stakhanovites. One Western newspaper, presumably trying to denigrate Sovietology, published the story under the heading of "Maybe Beria Doesn't Like Ballet." Maybe he didn't -- but, as the world was to discover soon, he had just been eliminated and the remaining leaders were displaying themselves in public to demonstrate that unity prevailed among his executioners.

Clearly, observers of the USSR ignore at their peril the clues provided by Soviet texts and pictures. (According to Dr. Mark Kuchment, the version of the photographs of the Azherbaidzhan delegation to the XXIVth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that appeared in the local press published in Baku had to be approved by the head of the local TASS Division -- Azherinform.) However, accurate interpretation and analysis of the material requires rigorous methodological skills, with self-discipline as an important ingredient.

How can one know, for instance, that apparent, albeit subtle, discrepancies in official texts pertaining to a particular issue do, in fact, reflect an ongoing factional conflict? Discrepancies in the phrasing of (implicitly) operational guidelines can be deemed to reflect ongoing factional rivalry only to the extent that two or more versions of directives concerning a specific topic appear more or less simultaneously, i.e., within days or, at most, weeks of one another (sometimes even in different portions of a single issue of a publication). When such variations cover a lengthier period, they are more likely to indicate adjustment in the central "Party Line" itself, a development that is, of course, worthy of careful interpretation, but does not necessarily imply internal disputes. Where strife between adversarial groups is at work, the omission, addition, or substitution of significant terms by the respective competitors can be ascertained readily by juxtaposing relevant paragraphs from two different statements addressing a particular issue at roughly the same time. However, this is not sufficient by itself to establish that the topic in question has become a factional "football." It is necessary also to demonstrate that, allowing for the exigencies of a changing objective situation, the respective "platforms" of the rivals remain reasonably consistent throughout the period of conflict, before one side ousts the other. In other words, whatever direction the Party's "General Line" may be taking, the approach of one group will deviate fairly constantly "to the right," so to speak, while its adversaries will lean just as steadily "to the left."[2] While a "debate" of this type is being waged, the line of confrontation between the contestants is likely to remain fairly firm, if only because neither can afford to lose credibility. Arguments, even if advanced for primarily tactical reasons, as opposed to genuine convictions, have to sound persuasive if they are to "score points" for either side.

Because of these considerations, Sovietologists have to exercise self-discipline, along the lines suggested; otherwise one can "discover" fissures within the Soviet leadership wherever one looks, and whether, in fact, they are genuine or imagined at a particular stage in Soviet affairs.

It must be borne in mind that "qualitative content analysis" also requires immersion in the glossary of ideological terms and comprehension of their historic derivation and consequent operational implications. It is only in this context that the nuances mentioned reveal their full political significance. For this reason, if no other, the official ideology would have to be kept in sight as a point of reference. However, that is not the only aspect of the ideology which is relevant here. Admittedly, the Soviet leadership is profoundly cynical and opportunistic rather than inspired by revolutionary fervor or faith; indeed, it might be argued that the elite is basically reactionary, and resorts to ideological arguments primarily as a tactic, i.e., as "ammunition" against rivals. The masses, on their part, are apathetic and view "scientific socialism" frequently as suitable material for political jokes.

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[2] In Communist jargon, these are tactical concepts; "leftists" are charged with "adventurism" and "sectarianism," while "rightists" are accused of "capitulationism" and "revisionism."

However, there remains an aspect of the ideology compelling Soviet leaders to continue paying lip service to it, at least: Ideology plays a legitimating role in a state that has developed no time-hallowed, constitutionally enshrined, consistently and fairly implemented, non-violent transfer of power mechanism. To date, leadership in the USSR has been grasped either by coup d'etat, violent or conspiratorial, and/or by secret machinations, the workings of which are never revealed to the public.

Under these circumstances, the Soviet leadership can hardly view itself (or expect to be regarded) as the end product of an ongoing line of legitimate succession. The heads of the CPSU are unable to present themselves as the lawful heirs of their predecessors (whom, in many instances, they have denounced, if not overtly -- as Khrushchev attacked Stalin's "cult of the personality" -- then at least implicitly, by reference to "harebrained schemes," meaning Khrushchev, or "obsequiousness and flattery," meaning Brezhnev). The Kremlin leadership can assert the right to rule only to the degree that it can demonstrate being the orthodox interpreter of a (secular) creed -- which reveals The Laws of History. Legitimacy then becomes a function of representing a superhuman force and doing so in a manner that is not heretical or schismatic (deviations of which one can accuse predecessors whom one pushed aside -- as Byzantine rulers were wont to do). However, to be accepted as the orthodox interlocutor of Historical and Dialectical Materialism requires recognition of that role by other followers of the ideology. That is the reason for the frequently ludicrous sight of Soviet leaders "negotiating" with some miniscule Communist Party from an obscure country to agree to have its representatives attend a meeting in Moscow summoned by the CPSU.

Thus, Soviet leaders cannot afford to disencumber themselves from ideological shackles, even were they intellectually capable of doing so. That explains why operational directives, whether in implementation of the "Party's General Line" or in pursuit of the clashing objectives of rival elements in the leadership, have to be expressed in "decent" terminology, i.e., the jargon of "Marxism-Leninsim." For that very reason, "qualitative content analysis," as was asserted earlier, requires immersion in the glossary of that ideology and in its philosophical assumptions and historical associations.

Data Collected Through National Technical Means

Detective work on biographical "footprints" and the interpretation of Soviet texts, however, by no means exhaust the methodological tools available to Sovietologists. A third variable (and primary source of information) relates to "hard data on the ground" (or in space, these days), that can be elicited by "national technical means" (primarily utilizing electronics), or, occasionally, by sophisticated, critical analysis of Soviet quantitative data. Obviously, the reference primarily is to military development and deployment, arms transfers, infrastructure, economic and demographic factors, and technological options. The approach to the "hard data" sketched here may appear to be more "scientific" than the other two methodologies, but it is unlikely, by itself, to provide "strategic" indicators, if that term is understood in its full Clausewitzian, politico-military implications (illustrated so fully in Lenin's notebook comments concerning the classical work _On War_). However, added to factors derived from biography and content analysis of printed sources, the third variable could produce a multi-dimensional image of Soviet developments and shed some light on Soviet intentions. That aspect is addressed more fully later in this chapter.

Oral History and Samizdat

Fortunately, a fourth and a fifth "dimension" can be added to the study of the Soviet Union, although, unlike the three approaches mentioned above, Sovietologists as a group have failed to devote adequate attention to these two additional methodological options. Both pose difficulties with regard to the accessibility of the sources, although these obstacles can be and have been overcome in practice. Both are of major importance, as repositories of significant data for analysis and in adding flesh and blood, so to speak, to the bare skeleton that can be unearthed by means of the more conventional approaches. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that both offer "flavor, texture, and color" that could not be distilled from the interpretation, however sensitive and penetrating, of other material.

The more significant of these additional resources at the disposal of Sovietologists attempting to improve their craft is "Oral History," i.e., in-depth, thoroughly prepared interviews of former senior Soviet, East European, and other Communist State and Party officials. This topic is addressed in greater detail later in this paper. However, some comments are appropriate at this point, for instance that there are several myths with regard to this particular source of information. One concerns the presumed inaccessibility of these personalities; another derives from a belief that their information is unreliable (or at any rate, confirmation is unlikely to be obtainable); and a third takes it for granted that, in official debriefings, and in their subsequent publication of articles and books, these ex-officials have provided the international affairs and security community with all or most of the knowledge at their disposal. None of these assumptions is necessarily well-founded:

(a) It is true that quite a few of these potential interviewees still are -- or are believed to be -- high on the "hit list" of the Soviet security agencies (or their clients), and are compelled, therefore, to take appropriate precautions. However, they are eager to be utilized as a resource. Once they discover that they are dealing with responsible, knowledgeable, and serious scholars, they are likely to cooperate.

(b) There is always a possibility of "disinformation," of course; however, conscientious preparatory work in anticipation of debriefings, based upon exhaustive investigation of extant literature, and checks of transcripts against the product of interviews with other personalities of an appropriate institutional affiliation and rank, can provide corroboration (or refutation) to address this problem. The number of interviewees has to be sufficiently large, moreover, to compensate for any distortions emanating from a single source.

(c) The agencies involved in the original debriefings of such former officials tend to be preoccupied with the search for "tactical" information, required urgently, such as the names and locations of the adversary's agents, the modus operandi of hostile networks, specific military data, etc. "Strategic" information of much longer-term significance, revealing, as it were, the "Gestalt" of the closed society, the functioning of the system as a whole, particularly the decision-making process, how information reaches the top, precisely where ultimate authority rests in terms of institutions and individuals, how decisions are translated into policy implementation and by whom, etc., is viewed, understandably, as being of less urgency. Many of these former officials soon find themselves in financial straits and attempt to rectify the situation by means of a successful book or two. Publishers, however, generally are interested in colorful and dramatic material, dealing with danger and escape, or providing "portraits" of leaders encountered by the authors during their careers. Consequently, it should not be surprising that significant information of a wider, longer-term "strategic" nature can still be retained by "Oral History" interviewees, previous debriefings and publications notwithstanding. (Among the reasons for this phenomenon is the "culture barrier" between open and closed societies.)

To be ascertained optimally, such information requires patient, laborious, and time-consuming preparatory and follow-up research work. All of the relevant information relating to the interviewee's arenas of work and his career has to be distilled carefully from the open literature and reinforced with data available from the more conventional Sovietological methodologies. A long, detailed, and carefully annotated Protocol (i.e., questionnaire) follows, and the subject has to be taken, step by step, through this list of questions. The tape obtained as a result has to be transcribed and conscientiously edited and annotated, to be sent to the interviewee for final touches and confirmation. Obviously, the larger the number of personalities interviewed, the more cross-reference work is required throughout this process.

In most instances, the results obtained offer data of an intimate nature that the more conventional approaches cannot be expected to reveal. This may include conversations with leading "actors" on the Soviet scene, the treatment of sensitive issues at the highest levels of the State and Party, of which, for one reason or another, the interviewee's work provided glimpses, and fortuitous "nuggets" not anticipated during the preparatory stage and not necessarily viewed as significant by the former official.

Parenthetically, it should be noted that this particular form of "Oral History" also plays a socially useful role. The interviewees often have lost all hope of contact with their families, their lives frequently are endangered, they are isolated, and feel in many cases that they "have been squeezed out like lemons and flung away." The result can be prolonged bouts of depression, sometimes leading to suicide or redefection (which may amount to the same thing). Their involvement in a project of this type demonstrates that their usefulness to society has not been exhausted but that, on the contrary, they have a very significant role to play in enlightening both the academic and the policy-making communities.

It should be pointed out, also, that "Oral History" need not be confined to former high officials who have "come in from the cold." Emigrès who, at one stage or another of their lives, were involved in work likely to have attracted attention "higher up," particularly in science and technology, may have become aware of aspects of the decision-making process, sometimes as "objects," and often as participants or onlookers in that system. Individuals may have been situated, however long ago, at an especially crucial location in a project of great sensitivity and importance (all the more if it had military implications at the time). Consequently, they might be in a position to witness and, sometimes, to influence the decisions concerning the direction of further progress and/or additional resource allocation for that particular project. In such cases, scientists or technicians could be well positioned to have "inside knowledge," in however passive a role, by viewing the impact of policy changes on their work. Since, by definition, such interviewees occupied a lower position in the system than former officials, the quantity of tapings has to make up for the fact that the knowledge at their disposal is less direct.

"Oral History" information is likely to be significant even when viewed in isolation, but incomparably more so when integrated with the three other, more conventional "dimensions" of Sovietology. The specifics of the "Oral History" Project of the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program are addressed later in this paper.

There is at least one other source of important data to be tapped and that emanates also from "emigration" or "defection," but of a slightly different type, namely that it takes place primarily within the closed society. The reference, of course, is to dissidents and to their particular form of "publication," that is subsumed under the general title of "Samizdat." In most instances, this means material circulated surreptitiously in the USSR and sometimes smuggled out subsequently, but there are also cases in which notebooks and other collections of data have found their way to the West, to achieve their first publication there.

"Samizdat" literature, like "Oral History," in its various forms provides the full flavor, color, and "texture" absent from the gray outline of events ascertained from the other "dimensions."

It should be evident, therefore, that for a reasonably revealing and accurate reflection of Soviet reality, all five of the "dimensions" enumerated here are required; to apply the various methodologies effectively demands assiduous labor, rigorous self-discipline, and a fair amount of good luck (at least as far as the "Samizdat" and/or "Oral History" aspects are concerned).

THE STATE OF CONTEMPORARY SOVIETOLOGY

Even so, sophisticated scholarship in the Soviet field may not achieve the impact it deserves upon the foreign affairs and security community. Personalities of repute, whether from the public policy arena or from the private sector, frequently are smitten by the ailment known as "localitis." As a result, they display a tendency to ignore all of the requirements of serious Sovietology, demanding, as it does, laborious and sometimes tedious research; they are inclined to shrug off loftily methodological considerations, as petty and irrelevant, "because I have been there, and x (the current Soviet leader) himself told me confidentially that. . ." Frequently, they may add, if not constrained by courtesy, "what Gorbachev (Brezhnev, Khrushchev) confided in me is what matters, and not your attempts to read the entrails of sheep."

"Localitis" is not the only problem, however, with which current Sovietology has to contend. The generation of analysts during the 1940s and 1950s was made up largely of refugees from the USSR and former ranking members of various communist parties, all of whom had no choice but to practice the art of "content analysis" in their previous incarnations, so to speak; moreover, they had developed extremely sensitive political antennae as a result of their personal experiences. Instinct enriched by lucid logic enabled writers like the late Franz Borkenau to discern linkages borne out by documentation that became available only at a much later date.

These analysts were succeeded, in due course, by a new generation of Sovietologists, lacking such a background, and being almost apolitical -- perhaps as a result. Feeling uncomfortable, at least, or even disoriented, when confronted by tasks their predecessors had tackled instinctively, they resorted frequently to "mirror imaging" or to quantification. That is fine, of course, in the context of demography or economics, but may not be too helpful when addressing the decision-making process of a regime which -- paradoxically for supposed Marxists -- unhesitatingly places politics over economics.

There is reason to believe, consequently, that the necessary data are accessible from which to elicit a great deal of vital information concerning the USSR, and that methodologies have been developed to process these data, but that the achievements in the Soviet field are vitiated, to some extent, both by the tendency of eminent personalities to ignore the results (either because of "localitis," or because the product may make unpleasant reading), and by biological erosion which is replacing Sovietologists with social scientists.

It is worth noting that information has reached the West, from time to time, concerning repeated discussions in Communist countries at high levels as to the advisability of reducing the degree of (Aesopian) candor in the open literature, since the operational "code" of Communist publications has been "broken" rather successfully by Western Sovietologists who practice rigorous "content analysis." The conclusion, in each case, apparently was to continue as before, partly because one cannot communicate effectively via entirely classified channels with a Soviet elite numbering several hundreds of thousands (defining Nomenklatura very broadly) -- not to speak of the leadership of more than one hundred other Communist parties -- and partly because Western analysts capable of accurate interpretation of Soviet operational directives in the open literature are few in number, becoming fewer, and, in any case, tend to be ignored in the Western decision-making process.

Even should the Soviet leadership decide otherwise one day, it is simply infeasible to hide political "footprints" or "signatures" (any more than one can conceal altogether major military moves), at least not consistently and over any length of time.

Soviet Defense Policy: The Sources

In dealing with the Soviet security sector, Westerners have tended to assume that, in this arena, even more than in other fields, it is difficult to discern Soviet plans and objectives, since anything of value is assumed automatically to be highly classified. Consequently, Western analysts are tempted to rely almost entirely upon one of the five "dimensions" (or methodologies) described earlier, namely, "national technical means," i.e., electronics (photographic and communications intelligence). Obviously, this should not be belittled in our era of high technology, but it confines our overview of the Soviet military sector to "that which was," i.e., systems already deployed or in advanced stages of production, rather than "that which is to be."

However, the other "dimensions" do provide clues with regard to plans, objectives, research, and early development: Open literature -- including not only the major works of Soviet military theoreticians, but even the manuals and articles in the professional press, all of which are accessible to some extent (even if somewhat belatedly) -- contains statements of doctrine that are by no means purely abstract. They reflect not only current posture but also planning and work in the research and development phase.

This is true particularly of active strategic defense, the advocacy of which has been mirrored for years in Soviet statements of doctrine. The third edition of the (Sokolovskiy et al.) classical volume on Soviet Military Strategy stated, "Military theory must outstrip the development of the means for armed conflict, actively influence their development, and, at the proper time, determine the changes in the methods of conducting armed conflict."[3] Clearly, therefore, Soviet enunciation of doctrine anticipate technological development and direct resources accordingly. Consequently, statements relating to military theory in Soviet literature constitute operational directives and are reliable indicators of the "portion of the iceberg that is not yet visible" (as far as "national technical means" are concerned). Significantly, all the editions of Soviet Military Strategy stated that "an extremely important type of strategic operations is the protection of territory from nuclear attacks by the enemy, using PVO (antiair), PRO (antimissile), and PKO (antimissile), and PKO (antispace defense)."[4]

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[3] V.D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, ed. Harriet Fast Scott (New York, NY: Crane, Russak, 1975), p. 275.

Moreover, the work of émigrès and former high officials from the USSR and its clients, even when it terminated years ago, can shed light upon what was considered feasible then and where resources and "campaigns" were focused (in implementation of directives that had been embodied in doctrine), including operations to acquire Western technology required for the purpose of the appropriate weapons development.

It is neither necessary, therefore, nor indeed desirable, to attempt to deal with Soviet policy in this vital area by "mirror imaging" Western concepts and plans, particularly since, in the West, unlike the USSR, resource allocation appears to take precedence over doctrine. Most of all, it is counterproductive to view Soviet decisions as part of an "action-reaction" syndrome. The Soviet Union would be acting against the imperatives of Leninism, indeed of common sense, if, while stressing seizure of the initiative, it confined itself entirely to developing technologies and weapons with which the West was known already to have decided to proceed.

There is a time lag of quite a few years between the point at which a technology becomes feasible, via the research and development stage, to the moment when the "tip of the iceberg" actually becomes visible, i.e., a system enters the production line and eventual deployment. Any state that awaited the time when its adversary's work had reached that visible stage would be condemning itself to limping behind perpetually. It is absurd, therefore, to assume that the Soviet Union relegates itself to this position by resigning itself to the role of a mere "reactor" to Western decisions, in contradiction to the very essence of Leninism. Significant conclusions can be drawn about Soviet plans from doctrinal literature and from "Oral History," which constitute, therefore, essential clues, when analyzed together with the evidence from "national technical means."

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[4] Ibid., pp. 284-285.

"DEFECTORS" -- A NEGLECTED RESOURCE

Regrettably, apart from the usual caveats that were examined and refuted earlier in this paper, the resort to "Oral History" interviews with former officials from the USSR and its clients has been impeded by a mixture of prejudice and neglect. In the recent book, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List, the author observes that the term "defector" is an ugly word.[5] It suggests that, while they may not be "traitors," there is still some defect, blemish, or flaw in such individuals. The author intimates that the USSR probably is pleased that the West refers to these personalities in this negative way. The importance that the Soviet Union assigned to "defectors" and the grim seriousness with which the Soviet authorities attempt to deal with those who decide to come over to the West is reflected in the KGB "wanted list." The Soviet state security organs are charged with prevention of "defection" and the tracking down and punishing of those who succeed in the attempt. The recent KGB "defector," Vitaliy Yurchenko, who subsequently re-defected, served in the section responsible for investigation of treason and for dealing with defection by KGB officers abroad. During 1980-1985, he was Chief of the Fifth Department of Directorate K (counter-intelligence) of the KGB's First Chief Directorate.[6] It is surprising, therefore, that, having a presumably clear understanding of the plight of defectors who return either willingly or unwillingly to the Soviet Union, he should have decided to re-defect.

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[5] Vladislav Krasnov, Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1986).

The author of Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List is not the first to struggle with this issue, not only of terminology but of implied attitude concerning such individuals. In the book The Craft of Intelligence, former Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, also discussed this question.[7] He noted that "the term defector is often used in the jargon of international relations and intelligence to discuss the officials or highly knowledgeable citizens, generally from Communist countries, who leave their country to come live in the West." However, Dulles referred to these individuals as volunteers. He believed that those who come over to the West, especially if they worked in the official Soviet or East European bloc hierarchies, could bring with them a wealth of revealing information.

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[6] For a detailed description of the organization of the Committee for State Security (KGB), see John Barron, KGB Today (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983), Appendix B. The best single source of literature on Soviet intelligence is Raymond G. Rocca and John J. Dziak, Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1985).

[7] Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1963).

Unfortunately, over the last decade and a half the West, and particularly the United States, has shown little interest in the knowledge concerning the Soviet system available through such "defectors" or volunteers. Their knowledge of and insight into Soviet and East European foreign and domestic policy, political-military doctrine and strategy, as well as their instinctive anticipation of Soviet future behavior, have been largely ignored. This was particularly true during the period of "detente" in the 1970s, when a "defector" became a source of embarrassment for the U.S., since he might affect negatively Soviet-American negotiations and relations in general. Therefore, the importance of these personalities was consciously and significantly minimized. Arkady Shevchenko, for instance, found himself in this predicament during the late 1970s.

During the 1950s, by way of contrast, Dulles viewed "defection" as a uniquely twentieth-century phenomenon resulting from totalitarian regimes. He did not equate these individuals with traitors or turncoats. Robert C. Tucker summed up the symptomatic aspects of this phenomenon most accurately in the following passage: "When a country reaches a point where, despite its enormous size, natural wealth, and untold other possibilities, large numbers of its citizens are willing to risk starting a new life under difficult conditions . . . we have every reason to question whether that country is in a state of health."[8]

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[8] Robert C. Tucker and G.R. Urban, eds., Stalinism: Its Impact on Russia and the World (New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1982).

"Defectors" from the USSR and other Communist countries may be divided into the following categories: scholars and intellectuals; personnel in science and technology; diplomats and security officers; military personnel; seamen and fishermen; athletes; and performing artists. The reasons for "defection" vary for individuals from (and even within) each of the different categories. "Defectors" themselves have offered the following explanations: personal and family reasons; fear of repression; desire to tell the truth; hope for a better life; pursuit of freedom; urge to protest and fight the system; material consequences; and personal danger (or at least serious disadvantages) resulting from power shifts or a new line-up.[9] From a more analytical perspective these might be categorized as follows: ideological-political; ethical-religious; personal-familial; and circumstantial (danger, threat to status, etc.).

The number of defectors from communist countries is not large. According to Krasnov, during the period 1959-1974 approximately 250 "defected" from the USSR, i.e., 15 annually from the categories listed above. They included forty-two intellectuals, thirty-one scholars, and twenty-one diplomats and intelligence officers.[10] The countries of Eastern Europe and other Soviet client states (e.g., Cuba) are not covered by these statistics.

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[9] For a summary of "defector" literature, including Congressional testimony, see Rocca and Dziak, *Bibliography on Soviet Intelligence and Security Services*, Ch. 3.

[10] Krasnov, *Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List*, Part II.

Oral History Research

The Oral History Project[11] of the Fletcher School's International Security Studies Program focuses on the decision-making process in the USSR (and its allies and clients), with regard to international and security policy, especially relating to the panoply of protracted low-intensity operations (covering arms transfers, training and logistical assistance for surrogate forces, including terrorists, and political coordination between them), intelligence, psychological warfare, disinformation, and active measures. The objective is to determine, through information and insights provided by those who were either directly or indirectly involved, how the Soviet decision-making and operational apparatus determines and plans these activities, integrates East European and other surrogate capabilities, and carries out policy "in the field." The goal is to ascertain the process of policy formation and implementation and thus to shed light upon the functioning of the Soviet system as an entity or "Gestalt," an enquiry that holds out prospects of success only to the extent that it remains sharply focused on specifics, rather than being diffused by preoccupation with generalities.

To accomplish these objectives, the Program developed a research design based upon reasonably structured interviews with individuals likely to have had direct or indirect access to knowledge concerning various aspects of the Soviet international and security policy process and operational apparatus. The interviews consist of two categories, of which the more significant covered former diplomats, military and intelligence officials, as well as personalities from Central Committee departments and special institutes of the Academy of Sciences, who have come over to the West. The sample includes individuals from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Nicaragua (ex-Sandinistas only), Cuba, and Afghanistan. "From above" they had access to, or at least knowledge of, the decision-making and operational apparatus dealing with the topics mentioned.

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[11] The Oral History Project was made possible by a generous grant from the J. Howard Pew Freedom Trust.

The second category of interviewees consists primarily of émigrés (with one or two "defectors") from the Soviet Union, who were engaged in science and technology, covering, in some instances, sensitive areas related to defense. Scientists and engineers, whose work was sufficiently significant to draw the attention of the "apparat," became "objects" of decision-making, and, as such, were able to view the process "from below." On the other hand, because the process of research and development is creative by nature, they could retain a measure of independence much greater than in other areas of Soviet life.

In light of the excessive compartmentalization encountered in Communist states, individual interviewees were unlikely to be able to provide comprehensive descriptions of the security policy formation process or of the operational apparatus. However, collectively, the interviewees available can provide reasonably detailed information about different components or aspects of the topics investigated, viewed from various points in time. Given their respective locations on many intersections of the vertical and horizontal lines of the "grid" which has resulted from the multiplicity of experiences contributed by these personalities -- in terms of institutions, levels of responsibility, and periods -- information and insights gathered allow investigators to begin fitting together different parts of the Soviet "jigsaw puzzle."

This data base cannot suffice, by itself, to present a multi-faceted image of the functioning of the Soviet system, even within the parameters set by the Project. To achieve that goal, the other "dimensions" or methodologies described earlier must be brought into play as well. However, knowledge provided by former officials, analyzed appropriately, can make a contribution that provides unique insight. Personalities who held positions in the foreign or intelligence services, and other operational arms of the "apparat" of the USSR (or one of its allies, clients, or surrogates) which function in the international arena are likely to have come into contact with aspects of policy formation and implementation, as well as leadership perceptions of success and failure. They comprehend Soviet operational patterns, coordination of surrogate elements, and the assets and liabilities of the apparatus. By interviewing former officials and émigrés, it becomes more feasible to develop and test hypotheses concerning Soviet doctrine, strategy, policy, and operations. Examples of questions to be examined include: Has there been any continuity in Soviet protracted warfare strategy during the period under investigation? Has this been an evolving policy with an upward escalatory trend or has it been marked by stops and starts and a lack of continuity?

Levels of Analysis and Oral History Interviews

Although the Oral History Project is still in midstream, the initial assessment indicates that the interviewees constitute a highly informative and sophisticated source of information. The Soviet Union appears to share this view, since it regards "defections" as very damaging substantively (i.e., not merely propagandistically). Moscow realizes that the information "defectors" offer to the West pierces the veil covering the Soviet inner sanctum. Since there has been a tendency in U.S. government circles, including segments of the intelligence community, to minimize contributions of defectors, particularly during the 1970s, the initial assessment of our Project runs counter to the mainstream. Within the intelligence community, "defectors" can provide an additional (or, at least, significantly supplementary) methodology for analysis of the Soviet Union and the states aligned with it.

The most knowledgeable former Soviet officials, with the more perceptive insights, can help specialists, on a long-term basis, to assess Soviet policy and activities concerning specific issues. Of course, it is not feasible to shed light upon every problem area in this manner, but it is instructive to note what long-term value the knowledge and experience even of "defectors" from the 1950s and 1960s can have.

From a bureaucratic perspective, full utilization of "strategic" debriefing of these personalities (as opposed to purely "tactical" questions to elicit names of hostile agents, etc.) requires circumventing perceptions that have developed in the West about the reliability of the interviewees and their information. Ways of coping with legitimate research concerns about the credibility of the evidence obtained were mentioned earlier in this paper (p. 16,(b)). They involve exhaustive cross-checking of Oral History testimony against information in the existing literature and by means of the other methodologies and data sources described previously. Recognition and appreciation is needed of the asset available in the persons of the former citizens of closed societies, plus a long-term institutional commitment to take advantage of their talents, knowledge, and background -- particularly when multiple debriefings are integrated into a collective product.

Predominantly "tactical" information, of course, has been utilized traditionally by Western intelligence, i.e., data concerning specific activities, personalities, and centers that had been in the direct purview of the interviewee, given the position held in the apparatus prior to "defection." Such material, from a former KGB officer, for example, obviously would have immediate impact upon the service left behind, potentially paralyzing, for months to come. However, that immediate or "time sensitive" information could contribute also to the broader picture that ought to be assembled by collating the individual components of the Soviet apparatus as it developed over time. Thus, even "tactical" data can have "strategic" implications, throwing light upon the modus operandi of the system (and its center of gravity) in various periods.

A second aspect that can be illuminated with the aid of such material relates to broader Soviet strategy and policy at the time of "defection." Perceptive debriefing can provide a window into activities that parallel the "defector's" own area of responsibility and, while usually second hand (derived from associates, extrapolation from personal experience, and scuttlebutt), can be highly significant.

Given the glacial nature of change in the Soviet Union, "Oral History" can utilize debriefing of individuals who came to the West over remarkably long periods of time. Thus, a third benefit of a project that integrates multiple interviews is to demonstrate the elements of continuity -- or inconsistency -- during the whole post-World War II period, with regard to Soviet strategy and policy implementation (including organization) in the international and security arenas.

Finally, as a result of all these aspects, the Oral History Project can have predictive value as well, especially given the sensitive political antennae of the interviewees and their ability to perceive analogies between current developments and their own extensive (individual and collective) experience. If a group were formed within the U.S. national security community of these former officials (of the USSR and its clients), they could bring to bear their insights to assess Soviet policy as it unfolds, making valuable contributions to the process of analysis, to complement the normal product of the foreign affairs and intelligence agencies.

TWO PERSPECTIVES ON SOVIET DECISION-MAKING: STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND "ACTIVE MEASURES"

The work of the ISSP Oral History Project already has produced highly significant "nuggets" which, viewed in concert with the other sources of information discussed above, make it possible here to discuss two critical issues of which Soviet decision-makers have been seized: The first concerns Soviet strategic defense policy; the second deals, in somewhat more theoretical parameters, with the role that Oral History can play in analyzing the USSR's approach to "active measures" and low intensity conflict (a topic on which the Project's work is still in progress). Information concerning Soviet efforts and decisions of the 1960s and early to mid-1970s, provided by former Soviet officials (as well as ex-officials from regimes allied with the USSR), throws light upon Soviet attitudes on these critical issues, with obvious relevance for current American policy considerations.

Soviet Strategic Defense Policy

The Department of Defense, in conjunction with the State Department, issued a white paper on "Soviet Strategic Defense Programs."[12] The study states that "over the last 25 years, the Soviets have increased their active and passive defenses in a determined attempt to blunt the effect of a U.S. and allied retaliation to Soviet attack." Evidence of the importance that Moscow places upon damage limitation and defense can be traced back, according to the white paper, to the beginning of the nuclear age (i.e., the early 1950s). In terms of active defense, two new mission areas apparently had been established by the mid-1960s, including anti-satellite defense and anti-ballistic missile defense (ABM). These programs were added to the National Air Defense Mission. The Soviet commitment to ABM research, according to the Department of Defense - State Department paper, was not constrained, in any way by the spirit of the ABM Treaty. (The letter of that agreement, of course, did permit certain kinds of ABM research.)

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[12] Soviet Strategic Defense Programs (Washington, DC: Department of Defense and Department of State, October, 1985).

By 1980, the USSR began to upgrade and expand its ABM deployment to the limits allowed by the Treaty. The modernized ABM system is to be composed of: silo-based, long-range, modified Galosh interceptors; silo-based, high acceleration interceptors designed to engage targets within the atmosphere; associated and guidance radars; and a new large radar at Pushkino designed to control ABM engagements. Soviet silos are reloadable. Launch detection satellites provide thirty minute warning of any U.S. launch. The next operational layer of detection consists of eleven HENHOUSE ballistic missile early warning radars at six locations on the periphery of the USSR. These distinguish size of attack, confirm satellite warning, and provide target tracking data for ABM forces. Additionally, according to the Department of Defense - State Department publication, the Soviet Union is now constructing a new network of six large phased-array radars that can track with greater accuracy than the HENHOUSE network. Five of these duplicate the HENHOUSE, while the sixth, near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia, closes the early warning loop. There is an arch of coverage from the Kola Peninsula in the northwest USSR, around Siberia, to the Caucasus in the southwest.

While the ABM Treaty recognizes the need for missile early warning, the publication points out that these developments in the USSR will allow for the operationalization of early warning radars that can detect and track warheads at great distances and across the expanse of Soviet territory. Consequently, such radars could play an important role in a nationwide ABM defense, prohibited by the Treaty. (That agreement allowed only early warning radars located on the country's periphery and oriented outward, minimizing the potential for rapid transition to a countrywide battle management network.)

The Krasnoyarsk facility is designed for missile detection, tracking, and early warning. Many, including members of the U.S. government, have stressed that this violates the Treaty, which stipulates that a battle management system must be located within a 150 kilometer radius of Moscow (Krasnoyarsk being 3,700 kilometers away from Moscow). Additionally, the facility is not oriented outward, toward Mongolia, but inward, across 4,000 kilometers of Soviet territory. The design is not for space tracking, as the USSR claims, but resembles other Soviet radars built for missile detection and tracking, as well as early warning. However, U.S. specialists are not unanimous on these issues.

What role was envisaged for ABM by the USSR and what light does this shed on current Soviet defense policy? Answers to these and related questions are vital, particularly at this point in

U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations. An Oral History interview, conducted with Dr. Anatoly Fedoseyev[13], provides significant information in this context. For many years, Fedoseyev was a leading designer of Soviet magnetrons, a critical component of the most powerful Soviet radars. Fedoseyev was the recipient both of the Lenin Prize for science and the award of Hero of Socialist Labor. During the period between the early 1950s and the early 1970s, he was an active participant in the development of Soviet ABM radars. He was the head of a department of one of the USSR's leading electronic research institutes and he helped to establish a school of magnetron research and design.

According to Professor Fedoseyev, the Soviet Union started the research and development of its ABM systems in earnest at the beginning of the 1960s ("around 1958-1960," as he put it).

By that time the Soviet Military-Industrial Commission, chaired consecutively by Viacheslav Malyshev[14] and Dmitri Ustinov, had made a decision on the type of national ABM system to be adopted. The two chief competitors were Professor Alexander L'vovich Mintz[15] and General Grigorii Vasilievich Kisun'ko.[16] Both projects were discussed and evaluated. Finally, Mintz's project was dismissed for two reasons -- that it was extremely expensive (much more so than the Kisun'ko project), and that it could not be activated until every component was ready.

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[13] Oral History Project, International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. The authors acknowledge with appreciation the valuable assistance provided by Dr. Mark Kuchment, of Harvard University's Russian Research Center and a former professor of the history of science in the USSR, in connection with this interview and its technological aspects. Dr. Kuchment has served as a consultant in the portion of the Oral History Project that concerned interviews of émigrés who had been engaged in science and technology.

[14] Viacheslav Aleksandrovich Malyshev - (1902-1957). Graduated from Bauman Advanced Technical College in Moscow (1934). From 1939-People's Commission of Heavy Industry 1940-1944; Vice Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, 1941-1946; People's Commissar of tank production; Minister of Middle Machine Building; Head of the State Committee on the diffusion of Advanced Technology (Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia, 3rd edition, vol. 15 p. 295 [873]).

The Kisun'ko system, on the other hand, could be used very quickly in modules, step by step. So one could begin with the Moscow ring, proceed to the Leningrad ring, and then, step by step, to approach the all-Union level. This system, which had to be developed in separate installments, permitted the absorption of technological innovations which might emerge in the course of its development, thus offering more flexibility than the rival design.

Professor Fedoseyev learned about these developments from General Kisun'ko at the end of the 1950s, when the latter asked him to develop a wave-guide magnetron-amplifier, which allowed for an average power of a radar signal of about one hundred kilowatts. Professor Anatol Fedoseyev was well prepared to handle the task, because he had already started research independently in this particular direction. On the other hand, he felt that if Professor Mintz's project were to win, then Professor Fedoseyev's rival, Mr. Zusmanovsky, would be ordered to develop klystrons for Mintz's radars. Consequently, Professor Fedoseyev went full speed ahead. He began his project in Friazino, near Moscow, and then completed it by 1964 in Moscow -- to which the Military Institute of Communication Systems was transferred. The first Soviet radar, using Professor Fedoseyev's wave-guide magnetron amplifier, started to operate in Kapustin Yar around 1963. The average energy was about 100 kilowatts. Operation of this extremely powerful device created an energy shortage in the surrounding area. Subsequently, Professor Fedoseyev's magnetrons were used in the ABM systems around Moscow.

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[15] Alexander L'vovich Mintz - born 1895; Soviet physicist and specialist in communication systems; professor from 1934; was in charge of design of the most powerful Soviet radio station, (radio Komintern, 1933). In 1957-70 director of the institute of Radio-Technology in the Academy of Sciences. From 1967, head of the council on the problems of acceleration of charged particles. Full member of the Academy from 1958. Participated in the design of the biggest Soviet elementary particles accelerators in Dubna and Serpulkhop/10 billion and 76 billion electron volts. Hero of Socialist Labor; Lenin and Stalin prize winner (Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia 3rd edition, vol. 16, p. 301 [891]).

[16] Grigorii Vasilievich Kisun'ko (born 1918). Soviet specialist in the area of radio electronics. Corresponding Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences (from 1958). Hero of Socialist Labor (1956). (Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia. 3rd Edition, vol. 12, p. 203 [596]).

In 1965, Professor Kisun'ko set another, much more ambitious task for Professor Fedoseyev: to raise the power of his magnetron amplifier more than ten times, so as to be able to reach an average energy of 1000 kilowatts or more. Professor Fedoseyev felt at that time that this new device would be installed at a phased-array radar, similar to the one now being assembled by the Soviet Union in the Krasnoyarsk area (as Professor Fedoseyev, reflecting on the recent events, put it: "I suspected that this Krasnoyarsk business was our new task").

Such a magnetron-amplifier, if developed, could lead to the creation of a phased-array radar, to be used for the interception of ICBMs. Knowing about the energy shortage which developed in the surrounding area after the Soviet Union installed its powerful radar at Kapustin Yar, Professor Fedoseyev viewed it as natural that this new, much more powerful radar should be located in close proximity of the Krasnoyarsk hydropower station, one of the largest of its kind.

Professor Fedoseyev did not participate directly in the task of creating this new superpowerful magnetron-amplifier. By 1965 he was preoccupied with other work and recommended his former student Mikhail Ivanovich Khvorov for the position. By that time (about twenty years ago), Mr. Khvorov was in his early forties, and he inherited Professor Fedoseyev's huge laboratory, which, at that time, had about 450 employees; Khvorov redirected its efforts to meet the new tasks.

Around 1968-69, Mr. Khvorov's team achieved its first major success, by creating a magnetron-amplifier with an average energy of 400 kilowatts. Professor Fedoseyev left the USSR several years later, and severed his connection with the Soviet military establishment. However, his experience, and the intuition of a veteran, lead him to believe that by the end of the 1970s the odds were in favor of Mr. Khvorov's team successfully creating a superpowerful magnetron-amplifier of the type that may be in the process of installation at the Krasnoyarsk radar. Professor Fedoseyev's views were recently partly corroborated by the Soviet Union itself, which implicitly acknowledged that its Krasnoyarsk radar is indeed part of the Soviet national ABM system.

We asked Professor Fedoyesev whether, toward the end of his stay in the Soviet Union, the Soviet military R&D community was aware of the limitations placed on the development of military technology by the impending SALT I treaty of 1972. (The issue of ABM radar limitations was of special concern during SALT I.)[17]

He was rather contemptuous in his response: "All those SALTs had no effect on our business. No effect at all. . . . You see, the SALT I, II, III is the agreement between the wolf [the USSR] and the sheep [the USA]. And the stupid sheep is always at fault. It is impossible, absolutely impossible, to let the Soviet Union do what it wants."

Professor Fedoseyev noted also that, in the mid-1960s, Kisun'ko directed a project for the development of a highly powerful laser that could be used in active defense. In other words, beginning in the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union had already embarked upon its equivalent of a strategic defense initiative. (The United States, of course, did not commit itself to SDI until President Reagan's speech of March 23, 1983.) Significantly, Soviet statements of doctrine published in the open literature of the mid- and late- 1960s (see p. 23 of this paper) already reflected the decisions that had been taken on the relevant technological development. Typically, many Western analysts dismissed that literature as mere "lobbying by Soviet military hawks."

First-hand, eye-witness information of the kind presented by Professor Fedoseyev, therefore, offers an additional dimension, together with content analysis of Soviet military literature, as well as data collected through national technical means (e.g., the information in the U.S. white paper, summarized earlier, on pp. 35-37), to be integrated in an analytical framework for assessing current and future Soviet policy. The issues to be examined include: Offense and defense in Soviet doctrine; a long-term view of Soviet research and development; Soviet opposition to ABM and SDI in its "public diplomacy"; and the Soviet approach to the letter and the spirit of strategic agreements like the ABM Treaty.

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[17] During the SALT I process, it became clear that Soviet leaders were interested primarily, at that stage, in halting the deployment of Safeguard (part of America's proposed ABM system), and, for that purpose, would entertain measures to restrict ABM on both sides. After rejecting a comprehensive U.S. proposal to curb ABM and strategic offensive systems, in 1970, Moscow pressed for an ABM treaty, and for postponing limitations on offensive systems.

Soviet Arms Control Tactics

A second, closely related area in which former Soviet officials can provide important information and insight relates to Moscow's operations to exert pressure, via public opinion, on its adversaries while engaged in the process of negotiating arms limitations. It should be recalled that, at the time of SALT I, many in the West had come to the conclusion that the Soviet Union viewed the arms control process and its potential outcome essentially as a "mirror image" of the U.S. approach. Many concluded that the accords signaled a wider mutual understanding concerning international behavior, informed by comprehension of the dangers of the thermonuclear age. Supposedly, they reflected convergence of thinking about technological, doctrinal, and national security issues. John Newhouse, in Cold Dawn, stated that during SALT I the Soviet Union had come to understand that "stability demands that each of the two societies stand wholly exposed to the destructive power of the other." He further noted that "acceptance of this severe and novel doctrine illustrates the growing sophistication and willingness to break with fixed attitudes."[18] These conclusions were summarized in an article by Roman Kolkowicz that appeared in 1971 (before the agreements were concluded):

> The most important implication for the future that can be derived from our analysis is that Soviet strategic doctrine and policy are progressively more shaped by factors that are trans-systemic: the momentum of technology; the available economic capabilities in the system; the scale of priorities in the system; and the inherent constraints of nuclear weapons and their related technologies, which largely dictate the doctrines on their uses and limitations. Thus we may discern a form of progressive strategic convergence of the superpowers.[19]

From this perspective, the ABM Treaty signalled rejection of strategic defense by the Soviet Union. Although research could continue, the feasibility and desirability of country-wide ABM was rejected by both sides. Doctrinally, Cold Dawn claimed, SALT I resulted in the establishment of the shared strategic concept of mutual assured destruction (MAD). It was asserted, moreover, that, as far as national security was concerned, the process signaled a desire by both sides to halt the arms race and to ensure the security of their states through limitations and possible reductions. According to those who negotiated for the United States, as summarized in Cold Dawn, this shared commitment to the process was the key to the breakthrough in negotiating arms limitations.

These and related subjects were raised in Oral History interviews with two former Soviet officials intimately engaged in the orchestration of the Soviet negotiations process and style. Michael Voslensky is referred to in the aforementioned study by Krasnov (Soviet Defectors: The KGB Wanted List) as having been identified originally as an Academy of Sciences disarmament specialist, academician, and author of several books on world politics. In reality he had a much more interesting career.[20] From the early 1950s, Voslensky was also connected with the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Established in the post-World War II period in place of the Comintern, the ID is responsible for planning, coordinating, and conducting "active measures" or political and psychological warfare.[21]

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[18] John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart, and Winson, 1973), pp. 1-3.

[19] Roman Kolkowicz, "Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives," World Politics (April 1, 1971), p. 440.

During the mid-1950s, Voslensky worked for the World Peace Council, the major Soviet front group concerned with propaganda and

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[20] Michael Voslensky, Nomenklatura: The Soviet Ruling Class -- An Insider's Report (New York, NY: Doubleday, 1984).

[21] Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (New York, NY: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984). Shultz and Godson define "active measures" as follows: A Soviet term that came into use in the 1950s to describe certain overt and covert techniques for influencing events and behavior in, and the actions of, foreign countries. Active measures may entail influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between other nations, and discrediting and weakening governmental and non-governmental opponents. This frequently involves attempts to deceive the target (foreign governmental and non-governmental elites or mass audiences) and to distort that target's perceptions of reality. Active measures may be conducted overtly through officially sponsored foreign propaganda channels, diplomatic relations, and cultural diplomacy. Covert political techniques include the use of covert propaganda, oral and written disinformation, agents of influence, clandestine radios, and international front organizations. Although active measures principally are political in nature, military maneuvers and paramilitary assistance to insurgents and terrorists also may be involved.

"active measures" on questions of disarmament. Later, he participated in the Pugwash Conferences and became a member of the Commission of Disarmament of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. What follows reflects his comments and perceptions of what the Kremlin leadership hoped to achieve through these activities.[22] His role in (and description of how the Soviet Union viewed) Pugwash sheds light on the questions raised above. It will be recalled that the Pugwash meetings brought together U.S. and Soviet scientists and scholars to develop a concrete, phased disarmament process. In many ways, it was the forerunner to official negotiations. From the U.S. side, many of the Pugwash participants over the years went on to play active roles in the debate over arms control and were consultants for or served in the U.S. government, participating either directly or indirectly in the SALT process. Voslensky noted that both Pubwash and the Disarmament Commission were of particular interest to the International Department and its head, Boris Ponomarev. This was due, in Voslensky's view, to the fact that the ID plays an instrumental role in the planning and implementation of Soviet "active measures" or political warfare. With respect, specifically, to Pugwash, he noted that the International Department hoped to use the meetings as a vehicle to ignite a genuine disarmament movement among elites in the West, in order to create an atmosphere conducive to arms control talks in general and, therefore, responsive to Soviet proposals as likely to enhance this process. As a member of the Soviet delegation to Pugwash, the

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[22] Oral History Project, International Security Studies Program, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

International Department instructed Voslensky along these lines. This was also true of his work with the Disarmament Commission when it interacted with Western officials and specialists.

Was there a hidden agenda behind Soviet Pugwash activities and Commission on Disarmament própossals? Voslensky stressed that, based upon his experiences, "certainly the USSR has no interest in arms control as a whole, but only in arms control of the West." He stated that representatives from the East European countries were coordinated into Soviet Pugwash strategy. He observed that the Soviet Union viewed most Western representatives to Pugwash as somewhat idealistic and therefore likely to prove receptive to the Soviet message. He mentioned also that some of the scientists in the Soviet delegation were equally idealistic. The Soviet leadership felt. Voslensky pointed out, that it was necessary to include such individuals for tactical reasons. However. he explained. those representatives who directed the Soviet delegation to Pugwash or were in charge of the Commission on Disarmament either were members of the International Department or worked for it. Their approach and views, according to Voslensky, were quite different.

During his tenure on the Soviet Commission on Disarmament (1965-1972), the SALT I process unfolded. During our interview, he discussed the shift in Soviet tactics on the question of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM). Voslensky asserted that the ABM Treaty did not affect the Soviet research and development agenda. The reason for engaging in ABM negotiations. according to Voslensky, was to limit American activities in this field. while allowing

Soviet work to continue. Unlike the West, where ABM came to be equated with potential strategic nuclear instability at the superpower level, it was never considered in these terms by the Soviet leadership. The Treaty did not curtail Soviet ABM research and development or the resources devoted to it. Since the ABM Treaty was linked in Western concepts to the strategy of mutual assured destruction (MAD), we asked whether the Soviet Union ever viewed MAD as a viable nuclear doctrine; Voslensky commented with acerbity that the USSR desired not mutual assured destruction, but rather just one-sided assured destruction.

An Oral History interview with Arkady Shevchenko provided additional evidence and insights concerning the questions examined in this section.[23] Due to the position he held within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and his involvement in the disarmament process, Shevchenko is well informed about the manner in which Soviet leaders viewed SALT I and related negotiations. In discussing these issues, he pointed to the division of labor between the International Department (which promoted general disarmament proposals of the type sponsored by the USSR at various Pugwash Conferences, at the UN, etc.) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which dealt with more specific developments, like the details of the SALT process). From a tactical perspective, the approach taken by the Ministry was more realistic, according to Shevchenko, since the U.S. was much more likely to take seriously concrete arms limitation initiatives than general disarmament discussions. In any case, the USSR was able to continue with its strategic programs, Shevchenko pointed out, while benefitting from the impact SALT I had on U.S. defense planning and appropriations.

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[23] Ibid.

The Soviet leaders assumed, Shevchenko noted, that SALT I afforded them an opportunity to close the qualitative gap in the strategic nuclear field by convincing the U.S. that the USSR was committed to the SALT process and shared U.S. concepts (like MAD). As a result, the USSR was able to continue its strategic research and development and to achieve qualitative parity by the late 1970s. In other words, Shevchenko had reason to believe that the Kremlin viewed SALT as a tactical move, rather than as the first step toward mutual arms reductions and eventual disarmament; nor did SALT signal Soviet acceptance of the U.S. approach to arms control and American strategic nuclear doctrine. The Soviet Union's SALT approach was much more effective, tactically, in Shevchenko's view, than Soviet propaganda concerning general disarmament.

Shevchenko noted that strategic deception was one of the Soviet objectives in SALT, since the USSR sought to convey a view of its strategic purpose that appeared to constitute a mirror image of American concepts. Shevchenko went on to discuss the role of the various research institutes of the Academy of Sciences in promoting this image, stressing the importance of influence operations or "active measures" directed at Western policy and research institutes. He observed that both the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB play an important part in directing this aspect of the work of the institutes. Similar statements about the latter, and especially the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada (IUSAC), were heard from other Oral History interviewees, such as Stanislav Levchenko and Galina Orionova.[24] Levchenko worked for the International Department from 1965 to 1971, before joining the KGB as a case officer specializing in "active measures," while Orionova spent ten years in IUSAC.

In sum, Voslensky and Shevchenko provide unique inside perceptions of the Soviet approach to arms control and other negotiations, with particular attention to psychological manipulation and camouflage as a way of achieving goals apparently unattainable through purely technological military competition.

Active Measures and "Low Intensity" Conflict

The historical record since 1917 has demonstrated that Soviet strategy is not limited to the deployment of nuclear and "conventional" military power. In pursuit of foreign policy objectives, the Soviet leadership also employs quite different instruments of power projection and influence. Referred to in the Western lexicon as "special operations," in Soviet terminology they are named "active measures" and integrated into what some Western analysts have called protracted or low intensity conflict. In many respects, the two terms--special operations and active measures--are not comparable. Special operations, in the U.S. national security lexicon, are defined narrowly and refer mainly to military actions. Soviet active measures, on the other hand, span the entire range of politico-military-psychological techniques, employed short of actual "conventional" military conflict.

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[24] Ibid.

Western appreciation and comprehension is very limited with regard to Soviet views concerning the panoply of operations associated with these protracted/low intensity conflicts. A search of relevant Western literature reveals little systematic and scholarly analysis of this highly significant factor. Until very recently, minimal attention has been paid to the concept of Soviet active measures, while their relationship to overall Soviet foreign and national security objectives has been largely ignored. In reality, the term "active measures" came into use in the USSR as long ago as the 1950s, when important Soviet policy decisions were made to escalate the use of the various aspects of these measures against the West--particularly in the Third World. This step involved the use of a host of overt and covert political, psychological, paramilitary and related techniques for influencing events and the behavior of foreign governments and of "movements."

Active measures may entail also undermining confidence in foreign leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between various governments, and intimidating, discrediting and delegitimizing governmental and non-governmental opponents of the USSR. Vehicles for the implementation of such measures include arms transfers, training of (and advisory support for) insurgents and terrorists, various intelligence operations, political and psychological warfare, disinformation, and the use of surrogate forces. While this strategy has played a significant role in Soviet international policy since the early days of Soviet power, in the late 1950s it underwent a quantitative and qualitative change. A careful analysis of Soviet international behavior since that time provides firm evidence of this transformation and it is reflected in Soviet primary sources and other relevant literature.

It is precisely in this area of protracted/low intensity conflict that Western policymakers and analysts display the least knowledge of Soviet decisionmaking, policy formulation and implementation. Greater attention is paid now to the end results and, while Sovietologists concede that the USSR has employed special operations or active measures that run the gamut of politico-military competition below the level of conventional conflict, no study is found in the public domain that delineates the Soviet *modus operandi* with regard to these activities or the concepts that guide them.

It is not surprising that Western leaders know relatively little about these aspects of Soviet decision-making and the inner workings of the apparatus through which policy is implemented. In the first place, many of these operations are clandestine and/or conducted through surrogates and proxies. Moreover, the Soviet institutions and agencies of the apparatus responsible both for initiating and implementing such politico-military activities are not readily accessible for investigation. Finally, the secondary priority that U.S. policymakers historically have assigned to protracted or low intensity conflict (in comparison to the nuclear and conventional military elements of Soviet national security policy and process) also contributes to this unfamiliarity.

Consequently, the literature on these aspects of the Soviet security equation is uneven and inconsistent, some aspects fortuitously receiving more attention than others. Material on the Soviet intelligence and security services, which play a central role in protracted/low intensity policy, is a case in point. First-hand publications by "defectors" provide insight (sometimes anecdotal) into the activities of particular branches of the intelligence services at specific times. Often written for the popular market, these works are only of limited value to the scholar or analyst seeking to trace the evolution of the formulation and implementation of policy and strategy. While these former officials often are capable of providing genuine, in-depth insight, publishers generally do not see this as the kind of information that "sells books" on the mass market. Secondary accounts, while numerous, are also more anecdotal than analytic and scholarly. Of course, there are exceptions, including works by George Leggett, Robert Slusser, Robert Conquest, Ronald Hingley, and others. However, for the most part, the secondary literature is characterized by the more journalistic and normative work of authors like John Barron (which is not meant to belittle his contribution). The same can be said of accounts by former U.S. intelligence officers.

Other institutions concerned with Soviet policy as it relates to protracted/low intensity activities have received much less consideration. For example, with few exceptions, little is available on the International Department (ID) of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The scholarly literature on Soviet foreign policy contributes little to our understanding of the internal workings of the ID and its role in policy formulation and implementation. One major exception to this is provided by the work of the late Leonard Schapiro. The study of Soviet international front organizations, under the direction of the ID, is another area in which the literature is often less than rigorous. The same can be said for those institutions of the Soviet apparatus that are involved in related aspects of its international and security policy. For instance, only recently have the Soviet special purpose (or Spetsnaz) forces under the Ministry of Defense, KGB, and MVD been discussed in Western publications. Sound analysis of this little understood segment of the USSR's military-security power is only in the embryonic stage, with studies by John Dziak constituting the rare exception. A recent study by John Collins of the Congressional Research Service (CRS) draws together the few pieces of information available at present. Other parts of the Soviet apparatus, including the various institutes of the Academy of Sciences, the Central Committee departments responsible for international communications, and those higher Party bodies responsible for oversight and coordination, have received even less consideration. Finally, we know very little of the "sister" departments and bureaus in the apparatus of Soviet allies and surrogates in Eastern Europe, Cuba, and elsewhere.

In sum, what becomes evident from a review of the literature in the public domain is the absence of analytic and scholarly examination of the evolution, development, and implementation of

Soviet international and security policy in the area of protracted/low intensity conflict. One of the objectives of the ISSP Oral History Project is to fill this void. This is being accomplished, in large part, through information and insights provided by those who were either directly or indirectly involved in these aspects of Soviet policy (and who, therefore, have first-hand knowledge of the manner in which Soviet decisionmaking process and operational apparatus formulate and plan these activities, integrate East European and other surrogate capabilities, and carry out policy "in the field"). The goal is to document the way in which that process has evolved and developed, thereby shedding light upon the functioning of the Soviet system as an entity (i.e., the "Gestalt" of that system), an inquiry that holds out prospects for success only to the extent that it remains sharply focused on specifics, rather than being diffused through preoccupation with generalities.

The potential importance of this on-going research project to current and future American foreign policy is reflected by the concern expressed both by Members of Congress and the Executive branch with regard to Soviet active measures, special operations, and related issues. There have been Congressional hearings on these subjects, as well as acts of bipartisan legislation designed to improve the ability of the U.S. to deter and/or to defend against these aspects of Soviet international and security policy. One recent example of Congressional concern can be seen in the actions of the Special Operations Panel of the House Armed Services Committee. During 1985, it sponsored the previously-mentioned CRS report, composed by John Collins, on U.S. and Soviet Special Operations. Hearings before the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, focused on Soviet active measures, also testify to the degree of interest within the Legislative branch. The Executive branch has been equally concerned, in recent years, with this frequently overlooked element of the U.S.-Soviet security equation. For example, there now is an interagency working group, chaired by the State Department, charged with monitoring Soviet active measures.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, a few notes of caution are in place. We recognize that no single source of information, no single variable, can provide complete explanation of behavior patterns. Moreover, we were conscious of the problem of potential bias and exaggeration. Serious efforts were made to cross-check information, and to evaluate its reliability. Finally, we realize the difficulties arising from "second-hand" material, i.e., information not directly resulting from the specific activities and operations in which the interviewees were involved in their former careers.

Nevertheless, in examining and assessing closed systems, like the Soviet polity, former senior officers provide not only valuable information, but sophisticated insight based upon long experience in coping with the system. With respect to Soviet foreign policy and national security, the personalities interviewed were close to the center of the apparatus. Therefore, they offer access to a unique data base that can fill in gaps in existing knowledge, test hypotheses, and help to cross-check other sources. We believe that these former Soviet officials and some of the émigrés can make important contributions to America's on-going assessment of Soviet policy, strategy, and capabilities, injecting an element of competitive analysis which can only enrich the processes of the official community. We have attempted to demonstrate, both in this submission and through the continuing work of our Project staff, how "Oral History" can be integrated with "content analysis" of Soviet texts, and with data from "national technical means" (as disclosed, for example, in a Department of Defense/Department of State publication), to resolve at least one small portion of Winston Churchill's "riddle." Nevertheless, there is more to be done in this realm, and the role of Congress in reviewing and supporting programs that deal with "defectors" is an issue that should be addressed as rapidly as feasible.

EXHIBIT NO. 17

STATEMENT OF
VLADIMIR RUDOLPH-SHABINSKY
BEFORE THE
U. S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

* * *

Mr. Chairman, my name is Vladimir Rudolph-Shabinsky. I defected to the West in 1947 through West Germany. I was the first employee of Radio Liberty and retired in 1981 as a Senior Commentator. During the 30 years that I worked for Radio Liberty, I was responsible for meeting most of the defectors from the Soviet Union. From 1947 to 1953, through my position as Head of the American Branch of the Central Organization of Post-War Emigrants (COPE), I also met many other defectors from the communist bloc. Based upon these as well as my own experiences, I would like to offer the Subcommittee my thoughts on the handling and resettlement of defectors.

Why does the Soviet Government so persistently and severely struggle with the defection of Soviet citizens to the West? Without answering this question, the importance of defectors from the U.S.S.R. will not be understood by the free world. And it will be likewise difficult to correctly solve the problem of their resettlement and adaptation in the U.S.A.

Even under the current regime, the boundaries of the Soviet Union are "under lock and key," primarily for the Soviet citizens. Those living in the areas along the boundary lines have been removed deeper into the country. Business and even tourist travel to countries of the free world for the Soviet citizens entail careful inspections by the K.G.B., militia, Party, and other Government departments.

Members of the Soviet citizen's family are considered as hostages while he/she is travelling abroad. During travels abroad, careful observation by specially designated agents is conducted of the tourists, government delegations as well as sailors of the merchant marine fleets.

Soviet citizens are not allowed to mingle with foreigners. The same goes for the tourists. Should they be seen speaking to foreigners, they can be grounded, i.e., deprived from future travel. As recently as Breshnev's regime, new statutes were added to the criminal code of the U.S.S.R. for punishment by imprisonment in labor camps just for simply associating with foreigners.

Soviet propaganda--especially the "official press" for the internal use of the Party, military and other government offices threatens those travelling abroad with penalties for improper association with foreigners. In cases of defection by a Soviet citizen during his trip, the escape is almost always presented as a "provocation" of Western security. Should the defector return, a propaganda campaign is used to describe the country from which the defector returned as a "capitalistic hell," using him in the role of a witness (after six months to a year, he is, usually, convicted to 10 years in the labor camps). In cases where the escapee is betrayed (delivered) by the authorities of the Western country, the return is highly publicized for the purpose of frightening other potential defectors.

The criminal code of the U.S.S.R. and the codes of the individual Republics for defection or for the non-return from foreign travel mandates a punishment of 10 to 15 years of labor camps. Defection by a KGB agent, diplomat, or a military officer dictates a court martial and usually a death sentence.

Each defector living in a country of the free world is carefully observed by Soviet consular, mission, trade, or Security Service personnel. For this purpose, the Soviet Embassies have the so-called "search lists" of defectors from the U.S.S.R. In these lists, for each defector there is exact biographical data about him with a description of his appearance, his activities abroad after his escape, as well as a list of his relatives and friends, their place of residence, etc.

In my case the KGB "search list" stated about me:

> "Zhabinsky, Vladimir Ivanovich. "Rudolph." Born 1914, Smogan, Molodochensky Region. Russian. Obtained technical degree. Employed as electrical shop supervisor at "Red Flag" plant, lived in Rostov. 196 cm. in height, sturdy build, blonde, blue-eyed, thick eyebrows, wide forehead, pointed, straight nose. Mother, Maria Mikhailovna Zhabinskaya, brother Boris Ivanovich Zhabinsky, sister Nina Ivanovna Pronina, son Valery Ivanovich Zhabinsky live in Rostov. Former wife, Zoya Mikhailovna Vasilieva lives in Leningrad; Nadezhda Davydovna Ippolitova, with whom cohabited, resides in Moscow.
>
> "In 1938, sentenced to 8 years hard labor by the Military Tribunal (Code No. 4512) in accordance with Article 58, Section 10, of the RSFSR Criminal Code. In 1941, escaped from custody while being transported, hid in the town of Teikovo, in the Ivanovo region. Obtained forged documents attesting to his service in the Soviet Army and to his having been wounded, and returned to Rostov, where he found a position at the "Red Flag" plant. In March, 1945, he was sent on official mission to Germany, where he at first worked with a dismantling group, then as an aide to the Representative of the USSR Ministry of Construction Materials attached to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. In March, 1947, defected to West Germany. From 1949-51 lived in Munich, worked for American intelligence under the alias "Rudolph," wrote slanderous articles for West German newspapers and magazines. Lives in New York (USA), employed by Radio Liberty, is one of the bosses of the "American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism." Publishes anti-Soviet works. Abroad, has used pseudonyms of Yurasov (Sava, Sergei, Vladimir). A 1967 snapshot and a handwriting specimen are on file.
>
> "Search case is in UKGB (Managing Dept. of the KGB). attached to USSR Council of Ministers, (in the affairs of Rostov-Don Region). (See attached for Russian version.)"

It is true that I made one escape from a Soviet prison camp, and a second escape from the Soviet Union itself, for which I was sentenced to be shot. To complete the picture, the KGB bureaucrats might have mentioned my third escape -- from an American internment camp.

The KGB's biographical sketch is basically accurate, although not lacking in exaggerations and distortions. For example, I am not 196 centimeters (6'6") in height, but only 190 centimeters (6'31/2"). Again, there is no way I could ever have been "one of the bosses of 'The American Committee for Liberation from Bolshevism.'" That Committee was already in existence in the 1950's; over the years, Eugene Lyons, Admiral Alan G. Kirk (former US Ambassador to Moscow), Vice Admiral Leslie C. Stevens, Howland H. Sargeant (former Assistant Secretary of State) served as its Presidents; among its members, it numbered Reginald T. Townsend, Isaac Don Levine, William H. Chamberlin, Allen Grover, William Y. Elliott, William L. White, The Hon. Charles Edison, John W. Studebaker, H.J. Heinz II, Mrs. Oscar Ahlgren. Three U.S. Presidents -- Harry S. Truman, Herbert Hoover, Dwight D. Eisenhower -- were Honorary Presidents of the Committee. I wasn't even a U.S. citizen at that time.

Nor had I been sent "on official mission" to Germany in March, 1945. The war with Germany was still going on then, and I was drafted into the Soviet Army and commissioned a Major in the Corps of Engineers. After the war, I was a Lt. Colonel attached to the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG), and then, after demobilization, I was attached (on Kaganovich's order) to the SVAG's Dept. of Reparations and Deliveries, as a representative of the USSR Ministry of the Construction Materials Industry. According to my KGB vita, I was "an aide to the representative of the Ministry." (See attached.)

On the other hand, it is true that after several months of interrogation I was sentenced, in accordance with Article 58, Section 10, of the Soviet Criminal Code to eight years of labor camp, to be followed by 5 years of deprivation of rights as a citizen (the KGB omits this). Article 58 deals with political crimes; section 10 specifically covers anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation. It is also true that after escaping from prison camp I lived in hiding from November, 1941 to August, 1944 in the town of Teikovo, in the Ivanovo region, 140 miles northeast of Moscow. This information in the KGB's secret "black list" is widely at variance with the sort of thing Soviet newspapers, magazines, and books have been writing about me for the past 20-odd years. Here are a few examples from the Soviet press, in chronological order:

> "Zhabinsky--a criminal an embezzler and squanderer--wormed his way into the American CIC, then into an American school for intelligence operatives in Regensburg; having proved his worth, he landed in the USA, where he applied himself to the business of publishing anti-Soviet literature." P. Buniakov & V. Komolov: Three Colors, One Suit, Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1957. 160p.
>
> "Vladimir Yurasov is none other than Valdimir Ivanovich Zhabinsky. Not long before the war Zhabinsky was sentenced to eight years of corrective labor for anti-social activity, but he escaped from custody with another man's papers. Fearing exposure, he fled to the West, where he began his career with anti-Soviet denunciations...." Feb. 16-22, 1970 issue

> of "Nedelja," the Sunday supplement of the central government organ Izvestiia.
>
> "He is...Vladimir Yurasov, a traitor to his homeland, an agent of the fascist and the American intelligence agencies." Journal Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn', Sept., 1971.
>
> "Before the war Zhabinsky busied himself with activities that are punishable under the Soviet Criminal Code. A Soviet court sentenced him to 8 years of corrective labor. He succeeded in escaping. For a while he concealed himself under a false identity, and during the war he defected to the West, where he lost no time in offering his services to the reactionary segment of the emigration. In the yellow press he told the tale of his long-suffering life in the Soviet Union and pictured himself as a victim of Communist terror." A. Belov & A. Shilkin: "Diversion Without Dynamite." Moscow: State Publishing House of Political Literature, 1972.
>
> "Before the war Yurasov was sentenced for criminal activity. During the occupation he escaped to the Germans; he was employed in the special commando groups and hanged Soviet patriots with his own hands." Literaturnaia Gazeta (central organ of the Union of Soviet Writers), Sept. 5, 1973; Austrian Communist newspaper Volkstimme cited as source. Also Krasnaia zvezda (central newspaper of Soviet Army), Nov. 23, 1973 (Volkstimme not cited).
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> "Vladimir Ivanovich Zhabinsky, alias Yurasov, deserted from the Soviet Army in 1947." A.F. Panfilov: Behind the Scenes at Radio Liberty. Moscow: International Relations Publishing House, 1974. 192 p.
>
> "...A certain Yurasov, a criminal before the war, once served in fascist punitive detachments; he now publicly calls for war against the Soviet Union." Journal Novyi mir, March, 1978, and Radio Moscow, March 21, 1978.

These and similar stories, with the most preposterous variations, have appeared and continue to appear in dozens of newspapers in all the Soviet republics, and in dozens of languages--Velorussian, Ukrainian, Georgian, Uzbek....I might also add publications like the English-language brochure that KGB agents hand out to American businessmen, Congressmen, and tourists on the Moscow-Leningrad "Red Arrow" express train. In that brochure, I am described as a war criminal.

My treatment, cited above, is normal for many defectors who have to face both official and unofficial threats by Soviet agents who harass them by telephone, deliver letters from their children, mothers, friends, in the USSR; try to drive them to drink, frighten, spread rumors among the local people where the defector resides or among emigres that the defector is a "KGB" agent, and in the Soviet newspapers and magazines, they print that the defector is a "military criminal," "Nazi follower" (even the Jewish defector, Filkinshtein, a journalist who escaped in England in the '60s, was accused of this!). The agents act in various ways in order to make it difficult for the defectors to adapt in their new country. In my own case, I have for many years received phone calls in Russian calling me "an enemy of the people" and recently encouraging me to return to the USSR under Gorbochov's rule of "openness."

Many of the defectors I have known live in constant fear (a former Soviet General ended with a persecution mania complex). Many look for an outlet in alcohol. Others, led to despair, want to return to the U.S.S.R., where they are used for anti-American, anti-Western propaganda, and afterward, are sent to labor camps (as was with the sailors of the steamship "TUAPSE").

Why does the Soviet Government give so much importance to its defectors?

From the point of view of the Communist authorities, the defectors are deserters. The escape itself to a country of the free world, especially to the U.S.A., from the Soviet point of view is considered to be a violation of Party, military, social disciplines--which are the basis of the Soviet militarized form of government. The Soviet leadership is wary of desertion by Soviet citizens, as the escapes of a few may turn into a massive escape. More so because the requirements of international Soviet politics is connected with a large number of Soviet personnel sent abroad--soldiers, diplomats, specialists, sailors, tourists, etc. The Soviet leadership was especially frightened with the desertion during World War II, when more than one million deserters fled to the Hitler Germany, and only the treachery and barbarism of the Hitler regime, put a stop to this massive desertion of Soviet military men.

Another vital reason for the Soviet leadership's fear of defectors is that they "open slightly" the closed Soviet Union, and in this way, they become a source of information of the Soviet Union's plans and the inner-workings of its military industrial complex; i.e., its industrial, agricultural, transport, Army, merchant marine, Party, and Government apparatus. The holders of such information are the defectors of the U.S.S.R.

Many of them do not have any knowledge of the secret Soviet agents abroad, of the new weapons of the Soviet military, of the internal relations in the Soviet leadership, i.e., information about which the Intelligence Service of the United States and countries of NATO are most interested in.

The majority of the defectors are specialists, industrial and agricultural workers, Government officials, mid-level Party members, merchant marine sailors, military personnel, soldiers and officers, and to a lesser extent--actors, musicians, sportsmen, journalists. All of them have their own experience of Soviet life which the Soviet Government conceals with great care from world opinion and from the governments of the Free World.

It is not a coincidence that the emigration policies are set up in such a way that those who are allowed to leave would not have the kind of experience which the defectors have. Those who are allowed to exit from the U.S.S.R. must undergo careful screening by the KGB and other departments. This is done in order to hold back people with experience and information which the majority of the defectors have.

Were the defectors to ask permission for exit abroad from the authorities, they not only would not be allowed to exit, but they immediately would be fired from their jobs, if not placed in psychiatric clinic or sent away in exile (labor camp). Visas for emigration are issued mainly to the intellectuals: poets, writers, artists, legal counsellors, minor official employees, physicians; and if visas are given to engineers and workers, then only to those who are with small business enterprises and research institutes.

Has the condition and handling of the defector improved since the 1950's? The answer is unfortunately no.

At the end of the 1950, with the assistance of the U.S. Government in Munich, Germany, the Central Organization of Post-War Emigrants (COPE) was organized with an office also in the U.S.A. This organization lasted only a few years. The important aspect of this experience was that the defectors from the U.S.S.R. had their own organization where they met with their own kind; Russian-Americans helped them with counselling and provided assistance; the organization had its own publication in Russian.

In the U.S.A., the defectors held conferences, published books about their escape from the U.S.S.R., wrote articles in American magazines and newspapers, the defectors provided interviews for American journalists and writers (Max Eastman, Jean Lyons, Don Levine, Arthur Kestler, and others), and with American veterans. All of this assisted the defectors in their adaptation in an American society and familiarized the American society with the situation in the U.S.S.R. But, as a result of some mistakes, the organization was discontinued. There is no similar organization in existence today which serves this function.

Based upon my interviews with defectors, it appears that the current wave of defectors who come to the U.S.A. after being screened at their place of escape and then again in West Germany, appear lost and indifferent. Their escapes are usually dangerous, they are proud of this, they consider themselves heroes, they thought that in the U.S.A. they would be useful, that their Soviet experience would be useful to America, but it turned out that nobody is interested in them. Soon they become disappointed, exactly what the Soviet Government expects--the disillusionment in the U.S.A. of the defector (as well as emigrant). This disappointment is a strong Soviet weapon in the anti-American propaganda and in their struggle with the defection of Soviet citizens.

The defectors fear the Soviet agents, do not trust the new emigrants from the U.S.S.R., they, as a rule, do not speak English, they are alone, they long for their dear ones and friends in the U.S.S.R., and feel guilty towards them, they are lost, depressed, the future for them is grim.

The defectors long for someone with whom they can talk to, somebody whom they can trust, whom they can ask for advice. In the beginning, during the first days, they need attention, a chat, explanation of some of the ways of life in the new society. But most important--human understanding, feeling of security, and hope for a better future for the sake of which escaped to America.

It is not necessary to create a totally new organization for defectors. An existing organization which has assisted defectors in the past, the Tolstoy Foundation, is the ideal organization for an enhanced program for defector resettlement. The organization is named after the great Russian writer and humanitarian, and many people in the Soviet Union are aware of the fact that the organization assists refugees from the U.S.S.R. Experience has shown that with this organization the defectors feel at ease and safe.

The Tolstoy Foundation has a Center (commonly referred to as the 'Farm') where Russian-Americans currently reside; there is a library with a Russian collection of books, a church, a hall for meetings and social activities and a summer school for Russian language study, not far from the Center are communities of Russian-Americans, i.e., in Nyack, and in New Jersey. Although the Center is only 20 miles from New York City where the Soviet authorities are widely represented, defectors could live at the Center among its residents without any feeling of danger.

I suggest utilizing the experienced personnel of the Tolstoy Foundation along the the Foundation's Center for any increased program for the assistance of defectors. The stay at the Tolstoy Foundation Center for the defectors could be the first painless period of their adaptation to the U.S.A. There they could easily learn the English language. The defectors could also be productively utilized in the summer school program, which brings in approximately 30 American college students every year. The defectors could teach English and Russian literature, culture, etc., while the American students could, in turn, teach defectors English, etc. While residing at the Center, the defectors could work with Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. Their speeches and radio broadcasts addressed to the Soviet radio listeners could be a first-class American propaganda weapon.

It also would be very desirable to publish every six months an almanac in which the defectors could write about the reasons for their escape from the U.S.S.R., and about other experiences in the Soviet Union. Such an almanac would be an excellent source of information about the U.S.S.R. for the American public and the press. Experience shows that the defectors who began their new life by writing articles and books about their escape and the reasons behind it, psychologically, break their ties with their Soviet past, adapt more easily in the West and usually never consider returning to the U.S.S.R., e.g., Peter Pirogov, Lev Volkov, Vladimirov-Filkinshtein, and others.

The Tolstoy Foundation would additionally be involved in the resettlement of these defectors--would find employment in any part of the country--the Foundation would need the assistance from the State Department and other organizations for this purpose.

In connection with security measures, it would be necessary to have a constant contact with the local police and control by the F.B.I.

The Tolstoy Foundation has experienced workers, but, possibly, the staff of workers should be reinforced with screened American personnel who can speak Russian.

All details and the necessary funding for such an organization at the Tolstoy Foundation Center for defectors from the U.S.S.R. should be discussed and reviewed with the management of the Tolstoy Foundation.

# # #

4.12.77

Многоуважаемый Господин Жабинский .

Прилагаю выписку из списков ГБ

С уважением.

ЖАБИНСКИЙ Владимир Иванович, «Рудольф», 1914 года рождения, урож. г. Смогань Молодечненской обл., русский, образование средне-техническое, работал начальником электроцеха завода «Красное Знамя», проживал в г. Ростове-на-Дону. Рост 196 см., плотного телосложения, блондин, глаза голубые, брови широкие, лоб большой, нос острый прямой. Мать Жабинская Мария Михайловна, брат Жабинский Борис Иванович, сестра Пронина Нина Ивановна, сын Жабинский Валерий Иванович проживают в г. Ростове-на-Дону; бывш. жена Васильева Зоя Михайловна — в г. Ленинграде; сожительница Ипполитова Надежда Давыдовна — в г. Москве.

В 1933 г. Военным трибуналом войсковой части 4512 был осужден по ст. 58—10 ч. I УК РСФСР на 8 лет ИТЛ. В 1941 г. при этапировании бежал из-под стражи, скрывался в г. Тейково Ивановской обл. Получив фиктивные документы о службе в Советской Армии и ранении, в 1944 г. прибыл в г. Ростов-на-Дону, где устроился работать на завод «Красное Знамя». В марте 1945 г. направлен в служебную командировку в Германию, где вначале работал в составе демонтажной группы, затем при Уполномоченном Министерства строительных материалов при Советской военной администрации. В марте 1947 г. бежал в Западную Германию. В 1949—1951 гг. проживал в г. Мюнхене, сотрудничал с американской разведкой под кличкой «Рудольф», писал клеветнические статьи в газеты и журналы Западной Германии. Проживает в Нью-Йорке (США), сотрудничает на радиостанции «Свобода», является одним из главарей т. н. «Американского комитета освобождения от большевизма». Публикует книги антисоветского содержания. За границей выступал под фамилией Юрасов Савва, Сергей и Владимир. Имеются фотокарточка 1957 г. и образец почерка.

Розыскное дело в УКГБ при СМ СССР по Ростовской обл.



Штаб СВА в Германии

Фамилия Табинский

Имя Владимир

Отчество Иванович

В. звание л-т

Должность [illegible]

Серия 0002

Временный

ПРОПУСК №

на право входа в штаб СВА

ителен по Июня 194 7 г.

Комендант штаба СВА

в Германии

„11" февраля 194 7 г.

СССР

ШТАБ

СОВЕТСКОЙ ВОЕННОЙ
АДМИНИСТРАЦИИ
В ГЕРМАНИИ

23 ноября 1946 г.

№ 02786

г. Берлин

Временное удостоверение

Предъявитель сего ——
(звание)

тов. ЖАБИНСКИЙ Владимир
(фамилия, имя,

Иванович
отчество)

действительно состоит на службе в Управлении Репаций и Поставок при Советской Военной Администрации в Германии в должности представитель Министерства Промышлен. Строй материалов СССР

Действительно по 31 "декабря 1946 г.

Зам. Начальника Общего Отдела

Штаба Советской Военной Администрации в Германии

майор *(П. Полегенько.)*



СССР
ШТАБ
СОВЕТСКОЙ ВОЕННОЙ АДМИНИСТРАЦИИ В ГЕРМАНИИ
25 ноября 1946 г.
№ 02786
г. Берлин

Временное удостоверение

Предъявитель сего
тов. [illegible] Владимир
Петрович
действительно состоит на службе в Управлении Репараций и Поставок при Советской Военной Администрации в Германии в должности [illegible]
Действительно по 31 - декабря 1946 г.

Зам. Начальника Общего Отдела
Штаба Советской Военной Администрации в Германии
майор [illegible] (П. [illegible])

Врем. удостоверение №2786 продлено
до 31 марта 1947г.

НАЧАЛЬНИК УПРАВЛЕНИЯ РЕПАРАЦИЙ
И ПОСТАВОК СВА В ГЕРМАНИИ:
генерал-майор
инженер.-тех.
службы /ЗОРИН/

Врем. удостоверение №2786 продлено
до 1 мая 1947 г.

[illegible]
Генерал-майор [illegible]

EXHIBIT NO. 18

STATEMENT OF
DR. ZDZISLAW M. RURARZ
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

The term "defection," or "defectors," is not an adequate one and to a large extent confusing and harmful to people who decided to break with the system in which they live.

In my contribution to the hearings, I would like to confine my remarks to a few issues only.

The first issue is the very decision to defect, if the commonly used term for the event is to be used as a mater of convenience.

Defection, unlike emigration, whether a voluntary or a forced one is, at least this was so in my case, a political and patriotic act.

Moreover, a defector, especially from a communist and Soviet-dominated country, and the one who belonged to the party, the ruling elite and the secret services first of all, is a very distinct individual from all others who leave their countries.

Such defectors, as a rule, have no material motives. On the contrary, they are even sure that in a material sense their future lives can be less affluent and certain than the previous ones.

Even still more importantly, defectors are usually sure that they may never again see their native countries, relatives and friends. Not only that they are barred by law from doing this, because as a rule they are deprived of their former citizenship, but also because of the fact that their return could mean death to them, or life imprisonment at best.

To illustrate the above, I should like to add that I was both deprived of my Polish citizenship and death sentenced in absentia.

Last but not least, defectors cannot be sure whether the sentences passed on them are a mere formality only. After all, many of them died a violent death, or a mysterious one.

Because of the above, defectors are exposed to many life inconveniences much more than other emigrants, or even certain categories of political asylees. Their moral and spiritual hardships, and all other sorts of life trials, are by far more complex than of anybody else leaving his country.

In fact, they cannot live normal lives. They can hardly stay in the open, travel freely, or have friends to their own liking, especially from among their own ethnic group. Neither can they maintain any contacts with their relatives and friends left behind, something the ordinary emigrants can do.

This very situation is a highly complicating factor at least for one reason.

Namely, a defector like myself, still able in body and mind, also highly motivated to do something for the cause which prompted him to defect, has not many options in his life. A total disappearance from public view, possibly with assuming a new identity, may unnecessarily lead to various fantastic speculations and rumors.

On the other hand, activities, whether for the cause of his native country, or of the adopted country, are not easy either.

In the first instance, his own past may not always be an asset, no matter how justified someone's judgements of his intentions can be. Besides, the host countries have good reasons to be somewhat vigilant, as the fake defectors are also the case.

In the second instance, a defector, normally not a citizen of his newly adopted country, or at least not soon, and sometimes not even its permanent resident has, obviously enough, no chance to join the mainstream of the country's life.

This very issue, or rather a nuisance, is even quite hard to reconcile with the very motives which lay behind the defector's dramatic decision to break with the system in which he lived.

More specifically, the decision to defect is not primarily an act of disillusionment and protest only, a sort of an one-shot affair chiefly. On the contrary, it is, or at least in my case it was, an act of war against the evils left behind.

True, in the new capacity, as in my particular case, I have had especially many opportunities to wage the mentioned war and on the terms I deemed proper.

But it is equally true that I could have done even still more and perhaps more effectively, too.

Thus the decision to defect does not mean, at least in my case, that one breaks with his past and withdraws from active life.

On the contrary, the defection may mean, and in my case this was the strong determination, the beginning of a new life, perhaps even more challenging and active than was the one in the past.

I must say that this great country does a lot to make the above work. But I am equally convinced that even still more could be done to this effect.

The second issue, which I deliberately do not place at the beginning of my paper, is the very process of defection.

What makes people defect?

I am fully aware of course that each individual deciding to defect is distinct from others like him. Moreover, defections take place in differing circumstances, both of general and personal nature. Finally, defectors are treated not in a uniform way by a host country, something only very understandable, as the issue is truly a complex one.

However, without trying to be pretentious, I should like once again to repeat the words already spelled out before.

Namely, that the defections are largely, in my case exclusively so, dictated by higher motives. The defections from the communist countries, especially from the Soviet bloc, are not the defections from a sinking ship. This was even still truer in the near past.

Thus it is the higher motives which play the decisive role in deciding for defection. My reasoning is as follows.

People like myself, born in a country particularly tested by the vicissitudes of history, have a special sense of duty to the motherland and the moral code which tolerates certain evils to some limits only. I, of course, realize that people with a different historical and personal experience may consider my philosophizing as a sort of typical Polish haughtiness, but I really mean what I say.

More specifically, when in 1945, at the age of only fifteen, I joined the communist movement. I did this not only because of the naivete' characteristics of my age, but I simply believed that Soviet-imposed yoke in Poland was going to stay for an unforeseeable period of time.

Hence it was logical, I believed, to try to change the state of affairs rather by joining it rather than fighting it. And throughout the period of over thirty six years I tried precisely to do this and, in a way, I thought my reasoning was a correct one. No matter how unconvincingly my words may sound, I always knew what I could do and what I could not. As long as the pluses prevailed over the minuses, I thought I had to stay in the game.

Moreover, communism in Poland has always been very much different than elsewhere. Having seen almost all communist countries in the world, I had the scale of comparison.

Besides, communism in Poland, more than in the other Soviet-dominated countries, has always been not totally divorced from truly national interests.

Furthermore, it seemed even to me that my dream of a free and democratic Poland was not totally baseless. Various events in postwar Poland rather supported the view that the country was far from having abandoned the idea of becoming free and democratic. Paradoxical as it may sound, many communist party members, like myself, tried to act in a way which could be conducive to the mentioned goals.

This very fact kept me from defecting earlier, although very long ago I lost all the illusions, if I really ever had any, as to the workability of communism.

Besides, or rather first of all, I truly could not imagine how I could live outside Poland, no matter that I knew, much better than many others, what this Poland really was.

Having no illusions thus what communism and the USSR were, as both I knew first hand, I decided to wait for better times. I was sure that neither communism, nor the USSR, could be defeated by any confrontation from without. But they can be defeated from within, or rather the combination of the two.

Communism, and especially its Soviet brand, is the most perfect among the totalitarian systems. If it is ever to be abolished, or substantially changed, it will be primarily through the disintegration of the ruling elites.

It does not matter that the ruling elites are the minority in the ruled countries. History knows many examples where only two percent of a nation could effectively rule over the remaining ninety eight percent. Communism is even more privileged in this respect, as the rulers count more than two percent of a nation.

Consequently, it does not matter that such a minority rule is detrimental to the nation as a whole. What really matters is the unchallenged power of the rulers. And as the experience shows, the rulers cannot be unseated from power as long as they stay united and defend their privileges. In Soviet-dominated countries this is even supplemented by the Brezhnev Doctrine, that is the Warsaw Pact.

Yet it is true that communism is in crisis. This does not mean that its days are counted. It still may expand and conquer new countries.

Thus, in other words, communism, almost in crisis, in not going to collapse as long as its ruling elite does not disintegrate.

Having known this for years, I tried, as much as I could, to civilize communism, what in consequence could lead with time to its fading away.

But at the same time I had another option, should the first one fail, that is to hit communism in its most vulnerable place, namely contribute to the said disintegration of the ruling elite.

More specifically, when Solidarity and other organizations sprang out in Poland in the summer of 1980, I, as many other progressists in the PZPR, or the Polish communist party, supported openly the so-called renewal. I had a faint hope that the ruling elite and its Soviet sponsors could be reconciled with the event and enter the path of long delayed and necessary changes.

Should this be not the case, I was ready for the step I eventually took on December 23, 1981. At that time, so much crucial for Poland and beyond, the choices to be made had to be clearly determined.

By trying to contribute to the process of disintegration of the mentioned ruling elites, one has to ask the question on how to make those elites to disintegrate?

There are many ways of doing this but the most effective way is to have the members of the elite desert its ranks.

Yet the practical implementation of such a step is by no means simple.

More specifically, one cannot really do this on one's own terms. This is especially true of those who are in sensitive positions and who are subjected to military discipline, something very much true of those connected in various ways to the "military-police complex," as was the case with me. Any resignation from the assigned post and the party membership, could be as much punishable as a more dramatic step which is the defection. Perhaps not at once and not openly done, but nevertheless.

Besides, a break with the elite cannot easily be done in a way which would attract most of publicity. The quiet resignation, for example, can miss the point altogether. The elite may silence such a break thoroughly, or present it in the way totally at variance with reality. Hence the impact of the step in question on the ruling elite can be completely the opposite from the one intended by the perpetrator.

Moreover, for those in foreign service and on assignment in a foreign country, especially in a Western one, the break is even still more complicated. This is particularly true of all those, as was the case with myself, who had connections with intelligence. Finally, with the declaration of martial law in Poland on December 13, 1981, any disobedience, especially in the post of an ambassador in a country like Japan, could not be tolerated even in the slightest way.

Having lost all the hope for change, and having been convinced that martial law was ordered by the USSR, and may I recall that martial law was formally a "state of war" declared by the Polish communist regime on the Polish nation, I had to take clearly the side of either of the two. I took the side of the nation and, moreover, I decided to contribute as much as possible to the earlier mentioned disintegration of the ruling elite.

The rest is known.

If I spoke at some length on the process of defection, as experienced by me, it is only for the purpose to explain how complex the motives of such a step can be and what a defector like myself wishes to do afterwards.

The latter part of the phrase should be somewhat elaborated.

For the ruling elites in the communist countries, especially for their members like myself, who have an extensive knowledge of the state of affairs in the contemporary world, it is not a secret that the United States is the only meaningful opponent to the spread of communism and Soviet imperialism in particular.

Therefore, if anybody finally decides for the step as was the case with mine, he invariably looks toward the United States. Not only that the resources and laws of the United States are as they are and the country is willing to shelter the defectors in question, but primarily that this country offers more changes than any other country in the world to continue the fight against communism.

I have to state in this place, that before I defected I already then knew quite well this country and Switzerland and even still better. And I must frankly say that I would prefer to live in Switzerland than in the United States. But in Switzerland, assuming that political asylum could be obtained by me, I would be unable to pursue my fight against communism, or not on the scale I do this in the United States. Hence my choice was for the United States and primarily because of the mentioned reasons.

Defectors, at least I believe I am such a defector, are fighters first of all and this country should view them accordingly.

It is not up to me to judge what other values they may represent for the country like the United States. Whether they are an asset or a liability, it is not up to me to say.

Yet it seems to me that as the former insiders, they may have a unique knowledge on how "real communism" functions. They, quite obviously, have no monopoly for wisdom on this particular issue and may even err in their viewing of the system they left behind. But their knowledge of certain vitally important details and their specific qualities of perception, can be a useful addition to what this country knows about its global adversary.

Returning once again to the issue of defectors, especially top-ranking ones, I should like simply to repeat that, in my view, they are just not the ordinary emigrants.

I must congratulate this Senate Subcommittee for the initiative of organizing these hearings. This country, continuing to receive many defectors over the decades, should decide how certain experiences accumulated in the past could be best used for this country and for the cause which united the defectors with it and vice versa.

In conclusion, I should like to say a few more words.

My country, Poland, already several centuries ago opened its frontiers to all sorts of persecuted people. Before the Sejm, or the Polish parliament, many top-ranking defectors, primarily from Russia, testified as I did before the U.S. Congress upon my defection.

Unfortunately, my country is no more free and instead of listening to defectors, it produces defectors. Hopefully, this will change one day. But before this happens, it is good to have a country like the United States. Without having the chance to defect to a country like this one, many from the ruling elites might perhaps stay in their ranks and in this way contribute to the triumph of the system which by no means deserves any triumph at all.

But by being able to break with such elites, the defector contributes to their disintegration, if not at once, something not to be overlooked by this citadel of freedom and democracy.
I thank you for your attention.

EXHIBIT NO. 19

STATEMENT OF CONSTANTINE SIDAMON-ERISTOFF
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
THE TOLSTOY FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, I appear before the Subcommittee on Investigations today to discuss the views and recommendations of the Tolstoy Foundation in the assistance to defectors from communist-bloc countries. The following statement will give the Foundation's position on the handling of Soviet defectors to the West. In addition, a short history of the Tolstoy Foundation will be given, describing its present status and past experiences with refugees and escapees. The statement will explain why certain voluntary agencies' offices have to be kept in operation in Western Europe. And the question of how defectors can be of use to us is also touched upon.

STATUS

The Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., is an international non-profit, non-political, non-sectarian agency, founded and incorporated in New York in 1939 as a charitable organization. The Foundation assists "any refugee from any kind of oppression" (par. 3, "Purposes" of the Charter), provides welfare and social services with an emphasis on the elderly, and offers a variety of cultural and educational programs.

FINANCIAL SUPPORT

The Tolstoy Foundation is a tax exempt charitable organization as identified under Section 501 (c) (3) of the United States tax code. It derives its private support from individual contributions, bequests, endowments, and grants from foundations and corporations. Additional funds are received through cooperative agreements and contracts with United States Government and State agencies, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with the governments of Canada, France, and the German Federal Republic.

HISTORY

Early in 1939, Alexandra Tolstoy, the youngest daughter of the Russian writer and humanitarian, Leo Tolstoy, together with Tatiana Schaufuss, a leading advocate of the cause of refugees, brought together a group of prominent Americans and Russian emigres, to address the needs of Russian refugees and to preserve and foster the best tenets of Russian culture. Soon thereafter, the Tolstoy Foundation was incorporated in

New York City as a not-for-profit organization, with former President Herbert Hoover serving as its first Honorary Chairman. Alexandra Tolstoy led the agency until her death in 1979.

Among those who joined Alexandra Tolstoy in founding the Tolstoy Foundation were Boris Bakhmeteff, the last Russian Ambassador of the Kerensky Democratic Government in Washington, the great pianist Serge Rachmaninoff, and Igor Sikorsky, the constructor of the helicopter. Concerned Americans, some of whom had worked with former President Herbert Hoover when he organized and headed the American Relief Agency (ARA) to handle the famine in Belgium after the first World War also contributed to the establishment of the Foundation. They were Quakers and YMCA members such as Dr. Paul Anderson, Dr. Ethan Colton, Allan Wardwell, and J. C. Traphagen.

ORIGINAL PURPOSES AND INTENTIONS

The original purposes of the Tolstoy Foundation were to assist Russian refugees, who, at that time, in April 1939, and even a few years before, were escaping from Nazi German troops entering Austria and Czechoslovakia, and threatening Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Greece, where there were the largest numbers of Russian refugees under the Nansen Mandate of the League of Nations.

The intentions of the founders, in addition to the charitable aspects of assistance to refugees, was to demonstrate the concern of Americans and of the Free World for the Russian people as distinct from official relations with the Soviet Union. The "TF" would become and serve as a "beacon of hope" for freedom from a totalitarian regime. The motivating factors behind this were President Roosevelt's recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, and the increasing anti-Western tone in the Soviet press. No word was mentioned then about the generous help given to the Russian people by the ARA during the famine which, despite the Soviet blackout, the Russians still remember now: the great network of the ARA had saved their lives from hunger in places as far as Siberia.

During the Second World War, the Tolstoy Foundation assisted Russian prisoners in Finland. After the war, the Tolstoy Foundation had to take a strong stand against forcible repatriation of Soviet Displaced Persons and former prisoners to the USSR. Special groups among the Displaced Persons were assisted from refugee camps in Europe, whose cases were a complicated mess of difficulties, almost impossible to interpret to Immigration or Consular personnel serving in the United States, Europe, the Far East, Hong Kong, and in the Philippines. Russian refugees from Red China fleeing to the Philippines, Hong Kong and Macau, were resettled on the West Coast. Slowly, the entire framework expanded to include assistance to Hungarian refugees.

Among the special groups that highlighted the activities of the Tolstoy Foundation in the 1950-1960s were the Buddhists-Kalmuks. The some 1,000 Buddhists-Kalmuks were situated in German Displaced Persons camps, considered "Asiatics and Mongols" by the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and therefore, ineligible to enter the United States as refugees. The Tolstoy Foundation was instrumental in clarifying the historical roots of these people who had lived in the Don River Region of European Russian for over 500 years. They are now settled in New Jersey and in

Pennsylvania.

There were also over 2,000 Moslem Circassians who, in order to avoid forcible repatriation to the USSR, had received asylum in Arab countries, such as Trans-Jordan, Syria, and Iraq, after World War II. There they found kinsmen and relatives who had moved to the Ottoman Empire in the 1870s. As they did not want to be caught in the Arab-Israeli conflict, they were able to enter the United States under the Refugee Relief Act. They too are now settled in New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

There were also Russian Old Believers who belonged to a sect of the Russian Orthodox Church with very strict rules, dating back to the 17th century. This special group lived in Turkey, in the Siakiang province of China, and in Siberia. They are now dispersed between Australia and the states of Washington and Alaska.

These communities in the United States were assisted by the Tolstoy Foundation to organize their own cultural, educational and religious centers to preserve their ethnic heritage and enable them to combine the best tenets of the United States with English classes and their own old country cultures.

All this would not have been possible without the understanding of the "TF's" purposes by the members of the administration, the United States Congress, and by the officials from the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM) and the UNHCR. Blair Taylor, member of the Unites States' Displaced Persons Commission in Europe, Walter Besterman, Deputy Director of ICEM, and Thomas Jamieson, Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, who became Tolstoy Foundation Directors and Coordinators of refugee operations, and who guided it through the corridors of power, should not be forgotten.

PROGRAMS

In response to international crises, the Tolstoy Foundation has grown to assume worldwide responsibility in three areas of endeavor:

Refugee Resettlement
Welfare and Social Services
Cultural Programs

Under the guidance of an active Board of Directors, the staff, comprised of experienced counselors and administrators, develops and implements the Foundation's programs in the United States, Europe, Canada, and South America.

The Tolstoy Foundation provides services in cooperation with the United States Department of State and the Department of Health and Human Services, state and local governments, the UNHCR, and the governments of Canada, France, and the Federal Republic of Germany. The Foundation works with ICM, is a member of the International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), of the American Council for Voluntary Action (INTERACTION), and is a founding member of CARE.

THE REFUGEE PROGRAM

As the number of refugees continues to escalate, the Tolstoy Foundation has broadened its scope of assistance to meet urgent needs of refugees in different areas of the world.

Refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: Over the years, the Foundation has developed expertise in assisting refugees from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The TF has resettled over 40,000 refugees from Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and the Soviet Union and special groups from the areas mentioned above, as well as the Pentecostals who appealed to President Carter and ALexandra Tolstoy in 1978. (See Appendix I)

Southeast Asia: Since this program began after the fall of Saigon in 1975, TF has resettled close to 15,000 refugees from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos in the United States. The TF gives attention to special cases of asylum seekers and resettlement.

The Near East: The largest concentration of refugees in the world is located in Pakistan; three million Afghans who have escapod over the border to Pakistan are waiting in refugee camps for admittance to countries willing to offer asylum. TF has sponsored 2,573 Afghans to the United States since 1980. 1,634 Iranian refugees have also been brought to the United States by the Tolstoy Foundation.

Africa: This program was founded to assist Ugandan Asians fleeing the government of Idi Amin in 1972, and today is focussed on Ethiopia. Since 1984, TF has resettled 360 Ethiopian refugees in the United States. One reason for their attraction to the Tolstoy Foundation is the possibility to speak their own Amharic language in the TF office in Rome. They also have contact with the Russian Orthodox Church there which they visit on Sundays and Holidays and where they meet TF personnel.

The basic approach to any Tolstoy Foundation sponsored activity is governed by an awareness that assistance should recognize human dignity and work to build a sense a self-reliance as opposed to charitable support, so that refugees can be an asset to their new environment, contributing culturally and economically to communities in which they live. Services provided begin prior to the arrival of the refugee in the United States, beginning with a search for private sponsors or relatives and their orientation, and continue with the verification of medical records and the reception of the refugee at point of entry and final destination in the United States. Initial support provides for food and clothing, housing and basic household goods and furnishings, depending on individual needs.

Orientation, training, employment counseling and placement, English language referral, school placement for children, health and other services which help integrate the refugee into a local community are arranged or provided by regional offices. To implement its resettlement program, the TF has six regional offices in the United States. Each office is staffed according to the needs of the sponsored refugees in the area. Staff of these offices maintain the capacity to provide necessary services in the native language of the non-English speaking refugee cases. Part time interpreter-counselors are utilized in offices where the caseload is too small to warrant a full time employee.

TF regional offices in the United States are located in New York City (headquarters), Phoenix, Arizona, Los Angeles, California, Ferndale, Michigan, Woonsocket, Rhode Island, and in Salt Lake City, Utah. Offices in San Francisco, California, Albuquerque, New Mexico, and Spartanburg, South Carolina were discontinued. The present offices operate under resettlement procedures and guidelines set by the national headquarters. Every office submits program and status reports, on a monthly basis, to headquarters. At least once a year executive staff in New York visit offices to monitor and advise on the resettlement efforts. Special workshops are usually held once a year for staff professional development.

Each regional office is provided with funds from which expenditures for food, rent, household items, bedding, some medical and other refugee expenses as well as office expenses. Accounting takes place by the utilization of monthly reports. Complete records with receipts are kept of all expenditures and are on file with the original at headquarters accounting office. Expenditures for each refugee are also noted in his/her file with running account records for each. Direct contact by phone is maintained for consultation and/or decision on matters for which the regional directors need advice or approval.

Through its regional offices, the TF is able to maintain direct contact with each refugee and sponsor through each stage of the resettlement process. Often this contact is maintained for many months or even years after the refugee has arrived in this country.

A portion of the costs of resettlement are borne by the private funds raised by the Foundation for arriving refugees. These funds come from individual donors, foundations and bequests. The Tolstoy Foundation regularly sends fund raising mailings to past and prospective donors. The TF hopes to continue previous levels of support for its resettlement programs.

In addition to the above described direct financial assistance, each Tolstoy regional office relies to a varying extent on volunteer services and "in-kind" contributions. The work of the Foundation would not be possible without this generous volunteer and community support.

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION - EUROPE

The European operation of the TF began in 1947. At present, the TF maintains offices in Rome, Vienna, Munich, Frankfurt, Athens, Brussels, and Paris, and has a representative in Stockholm. These are strategically important centers for initial assistance and guidance to refugees in securing initial welcome, shelter and food, medical care, counseling and guidance, immigration and asylum processing, and transportation to countries of resettlement.

European headquarters are located in Munich. Through contractual agreements, the United States Department of State assists with the funding needed for the operation of several of the European offices. However, all of the funds required by the offices in Paris and Brussels are derived from New York headquareters, private funds, and local contributions. Additional funds for the operation in Germany are received from the government of the German Federal Republic and from the Bavarian government. The Foundation has corporations in Germany and Supporting Committees in Belgium and France, with German, French, and Belgian nationals on their Boards. A close cooperation exists de facto in Vienna, where the Polish agency and the TF share an office, and in Rome, where a representative of the American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees shares our office.

The Board of Directors of the Tolstoy Foundation was seriously concerned about the thinking in the Department of State to discontinue support of the TF offices in Paris and Brussels in 1981. The official trend is to consolidate voluntary agencies' offices in

Western Europe - Athens, Frankfurt, Munich, Rome and Vienna - replacing them with an American Joint Voluntary Agency Representative (JVAR) or consolidated Volag Agencies who would simply prepare applications for refugee migration to the United States. The Tolstoy Foundation, on the basis of its 48 years of experience, considers its European offices indispensable and that they should be maintained for the following reasons:

I. The Tolstoy Foundation offices in Europe have a long-established relationship with European governments and voluntary groups. For this reason they are able to extend social services, legal protection, medical references and immigration processing to all countries in the West, for a steady stream of refugees that varies depending on political circumstances. Refugees seeking asylum in Europe and emigration to other countries than the Unites States, and in need of social services will be left without all these facilities since the JVARs will handle United States immigration as their major task.

II. As a private American organization with Russian ethnic and cultural expertise, the TF performs a unique political function by providing services in Europe to the refugees. In Athens, Brussels, Frankfurt, Munich, Paris, Rome, and Vienna, and in refugee camps in Austria (Traiskirchen), Italy (Latina), and Greece (Lavrion), it delivers the message of American solidarity and goodwill to the oppressed people of Communist countries. Men and women, who at a certain point in time have decided to risk the dangers of flight from their native land into the unknown free world, express by this action, a protest against the pressures and abuses of authoritarian regimes in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. These people know that TF offices in Europe will give them immediate protection, counsel in unfamiliar circumstances and help them in granting temporary asylum until a durable solution will develop. Even in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, TF offices are well known with a history of many years of immediate and efficient response to exiles and refugees. Potential dissenters and those still seeking escape and refugees who manage to do so, know full well that they will receive understanding and support as well as native language counseling when they walk through the door bearing the name "Tolstoy Foundation."

III. Although the intended withdrawal of United States governmental support and consolidation is being made in the interest of economy, efficiency and internationalization of refugee services, it would be easy for the disappearance of the Tolstoy Foundation in Europe to be read as an American withdrawal of concern and compassion toward the Eastern European and Soviet people. This withdrawal will certainly be used by the Soviet Union and its block countries to discourage dissent among their people and it will seem as if a connection of hope and support in the West will have been liquidated.

The long-standing traditional American policy of concern for the Russians and other oppressed people should be considered by the United States government within the delicate context of East-West relations in addition to the understandable reasons of economy and administrative efficiency. The Board of Directors of the TF is confident that when all is considered, it will become evident that the Foundation offices in Europe should continue to operate and that the closing of these first line rescue posts for refugees would be a tragedy for the refugees and a set-back for America.

On March 23, 1952, President Truman, basing his action on the Kersten Amendment to the Mutual Security Act, authorized $4.3 million to "initiate a program to improve the reception and placement and treatment, and to secure resettlement of qualified people who escape from the Iron Curtain Area." This became the United States Escapee Program (USEP) which, after several changes during the years in its title and role, has developed into a broad international program, more humanitarian than political in its intent, under the direction of the State Department. This new emphasis is responsive to the humanitarian goal of assisting refugees in general, but that special escapee idea has been lessened in the broadening of the concept.

Since an important element of this program has always been the work of small but particularly involved Voluntary Agencies, which have different ethnic backgrounds and ideological motivations, we bring as another reason the significance of preserving this identity and its continuity by providing, in present and in future, small funds which the United States government has allotted heretofore for this purpose.

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION - CANADA

The same basic services existing in the United States are provided to refugees by the Tolstoy Foundation in Canada. Some 250 to 300 refugees from all over the world are resettled annually throughout Canada by the TF office in Montreal. This Canadian TF receives limited financial assistance from the Canadian government, and the Government of the Province of Quebec, and is therefore partially subsidized by TF New York.

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION - LATIN AMERICA

The Tolstoy Foundation cooperates with the UNHCR in Latin America. Headquarters are located in Buenos Aires, Argentina and regional offices are situated in Brazil (Sao Paolo), Chile (Santiago), Paraguay (Asuncion), Peru (Lima), and Uruguay (Montevideo). From these offices, the Foundation assists refugees and students with subsidies, scholarships, and legal advice, and provides special care for the elderly. In 1986, TF provided 20%, some $40,000 toward the cost of these programs, with 80% granted by the UNHCR for a total value of $300,000 annually. The latest achievement is a small nursing home for refugees in Buenos Aires with combined home-care service in a program with the UNHCR.

SPECIAL REFUGEE CASES

The Tolstoy Foundation does not differentiate between categories of refugees. It is understood that there is no limit of eligibility; if a case must be transfered to another agency, it is for the purposes of efficiency, or in order to avoid duplication or competition with other agencies.

There is an unwritten agreement that in any given refugee movement, in any given year, the TF takes responsibility of approximately 3% of the total number admitted to the Unites States. No refugee is ever turned down: it is felt that after initial consultation it is the choice of the refugee to select his own agency and to choose the country of his preference for resettlement.

The Tolstoy Foundation has established a reputation for the expert handling of special resetttlement cases such as:

DEFECTORS AND FUGITIVES from the Soviet Union and other totalitarian regimes who are seeking political asylum. These individuals, fearing retaliation, must be shielded from public attention, and provided with expert counseling. Among them are HIGHLY QUALIFIED PROFESSIONALS who need retraining for certification in the United States. HANDICAPPED REFUGEES who require considerable time and esources during the resettlement process are also handled .

THE POSITION OF THE TOLSTOY FOUNDATION ON THE HANDLING OF SOVIET DEFECTORS TO THE WEST

The Tolstoy Foundation's operating procedures are based on 40 years of experience in assisting Soviet defectors. We have learned the following:

-To give them a feeling of family atmosphere, support, and a sense of security.

-To refrain from asking questions about their past, the Soviet Union, and their personal experiences.

-To protect them from public curiosity.

-To answer all their questions, be frank and open, to try to keep one's word and promises, show them the United States as they are, without boasting, or criticizing the Soviet Union.

To help them in their resettlement, we also propose:

-To assign them a guide or tutor, to teach them English as a Second Language (ESL), to give them counseling and orientation, work at the TF Center[*], and counsel them on a career in life.

This is a slow process and depends on the individual and his state of mind.

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[*] The TF has a unique asset in the TF Center, a 75-acre farm donated to the TF in 1941 in Rockland County, NY, by Mrs. Stillman Harkness, through the Commonwealth Foundation for a token gift of $1. The residence of Alexandra Tolstoy for many years, the TF Center has given shelter to over 6,000 refugees. Today, in addition to its extensive programs for the elderly, the TF Center offers cultural and educational services which include the St.Sergius Russian Orthodox Church, a library, conference rooms, a summer Russian language institute, all surrounded by fields and a 2-acre pond.

We will be the last ones to reject them. The Tolstoy Foundation will be happy to lend its support to their final establishment. (see Appendix II, "Plans and Procedures.")

THE PROBLEM WITH POLITICAL DEFECTIONS FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO THE WEST

Historical Perspective

Flights of individuals from Russia, for reasons of fear, political or religious disagreement have been a longtime established tradition. The act was usually considered by the old Russian regime and then by the Soviet regime as an act of treason or an escape from a just retribution.

Escapes can be traced to 1564 when Prince Andrey Kurbsky blessed his wife and 9-year old son and took off on horseback at full speed with twelve noblemen from Dorpat in Russian Livonia to Volmar in Lithuania. He was expecting to be arrested by orders of Ivan the Terrible but had a safe-conduct from Sigismund II Augustus. He consulted with his wife on whether he should stay and be executed, or should leave never to be heard from or seen again. She answered that his life was more important to her than her own happiness. (Ivan the Terrible, Robert Payne and Nikita Romanov, Cromwell Co., New York, 1975)

At another time, some of the young men who had been sent by Peter the Great to study in Europe stayed behind and did not dare return to Russia. There is a prominent Swiss family, the Cramers of Geneva, which descends from one of them. Even Peter's own son, Alexis, tried to stay abroad, but was lured back from Italy.

Later on, in 1830, a Princess Wolkonsky became a Roman Catholic and went to live in Rome. Nicholas I sent his own chaplain to bring her back into the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church and to Russia, but without success. The Princess built herself a villa in Rome and stayed there for the rest of her life.

In the 1880s, Bakunin, Kropotkin and Troubetzkoy stayed as exiles in in Switzerland and France.

Turgeneff, the writer, organized in the 1870s readings by poets and writers, and concerts in Paris to raise money for destitute Russian students to whom the Russian embassy refused to pay their allowance because of their anti-government behavior, Turgeneff established a club where the students could have shelter and food, which developed later into the Turgeneff Library, existing to this day.

To make the picture complete, one should also mention the precursors of the present trend; people such as Vladimir Lenin, who preferred life in the West, where they could plot against the government of Russia in safety.

The difference between the situation in Tsarist Russia with the one in the Soviet Union now, is that before the Revolution one was free to leave for whatever reason, e.g., the Old Believers, the Mennonites, Jews, westernized aristocrats, revolutionaries, political dissenters, writers, students, tourists, etc., all were free to leave whenever they wanted and with all their possessions.

PSYCHOLOGY OF A POLITICAL FUGITIVE

An escapee from the Soviet Union is not necessarily someone who wishes to join the West and embrace its values. His escape is first and foremost from Soviet power; to flee arrest, incrimination or perhaps personal and family difficulties which have little to do with politics and are often the consequence of the common practice of denunciation.

A Soviet defector is prepared, or thinks he/she is prepared, to suffer privations and discomfort, to "eat the bitter bread of exile" instead of facing complications at home. A Soviet defector is usually not ready to be identified willingly as a turncoat. He might have his own special reasons for defection. He will not gladly vilify everything in the Soviet Union, its regime, his own people, in order to conform with the impressions acquired in the West about the USSR and to satisfy his interrogators or the press.

Ir should be noted that as a question of principle, politically active and conscious anti-Communists do not try to escape, but remain in the country to fight for its freedom. Occasionally, they are expelled from the USSR and continue their political action abroad. These are special cases for whom many of our remarks do not apply.

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION EXPERIENCE

The TF has been assisting Soviet asylum seekers since its inception. Individuals and groups who arrived to the United States during the last fifteen years present a great variety of men and women with different motivations and circumstances. Most of them have done well in the West after having gone through a difficult period of transition.

It is practically impossible to generalize about the motivations of refugees, defectors or fugitives from the Soviet Union, except for one obvious reason: they have all, for one reason or another, left their country of birth and refused to return.

Most of them have not gone back on their decision and have accepted the high price of separation from the family and environment they grew in. Many have been subjected to Soviet pressure to return to the USSR and were questioned by United States and other intelligence agencies intensively. The percentage is difficult to establish, since the TF assits only a portion of the total number of defectors who come to the United States.

In our opinion, a policy of handling defectors should be developed using acquired on-hand experience which will give them a feeling of security and which will protect them from returning to the Soviet Union in an act of desperation.

PROFILES AND STATISTICS

The Tolstoy Foundation has accepted and sponsored 86 Soviet defectors since 1976. The TF receives an average of 8 to 10 defectors annually with the exceptionally large number of 20 received in 1981.

The professions of the refugees are varied: architects, ballet dancers, biologists, carpenters, conductors, geochemists, engineers, musicians, photographers, radio-mechanics, Soviet Army officials, sailors, tourists, and United Nations interpreters. Some of the defectors appeared in Iceland, Mexico, Greece, Hong Kong, France, India, Great Britain, Egypt, Japan and Belgium, and were referred to our offices in Europe to to headquarters in New York.

As a rule, as soon as a small notice of Soviet defection appears in the press, the TF headquarters informs the State Department and the United States Mission in Geneva of its interest. Defectors are not always referred to the Foundation and have been allocated to other voluntary agencies for assistance.

As a result, our statistics are incomplete. Usually, defectors handled by other agencies end up at the TF for guidance.

Most of the refugees resettled by the Tolstoy Foundation have succeeded in adjusting themselves to new conditions. They begin a new life without fear or afterthought. It is during the first year in the United States that the adjustment to western ways is the most crucial and difficult. Out of all the defectors the Tolstoy Foundation has assisted, a few returned to the USSR and three died in the initial twelve month period. Attached is a proposed detailed plan and procedure for handling defectors. (See Appendix II)

SUMMARY AND PROPOSAL

To summarize, we feel strongly that in order to carry out a successful operation of assistance to refugees, asylum seekers, escapees and defectors, the following conditions have to exist:

-A strong network of welcoming centers in Western Europe - of an ethnic character, easily identifiable, such as the TF offices which have existed already many years - as opposed to the concept of the JVAR in Europe (See letter to R. H. Funseth, dated September 8, 1982, Appendix III)

-Maintenance of a cultural shelter with trained and dedicated personnel, where newcomers could slowly adjust to a new way of life. (Details described in Appendix II, "Plans and Procedures")

-Establishment of a Revolving Fund for support and maintenance of defectors and escapees (on a long-term loan basis and broad eligibility criteria) until they are able to earn their own living.

-A panel, a standing conference or an advisory committee of joint government and private agencies' staff responsible for defectors, to discuss, recommend and implement asylum processing practices and to monitor the program in general.

FINAL NOTE

It is obvious that defectors have certain knowledge and experience which they could and are often willing to share with interested scholars or information specialists. However, one must be cautious in not trying to "squeeze them as a lemon," as the result can be counterproductive.

A coordinated program can be started to build up a bank of comprehensive and scholarly gathered data with the help of computers, cross-references, research and publications facilities. However, this is beyond the purposes of this Statement.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear before your Committee.

TKB/OR/ao 8.27.87

APPENDIX I - PENTACOSTALS

Cable Address TOLFUND, New York
Telex No. [illegible]

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.
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Tolstoy Foundation Center • Valley Cottage, N. Y. 10989 • Telephone (914) CO 8-6140

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Mrs. Tatiana Schaufuss
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•Executive Committee
• as of May, 1979

June 25, 1979

Twenty thousand Christians, of the non-registered Churches in the Soviet Union, have officially signed and presented to their government a document renouncing their citizenship, having submitted applications to emigrate from the U.S.S.R.

This group is comprised of Pentecostals, Baptists, Catholics and Orthodox Christians. Their motivation to immigrate to any country in the Free World stems from the fact that belonging to non-State sanctioned Churches produces severe persecution by the K.G.B. Their unwillingness to register is explained by the fact that they do not wish to be members of Churches run by the K.G.B. - the registered ones.

The Tolstoy Foundation has been actively involved in trying to help these destitute people to emigrate. However, without the support and outspokeness of the American government, as well as a strong stand of its people, the World will remain ignorant of the truth. The Christians will continue living in concentration camps, be committed to psychiatric hospitals and their children mocked for their Faith and forcibly re-educated into atheists.

We hope that the attached material will describe to you what has occured since their first plea to the West. We hope that it will impress upon you the need and urgency of your support.

For further information please contact:

Mrs. Alla G. Ivask
Assistant Director
Department of Immigration and
Resettlement

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.
250 West 57th Street
New York, N.Y. 10019

Tel: (212) 247-2922

Cable Address: TOLFUND, New York
Telex No. [illegible]

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*Executive Committee
• as of May, 1979

January 2, 1979

Dear Friends:

Enclosed is a memorandum on the difficulties with the immigration of Baptists, Pentecostals and Orthodox people in the Soviet Union.

The time has come to take some action to solve this problem, since no results have been achieved in 2 years. The same memorandum has been sent to the White House, to various governmental officials in Washington, as well as to Senators and Congressmen.

It would be of great help, if you would support this appeal in your capacity as sponsors of the families for which you have sent "vyzovs".

Write to your Senators, Congressmen and Pastors, asking them for effective action on the part of the United States, to gain the release, by the Soviet authorities, of the people you are sponsoring.

This matter is of utmost urgency and importance, please help.

Sincerely,

Alla Ivask

Alla Ivask (Mrs.)
Assistant Director
Department of Immigration and Resettlement

Encl.
AI/mg

The Tolstoy Foundation is a public charity. Contributions are deductible to the full extent provided by law and will be acknowledged.

Cable Address: TOLFUND, New York

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250 West 57th Street, New York, N. Y. 10019
Telephone (212) 247-2922

November 21, 1978

MEMORANDUM

Situation of Baptists, Pentecostals
and other Christians in the USSR whose
applications for exit visas have been
denied by the Soviets.

Sponsors and Applicants.

Some 200 sponsors in this country have signed assurances (vyzovs) (Appendix I - Statistics & Appendix II - Dean Dexter's letter) for approximately 900 Orthodox Christians, Baptists and Pentecostals in the Soviet Union who applied for immigration to the United States, but whose applications have been rejected by the Soviet authorities.

An estimated additional number of 1,000 sponsors are ready to come forward for some seven thousand believers in the Soviet Union - Baptists, Pentecostals and a few hundred of Orthodox Christians whose names are known in this country.

Soviet Refusal.

The Soviet refusal to issue exit permits to believers (Appendix III - Embassy cable) is based on the very same reason for emigration of these people which is religious persecution, a fact denied by the Soviets. According to the information in the appeals for help received in this country, Soviet refusals are followed by harassment from the local authorities - children of applicants are sent to unattached children's homes for re-education, heads of families and young men are sent to forced labor camps and women, left behind, are penalized with nuisance tactics and lecturing for clinging to their religious beliefs. Participants in prayer meetings in private homes (Appendix IV - Plotnikoff revocation) have been sentenced to pay 50-ruble fines. Soviet officials allow emigration from the USSR only for family reunion or for the return to one's homeland. Most of the people in our case are ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians and Lithuanians, all nationals of the 16 Socialist Republics of the Soviet Union.

A brief history of the Pentecostal movement in the Soviet Union is attached (Appendix V).

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Contributions are deductible to the full extent provided by law and will be acknowledged

Appeals and Applications.

Lists of applicants for immigration to the United States with appeals for support have been received by the American Embassy in Moscow, the Consulate in Leningrad and the Advance Party of the U.S. Consulate in Kiev, and forwarded to whom the appeal is addressed: President Jimmy Carter, as a "brother Christian and Baptist," Rev. Potter, Chairman of the World Council of Churches (WCC) in Geneva, and Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations. Several appeals were forwarded in the original form to the Tolstoy Foundation. One appeal was addressed to Alexandra Tolstoy, the daughter of the Russian writer, Leo Tolstoy, the founder and now chairman emeritus of the Tolstoy Foundation (Appendix VI). To the best of our knowledge, except for the last one, none of the appeals have yet been acknowledged by their addressees.

Role and Position of the Tolstoy Foundation.

The Tolstoy Foundation is not directly involved in the sponsorship of this group. It limits its role to good services in the preparation of sponsorships in the United States (vyzovs) and to the assistance in resettlement after the people will have left the USSR.

The Tolstoy Foundation has presented documentation about the plight of the Baptist, Pentecostal and other Christian applicants to the National Security Council at the White House and to the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs of the State Department. Encouragement has been received from the Soviet Desk of the State Department and the names added to the large waiting list of applicants whose exit visas have been refused for years by the Soviets.

The position of the Tolstoy Foundation in similar cases has always been to examine them as individual family cases requiring emigration to change the environment and thus eliminate unwarranted hardship. The course of action recommended by the Tolstoy Foundation is not of a confrontation with anyone on a Human Rights issue, but rather of practical steps taken with the approval of the local authorities and cooperation in compassionate understanding (Appendix VII - March 1, 1978 & January 25, 1978 Reports).

Some Reasons for and Reactions to the Soviet Refusal.

Since the arrival of the first list and the sending of the first affidavit by an American sponsor, two years have passed. Patience is getting thinner and tension is growing amongst sponsors in the United States. At the same time, the Christian applicants in the USSR are becoming more intransigent in their stand. Notwithstanding increased pressure from officialdom, they refuse to register their congregations and to withdraw their applications for emigration.

The Vastchenko Incident.

One Pentecostal family(with a U.S. sponsorship through the good services of the Tolstoy Foundation) forced its way into the American Embassy and is squatting there since June 1978, raising problems of its own (Appendix VIII - N.Y. Times, November 9, 1978). The escalation of the conflict between the Soviet authorities and the above-mentioned groups of conservative Christians is the consequence of three separate, but recent events.

- One is the publication in the Soviet press, two years ago, of the full text of the Helsinki Agreement offering freedom of movement among other promises.
- Another was the introduction of the new Soviet constitution of 1978 which mentions the negative position of the Communist party on religion. (Appendix IX - Soviet Constitution, old and new),
- and, finally, the election of Jimmy Carter a Baptist as President of the United States.

A number of Christian communities in the USSR concluded that loyalty to their faith is incompatible with an allegiance to the Soviet order and felt that their conscience compells them to follow precedents in similar situations in the Bible and directs them to leave the USSR. They also believe that the President of the United States will understand their position better.

Need for Review of the Present Standstill.

It would be illusory to discard this growing situation as an internal Soviet problem. The United States is unavoidably affected.

> Two hundred American families, supported by a much larger constituency of Baptists, Pentecostals and Orthodox Christians in the United States have sent affidavits, spent money, prepared housing and secured jobs, and have committed themselves and their churches to help their brethren in the USSR.
>
> Despite the internal pressure or maybe because of it, the number of applications in the Soviet Union has grown to 7,000 people. with a corresponding increase of American sponsors. The cost of processing these cases (registrations, translations, certifications fees, and administrative costs) comes to an average of $100 per case and a total of $20,000 so far, without taking into account the price of frustration of American sponsors and the hardship of applicants in the USSR.

Consideration of Possible Action.

The Tolstoy Foundation seeks clarification, guidance and support in order to decide if its efforts must continue or should this operation be terminated and sponsors and applicants informed accordingly.

There are two options open for consideration.

Option I

In view of the fact that the U.S. Government has been unsuccessful in securing from the Soviet government exit visas for the Baptists, Pentecostals and other Christians who have applied for immigration to the USA, the sponsors in the USA should be so informed and released of their obligations. The applicants in the USSR should also be informed that they must not try to leave their homeland, nor that they should apply for exit permits again. This action might only endanger their peace and security and embarrass the United States.

Option II

The U.S. Government (the White House, Departments of State and Justice) will undertake the initiative of special separate negotiations for an agreement with the USSR for the release of a number of Christian individual cases for immigration to the United States on the following grounds: the applicants are people "difficult to integrate in the USSR who would be happier in the United States. They share the beliefs which were brought by American missionaries to Russia." Another suggested line of thought which might be acceptable to the Soviets would be for them to consider these Baptist, Pentecostal and other applicants in a category of "a marginal ethnic oddity too stubborn to change its religious persuasions." The Soviet Union might decide that they are "unfit to be part of the culturally advanced Soviet society." The tension they generate by their attitude will be defused by their emigration from the USSR. Their emigration will also improve the relationship between the USA and the USSR, which is now aggravated by the growing hostility on both sides generated by this situation.

One can sympathize with the reluctance of any American official or private citizen to declare that nothing more than lip service, except for special cases, can be given to Human Rights cases in the Soviet Union.

One can also understand the fear of an escalation in the numbers of applicants if a token number of people is released. Experience shows that movements of people decline with time and that refugee groups are not a burden to the receiving country.

Need of Meeting for a Consensus.

The failure to achieve during the period of two years a release of the groups of conservative Christians to rejoin their sponsors in the United States requires some special action. A meeting of all those concerned and familiar with the situation should be called at an early date, to gather together all information, and to devise a consensus on the action to take. It would be most desirable that it be held with the participation of representatives of the Administration, Congress, NGOs, American Pentecostals, Baptists and other sponsors. This will contribute to an honest appraisal of the situation and, in general, to the successful outcome of such a meeting.

Respectfully submitted,

T. K. Bagration

Teymuraz K. Bagration
Executive Secretary

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

Attachments

APPENDIX I

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

REGISTRATION OF PENTECOSTALS (as of October 30, 1978)

STATE	No. of SPONSORS	FAMILIES/PEOPLE	
Alabama	1	1	5
California	81	87	447
Illinois	1	1	6
Missouri	1	1	2
New Hampshire	1	2	10
New Jersey	3	4	24
New York	2	2	10
Texas	1	1	1
Oregon	26	26	185
Washington	21	21	/ 93
TOTAL VYZOVS SENT (signed receipts returned)	138 sponsors	146	783

REGISTRATION OF BAPTISTS

California	13	13 /	68
GRAND TOTAL	151	Families 159 /	851 People

TOTAL POTENTIAL : SPONSORS 1,000 FAMILIES 1,000 / 7,000 PEOPLE

TKB/MG:hy

Appendix III

UNCLASSIFIED MOSCOW 4840

Z MAR 78
EMBASSY MOSCOW
USMISSION GENEVA 7247
AMEMBASSY ROME 6979
SECSTATE WASHDC 9131

16 MAR 78
TOR: 1619
CN: 02812
ACTION: HA
INFO: DC
4

ACTION COPY

UNCLAS MOSCOW 04840

FOR INS

.O. 11652: N/A
AGS: CVIS, UR
UBJECT: TCP - PLOTNIKOV (3)

EF: (A) GENEVA 1489, (B) 77 MOSCOW 8707

1. PLOTNIKOV HAS INFORMED EMBASSY THAT NAKHODKA
VIR HAS REFUSED TO ISSUE HIS FAMILY SOVIET FOREIGN
RAVEL PASSPORTS. HE BELIEVES THAT EXIT PERMISSION
ILL BE SHORTLY REVOKED AS WELL.

2. PLEASE INFORM TOLSTOY FOUNDATION. TOON

UNCLASSIFIED MOSCOW 4840

Appendix I

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ

от 10 марта 1978 года

Административная комиссия при исполкоме Малоярославецкого райсовета рассмотрев материал гр. Севмерьяновой Веры Евсеевны, не работает - пенсионерка о нарушении постановления ВЦИК и СНК РСФСР от 08.04.1929 г., выразившееся в том, что она 5 марта 1978 года в 8 часов 10 минут утра предоставила свой дом для сбора верующих веры Евангельских христиан без разрешения органов советской власти.

ПОСТАНОВИЛА:

За нарушение постановления ВЦИК и СНК РСФСР от 08.04. 1929 года, выразившееся в том, что гр. Севмерьянова В.Е. 5 марта 1978 г. в 8 часов 10 минут утра предоставила свой дом для сбора верующих веры Евангельских христиан в г. Малоярославце ул. Лермонтова д.№ 7 без разрешения советских органов власти подвергнуть её штрафу в сумме 50 (пятьдесят) рублей.

Штраф должен быть уплачен в десятидневный срок со дня получения постановления.

В случае неуплаты штрафа в указанный срок дело будет передано на удержание через народный суд.

Постановление может быть обжаловано в райисполком в десятидневный срок со дня его получения. После истечения которого постановление обжалованию не подлежит.

Председатель административной
комиссии

Т.П.Рогачевская

Russian text of a Resolution, order and receipt for a fine of 50 rubles paid by V.E. Sevmeruanov for allowing a religious meeting in her home of Evangelical Christians on March 10, 1978.

Appendix IV.

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ № 102

23 · 03 1977 г. Административная комиссия при исполкоме Старогородского районного Совета депутатов трудящихся г. Винницы в составе председателя комиссии тов. Бондаренко Л.Д. членов комиссии Гунько, Галущенко, Нечипайло, Огородник, Чупахина, Колногозюк

и секретаря комиссии тов. Овчарука П.Е.

рассмотрели Протокол № 164

на гр-на(ку) Бондарчук Анну Васильевну

года рождения 1927, который (ая) проживает в г. Виннице по ул. Южная

№ 78 кв. работает домохозяйка

о нарушении "Указа Президиума Верховного Совета УССР от 26 марта 1956 г."

которого направлялось в том, что она собрала в своем доме и проводила тайное собрание 35 человек верующих христиан

ПОСТАНОВИЛА:

На гр-на(ку) Бондарчук А.В. наложить административное взыскание в виде предупреждения, общественного порицания, штрафа в сумме

пятдесят руб.

Предложить гр-ну(ке) Бондарчук А.В.

внести штраф в приходную сберегательную кассу в 15-дневный срок.

В случае неуплаты штрафа в указанный срок, штраф будет взыскан в бесспорном порядке с заработной платы оштрафованного.

Если оштрафованный не работает, то взыскание штрафа производится судебными исполнителями.

Граждане, а также служебные лица, на которых наложено административное взыскание, имеют право обжалования постановления административной комиссии в 10-дневный срок после его вручения:

а) о наложении штрафа в народный суд по месту жительства

б) о наложении других видов административного взыскания — в исполком районного Совета депутатов трудящихся.

Вещественные доказательства

Председатель комиссии

Секретарь

Постановление получил: от подписи отказалась

Калиновская тип. зак. 2421—5000 15 7 1976 г.



КВИТАНЦИЯ

Принято от Бондарчук Appendix IV
(фамилия)
Анна Васильевна
(имя, отчество)

Адрес плательщика Винница
(город (поселок))
ул Южная 78
(улица, дом №)

Согласно извещению № 102 за 1977 год
штраф. пятдесят ру
(наименование гор(рай)финотдела или
богомоленья.
другой организации, выдавшей извещение)

30 IV 77г
50.00 № 7064
(Для отметки сберегательной кассы)

Наименование и срок платежа	Недоимка прошлых лет	Платежи текущего года	Пеня	Всего
за тайное собрание				50

Подпись плательщика

Кассир (контролер)



КВИТАНЦИЯ

Ф. № 1

Принято от Федотова
(фамилия)
Ивана Петровича
(имя, отчество)

Адрес плательщика г. Малоярославец
(город (поселок))
ул. Зеленая 7
(улица, дом №)

Согласно извещению № 17/III за 1978 год
райисполком.
(наименование гор(рай)финотдела или
другой организации, выдавшей извещение)

(Для отметки сберегательной кассы)

Наименование и срок платежа	Недоимка прошлых лет	Платежи текущего года	Пеня	Всего
штраф за участие в религиозном собрании				50

Подпись плательщика Фед

Кассир (контролер)

Appendix V

Pentecostals in Russia: A Historical Note

The Pentecostal movement evolved from the "Holiness Movement", which occurred in American Protestantism towards the turn of the twentieth century.

The Bethel Bible College in Topeka, Kansas served as the first center for this movement in 1873, and subsequently transferred in 1906 to the Azusa Street Mission in Los Angeles, California.

From its inception in the United States, the religion began spreading to Great Britain, Continental Europe, Asia and Latin America. The incredible rapidity of its growth can be substantiated by simple statistics; i.e., by 1975 (close to 25 years later) its membership counts some seven million.

The Pentecostal religious movement came to Russia at the beginning of the 20th century, when in 1908 several American ministers created small Pentecostal communities in St. Petersburg, Moscow and Odessa.

Until a well-known American preacher, Ivan Efimovitch Voronaeff came to Russia in 1924 and created an Evangelical Christian Pentecostal Union, these communities remained rather small and ineffective. With his arrival, the movement began rapidly spreading to Central Russia, the Ukraine and East Asia.

The Central Pentecostal Union began acting as a coordinating organ of the newly forming religious group and its communities. It even introduced the publication of a Pentecostal religious magazine called, "The Evangelist".

However, in 1928 when Stalin submitted all churches, regardless of their denomination to State control, Voronaeff was ordered to call an assembly of some 500 Pentecostal delegates to pledge allegiance to the State and to have them vote in favor of the newly developed policy on religious affairs.

The majority of the delegates voted against this State policy and refused to pledge their allegiance to the State. This type of vote resulted in the imprisonment of Voronaeff and his followers. Voronaeff personally was given a six year sentence, and in 1928 was torn to pieces by police dogs.

Since that time, (the establishment of State Control over religious bodies), the Pentecostals began suffering most from persecution for their religious convictions and the present government, despite their agreement on Human Rights and signature of the Helsinki Agreement, have only worsened their attitude and behaviour towards this denomination.

Cable Address: TOLFUND, New York

Appendix VII

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.
250 West 57th Street, New York, N. Y. 10019
Telephone (212) 247-2922

March 1, 1978

THE PLIGHT OF RUSSIAN PENTECOSTALS

1. Appeal from the USSR

In October 1976, a letter from the Pentecostals and Baptists, belonging to the non-registered Church in the USSR, reached the Tolstoy Foundation. The content was a plea to the US Government and the American public, to assist them to immigrate to a country in which they can enjoy freedom of religion. Attached to the appeal was a list of 20 Pentecostal families and 20 Baptist families.

2. Support from the USA

The Tolstoy Foundation immediately began seeking sponsors for the families and as soon as the first few "vyzovs" (invitations) were sent out and received in the USSR, additional petition-lists were forwarded to Tolstoy Foundation by the Pentecostals and Baptists.

With the help of an organization in the USA, "Evangelism to Communist Lands", headed by Rev. Harlaan Popov, the Tolstoy Foundation found sponsors in the following states:

Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire (the full and active support of Commissioner Dean Dexter), New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Virginia, Washington and Washington, D.C.

By November 1977, the Tolstoy Foundation sent out vyzovs and found sponsors for a total of 127 families (696 persons) for Pentecostals and Baptists.

3. Official refusals

To be able to monitor the fate of the "vyzovs" as well as the reaction of local Soviet authorities toward those petitioning for exit permits, contact was established with:

Mr. Eugene Bresenden
P. O. Box 1
Far East Broadcasting Corp.
Whittier, CA 90608
Tel.: Office (213) 698-8077
Home (213) 693-9822

Mr. Eugene Bresenden who is a Pentecostal immigrated to the United States two years ago through the auspices of the Tolstoy Foundation. Mr. Bresenden is personally acquainted with every family for which Tolstoy Foundation sent "vyzovs" and has maintained contact with them, by mail and telephone, after his departure from the USSR.

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION CENTER • VALLEY COTTAGE, N. Y. 10989 • Telephone (914) CO 8-6140
Contributions are deductible to the full extent provided by law and will be acknowledged.

All pertinent information to this joint mission was reported to the Tolstoy Foundation. In December 1977 Mr. Bresenden informed us that all recipients of our "vyzovs" were denied exit permits.

4. American Embassy in Moscow and US Mission in Geneva

On January 16, 1978 a letter arrived from the US Mission in Geneva stating that the family of RAYLYAN, N.A. from Nahodka, USSR, a Pentecostal case, was permitted to emigrate. Subsequently, the same week, we received notification from the US Embassy in Moscow that two more families had been granted permission to leave. These were GORTMAN, A.F. and PLOTNIKOV, I.S., both from Nahodka, USSR. But for some of the people permission has been withdrawn by the authorities.

5. The case of CHUPRINA, Anna Sevelevna

Mrs. Chuprina from Nahodka, USSR, also a Pentecostal, was called by the US Embassy in Moscow and was told that she received an exit visa. She was also told to report to the US Embassy accompanied by someone. Together with two men from her group she went to Vladivostok and thence flew to Moscow. At the airport she was escorted to a private room, was ordered to remove her clothes and was thorougly searched. Then, the threesome was permitted to leave for Moscow, but at the US Embassy gates they were met by the KGB agents and put under arrest for two days. Mrs.Chuprina brought with her 28 "vyzovs" for various families which had to be validated since they expire after one year. KGB confiscated all the "vyzovs" and Mr. Bresenden is not sure whether they had been returned or not. After two days Mrs.Chuprina and her escort were released and told never to set foot in Moscow again. This was reported to us on February 23, 1978.

One has to keep the following facts in mind:

A) The reason for emigrating from the USSR is stated openly by the Pentecostals, Baptists and Orthodox Christians, as being religious persecution.

B) The sponsor did not mention in the "vyzovs" the family relationship.

C) There are mainly three groups of persecuted Christians wishing to leave - in Nahodka (Russian Far East), the Northern Caucasus and the Baltic countries.

All American Pentecostals and Baptists are fully aware of the harassment of their "Brothers and Sisters in Christ" and are willing to provide full support to expedite their immigration. Certainly, many Soviet Christians would prefer to stay where they are with the hope that the present pressure on their religious beliefs and practices will abate.

Attached is a list of sponsors and people concerned in the United States.

AI/TKB:hy

Enclosures

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

Jan 25, 1978

Appendix VII

REPORT ON THE SITUATION AND SPONSORSHIP OF PENTECOSTALS AND BAPTISTS FROM THE U.S.S.R. TO THE U.S.

In October of 1976, a letter from the Pentecostals and Baptists, belonging to the non-registered Church in the U.S.S.R., reached the Tolstoy Foundation. The content was a plea to assist them to immigrate to a country in which they can enjoy freedom of religion and not live as second class citizens. Attached to this plea was a list of families (20), wishing to emigate. Immediately following, was a letter from Mr. Eugene Bresenden (the first Pentecostal able to make his way to the U.S., through the Tolstoy Foundation) with a similar plea on their behalf, and additional lists of families.

In order for anyone to immigrate to the U.S. from the U.S.S.R., on the Reunion of Family program (T.C.P.), the person must receive an invitation ("vyzov") from the U.S. When the Soviet authorities approve their departure, the immigrants receive a visa, allowing them to go to the consulate in Europe, Rome, where they are "re-processed", under the 7th Preference of the Immigration law.

With the help and absolute support of several international religious organizations, amongst them Evangelism to Communist Lands and Word to Russia, the Tolstoy Foundation launched a campaign to arouse the American public's attention to this matter. We met with an excellent response as well as understanding, not only on the part of the United States, but also Canada and Australia.

By November 1977, sponsors were found, and "vyzovs" sent for 115 Pentecostal families (634 persons), and 12 Baptist families (62 persons), making a total of 127 cases, 696 persons. All "vyzovs" were sent to the U.S.S.R. from the Tolstoy Foundation - registered mail, return receipts requested, without any mention of the Tolstoy Foundation. Shortly, receipts were returned to us, signed allegedly by those who had received these "vyzovs" in the U.S.S.R. According to these receipts, all but four families,leading the Pentecostal movement in the Soviet Union, received our documents; a search is out on the other four cases.

Upon receipt of a "vyzov", the individual must present it to the local immigration department, "OVIR". If the local "OVIR" grants permission for an exit permit, the documents are then forwarded to Soviet immigration headquarters in Moscow, who have the final verdict on the case.

In December 1977, the Tolstoy Foundation received the distressing news that all the Pentecostals, who submitted their papers to the local "OVIR", were denied exit permit. This was reported to us by Mr. Eugene Bresenden, after he received a telephone call from the U.S.S.R., and was informed about this matter.

Each case had a basis for denial. The reasons varied. Some, because they had no relatives in the U.S., others because even though their relatives had immigrated to the U.S., the Soviet authorities regretted to have made the mistake of letting them out in the first place, and were not going to repeat it. "Vyzovs" of others were plainly torn up in their presence.

A small group of Pentecostals in Nakhodka (Soviet Far East), a total of three families, were given hope of an exit permit. To speed up the processing, they volunteered to hand carry these documents to Moscow, but were told that their "vyzovs" were already in the capital, and the end result should be positive. Several weeks later, they learned that these "vyzovs" never went past the clerk in the local "OVIR", to whom they were originally presented.

Some Pentecostals were issued a six-page questionnaire, with inquiries about their sponsors in the U.S., to be completed in detail. At the same time were told that the "vyzov" is valid for three months only, knowing well that the exhange of such information would take longer.

During the first months of 1977 Lydia Voronina, a member of the Helsinki Monitoring Committee and who was petitioning for three years to receive an exit permit, was ordered to leave the U.S.S.R. The reason for this was that her assignment with the Committee was to travel among the Baptist and Pentecostal Communities to collect documents substantiating their situation. Prior to her departure, her apartment was searched and most of the important documentation was confiscated. She was able to save some documents and as a result was able to testify at the Congressional hearings in Washington D.C., after her immigration to the U.S. through the Tolstoy Foundation. Her testimony contained detailed, horrifying information about the continuous harrassment of the Pentecostals and Baptists in the U.S.S.R.

Since the time the Tolstoy Foundation flooded the communities of the-Pentecostals and Baptists with "vyzovs" many families who had received them, were put under house arrest, others were laid off work, children were expelled from school, husbands were imprisoned, mothers threatened to have their children taken away to be adopted by the State. The reason for this, as told to the parents was because they were raising them immorally, by teaching them about God. To the best of our knowledge, one such case occurred, because of a "vyzov". The Tolstoy Foundation is trying to collect accurate and detailed accounts of such occurances, however, only a few letters of these believers actually reach us.

The Tolstoy Foundation and the American sponsors are trying their utmost to help these people, who went on a hunger strike in support of their movement, however time is running out. Their situation in the U.S.S.R. is worsening and there appears to be little hope without action from the White House. The State Department is kept informed.

AI/ams/mg
1/25/78

Appendix IX.



Статья 122. Женщине в СССР предоставляются равные права с мужчиной во всех областях хозяйственной, государственной, культурной и общественно-политической жизни.

Возможность осуществления этих прав женщин обеспечивается предоставлением женщине равного с мужчиной права на труд, оплату труда, отдых, социальное страхование и образование, государственной охраной интересов матери и ребенка, государственной помощью многодетным и одиноким матерям, предоставлением женщине при беременности отпусков с сохранением содержания, широкой сетью родильных домов, детских яслей и садов.

Статья 123. Равноправие граждан СССР, независимо от их национальности и расы, во всех областях хозяйственной, государственной, культурной и общественно-политической жизни является непреложным законом.

Какое бы то ни было прямое или косвенное ограничение прав или, наоборот, установление прямых или косвенных преимуществ граждан в зависимости от их расовой и национальной принадлежности, равно как всякая проповедь расовой или национальной исключительности, или ненависти и пренебрежения — караются законом.

Статья 124. В целях обеспечения за гражданами свободы совести церковь в СССР отделена от государства и школа от церкви. Свобода отправления религиозных культов и свобода антирелигиозной пропаганды признается за всеми гражданами.

Статья 125. В соответствии с интересами трудящихся и в целях укрепления социалистического строя гражданам СССР гарантируется законом:

а) свобода слова;
б) свобода печати;
в) свобода собраний и митингов;
г) свобода уличных шествий и демонстраций.

— 37 —

Russian text of Old Soviet Constitution, Article 124 "In order to secure freedom of conscience, separation of Church from State and school." Freedom of religious cults and of anti-religious propaganda (five lines of text).

Appendix IXa

рассматривать предложения и заявления граждан, давать на них ответы и принимать необходимые меры.

Преследование за критику запрещается. Лица, преследующие за критику, привлекаются к ответственности.

Статья 50. В соответствии с интересами народа и в целях укрепления и развития социалистического строя гражданам СССР гарантируются свободы: слова, печати, собраний, митингов, уличных шествий и демонстраций.

Осуществление этих политических свобод обеспечивается предоставлением трудящимся и их организациям общественных зданий, улиц и площадей, широким распространением информации, возможностью использования печати, телевидения и радио.

Статья 51. В соответствии с целями коммунистического строительства граждане СССР имеют право объединяться в общественные организации, способствующие развитию политической активности и самодеятельности, удовлетворению их многообразных интересов.

Общественным организациям гарантируются условия для успешного выполнения ими своих уставных задач.

Статья 52. Гражданам СССР гарантируется свобода совести, то есть право исповедовать любую религию или не исповедовать никакой, отправлять религиозные культы или вести атеистическую пропаганду. Возбуждение вражды и ненависти в связи с религиозными верованиями запрещается.

Церковь в СССР отделена от государства и школа — от церкви.

Статья 53. Семья находится под защитой государства.

Брак основывается на добровольном согласии

Russian text of New Soviet Constitution of 1978, Article 52 (eight lines of text). Very similar to Old Constitution with added word "guarantee" instead of "secure" freedom of conscience.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

December 21, 1978

Dear Mr. Bagration:

Thank you for your letter of December 6 concerning the plight of Baptists, Pentecostals and Orthodox Christians in the Soviet Union. I share your concern at the Soviet Government's refusal to issue foreign travel passports to those seeking to leave the USSR. I am also disturbed by reports of harassment and mistreatment of those wishing to emigrate.

I think your idea of a working meeting involving those within the government and those within the private sector concerned with this problem is a good one. I also have discussed it with the European Bureau in the Department. I would propose some mutually agreeable date in mid-January. I suggest that you contact Mr. Charles Salmon (632-3088) of my office about setting up the meeting.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Patricia M. Derian
Assistant Secretary for
Human Rights and
Humanitarian Affairs

Mr. Teymuraz K. Bagration,
Executive Secretary,
Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.,
250 West 57th Street,
New York, New York.

Cable Address: TOLFUND, New York

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.
250 West 57th Street, New York, N. Y. 10019
Telephone (212) 247-2922

SUMMARY OF APPEALS FROM SOVIET CHRISTIANS

The Tolstoy Foundation received copies of appeals, addressed to World leaders and friends, from Soviet Christians, asking help in emigrating from the U.S.S.R.

No. 1 - 30 October 1978 - To President Jimmy Carter from Pentecostals and Baptists.

No. 2 - 30 October 1978 - To Alexandra Tolstoy (daughter of Leo Tolstoy) from Evangelical Pentecostals and Baptists in the Soviet Union.

No. 3 - 30 October 1978 - To Pentecostals and Baptists of the United States of America, Canada, Argentina, Great Britain, France, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Holland, Norway, Finland and Australia.

No. 4 - Undated list of data on arrests and procedure of refusals for exit permits from the U.S.S.R. (Nahodka).

- Translation from Russian original to the delegates of the Belgrade Conference from Pentecostals and Baptists.

- Statement of Mr. Eugene Bresenden on persecution of Pentecostals.

The Tolstoy Foundation also received lists of applicants for emigration, sent at various times to the West. Evangelism to Communist Lands has computerized some 20,000 names with addresses, eliminating duplication. We are certain that 803 people are sponsored by 151 Americans. There may certainly be an additional number, of which we are not aware.

March 1979
mg

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION CENTER • VALLEY COTTAGE, N. Y. 10989 • Telephone (914) CO 8-6140

Contributions are deductible to the full extent provided by law and will be acknowledged

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

No. 1

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN ORIGINAL

SALIENT FEATURES

Letter
DATED October 30, 1978

To: Mr. Jimmy Carter, President of the United States of America

From: Pentecostals and Baptists trying to emigrate from the U.S.S.R.

Mr. President!

We are praying for you, as we are praying for all the Soviet authorities, so that there may be peace between the United States and the Soviet Union. If God will help us, with prayer and deed we will work towards emigrating from this country.

We would like to leave the U.S.S.R. for the sake of peace and God, a peace we know we will be able to achieve.

Mr. President! Your voice for Human Rights is a titanic burst of the nobility of your soul and spirit. We know that this is all the result of your christian/motivation. You are a decon in the Church, therefore not only a President, but the servant of God. Please help us achieve our hopes, using your Christian and diplomatic talents, during the upcoming meeting with L. Brezhnev.

Our goal is to leave the Soviet Union. This idea was born as a result of a Pilgrim's journey to the Promised Land.

On August 25 we renounced our citizenship, about which fact we have informed the Soviet authorities twice, as well as the U.N. and the leaders of the 35 countries which signed the Helsinki Accords.

Please understand our situation and help us. The Soviet authorities are displeased with our aim.

According to the statutes of the United Nations, the Declaration of Human Rights and the Soviet Constitution itself, we are Free People. That is why your assistance in our leaving the country will not be an interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union, but only into our affairs, upon our request.

"Vyzovs" have been mailed to all of us from your country. Much to our avail, however, only a few received them. The others have not been released to us. But the question is not the "vyzovs", since if it was for

cont.-

them, those who received them would have left a long time ago. However, no one has left to date, neither through "vyzovs" nor without them. Therefore there is need for a mutual agreement, and this is what we are asking of you.

God Bless You and the years of your Presidency...

Amen.

With Respect to You,

Christians trying to emigrate
from the U.S.S.R.

Hand written note: List of signatures given separately

Prepared by: Alla G. Ivask
Assistant Director
Dept. of Immigration and Resettlement

February 25, 1979

AI/mg

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

No. 2

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN ORIGINAL

SALIENT FEATURES

Letter

To: Alexandra Lvovna Tolstoy

From: Evangelical Pentecostals and Baptists in the Soviet Union

Dear Alexandra Lvovna:

God Bless you to live for a very long time. Last year, we approached you and your organization regarding a loan for our immigration to the West. You answered our appeal and we heard your interview on the radio. We thank you heartily for this. Our problem is not financial, the authorities categorically refused us exit permits. Due to this, on August 25, 1978, we renounced our citizenship. We are asking you to influence the Soviet authorities, who signed laws on Human Rights, but do not adhere to them.

For almost two years, we have been requesting to immigrate to the West, but have not been able to leave. You are also an immigrant, is it possible that you were also held in your time, as we are now? Please inform us how we can receive financial assistance from you and your Foundation in order to pay for the necessary processing of documents needed for emigrating.

Once again, God Bless You...

October 30, 1978

Handwritten note: List of signatures given separately.

Prepared by: Alla G. Ivask
Assistant Director
Dept. of Immigration and Resettlement

February 25, 1979

AI/mg

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

No. 3

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN ORIGINAL

SALIENT FEATURES

Letter

To: Pentecostals and Baptists of the United States of America, Canada
Argentina, Great Britain, France, Denmark, Belgium, Sweden, Holland
Norway, Finland and Australia

From: Pentecostals and Baptists trying to emigrate from the U.S.S.R.

Our Beloved Brothers and Sisters in Christ!

You must be well aware of the fact that we are trying to leave our atheistic country. Despite the fact that laws exist, we still have not been able to emigrate.

We need your help, dear brothers and sisters in Christ. First, we need your communities to understand that we need your help in trying to emigrate, and secondly, we need some financial assistance for our move. Of the thousands who have submitted their applications to leave the country, only very few have the means to do that.

Our goal is to peacefully leave the U.S.S.R., burying the past and all that we have endured. On August the 25th and September 30th, we officially renounced our citizenship. We all have large families and many small children. We are asking you to join us in our prayers...

We are Christians. We are awaiting your help in the name of Christ...

Basing ourselves on historical documents, such as the Statutes of the U.N., the Declaration of Human Rights, which are recognised by your countries as well as the U.S.S.R., we are approaching you for help...

We are awaiting your reply...

October 30, 1978

Handwritten note: List of signatures given separately.

Prepared by: Alla G. Ivask
Assistant Director
Dept. of Immigration and Resettlement

February 25, 1979

AI/mg

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION. INC. No. 4

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN ORIGINAL

December 23, 1977 - Mikhail Yurkov arrested.
Has not been charged to date.
During the search prior to his arrest, his wife and three children were thrown out into the cold and 870 rubles (the families savings) were stolen.

Many years of persecution, forced 10,000 people to submit their names for emigration from the Soviet Union. These people are now being harassed by the Soviet authorities.

Subject to being arrested at present are the following:

Boris Perchatkin
Vladimir Stepanov - both from Nakhodka

They will be arrested for attempting to enter the American Embassy, in order to validate their American "vyzovs".

January 5, 1978 - Victor Vasiliev, from Vilnius, Lithuanian S.S.R., and his family were evicted from their apartment. They have no housing. They have been attempting to emigrate from the U.S.S.R. for 2 years. They have received a "vyzov" from the U.S., but the authorities will not release the "vyzov" to them.

Since 1956, V.I. Gorelkin, from the city of Tan, Estonian S.S.R., a presbyter of a Pentecostal community, has been attempting to immigrate to Australia, where two of his sisters and one brother reside. Six of his "vyzovs" have been refused. After submitting the seventh, the authorities stated that if he will work with them, betraying the organizers of the movement to emigrate, they will allow him to reunite with his family in Australia. This statement was made on December 6, 1977. He has been threatened since. More than likely, he will be eliminated in an automobile accident.

Automobile accidents have been the most recent method of persecuting Pentecostals.

Nikolai Petrovich Goretoi is under an extreme threat of persecution. He is the presbyter of a Pentecostal community in Staro-Titorovsk, Region of Krasnodarsk. He was sent 11 "vyzovs".Soviet authorities only released one to him. He began the necessary process for emigration from the U.S.S.R., but after three months, the authorities refused him an exit permit.

AI/mg

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN
OF APPEAL OF SOVIET CHRISTIANS TO THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE

TO THE DELEGATES OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE
FROM PENTECOSTALS AND BAPTISTS

Translation From Russian Original
Prepared by: Alla G. Ivask

Desiring to emigrate from the USSR, due to unbarable living conditions and unceasing persecution, we approached the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Brezhnev, as well as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Soviet of Ministers five times, however, to this date received no answer. The number of persons who have submitted petitions for emigration at present total 3,000, of which approximately 2,000 are adults and the remainder children.

The government of this country has not suceeded to any of our requests on this matter, despite the fact that we have been awaiting permission to leave the USSR since February of this year. Some of us have been petitioning to emigrate for 6, 10, up to 15 years, but have gone nowhere. The "vyzovs" which were sent to us from abroad, in the past, were torn up by OVIR. Some of us recently received "vyzovs" from thr U.S., but it is far from the total "vyzovs" which we know were sent. Christiar living in Krasnodarsk and in the Northern Caucasus as well as other provinces have not received a single "vyzov" although they have been sent. Only one "vyzov" arrived to the Transcaucasus, the city of Batumi, even though close to 100 persons are awaiting permission to leave. We know that those who have received invitations will not leave too soon, if at all, and they are fully aware of what type of procedures and sifting they must experience, whatever the outcome.

Since all 3,000 of us are expressing the desire to leave the USSR for religious reasons, and not as family reunion cases, we ask you, the government of the USSR to give us permission to exit, without "vyzovs", after all we are not slaves or serfs, or prisoners. We ask that this matter be discussed at the Belgrade conference, so that by the October session of this conference, the Soviet authorities would give us permission to leave prior to the beginning of the session. We have large families, and would like to leave before the winter months begin.

Aside from this we are begging you to put the Soviet Government to shame, for they are demanding from each person, who is emigrating from the Soviet Union, 500 rubles for turning in their passports. We declare this practice by the government to be unjust. In addition, we have paid for our citizenship and our slavery

100 times over, just by working for Soviet companies and industries. We are slaves, there is no other country where they pay workers less than in the Soviet Union.

We have large families, up to 5,10, even 15 children. In such cases the mother cannot work, therefore there is only one bread winner in the family until the children reach an employable age. It is dubious what type of a plush life a family of 15-17 can lead when the provider receives a monthly salary of 80, at the most 100 rubles.

This is a half hungry existance, yet we bare it, and continue to do so. How can we save any money? But then what about the years of imprisonment, disappointments, years of the destruction of our families, years of unbarable tragedies. And now, when we finally want to rid ourselves of the guardianship of the Soviet government, they demand us to pay 500 rubles for an exit permit and an additional 500 rubles for turning in our passports. This totals 1000 rubles per adult person, per family. What therefore does this mean? This is a method by which they attempt to retain us poor christians, without any future.

"Help us, mister delegates!" Please make your statements and protests known to the Soviet authorities, because they do not answer our inquiries. And if possible, reach an agreement amongst your representatives and redeem us from our slavery. We will pay you back, double, even triple the amount, thanking God for your generosity and grace to us.

With much respect to you,

Signed: Christians-Pentecostals and Baptists

12/9/77
AI/mg

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

STATEMENT OF EUGENE BRESENDEN ON PERSECUTION OF PENTECOSTALS

Prepared by A. Ivask

SALIENT FEATURES: REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF PENTECOSTALS RESIDING IN THE U.S.S.R.

Received on October 31, 1978

The Russian original was compiled by Eugene Bresenden, a Pentecostal who recently immigrated to the United States through the auspices of the Tolstoy Foundation, on an Israeli "vyzov" (invitation).

This document is a compilation of materials which both Mr. Bresenden and the Tolstoy Foundation has received. Certain facts are based on Mr. Bresenden's personal experience, while he was living in Nakhodka, U.S.S.R.

Due to the length of the original, the attached English version is basically a summary of the original's salient features and a very loose translation.

In the original, certain articles of the Soviet Constitution, to which the author referred, were paraphrased by him in his own words. The English summary quotes each article in its entirety, directly from the Soviet Constitution.

SALIENT FEATURES

Pentecostals first appeared in Russia in the beginning of the 20th C., mainly in Western and Central Ukraine. The actual and real spread of this religious movement occured in 1924, when an American preacher from the United States, Ivan Yefimovich Voronaev, came to Russia.

In 1928, Voronaev was arrested and met his death in prison, when guard dogs tore him to pieces during his daily walk in the courtyard. Arrests began of other religious leaders, preachers and civilians. The Pentecostal magazine was banned and general persecution of Pentecostals began. Large arrests were made particularly in 1937, 1939, 1946, 1949, 1953 and 1961, concentrating on presbyters, deacons and preachers who did not agree to conditions put before them by the atheists.

In 1946, an attempt on the part of the Soviet authorities was made to form a Union of Baptists and Pentecostals. However, this Union was not planned to look out for the interests of the Believers, but on the contrary, was to employ those in the Union, to the benefit of the atheistic government. The majority of the leaders of the Pentecostals who were tricked into joining this Union, quickly understood what awaited them and withdrew from this Union with their parishioners. This group numbered 170,000. Only some 30,000 remained in this Union. Those leaders who withdrew their membership from the Union were immediately arrested and imprisoned.

The situation of the Pentecostals in the Soviet Union who do not belong to the Union, now called "Ye.Kh.B.", is extremely difficult. These Pentecostals are not permitted to form their own Union. For the least amount of doubt that a group is forming a Union, they are imprisoned, be it truth or just a suspicion. They are charged with various felonies, for example, those arrested were: I. Fedotov (from the ciyy of Kaluga) and Belykh and Levchuk; all now exhiled. Also, Vaschenko (city of Nakhodka) and Bedash (city of Piatikhatka) are now under house arrest.

Salient features cont'd.

In the U.S.S.R., there are no Houses of Worship for the Pentecostals. Therefore they must meet in private homes. They are liable to be fined and brought to court for every such meeting. The Pentecostal sect is officially banned. Pentecostals are denied not only religious rights, but civil rights:

1. Right to work
2. Right to rest and leisure
3. Right to education
4. Freedom of conscience
5. Permission to raise children in religion
6. Right to correspond and privacy of correspondence
7. Loss of right to legal defense

Bearing in mind the above, the activities of P. Shatrov, (who is officially sanctioned by the KGB) during his travels in the U.S.S.R. and abroad are dubious. He deceives everyone. Proof of this lies in the fact that thousands of religious leaders are in prisons and in camps, from Lithuania all the way to the Far East.

The circumstances of the Pentecostals in the U.S.S.R. can be compared to the life of the Jews in Egypt. These circumstances brought to the minds of Pentecostals the thought to emigrate from the Soviet Union, just as the Jews in Egypt. The situation of the Pentecostals has been brought to the attention of all possible official organs of the Soviet Union, however, they do not answer. Such polemics have been going on since the 16th of March, 1973.

I, Eugene Bresenden, am officially authorized by the Pentecostal communities in the Soviet Union to ask the population of the World to intervene on the behalf of the Believers in the Soviet Union, which is in full accordance with what the Soviet Union promised at the Helsinki Hearings in the Helsinki Accords. The Soviet Union promised to ensure Human Rights. Either the government of the Seviet Union ensures religious freedom to the Believers or permits the Believers to emigrate to any non-communist country.

Absence of the right to work

According to the Soviet Constitution, Article 60:

> "It is the duty of, and a matter of honour, for every able-bodied citizen of the U.S.S.R. to work conscientiously in his chosen, socially useful occupation, and strictly to observe labour discipline. Evasion of socially useful work is incompatible with the principles of socialist society."[1]

Pentecostals, nonetheless, are not given equal rights in terms of employment. Although a regular work day is considered to be 8 hours, and the official minimum wage per month amounts to 50 rubles, most Believers earn between 8 and 20 rubles monthly. Due to the fact that Believers have large families, they must work on two jobs, otherwise they would starve to death. Similarly, active leaders of the Pentecostal communities are forced to leave work, therefore placing their families in an even worse position, often having no income. In view of the fact that Believers are barred from educational institutions, none of them have any particular qualifications and are always employed on "blue collar" jobs, many involving hard physical labour.

According to Article 40 of the Soviet Constitution:

> "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to work (that is, to guaranteed employeent and pay in accordance with the quantity of their work and not below the state-established minimum), including the right to choose their trade or profession, type of job and work in accordance with their inclinations, abilities, training and education, with due account of the needs of society.
>
> This right is ensured by the socialist economic system, steady growth of the productive forces, free vocational and professional training, improvement of skills, training in new trades or professions, and developement of the system of vocational guidance and job placement."[2]

Absence of the right to education

According to the Soviet Constitution, Article 45:

> "Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to education. This right is ensured by free provision of all forms of education, by the institution of universal compulsory secondary education, and broad developement of vocational, specialized secondary and higher education, in which instruction is oriented toward practical activity and production; by the developement of extramural, correspondence and evening courses;

by the provision of state scholarships and grants and privileges for students; by the free issue of school textbooks; by the opportunity to attend a school where teaching is in the native language; and by the provision of facilities for self-education."[3]

Even if the situation be that a Believer is permitted to enter the University, he is told that the profession he has chosen, in the end, will make him an educator; educators with religious beliefs are not needed. Aside from this, one of the prerequisites in the program of a University is the subject "Scientific Atheism.: Those who do not excel in subjects of this nature, despite the fact that it is not their major, are failed.

Those who began believing only after they received a university degree,and had already a lucrative position in the business world, the moment they became Christians lost their positions and were forced into poverty.

Pentecostals are permitted to attend grammar school because primary education is absolutely compulsory in the USSR.

The right to teach religion privately does not exist. If parents attempt to teach religion to their children, their children are taken away from them and are placed in special homes run by the State.

Absence of the right to rest

According to the Soviet Constitution, Article 41:

> "Citizens of the USSR have the right to rest and leisure. This right is ensured by the establishment of a working week not exceeding 41 hours, for workers and other employees, a shorter working day in a number of trades and industries, and shorter hours for night work; by the provision of paid annual holidays, weekly days of rest, extension of the network of cultural, educational and health building institutions, and the development on a mass scale of sport, physical culture and camping and tourism; by the provision of neighbourhood recreational facilities, and of other opportunities for rational use of free time.
>
> The length of collective farmers' working and leisure time is established by their collective farms."[4]

The Pentecostals cannot possibly save for a vacation, as their minimal earnings barely cover basic needs. They also are not eligible to obtain vacation permits because they are not members of Unions. Christain faith is incompatible with the atheist ideology of the unions. Union membership cards clearly state: "The Unions are the school of Communism." Moreover, the Pentecostals are continually fined for prayer meetings which exhausts their small savings.

Absence of freedom of conscience

According to the Soviet Constitution, Article 52:

> "Citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of conscience, that is, the right to profess or not to profess any religion, and to conduct religious worship or atheistic propaganda. Incitement of hostility or hatred on religious grounds is prohibited.
>
> In the USSR, the church is separated from the State, and the school from the church."5

Pentecostals are not permitted to observe Evangelical commandments, nor to practice charity towards each other. But when our leaders are imprisoned, how can we not help them? Often parents of eight to ten children are fired from work or imprisoned; how can we not help them?

Believers are not permitted to attend religious gatherings, nor to bring their children to these gatherings. They are not permitted to organize musical societies, literary clubs, prayer circles, Bible study circles, children's gatherings and other similar activities.

Prohibition of raising children in the spirit of religion

There is a commandment in the Gospel that all children of Christians must be raised in the Name of God. Therefore, all Believers must raise their children in the spirit of religion. This is absolutely forbidden in the USSR. The Soviets preach that children must reach adulthood and then decide what beliefs they wish to accept. But the Soviets themselves do not actually wait for their children to reach adulthood; they begin preaching atheism to them almost from birth. To ensure that children will not be raised in the spirit of religion, the State takes the children away from the parents. They are placed in special State-run homes, in order to bring them up as atheists. And so it is out of concern for their children that the Pentecostals have decided to pursue the idea of emigrating.

Right to correspond and the privacy of correspondence

According to the Soviet Constitution, Article 56:

> "The privacy of citizens, and their correspondence, telephone conversations, and telegraphic communications is protected by law."[6]

Believers in the Soviet Union are not permitted to write letters to their Brothers in Christ abroad. If they write about their sufferings, they must send these letters in an illegal manner.

Loss of the right to legal defense

According to the Soviet Constitution, Article 57:

> "Respect for the individual and protection of the rights and freedoms of citizens are the duty of all state bodies, public organizations, and officials.
>
> Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the right to protection by the courts against encroachments on their honour and reputation, life and health, and personal freedom and property."[7]

In the U.S.S.R., there are no lawyers who are Believers and who would be capable of protecting the rights of Believers. To have a lawyer from the West defend the Pentecostals is virtually impossible, although it was done once, in the case of Georgi Vins. But is it possible that Soviet judiciary might independently decide the constitutional issue of freedom of conscience (as in the case of Vins) without legal defense? All know the answer - it has not happened. Vins was condemned, just like thousands of lesser-known Believers.

The Soviet Press prints outright lies about Believers. With the knowledge of the authorities, Believers are beaten; they are fined for religious gatherings but the law has never defended them. Believers are subjected to discrimination, but the law never reached out to protect them, neither in the official press, nor in court.

FOOTNOTES

1) Constitution (Fundamental Law) Of The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics, Adopted at the Seventh (Special) Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Ninth Convocation on October 7, 1977, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1977, page 50.

2) Ibid., p. 41

3) Ibid., p. 44

4) Ibid., p. 41

5) Ibid., p. 47

6) ibid., p. 48

7) Ibid., p. 41

TRANSLATION FROM RUSSIAN ORIGINAL OF LETTER SENT FROM NAHODKA, PRIMORSKII REGION, USSR

TO: ALEXANDRA LVOVNA TOLSTOY, DAUGHTER OF LEO NIKOLAYEVICH TOLSTOY, FROM CHRISTIAN MOTHERS OF THE EVANGELICAL PENTECOSTAL AND BAPTIST CHURCHES, EMIGRATING FROM THE USSR.

OPEN LETTER - APPEAL

Our Esteemed and dearest Alexandra Lvovna !

We have already appealed to you through our Bishop/Presbyter (these titles are of equal meaning to us, as it is written in the Gospel), Nikolai Petrovich Goretoi, Feodor Akimovich Sidenko (a member of our Church) and Lydia Voronina, now living in your Country of Freedom.

We appealed to you, that you, through God's mercy, open-handedly for God and your deceased parent, would give us, Christians, emigrating from the USSR, a financial loan to realize our departure.

Most Christians, especially those whose family members are under strict surveillance by the authorities, with all rights denied, or former prisoners (arrested for religious beliefs) have no monetary resources. With happiness we listened to your answer, during your interview with "Voice of America". At that time you had statedthat all those believers without any financial resources can approach the Tolstoy Foundation and participating Churches on this matter. We certainly do not need anything "gratis" - our families are full of strong young sons and daughters who, working in a new country of residence, God willing, will be capable of compensating your temporary loss with legal interest and heartfelt gratitude for such generosity and charity, so that others can make use of it.

But, Alexandra Lvovna (our esteemed and dearest sister in God - we cannot address you in any other way - because of your God-abiding generosity and humanitarian attitude), we do not know how to gain access to the funds from your Foundation ! Where should we go and how can we receive them ? Please bear in mind that many of us are so poor that we have no means of submitting our documents to receive visas.

The Soviet government is such that each city is governed by different laws. For instance, Christians living in Nahodka were told by the authorities of the Primorskii Krai - "The cost of the processing of documents of those immigrating to Israel will be greater; the fee for renunciation of one's citizenship will be 500 rubles and an additional 300 rubles for other administrative costs. The reason for this is that the USSR has neither diplomatic relations with Israel not an Embassy. The renunciation of citizenship for those immigrating to the USA, Canada or Australia will cost 270 rubles and 30 rubles for administrative costs. The cost of transportation is not included."

But here is a second version which confuses us Christians. Our co-religionists living in the city and region of Zaporojie were told by the authorities from OVIR: "You will need a sack of money to leave the USSR. If you do not have this money, the government has no intention to subsidize your departure financially".

Furthermore, the Director of that particular OVIR office told the Christian Pentecostals Nikolai Gordievski (father and seven children) and Ivan Gerasimchuk (father and nine children):

1. Renunciation of citizenship is a must, not only for adults but also for children, at a rate of 500 rubles per person.
2. State imposition tax runs at 300 rubles, and transportation to the USA is 400 rubles. The cost of transportation for children depends upon their age; it ranges from 200 rubles and up.

These calculations produced by the director of that local OVIR clearly prove that the family Gerasimchuk would literally need a sack of money: 9 children, 2 adults, total 11 persons, therefore, 12,000 rubles, a sum they have never dreamt of.

Such an amount would not worry us if we were not living in the USSR. Here the prices for consumer goods are so "stable" that they are rising continuously, yet the average income for a "blue collar" worker is only 100 rubles per month. Considering the fact that the average income in the US ranges from 500 to 800 dollars per month and the dollar buys three to five times more than our ruble (we are familiar with the prices of your merchandise and produce) such figures as mentioned by the director of OVIR would not be frightening.

In one word, dear Alexandra Lvovna, you are, in your serene age, a mother to us all, to some, even a great-grandmother. We are asking either you or your assistants to speak over the radio "Voice of America" once again to explain to those emigrating -whom can we approach, which Embassy or bank in the USSR - authorized by you to make financial loan arrangements for all those who wish to leave ?

Aside from this, Alexandra Lvovna, we are asking you to write a letter to our government so that it would instruct its State OVIR offices to minimize and stabilize the sums for:

1. Renunciation of citizenship
2. State imposition tax
3. Transportation

with an exact explanation as to what is needed for children of various ages as well as adults.

We believe that the greatness of your Father is comparable to your venerable age which will influence the authorities and they will abolish all their foolish methods of trying to keep us in captivity and will also lower all of these cosmic prices which no American has to pay when leaving the USA or Canada or any Latin American country. We are also asking you, Alexandra Lvovna, to write a letter to our government to let us emigrate not by means of "vyzovs" from abroad but simply through claims to OVIR as it is done in your country and in all of Western Europe for the period of 300 years. Grant us this favor and fulfill our requests, Alexandra Lvovna!

Remember that such charity, especially so great, is valued immensely by our God and those people who honor Him.

AI:hy

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

ABSTRACT

Introduction -

This is an abstract of a document, in Russian, received from Soviet Christians in Russia. In the original, a large part of the text refers to the Gospel. This summary contains only salient features, paraphrased into English.

Prepared by Alla G. Ivask (Mrs.) - Assistant Director
Department of Immigration and Resettlement

TO: Christians of all free countries of the World

Pope John-Paul II
Catholic Cardinals and Bishops
Patriarch of the Greek Orthodox Church and all Orthodox Bishops
World Council of Churches
Christian Unions of the Free World

Governments of Christian Countries

U.S.A., Canada, Agentina, Australia, France, Great Britain, Northern Ireland, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Luxemburg, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Holland, Greece, Republic of Cyprus, Norway, Sweden, Spain, Portugal.

FROM: Christians of Evangelical Faith, Pentecostals, Baptists, Orthodox, Lutherans and other Believers, applying to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet in the U.S.S.R. for permission to emigrate.

Due to the fact that we do not wish to bow to their stern devil (Lenin), we are sent to concentration camps where countless millions of Believers have already died. For many years, 60 years, echo the cries of poor orphans and widows to the alter of the Almighty God and also the blood of killed and tortured Abels.

People, who have not sinned in front of the government, but on the contrary lived in faith and good will, are being harassed by Soviet Jimmy Jones.

However, the Sakharov group are good Samaritans, they realized our predicament and out of humanitarian feelings began helping us.

We are appealing to you to help us. In the World there exists the United Nations and the Declaration of Human Rights, and now a Helsinki Agreement. These documents were signed by countries, which are members of the United Nations, including the U.S.S.R.

But your governments are adhering to these laws, while the Soviet government is not. According to International Declarations and Pacts about Human Rights, we should be permitted to emigrate. Please, then help us.

The 25 of August 1978, many of us renounced our Soviet Citizenship and demanded the right to leave. However, the incidious authorities of the U.S.S.R., during the November sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., made a resolution not to recognize a voluntary renouncement of Soviet citizenship, but to acknowledge a stateless status of a person only when They rule him/her to be stateless e.g. Peter Grigorenko, Rastrapovich and wife etc. Therefore, those whose renouncements of citizenship they refuse to acknowledge, remain slaves. We are asking all Fathers of the Church, all Christians and rulers of Christian communities to consider these facts.

Israel is freeing the Jews, Germany - Germans. You free us, Believers, disregarding our nationality. Over 20,000 Believers, children and adults, applied for emigration - they are awaiting your help. Tens of thousands, who at present are indecisive, are nonetheless similarly inclined.

Signed - 70 persons

Dec. 15, 1978

AI/mg

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Moscow, USSR

January 9, 1979

Mr. Teymuraz K. Bagration
Executive Secretary
Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.
250 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10019

Dear Mr. Bagration:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of your organization's memorandum on the emigration of Soviet Baptists and Pentecostalists from the USSR to the United States. My colleagues and I at the Embassy found it very interesting..

The Consular Section receives a large number of letters and appeals from Soviet Christians seeking help in emigrating from the Soviet Union. I am forwarding for your information a letter I recently received from a family living in Moldavia.

The Embassy has raised the issue of the emigration of Pentecostalists, as well as specific cases of Soviet Christians who have been denied exit permission. Rest assured that the Embassy will remain vitally interested in this critical issue.

If I can be of any further assistance to the Tolstoy Foundation, please do not hesitate to contact me again.

Sincerely,

Robert W Pringle

Robert W. Pringle
Vice Consul

Encl: a/s

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

Translation from Russian Handwritten Original 1/29/79

To: The President of the United States of America
Mr. Jimmy Carter

From: A Citizen of the Ukranian S.S.R.
Nazarevich Feofan, son of Anton
born 1939
residing in - U.S.S.R.
- City of Lutsk
- Gordiuk Street 4A, Apt. 12

A REQUEST

I ask you, Mr. President, to intervene on my behalf before the Congress of the United States and the United Nations, as well as the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., to hasten my and my family's immigration to the U.S. from the U.S.S.R.

My situation is such, that my father was brutally killed on Dec. 5, 1945 without a trial or investigation. Following his death, an accusation of the following nature was fabricated: Nazarevich Anton, son of Andre, was an active member of O.U.N., was killed during a struggle against the Soviet power and while attacking an employee of the N.K.V.D. However, our repeated demands addressed to I.V. Stalin to have an autopsy performed, went unmet.

In 1947, during the month of December, at 4:00 a.m., having been allowed only 20 minutes for packing, we, with 6 young children and our mother, were sent into exile to the Urals, in a freight train. Here, we were doomed for death from hunger and cold, since we were placed in abandoned barracks with no heating. It was due to the heroic courage of my mother, that we were able to stay alive.

At 12 years of age, I began doing physical labor, beyond my strength, but this actually was just the beginning of the humiliations which I endured during 27 years of my labor service. Still then, in 1951, I did not understand that a secret ban was imposed on my choice of a profession, and that I was forever deprived of my homeland and basic human rights.

During my labor service, I persistently tried to achieve exoneration. I was always told, that I am not responsible for my father's crimes, nonetheless, why was I exiled at the age of 8, losing all of my inheritance?

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

To: The President of the United States of America
Mr. Jimmy Carter

From: A Citizen of the Ukranian S.S.R.
Nazarevich Feofan, son of Anton
Born 1939

cont.-

In 1955, I was released, but with no right to return to my homeland. I was also forbidden to choose a profession.

At present, the new constitution confirmed these flaws. On the basis of article #39, I am legally deprived of my homeland, and all rights stated in this constitution; the same applies to my children.

I had to change my convictions, and I became a Believer, a Pentecostal. But even here the authorities did not forget me. In the form of an order they asked me to register. I refused to register and in 1977, submitted an application for emigration from the U.S.S.R. I was denied the permission, on the grounds that I had no "vyzov".

It is of ill omen to continue residing in the U.S.S.R., according to article # 39 of the constitution.

The make-up of my family is as follows:

Mother - Taranova, Olga
daughter of Axentiev
born 1910

Wife - Nazarevich, Valentina
daughter of Daniel
born 1940

Son - Nazarevich, Yuri
born 1960

Daughter- Nazarevich, Larissa
born 1971

Signed
12/10/78
F. Nazarevich

P.S.- My brother and his family have also expressed the desire to immigrate with me:

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

To: The President of the United States of America
Mr. Jimmy Carter

From: A Citizen of the Ukrahian S.S.R.
Nazarevich Feofan, son of Anton

cont.-

Nazarevich, Anton
son of Anton
born 1945
residing in the city of Lutsk
Zankovetskaya Street 14/2

He was also denied permission to leave due to no "vyzov".

Translated by: Alla G. Ivask
Assistant Director
Department of Immigration and
Resettlement

1/29/79
AI/mg

BENTLY T. ELLIOTT
2310 Windsor Road
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

May 15, 1979

Mr. Walter Hoving
Chairman of the Board
Tiffany & Co.
727 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr. Hoving:

Although we have never met, I have often heard my brother Frank praise your exceptional contributions to the Christian community. I understand Frank has already alerted you that I would be writing, and perhaps you will remember his letter on my behalf.

As you will see from the enclosed, I am trying to assist the Tolstoy Foundation in organizing a national campaign in support of Russian Christians, many of whom are suffering horrible persecution. The United States government is certainly aware of this problem, but it acts more embarrassed by it than genuinely concerned.

I know that you are a very busy man, but if our effort is to succeed, we badly need the leadership of individuals like yourself to inform the public and encourage it to get involved. Is there a chance you might have any interest or free time for such a challenge? If there is, and that would be fantastic, please contact Alla Ivask at your earliest convenience at the Tolstoy Foundation. Alla has been working on this problem for an extended period and she is extremely dedicated and well-informed. Obviously I'd like to hear from you as well.

I also wanted to alert you to one additional possibility -- you might be receiving a call from George Otis, Jr. Perhaps you know his father, George, Sr., who is a retired businessman, a pilot, and a most respected and dynamic Christian who authored The Blueprint, hosted the television program "High Adventure," and who also works tirelessly on many other fronts. George, Jr. is training a contingent of volunteers to witness for Christ during the upcoming Moscow Olympics. I know that he would value the opportunity of speaking with someone with your wisdom and experience, and I can attest that he is in all ways honorable and responsible.

Thank you very much for anything you could do to help. I would, of course, understand perfectly if you are already too heavily engaged to make any commitment.

Sincerely,

Bently T. Elliott

BENTLY T. ELLIOTT
2310 Windsor Road
Alexandria, Virginia 22307

May 15, 1979

Dear Friend:

For years, millions of Americans have worked together to relieve suffering and secure the emigration of an untold number of Russian Jews. And while that campaign has obviously not been a total success, and must be both sustained and intensified, it has produced results -- during 1979, a projected 50,000 Jewish dissidents will be permitted to leave the Soviet Union.

Yet for all the good work done on behalf of Russian Jews, no such campaign has ever been waged on behalf of Russian Christians. That is tragic, for their suffering has been equally great, and their needs remain equally desperate.

Orthodox Christians, Baptists, Lutherans, Pentacostals and countless other Christians belonging to unregistered Russian churches face widespread persecution of the most horrid sort -- persecution that violates specific guarantees set down in the Russian Constitution, that mocks the spirit of the Helsinki Accords and that contradicts the very essence of a civilized society.

For Christians of conviction, simple but persistent public declarations of faith can provoke harsh retaliation -- public humiliation, followed by social ostracism and, in some cases, torture in the form of starvation diets, druggings, beatings and constant isolation inside concentration camps and so-called "psychiatric hospitals."

American authorities are aware of this problem. They know, for example, that some 20,000 Russian Christians have decided to risk the worst by sending their names to the Supreme Soviet, asking for permission to emigrate. But to date, the attitude of our government has been one of near silence, even passive acquiesence. Letters from Russian Christians to the White House pleading for help have not been answered. The State Department promised the Tolstoy Foundation to look into the problem in view of possibly taking official action. That promise has not materialized.

That leaves the American people. They can make a difference. Perhaps, only they can make a difference. What is urgently needed is a massive outpouring of public indignation from millions of Americans . . . a campaign in which Americans from all walks of life join together to condemn these atrocities, demand a halt to the persecution, and the release of those who want to leave the Soviet Union.

This must be a campaign from the grassroots, and one that persists until those in Washington and Moscow understand that they dare not ignore the will of the people. But that means a difficult struggle, perhaps years of sacrifice given the inevitable resistance such a campaign is bound to provoke. We must begin now.

Will you make a personal commitment to get involved . . . and to speak with your family, your friends, your church and your community and ask that they get involved? Will you make it a point to communicate to those in Washington that, as the leader of the free world, we can and must do much, much more to stop this persecution of Christians and Jews?

For all needed information on this subject, please write

The Tolstoy Foundation
250 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019

Attn: Alla Ivask

Your support and leadership are urgently needed. Please act now.

With sincere gratitude,

Bently T. Elliott
Bently T. Elliott

BTE/ase

logos

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forum

Russian Pentecostals Want Freedom to Emigrate

by Edmund K. Gravely, Jr.

Tens of thousands of Russian Pentecostals, Baptists and other Christians are desperately trying to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

The remarkable thing about it is that all across the Soviet Union, from Europe to Siberia, from great cities to isolated and widely separated villages, as if by some unseen signal, they have joined together in their clamoring to leave.

More than 20,000 Soviet Christians have gone so far as to put their names on long lists, formally declaring their desire to escape persecution by leaving the country. These lists, secretly passed by hand from region to region until they reach Moscow, have been submitted to Soviet authorities. They include individuals, families, even whole communities of evangelicals who are pressing their faces against the windows of freedom, hoping those on the other side will help them.

It is a daring move without precedent in Soviet history. None others ever dared to put their names on lists, since the Soviet government could use such information to round up Christians and put them in prison.

One Soviet emigrant, a journalist who traveled widely in Russia and had met many of these Christians, reported that by restricting worship, education, housing and job opportunities, the government was "trying to make life about as difficult as it would be in a concentration camp" for Soviet Christians.

Some of the believers, in their desperation, have gone so far as to renounce Russian citizenship in order to escape the jurisdiction of Soviet laws that weigh so heavily on them.

Not all of the 20,000—a few of whom are Orthodox Christians and Seventh-Day Adventists—have been able to apply for exit visas. Most of them lack the required formal invitation, called a *vyzov*, from someone in the country of destination. Without this vyzov, a Russian cannot even apply for emigration.

Some have received invitations, however. In the last two years, the Tolstoy Foundation has helped process vyzovs for more than 800 Baptists, Pentecostals and Orthodox Christians, according to Teymuraz K. Bagration, the organization's executive secretary in New York.

Even so, not one visa has been issued.

The foundation, which helps refugees all over the world to relocate, has become especially involved in the efforts of Russian evangelicals to emigrate. One foundation official, Mrs. Alla Ivask, said that nothing is happening in any Communist country to compare with the flood of letters and appeals coming out of Russia. They have become so numerous that the U.S. State Department, which

Gregori Brodsky, his wife and nine children recently emigrated from USSR via Israel. He was granted permission to leave Russia because he was a Jew. Here he worships with his son in a Russian pentecostal church near his new home in Woodburn, Oregon.

receives most of them, simply puts them in a large envelope and sends them on to the foundation without a covering letter.

What is new is the bold, nationwide movement of believers who are convinced that they must leave their homeland in order to survive physically and spiritually and to pass on their faith to subsequent generations.

Most of those trying to leave are "unregistered" Christians. That is, they do not belong to officially-recognized denominations in the Soviet Union. (Registered religions in Russia include a government-approved Evangelical Christian Baptist Church, the Russian Orthodox, Moslems, Jews, Buddhists and Lutherans.)

In some cases, the government will not allow Christians to register. In other cases, the believers refuse to register because they reject certain government restrictions on their faith.

For instance, it is against the law for a Christian to teach his children about the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Unregistered believers teach their children God's truth no matter what the cost, and the cost has been great.

They cannot have a church building.

They cannot meet in private homes; when they do, they are heavily fined.

Their children are denied education above grammar school level. In school, their children are mocked by teachers and other students; they are sometimes beaten up.

They are given the jobs that pay the least and are denied promotions. They sweep streets and pick up garbage.

Their large families often have to jam together into one or two rooms.

Families are often forced to move from town to town. This disrupts their churches by scattering their members and leaders.

Problems of Christians in Russia—and in other Communist countries—have been known for years through first-hand books and articles. In the last three years, Christian groups have emphasized the need for compliance with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. This guarantees human rights, including freedom of emigration. The Soviet Union was one of the thirty-five signators.

Arkady Polishchuk, former Russian journalist turned dissident, is now writing a book about the plight of Christians in Russia.

A presidential paper on human rights last December reported:

"Religious persecution in the Soviet Union, coupled with restrictive emigration policies, caused a large family of Pentecostalists to seek refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow. They entered the consulate in June and have refused to leave until Soviet authorities grant them permission to emigrate. Several thousand Pentecostalists have applied unsuccessfully to emigrate from the Soviet Union because of religious persecution."

Last summer, however, a wealth of firsthand information came forth in the person of a slender, silver-haired Jewish dissident named Arkady Polishchuk.

Mr. Polishchuk, a 48-year-old former jounalist whose work was published *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, edited the magazine *Asia and Africa Today* before becoming an active dissident in 1973.

His transformation from Party member to dissident, Communist and atheist to believer, came out of his experiences as a reporter.

"During my career as a journalist," he explained, "I read many articles in various newspapers about Baptists and Pentecostals, that they were bad people, that they sacrificed their children. I really believed the articles. I knew my magazine printed lies, but I thought it was just in this particular area and in this particular magazine perhaps because of bad management or because the people above us were bad. But when I started traveling, I realized this was the case all over the country.

"The Pentecostals were the best people I had ever met." This revelation completely changed his life: "I remember a day when I actually felt I was no longer an atheist." This belief in God led to other things.

First, he stopped writing for *Pravda* and *Izvestia*. Then he quit his job as a magazine writer. Finally, he joined the ranks of those he once despised—the dissidents—Jews, Pentecostals, Baptists, Orthodox Christians, Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists. And he, too, applied for permission to leave the country.

Mr. Polishchuk gained credentials as a dissident in October 1976, when he and several dozen other Jewish dissidents staged a sit-in for several days in an administrative building of the Supreme Soviet in Moscow to protest the delay in their emigration visas. Their boldness, he reported to Western journalists at that time, earned himself and about a dozen others eviction from the building and transportation to a forest outside Moscow, where they were beaten.

In the years Mr. Polishchuk was a dissident in Russia—1973 to 1978—world attention centered on the cause of Jewish emigration, and as a result tens of thousands of Russian Jews were allowed to leave.

Mr. Polishchuk, however, spent most of his time traveling around the country, visiting different Christian communities. He helped these groups write their appeals to the government and to the free world. Many of the evangelicals' appeals had been long, sermon-like discourses, in which important facts were hidden. He helped them understand that more people would listen if they included less theology and kept to facts. He monitored trials and took notes (but hid them immediately so that when the police searched him they couldn't confiscate them), always preparing for the time when he would be allowed, once in freedom, to describe what he had seen.

Before he left Russia, evangelical believers asked him to be a kind of ambassador to the free world for them, to describe their plight and to marshall support for their emigration.

He got to know many of those believers personally. Sometimes he visited their homes for several weeks. "My hand was limp at the end of each day from writing all the time," he recalls. They came from all around to tell him what was happening to them.

His apartment in Moscow became a clearing house for information about religious persecution in the Soviet Union. Precious lists of families, carefully passed from faithful courier to faithful courier, reached his hands there. He guarded and collected them until he had hundreds, and then he, or someone else, would make sure they got into the hands of Soviet authorities who had no choice but to receive them. In this way, he and others turned in more than 20,000 names of Russian Christians who are seeking to emigrate.

Christians from all over Russia sought him out. They would bring important information to him and describe the persecutions they faced.

"You're only allowed to have prayer meetings in specially-designated buildings," Mr. Polishchuk explains. "But the believers have to gather in their own homes, because their buildings are being torn down. They are given 50-ruble fines for conducting 'secret religious meetings.'

"These people work very hard. They are given the smallest amount of pay—about 60 rubles a month—and then they are fined. I can give you names of people who got very many fines very quickly. What can they do?

"They are fined for participating in funerals, for participating in weddings. The bridegroom can actually be put in jail for about 15 days for getting married in a religious ceremony," he reports.

"When a person is born to a Pentecostal family, he's already classified as a dissident because he's born to a Christian family."

From his briefcase Polishchuk pulled a stack of hand-written letters from the children of Pentecostals—also part of the cargo he secreted out of the Soviet Union. These are all neatly penned, most of them carrying the picture of a sober-faced young girl or boy.

"Eight, nine, 15-year-old children wrote them in their own handwriting. One girl writes that people stick pins in her sister in school because she is a believer. Her teacher tells other people that Pentecostals sacrifice their children," he relates.

Another letter reads, "In the U.S.S.R., now and before, very many believers are imprisoned. And this means that the same thing is awaiting us."

"Why do I call these children dissidents? A child like this comes to school and refuses to memorize poems about Lenin. They refuse to join the Communist youth organizations because they are atheistic organizations," Mr. Polishchuk said.

"They are beaten in school. Rocks are thrown at them. The child of the minister, Nicholas Goretoi, the head of the Pentecostal church in Krasnodarski, has nine scars on his head.

After the child of an unregistered Pentecostal finishes grammar school, he is labeled as an active Pentecostal who refuses to join the

Stacks of letters written by children (like the one below) were smuggled out of Russia by Arkady Polishchuk. One girl wrote that people "stuck pins in my sister because she is a believer."
Blahoslav Hruby, (inset) editor of "Religion in Communist Dominated Areas."



Дорогие
дяденьки
господа!

Я, Люба Пищенко, учусь в школе.
во 2ом классе, Меня
в пионеры. А я не
что пионеры, там
бог учительницу.
что я верующая. У
А папочка
на наших часто
али плохо в школе, а
ками. В школе нас
смеялись и били

Part of the Peter Vashchenko family have taken refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow. They entered the Embassy in June, 1978. (see related story right.)

Communist youth organization. "That's enough not to get him into any schools," Mr. Polishchuk states. "One boy wanted to go to a trade school, but they didn't even let him go to do that.

"So they sweep the streets and pick up garbage. They have the worst jobs possible—the dirtiest jobs possible."

Now that he is in the United States, Mr. Polishchuk, who gets some support from American and Canadian Christians, is dedicated to writing a book about the plight of Christians in Russia, and he is determined to help them emigrate.

How long will he keep up this campaign? "Probably now for the rest of my life," he answers.

There are a number of organizations in the United States and elsewhere that share his determination, at least in part. Among them are England's Keston College which gathers and publishes information about religious persecution in Communist countries; the Research Center for Religion and Human Rights in Closed Societies, Ltd., in New York City, founded by Blahoslav S. Hruby; Evangelism of Communist Lands, founded by Harlan Popov; Jesus to the Communist World, and others.

Some other American churches also have become quite involved on an individual level. One is the Crescent Hill Presbyterian Church, Selma, Alabama, which has agreed to sponsor the 15 members of the Peter Vashchenko family, five of whom are in the American Embassy in Moscow.

"We're writing, sending telegrams, news releases," said Rev. Cecil Williamson, pastor of this southern evangelical church. "Our congregation has written 5,000 letters over a period of the past six months.

"The Jews seem to have a much better way of getting their people out of Russia than we Christians have," he said. "There just seems to be no organization to help get Christians out of Russia."

There is much that free world Christians can do to help our persecuted brethrens in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries. We can become better informed, taking time to learn the issues and possible approaches to the problem. We can ask our government leaders to help. We can publicize the plight of the Soviet Christians. Most importantly, we can pray for the persecuted church, the imprisoned believers, the Communist leaders, and the individuals and organizations that are trying to help. Our brothers and sisters behind the Iron Curtain need our support. ⊂⊃

Ed Gravely, a frequent contributor to the Logos Journal, works on the National News Desk of *The New York Times*.

The Vaschenkos: Heroes or Rebels?

In June 1978 Peter Vashchenko, his family and some friends, crashed into the American Embassy in Moscow begging for asylum and emigration. It is helpful in understanding this controversy to know that in Russia there are "registered" and "unregistered" churches. That is, some churches have submitted to limitations on their activities in return for a place to meet and official recognition of their existence. It is estimated that half the Baptist and a lesser amount of Pentecostal churches in the U.S.S.R. are registered.

Peter and Argustina Vashchenko were leaders of a 300-member Pentecostal community in southern Siberia. As early as 1963 the Vashenko family clashed with government-recognized Pentecostal leaders, when they staged a demonstration at the American Embassy and charged the Soviet government with denying them "freedom to worship." The underground Pentecostal church, which is not recognized by the Soviet government and has one million adherents, has been seeking government recognition. *The People's Organization of Religion Act of 1929* forced Pentecostals to become a part of the all-union Council of Christian Baptists. State-appointed Pentecostal church officials have complained that provocative and "rebellious acts of dissidence" by its own members put them in bad light with the government.

The fact, however, is that in the last three years more than 20,000 Pentecostals and Baptists have openly called for permission to emigrate in order to escape religious persecution. Does this indicate that the Vaschenkos have become the standard bearers for tens of thousands of Russian Christians?

The Vashchenko case complicates the debate on how to evangelize in communist countries. In the United States, ugly scandals have tainted the image of anti-communist, right-wing fundamentalist organizations. One of the largest and most visible of such organizations reportedly raised millions of dollars and kept ninety per cent of its income for "operations." Fraudulent fund-raising practices have allegedly included fake pictures and manufactured testimonies. A European missionary leader complains that American audiences don't want to be told the truth. "They want stories of torture—they demand it."

What has gone unreported is the gains made by the government-registered church. In the last two years more than fifty new "Pentecostal" churches have been opened in the Ukraine. A second church is being built in Leningrad. Officially it is recognized as a Council of Christian Baptists church, but privately a member of the Council presidium assured us that this church is being built for the burgeoning pentecostal community.

Are the Vashchenkos rebels? Is their action an emberrassment to the state-registered Pentecostals still trying to build rapport with their government? Or are they representative of the estimated one million uhderground and harassed Pentecostals? How much compromise has taken place in order for the "official" Pentecostal church to be recognized? What have the "official" Pentecostal leaders had to do in order to obtain visas and visit the United States? Some ask the question, "Would a true pentecostal believer be allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. and visit America?" These pentecostal visitors insist that there is little persecution of the church. Other reports indicate that underground pentecostals, estimated to be the large majority of Russian pentecostals, are beaten, fired, imprisoned and constantly harassed for their anti-establishment ways. Whom should we believe?

A Russian-appointed Pentecostal leader claims that the Vaschenko problem began prior to the 1963 American Embassy incident. Pentecostal leaders told the Logos Journal they had "excommunicated Vaschenko and his people for holding heretical views. Their views on marriage and divorce had something to do with it," leaders said, adding that there were "other things." Pressed for the "other things," sources said there was much debate on Vaschenko's views about "whether it is right to catch a fish alive or not." Now figure that out!

Some classical Pentecostal leaders in America have accepted the official Pentecostal Church story. They insist that, in their numerous visits to the U.S.S.R., Bibles and believers thrive in an atmosphere of tolerance.

The controversy still is unresolved. Are the Vaschenkos rebels, a dissident family, just causing trouble for everyone?

Probably not. Probably Peter Vaschenko and his little group are only representative of their time. Saddled by Soviet government restrictions, and too liberal for a legalistic Russian Pentecostal church, Peter and others like him are no doubt serious and sincere in their quest for "freedom to worship."

One U.S. Embassy worker in Moscow, in a letter to his family in the United States, wrote:

> Without question, the dominant event in our lives this year has been our experience with the Vaschenko and Chmykhalov families. In our judgment these are the most courageous people we have ever known. Their lives are precious beyond our ability to express. It is virtually not possible to know them without falling in love with them. While they are almost invariably referred to in the Western press as "Pentecostals" we think a better term would simply be believers. Their theology is firmly rooted in the Scriptures, the standard by which they evaluate the words and actions of men and nations, presidents, ambassadors, friends and those who wish them ill. They are exceedingly tolerant of other believers who may hold views at variance from theirs. Always for them the test for truth is Scriptures, the test for love is truth, the test for actions is love.

Heroes or rebels? We will not know for sure unless the Russians let them go. One thing we can be sure of, Peter Vaschenko is gutsy. He and his friends survived a hale of Soviet persecution for years. Once inside the American Embassy they lived for two months in the lobby. The U.S. Government could not legally provide food or care. Embassy officials were struck by the scene of Vaschenko sitting for hours quietly reading his Bible, they began to share their own food and blankets with the dissidents. In September the Vaschenko group were all moved to an apartment in the Embassy.

What do the Pentecostal dissidents want? "Emigration visas," they said. A State Department official stated, "We are negotiating with the Soviet Government in order to resolve this matter in the most humanitarian way possible."

As of this writing the Vaschenko saga continues. They have already stayed in an American Embassy longer than any other defectors, but their case is by no means certain. No citizens or stateside Pentecostal church leaders have petitioned the U.S. Government to give them asylum. The State Department emphatically claims it is only offering "temporary refuge." The international news media is strangely disinterested. The "live in" at the American Embassy in Moscow cannot last much longer. The Vaschenkos may be turned back to Russian police and given a nice rest at one of the UGB's famous mental institutions and the truth about them will keep till the great day of the Lord. Or maybe our born-again President or his pentecostal sister will intervene and give up a few captured Russian spies to gain emigration visas for the dissidents. And who would we be getting for the Russian spies, rebels or heroes? Our suspicion is that if we ever meet them, we will have a priceless look into one of the most courageous and secretive spiritual renewals in modern history.

This article was written from reports filed by Doug Wead, associate editor; Edmund K. Gravely, Jr., of *The New York Times*; and research consultant, Doug Chickie.

Smuggling Bibles—Is it Right or Wrong?



Says this elderly Russian, "I want my grandchildren to appreciate the Bible. . . . It's easy in America to take it for granted."

Brother Andrew, the Dutchman of *God's Smuggler* fame, was uncomfortable with that title because it implied a sinful involvement with breaking the law. In his companion book, called *The Ethics of Smuggling*, he made this statement: "If indeed I am a smuggler, it is to do God's work among God's people with God's supplies and according to God's orders."

Is he right or wrong? Are the many missions that engage couriers to cross Communist borders with large quantities of Bibles, hymnals, concordances, Gospel portions, and Bible studies producing positive results with God's affirmation and scriptural endorsement? Or are they displeasing God by clever, clandestine activities that dishonor God and adversely involve the recipients in countries where the ideology of atheism prevails?

In order to comprehend some of the complexities involved in this important issue, one that more often engages emotional response rather than careful and sensitive analysis, the rationale for both sides of the argument must be understood.

Christians who are opposed to Bible smuggling do so on the following basis:

1) Many righteous people declare that if a government forbids the import of Bibles, then Christians should obey that particular government, be it Chinese, Soviet or Albanian. This position is defended by stating that all Christians are to submit to civil and legal authorities for it is scripturally binding on all followers of Jesus Christ. Romans 13:1 and 2 states, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation."

2) Other Christians reason that the attempt to break Communist laws regarding contraband is not justified by upgrading the contraband. They insist that the "Christian smugglers" are using the Communist ethic, namely that the end justifies the means. One Christian leader stated his opposition to smuggling Christian literature into countries that ban it, on the premise that it was no different from smuggling whiskey or watches. He didn't think Christians had the right "to batter the frontier of anybody else's country."

3) Several Christian articles have reminded smugglers that they must declare all the goods they have upon entry into a Communist country. Not to comply completely is to deceive and to lie.

4) Other Christians are opposed to the publicity given to this activity, such as the publication of *God's Smuggler*, on the grounds that it would be far better had such accounts never been told. It is argued that embarrassed Communist officials initiate retaliatory

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measures, and continued exposure in magazine articles may jeopardize the Christians in those dominated lands. In Bulgaria all the Protestant pastors were pressured by Party officials who lashed out against Haralan Popov for publishing his story of suffering under that regime.

5) One criticism suggests an alternate attempt to spread the gospel, that of engaging in "open" ministries such as radio broadcasting.

6) Another argument places the burden and blame on the smugglers for weakening the position of Bible societies that are negotiating with Communist countries for open shipments of Bibles. They hasten to add that the Bible societies are opposed to these clandestine activities to the point of indignation.

The six points listed above do not exhaust the arguments against smuggling held by many sincere Christian leaders, denominations and laity. Among them are disturbed feelings for the type of imagery that exalts individuals and missions for their smuggling "exploits," and esteems them for "cleverly outwitting border guards" in their passionate pursuit of carrying Bibles into Communist lands. Although few of those in the anti-smuggling camp contest the fact that the need for Bibles outstrips the supply, they maintain the firm conviction that Christians should operate within the limits of legitimacy in their endeavor to meet the need. Cautiously, they encourage tourists to cross into Marxist countries with one or two Bibles openly declared and in full view of the inspectors. (For the 100,000 American tourists who visit the USSR annually, inexpensive Russian Bibles may be secured from the American Bible Society, 1865 Broadway, New York City 10023.)

Among the advocates that champion the cause of smuggling Bibles is Richard Wurmbrand, a Lutheran minister who spent fourteen years in Romanian prisons. His disdain for those who merely debate the subject is apparent. He states, "There are those who favor Bible smuggling and there are those who oppose it. And then there are those who do it."

Missions that deal almost exclusively in meeting the needs of the body of believers under Communist flags are numerous and the support they receive from their constituencies is generous. A few, such as the East European Mission and the Slavic Gospel Association, have admirable records of consistent and effective help to these brethren for almost fifty years. Among those active for about twenty years are Brother Andrew's Open Doors, George Derkatch's World Christian Ministries, L.J. Bass's Underground Evangelism, Dave Benson's Russia for Christ, and Gene Dulin's Taking Christ to Millions. In the last decade, phenomenal growth has accompanied both Richard Wurmbrand's Jesus to the Communist World, and Haralan Popov's Evangelism to Communist Lands. Both men left L.J. Bass to establish their own missions.

Recent Russian immigrant Maria Brodsky weeps openly as she worships in her new found pentecostal fellowship.

It is significant to note the similarities in the way our forefathers first received the printed Word. The best-selling, paraphrased version of the Bible, The Living Bible, is published by Tyndale House Publishers. We are indebted to William Tyndale of the sixteenth-century because this man was driven with the desire to translate and publish the first complete New Testament in English so the common people could read it gladly. So convinced was Tyndale of the importance for English people to read the Bible in their own language that he willingly faced severe persecution, not from atheists in power, but from clergymen. As persecution increased and vigilant ministers were stationed at ports of entry, Tyndale shipped the small New Testaments in boxes, barrels, in bales of cloth and even in sacks of flour. Many eluded the inspectors and the Bibles were received and read by the masses.

Was Tyndale right or wrong? Was he unethical in having the Scriptures concealed as they poured into England? Should we, who edify ourselves daily as we read our English Bibles, nevertheless apologize for the methods employed by Tyndale?

Christians who favor transporting Bibles into lands that do all they can to confiscate every copy of the Scriptures or severely limit the importation to a mere token number, have answers to the objections enumerated by Christians opposed to such contraband. Their response to the six points already presented are as follows:

1) Verses 3 and 4 of Romans 13 qualify the first two verses mentioned earlier. "For rulers are not a terror to good works, but to the evil. Wilt thou then not be afraid of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise of the same: For he is the minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid." The Bible couriers reason that although God permits evil in the world according to his providence, it does not follow that a government is righteous simply because it exists and is recognized as a sovereign state by the world. Is it then right to break the laws of Communist countries? The answer suggested is both yes and no, subject to the premise that whenever the laws of a Communist nation correspond with the law of God or do not violate the Christian conscience, they are to be obeyed. Man's law is subject to change and frequently does as governments rise and fall, whereas the divine law is unchanged regardless of the response of men to God's higher law.

A Russian family relocated in Alaska have daily family devotions.

Scriptural examples abound in which loyalty to God is of primary importance. There were the Hebrew midwives who spared the lives of the male children in violation of the edict of Egypt's king (Exodus 1:15-20). The mother of Moses hid her child contrary to Pharaoh's order. Daniel disobeyed the royal decree by courageously continuing his habit of kneeling in prayer before an open window three times daily (Daniel 6). The three Hebrew young men refused to bow before Nebuchadnezzar's golden image, even though the fiery furnace was next on the agenda for their disobedience (Daniel 3). The question is not is it legal, but who has the right to declare that Bibles are illegal? Besides, there is no Soviet law forbidding the importation of Bibles. One group of university students were held at Moscow's airport for almost seven hours of interrogation because of the Russian Bibles they brought in. During the psychological ordeal, the professor asked one of the customs officials to show him in writing where there was any statement banning the entry of Bibles into the USSR. The agent's face went blank and instead of a response, he made an about-face and left the room.

Brother Andrew reminds his readers that the Norwegian Parliament regards the documented persecution of Christians behind the Iron Curtain as crimes against humanity, and appeals to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to correct this violation of the international charter.

2) Is the delivery of Bibles an ethical issue or a loyalty issue? The marching orders of Jesus Christ (Matthew 28:18-20) demand top priority, even in the face of border barriers. The great commission is a teaching commission based on the Bible as its primary textbook. Jesus never said to go into all the world, except to those nations hostile to his message.

Richard Wurmbrand, in a tract titled "Are Bible Smugglers Deceivers?", sees the probing problem in this light, "I understand the good intentions of my opponents who take the ethical position—"The end does not justify the means." Herewith I agree, but it is unethical to leave a country without the Word of God, when Jesus has commanded us to preach the gospel to all creation." He further reasons that no one's frontier is violated because these people are "ruled by dictators who have come to power by deceit and terror." Should their citizens miss heaven because the frontiers are closed to the Word of God? To cooperate with Marxist states by not "violating" their borders is to aid in the suppression of the gospel and obeys man rather than God.

3) The objections of many Christians seem to assume that smugglers have no choice except to lie in order to clear their Bibles at border crossings. The Soviets make visitors sign a Customs Declaration which, in its

design, leaves the foreigner to logically conclude that there is a legal obligation to declare printed matter. This is not so. Whereas a tourist is obliged to declare in writing all his currency, precious metals, weapons and objects belonging to other persons, the other side of this Customs Declaration form indicates that he must "submit for inspection . . . printed matter" and if "concealed from customs inspection shall be subject to confiscation as contraband."

Refusing to cooperate with Communist wishes need not mean that Christians resort to deceit and lying, but simply choose not to declare all. Brother Andrew has stated, "I don't condone telling lies. As far as my own ministry is concerned, I will never tell a lie." He makes a distinction between partial truth and untruth, stating, "I pray hard that I don't have to tell the truth. But it's not telling a lie, if I hide the truth from people who have utterly forfeited the right to know the truth."

4) Copies of Western missions publications that have ministries penetrating Eastern Europe usually end up in the expanding files of Communist offices. Some supply information regarding standard questions such as: How many Bibles have crossed the borders? Who is involved on both the giving and receiving ends of literature exchanges and what are some of the techniques employed in propagating the literature? Some believers behind the Iron Curtain have been confronted with this information, resulting in reprimands, fines or worse. The publicity given to the best sellers that graphically portray the sufferings and torture during prolonged prison sentences spent by faithful pastors may have turned the heat on for their brethren, but there is less likelihood that more of the same will be repeated. Is it worth it?

One Bulgarian pastor, in an answer to the criticism of such an expose by a fellow pastor now in the West, said, "The story had to be told sooner or later."

It should be noted that the Helsinki Agreement declares, "The participating countries will recognize and respect the freedom of every individual to confess and practice alone, or in fellowship with others their religion and faith, following their own conscience." As a signatory, the Soviets may be squirming under the spotlight of the world press (particularly Western mission publications), exposing their lapses of memory. Perhaps to improve their public relations and to provide some credible propaganda they have permitted the import of 25,000 Russian Bibles and 5,000 concordances to the Evangelical Christians-Baptist headquarters in Moscow. Since 1917 the evangelicals have been favored with an average of one official printing of ten thousand to twenty thousand Bibles for each ten-year period.

> ***"Perhaps to improve their public relations . . . they have allowed the import of 25,000 Bibles. . ."***

5) Critics suggest a switch to "open" ministries such as radio broadcasting to replace the dangerous smuggling operations. Indeed the steady stream of letters that slip past the censors reveals a swelling mass of listeners tuned in to religious broadcasts. The militant atheists are deeply disturbed over the increase of gospel broadcasts from numerous powerful transmitters surrounding Communist lands. Frequently the Soviet mass media must step up anti-religious programs to meet this growing threat. In a *Pravda* article, Kuroyedov, head of the Council for Religious Affairs, confessed that nine foreign, shortwave stations were sending eleven hours of spiritual programs to the USSR daily. The chief editor of *Nauka i Religiya* (Science and Religion) stated, "It is not by chance that religion uses the radio. The fact is that Christianity is now the only ideology which can be said to attract the crowds." With more than 100 million shortwave radios in the Soviet Union, Party pressure to dissuade citizens from listening to religious propaganda is not succeeding.

Since the atheists are angered by the violation of their territorial borders both by Bible imports and Bible broadcasts, why should one be seen as unethical smuggling and the other as a noble "open" ministry? Yet, few if any question the ethical or moral right of broadcasting the gospel. The answer is not to substitute radio programs for Bibles but to saturate the lands with the spoken and printed Word.

6) Do Bible deliveries conducted by aggressive missions jeopardize agreements that may be made between the Bible societies and the Communists? To the contrary, such activities have placed counter pressures on the Communists to sit down and negotiate with the Bible societies. This was confirmed recently by an official who encouraged a large mission to continue communicating the great need for Bibles.

Obviously this kind of publicity creates the illusion of religious freedom in Communist countries and helps to gain favorable propaganda mileage. However, the Communists maintain control of the distribution of the Bibles and register each recipient of a Bible, contrary to the historic role of the Bible societies as supplier and distributor. The registered Bible owners may be in a vulnerable position during times of increased harassment by militant atheists.

What's ahead? Honest differences continue to exist among Christians who hold different convictions regarding Bible "smuggling." Both sides agree that the need for Bibles continues. The confiscation of Scriptures continues to be carried out with the zeal of a Saul of Tarsus, indicating the fantastic fear the Communists conjure up for the published Word. Theirs is a religion turned inside out. They are believing unbelievers, haunted by their doubts. Let Christians on both sides of this issue pray for a harvest of souls and a spiritual renewal in Communist lands that will surpass all expectations. <>

Editor's Note: *This article was written by a prominent Christian man who is an authority on the subject, has been to Russia and other Communist countries numerous times, and has several published works on the subject. He requests to not be identified due to potential visa problems in going back to the USSR*

essay

What can we do about the Soviet Pentecostals?

by Edmund K. Gravely, Jr.

Ever since I learned what really is going on in Russia with my fellow Christians, I have known that I must do something. I just can't pass by the need on the other side of the road, hoping that someone else might stop and help.

The need is closer than I ever thought, for the history of the Russian Pentecostals is inextricably linked both to the Pentecostal movement in the United States, and by marvelous connections, to the charismatic renewal. They are descendents of American Pentecostals, and, in a significant way, we are their decendents.

The Pentecostal movement in Russia traces its roots to the work of a Russian preacher, Ivan Voronayev, who, before going to Russia, preached the gospel of salvation on the street corners of lower Manhattan. One of those who heard and believed was Stephen Malachuk, the father of Dan Malachuk, who is the founder of Logos books and the magazine you are now reading.

In 1924, Voronayev went to Russia and shortly thereafter, largely by his preaching, organizational skill and magazine publishing, Pentecostal communities spread through central Russia, the Ukraine and central Asia.

His was a quick work. It had to be, for in 1930 he was sentenced to prison; then sentenced again; then again. Finally, he died in prison. That began wave after wave of imprisonments, repressions, mass arrests and even some executions among his followers.

In Russia, walking in the light has been costly almost from the beginning; and today, despite what some political and religious leaders might say, it still is.

Some American travelers have reported seeing throngs of Christians attending vibrant, moving services in the Soviet Union.

What apparently happened was that the travelers failed to understand a vital fact about churches in Russia: some are "registered" and others are not. It helps to know the difference between the two types, though both seem to be thriving in that country.

Members and leaders of registered churches (registered with the government) agree to live under certain restrictions imposed by Soviet law in exchange for the right to assemble in a state-supplied building.

Others, however, refuse these limitations, and they belong to unregistered churches. Here is a sample of the laws under which registered churches must make do, according to Evgeny Bresenden, a Russian Pentecostal who was able to emigrate several years ago:

—no preaching outside the designated prayer houses.

—visiting preachers must get permission from local authorities before preaching outside their city.

—you cannot go to hear another preacher in another place.

—the unexpected arrival of a visiting preacher or group of Christians must be reported to the local authorities. Sometimes, the visitors are called in for questioning and threats.

—children under eighteen are forbidden to attend prayer meetings, and churches cannot organize activites outside the prayer houses for youths.

—no meetings for women; no special prayer meetings, literary, musical or work groups.

—money may not be collected for the aid of the ill, the aged, for prisoners or for their families.

—a congregation cannot choose its own pastor. Local authorities do that; and, according to Mr. Bresenden, those authorities choose men who will cooperate with an atheistic government, to the detriment of the church. The law stipulates that no one can be appointed a pastor of a recognized church who has been in jail; but, according to Mr. Bresenden, "Almost all sincere ministers and preachers of the church have been sentenced two or three times."

—a local congregation cannot collect funds to build a church building, and the state rarely provides a building, though it is supposed to.

To some Christians, these restrictions are unconscionable. Soviet laws, Mr. Bresenden said, "carry so many prohibitions that it becomes senseless to believe and it equals spiritual suicide."

That is why unregistered believers prefer their tenuous status. They meet in forests, out beyond city limits, or in small apartments with the shades pulled, singing, praying and preaching softly, fearing all the time that the police might burst in upon them and haul some off to jail or slap heavy fines on those who can barely make ends meet anyway.

Some Pentecostal young men refuse to swear allegiance to the Soviet government in the armed forces. Three years at hard labor is not unusual punishment for such behavior. The few who have joined the army but refused to carry arms have gotten worse treatment.

But what can we do?

Recently, I heard a Jewish immigrant from Russia describe the power of the American public and its press. Eight lines of type in a prominent newspaper in the U.S. can save the life of a person being persecuted in Russia, he said.

The Soviet government officially maintains that American public interest and government pressure make no difference on Soviet policies concerning Jews and Christians. Reality is different. Before Jews in America began to call world attention to the plight of Soviet Jewry, and before the U.S. government began to put pressure on the Soviet government, Russian Jewish emigration was a trickle. But after years of sustained American public interest and U.S. government initiatives tens of thousands of Russian Jews have been allowed to leave the Soviet Union to go to Israel and other countries of their choice.

The reality of the matter is this: unless American Christians do for Russian Christians what American Jews did for Russian Jews, nothing will change for thousands of Pentecostals and other Christians now living under severe persecution.

Mrs. Alla Ivask, an official in the Tolstoy Foundation, who began almost single-handedly the present campaign to help Soviet Christians emigrate, put it this way:

"Absolute public support is what is needed, because the system works this way. It goes from representative to senator to governors. If the American people want it enough and pursue it enough, they get it."

In a recent letter "to all Pentecostals and Baptists" in the United States and other free countries, dated Oct. 30, 1978, hundreds of Soviet Christians who signed the appeal said:

"We really need your help and assistance in trying to leave the Soviet Union and we also need financial help for our trip from there to wherever we are going. . . . We are waiting for your help in the name of Christ, because without this help, it will be impossibly difficult for us to leave."

What can we do? We can write our congressmen, our senators, our governors, our President. We can ask them to make it clear that the Soviet Union will not enjoy the trade benefits that come from this free land until they allow basic freedom to those who cry out for it. And we must not give up. ⊂<

Logos International Fellowship, as a non-profit Christian ministry, wants to help persecuted Christians in Russia. A special fund is established to assist the Pentecostals; your help is needed. Gifts are tax deductible; send to Logos International Fellowship: Aid to Christians in Communist Lands, 201 Church Street, Plainfield, NJ, 07060.

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

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Times-Union (Albany, New York) - April 14, 1979

Soviets persecute 'enemies'

Dissident describes severe repression in 'everyday lives'

By HARRY HAGGERTY

An atmosphere of prison surrounds the everyday lives of thousands of people in the Soviet Union declared enemies of the government because of their religious and political beliefs, a former Soviet journalist told a Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute audience Friday night.

Arkadiye Polishchuk, a Soviet dissident who for many years was a free-lance journalist in Russia, told how members of several Christian churches have suffered severe repression, both in labor camps and psychiatric centers, and "in their everyday lives."

Touring the country under sponsorship of Amnesty International, a worldwide movement working on behalf of prisoners of conscience, Polishchuk recounted several of what he said were "thousands of cases" in which people are being harassed, hounded from their work, chased from their homes and, many times, imprisoned for exercising their religious beliefs.

Claiming to have been a firm believer in the Marxist philosphy and a member of the Communist Party for 15 years, Polishchuk said he became sympathetic to political and religious dissidents while covering some of their trials. Although being told what to report, Polishchuk documented the true stories behind their persecution and later helped in their movements.

ARKADIYE POLISHCHUK

In 1978, he was given the choice of leaving the country or being imprisoned in a labor camp.

Polishchuk told the audience, many belonging to the local chapter of Amnesty International, how Soviet oppression of religious enemies of the government affects both young and old.

He described how a man was refused permission to expand his home and he, his wife, and five children had to live in a one-room house. He said a child proclaiming his religious belief in school is scorned by the teacher, who orders fellow classmates to do the same. He said this often results in the child being beaten or stoned.

"One child had nine scars on his head from being beaten by his classmates," Polishchuk said.

He also told how persons are hounded by the KGB, the Soviet secret police, and forced to constantly move from community to community. Many never find employment after being declared a religious dissident.

Polishchuk relayed how Soviet newspapers print propaganda about how ignorant Christians are and about how they "sometimes like to sacrifice their children."

He said of the hundreds of cases he had documented, only one girl was allowed to enter college. He said most Christian children are expelled from school in the lower grades. Many children are taken from their parents and placed into the care of the state.

Polishchuk's lecture tour is part of Amnesty International's campaign to release imprisoned dissidents, primarily through a massive letter-writing movement. Polishchuk said the letter-writing campaign has proved effective in helping people escape persecution.

He said the Soviet government operates from three sources of strength — the police machine, the military and propaganda.

"Through letter writing, you are saying that freedom of religion advertised in the Soviet Union is not true."

Churches in U.S. Back Christians Who Seek To Quit Soviet Union

For more than a decade, emigration from the Soviet Union has been a human rights issue focused on Russian Jews. Recently, however, it has become an issue for Christians, too.

Spurred by reports of religious persecution in the Soviet Union, liberal and conservative Christians in the United States, along with Jewish organizations, have begun a campaign to support Christians who want to emigrate from the Soviet Union.

In different ways and without any central coordination, a number of organizations, some of them newly formed, and church leaders are working to help some 20,000 Christians in the Soviet Union who have submitted lists of their names, ages and addresses to the Supreme Soviet, the nation's parliament, requesting permission to leave because of religious persecution. None so far have been allowed to leave.

Probably the most active organization has been the Tolstoy Foundation, based in New York City, which helps relocate refugees from many countries. Over the last three years, the foundation has helped process more than 800 official invitations, called vyzovs, that are required by the Soviet Government before anyone can apply for an exit visa.

Not one visa has been granted, according to Alla Ivask of the foundation. What is needed, she said, is a campaign for Christian emigration as persistent as the one for Jewish emigration.

The foundation is to hold a meeting today with State Department officials to describe the scope of the situaton and see what can be done to break the deadlock.

The campaign on behalf of Soviet Christians sprang from reports of persecution that caused many of them, most of them unregistered Pentecostals and Baptists, to leave to preserve their faith. In some areas, whole communities are seeking exit visas.

A few of those trying to emigrate are Orthodox Christians and Seventh-day Adventists, while others belong to denominations officially registered in the Soviet Union. These include the Evangelical Christian Baptist Church, the Russian Orthodox Church, Moslems, Jews, Buddhists and Lutherans. But most belong to unregistered churches. They reject laws that prohibit them from teaching their children about God and taking them to church before they are 18 years old, the reports said.

DO NOT FORGET THE NEEDIEST!

2/26/79

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, FEBR

Church Leaders Back Christians Who Want to Quit Soviet Union

For more than a decade, emigration from the Soviet Union has been a human rights issue focused on Russian Jews. Recently, however, it has become an issue for Christians, too.

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Some Registered Officially

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Attention was focused on the issue last June when seven members of two Pentecostal families entered the United States Embassy in Moscow and refused to leave without an assurance that they would be allowed to emigrate. They are still in the embassy. One of the families, the Vashchenkos, first applied for exit visas 17 years ago.

The Alabama Council to Save Soviet Jews has joined with the Vashchenkos' sponsor, the Rev. Cecil Williamson of Selma, Ala., in efforts to help the family emigrate.

Last month, members of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches issued an appeal to Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, to let the families emigrate.

Appeal for Baptist Minister

William P. Thompson, stated clerk of the United Presbyterian Church, sent a similar appeal last year on behalf of the family of an imprisoned Baptist minster, Georgi Vins.

Another impetus in the campaign for Christians in the Soviet Union has come from firsthand accounts of their plight by a Jewish dissident who spent four years traveling around the country before emigrating last August.

By restricting worship, education, housing and job opportunities, the Government is "trying to make life about as difficult as it would be in a concentration camp," Arkady Polishchuk, a 48-year-old journalist and former magazine editor, said in an interview.

Among the newly formed organizations concerned with the matter is Freedom of Faith, whose officers include the Rev. Dr. William Sloan Coffin Jr., pastor of the Riverside Church in Manhattan, the Rev. Joseph O'Hair, S.J., editor of the magazine America, and the Rev. Dr. Alexander Schmemann, dean of St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary in Scarsdale, N.Y.

Other groups include the Persecuted Church Commission and the Research Center for Religion and Human Rights in Closed Societies Ltd.

I Love New York, Metropolitan!

U.S. Still Giving Pentecostalists Soviet Asylum

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY

Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, Nov. 8 — Seven Pentecostals who have been staying in the United States Embassy since June said today that they would remain, despite American objections, until the Soviet Government lets them emigrate.

"The embassy keeps us from contact with fellow believers here and we know they haven't let us get some mail," said Pyotr P. Vashchenko, the father of 13 children. "It's like the isolation cell in a prison. We can't complain about the way we have been fed and clothed, but we will never go out of here and submit to Soviet law again." His wife, Avgustina, and a 27-year-old daughter, Lidiya, nodded.

Both Mr. and Mrs. Vashchenko have served prison sentences for previous struggles with police guards outside the embassy and have been denied emigration visas.

Given a One-Room Apartment

Now they have been inside the embassy gates for four months, but Ambassador Malcolm Toon wants them to leave because staying will not get them the visas either. After they had spent two months in the lobby of the consular section, Mr. Toon gave them the use of a one-room apartment in a residential wing.

But the embassy controls their contacts and is withholding mail sent to them through the diplomatic pouch, on the ground that Soviet citizens are not entitled to use it.

Members of the American community donate food and have given winter clothing to the group, which includes Mr. and Mrs. Vashchenko, three of their daughters, and Mariya Chmykhalova and her teen-age son, Timofei, all from the southern Siberian city of Chernogorsk.

Mr. Vashchenko was a leader of the 200-member Pentecostal community there. He is a short, slight man whose faith and strength seemed to exert a powerful sway over the others in a brief encounter today in the snow-covered embassy playground.

After Soviet Jews, Pentecostals may be the largest group seeking to emigrate. The fundamentalist Christian belief came to the Soviet Union from the United States in the 1920's, and estimates of the number of Soviet Pentecostals today ranges from 500,000 to 1.5 million.

Young Pentecostals often refuse military service, but the category of conscientious objector is not recognized in the Soviet Union. The Vashchenkos' 19-year-old son, Aleksandr, is serving a prison sentence for this offense.

Refuse to Carry Identity Papers

The Vashchenkos, like other Pentecostals, refuse to carry identity papers declaring them citizens of this officially atheistic state. Mr. Vashchenko served a year in prison for that crime in 1962.

Vashchenko family members have twice before burst past guards at the embassy. After the first attempt, in 1963, the parents went back home, but they lost custody of three of their daughters. The authorities said the children were being poisoned with religious propaganda.

"Go on home now," a policeman once told the mother, "they are our children, not yours." But the girls did return home.

Mrs. Vashchenko spent 10 months in prison after her second encounter at the embassy with Soviet guards in 1968. Now they feel they have nothing to lose.

APPENDIX II - "PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING SOVIET DEFECTORS"

[illegible]

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.
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*Executive Committee
•As of April 1, 1984

August 21, 1984

COPY

The Honorable
Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
National Security Council - Room 368
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

Following my recent conversation with Mrs. Madeleine Kirk concerning the resettlement of defectors from the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan, I am submitting our description of how we propose to handle the resettlement of Soviet defectors.

~~From our many years experience~~ with defectors we have learned that it is essential to do the following:

- To give them a feeling of family atmosphere, support and sense of security.

- To refrain from asking questions about their past, the Soviet Union, and their personal experiences.

- To protect them from public curiosity.

- To answer all their questions, be frank and open, keep ones word and promises, show them the USA as it is, without boasting or criticizing the Soviet Union.

To help them in their resettlement, we also propose:

- To assign them a guide or tutor, to teach them English as a second language (ESL), to give them counselling and orientation, and work at the TF Center, and counsel them on a career in life.

- 2 -

The Tolstoy Foundation is a charitable organization.
Contributions are fully tax deductible, and will be acknowledged.

This is a slow process and depends on the individual and his state of mind. We will be the last to push them out. The Tolstoy Foundation will be happy to lend its support to their final establishment.

We are, of course, at your service for any additional information you might wish to have.

I want to take this opportunity to express our sincere appreciation for the time and interest you have given to this delicate situation and for the role which the Tolstoy Foundation can have.

Sincerely yours,

T.K. Bagration

Teymuraz K. Bagration
Executive Director and
Chief Executive Officer

TKB:hy

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION (TF) PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING SOVIET DEFECTORS

The Tolstoy Foundation Center at Valley Cottage, N.Y. is well prepared to greet and welcome defectors and give them the necessary care during the critical period of their adjustment to life in the Free World. At present, there are two such individuals doing very well at the "Farm".

The TF Center is not equipped however for high class defectors, intelligence agents or great artists. It is able to assist more ordinary people such as sailors, soldiers, professionals and tourists who decide not to return to the Soviet Union.

This presentation is not intended as a competition with other organizations helping defectors and asylum seekers, and should not be taken as a criticism of other groups' efforts to assist defectors.

The TF has an established tradition of cooperation and coordination with Government and private agencies in the service to refugees..

Described below are the basic rules based on 40 years of success and failures of assistance to defectors.

1. To give them a feeling of family atmosphere and sense of security.
   This is what they painfully miss most. Also, give them the possibility to find their roots in a convivial Russian atmosphere, to be exposed to their own ethnic culture which is theirs by right of birth, and of which they were denied in the USSR, e.g., read what they want in our 30,000-volume library, speak with interesting residents of the TF-Homes, attend the Church if they so desire, and participate in the Choral Society rehersals and other cultural activities.
   To make then feel that they belong to the same stream of people who have been fleeing the Soviet Union since the Revolution. One should not refer to them as deserters. They took great risks for themselves and their families by deciding to defect, and they deserve proper consideration and treatment.
2. To refrain from asking questions about their past, the USSR, and their personal experience.
   They will either lie or will adjust their answers to what they think you would like to hear.

"To lie is a part of my eduction". "It is bad manners to ask personal questions", "questions are asked only by KGB prosecutors or by provocateurs", these are remarks one often hears from the defectors. One should also be available to listen, when they will feel the urge to talk about their families and their previous life.

3. To protect them from public curiosity

   Publicity will jeopardise their safety and feeling of security. It will compromise their families and friends in the Soviet Union, and will expose them to blackmail here in the USA. Interviews could be arranged, but without sensationalism.

4. To answer all their questions, be frank and open, keep one's word and promises, show them the USA as it is, without boasting about it and without systematically criticizing the USSR and its system.

   Let them draw their own conclusions.

A. The person to be assigned as sponsor, guide and tutor to a defector at the TF Center or at a regional office, should not be changed too often in order to give the refugee time to establish a relationship of trust and confidence.

B. The sponsor (starshina or elder) should identify him or her sufficiently for the refugee to understand with whom he or she is dealing - i.e., "I am John Doe and I have the pleasure of being assigned by the Director to assist you in adjusting to the life in America. I will always be available to find a solution to any problem you may have or to any question. My questions to you will only be of the nature to help you best and not to fill-in forms for security agencies. If they so desire, the agencies will come and identify themselves. My advice from past practice, tell the simple truth - it is easy to remember if you are asked again-later the same question, as it might easily happen".

C. The defectors will be given room and board at the TF Center in a 20-room dormitory with a cafeteria, washing machines, and will be given explanations as to the conditions (costs) and rules of behavior at the Farm. They will be billed and will pay from earnings, or when they can, later. A partial list of dos and don'ts will be given to each person, the familiar ones being:

- Do not smoke in bed.
- Lock your room when you leave.
- Keep your room clean.
- Do not be noisy and behave yourself - there are old people and children nearby.
- Be neat and clean - give clothes to the cleaners, use laundry machine, take shower or bath daily.
- Do not drive cars or motorcycles without a license.
- Report anything unusual that might happen to you.
- Do not give or accept interviews with the media or freelance correspondents without checking with your sponsor/guardian.
- Do not drive after drinking and be moderate with liquor.

Jobs and Work Schedule

Refugees at the Farm have a choice of work to do and jobs to perform such as:

Cut grass
Clean roads
Cut branches
Cut hedges

Work in the vegetable garden
Work in the warehouse
Work in the kitchen
Escort residents to village

Plumbing
Electricity
Roofs
Trees

Work is from 8 AM to 4 PM. The wages are the prevailing wages, plus overtime. In order to work, the refugee must have a Social Security number and a "permit to work" issued by INS.

Refugee workers have all the rights and duties of any other worker.

Refugees can work outside the Farm - there are factories, plants, mechanical shops, garages and constructions.

Education and Orientation

Refugees will be advised to attend English language classes at the Farm and in the neighborhood. They can prepare for admission to college (Rockland Community College and others). They will be given orientation classes on savings, charities, the Constitution, Rights of the individual.

Recreation and Sports

Afternoons, evenings and Sundays are crucial hours, when defectors require more attention. They should be encouraged to go sightseeing, hiking, home visits; movies and television should be organized on a carefully prepared schedule.

Refugees should be allowed at least once a week to prepare their own meals or barbecue around a camp fire with Russian songs and some guests.

General chats on the ways of life in America and about the refugees' own problems should be organized in the form of routine sessions during which their behavior could be discussed and their mood caught in order to keep their morale up and not sagging.

There is a volley ball court, they can jog, and there is a swimming pool at the Rockland Lake Recreation Center within 10 minutes from the Farm.

Special Value of the Defectors

The message to the world of the defectors, as of witnesses of the vicissitudes of an average Soviet person in daily life will be of interest to the Western readers and listeners, and will better formulate to the defectors why they preferred to "vote with their feet".

The ethnic structure of the TF which was created in 1939 by Alexandra Tolstoy exactly for the purpose of handling such people, is equipped to handle the defectors. Core Services required by the State Department are insufficient for defectors. Homesickness and displacement are the biggest problems. They have to be kept in a surrounding similar to their own with people speaking the same language who may help them to understand and adjust to the new life. If there is no available family with a home and young people of the defector's age, the only alternative is an establishment such as the TF Center.

The defectors have to be kept busy all the time, defeating despair and avoiding going to the bottle, and helping them to forget all that they went through. The only remedy to all the above-mentioned, is available at the TF Center: work, the library, ESL classes, counselling, also advice by former defectors who have successfully resettled in the USA, moral support by their own ethnic group, acting in support of the TF, as newly acquired family, friends, etc

At the same time, the possibility to have a room or their own at the TF Center where they can relax their battled soul away from their families, friends and country.

Only after a certain period of time, can they be ready, on an individual basis, to start getting acquainted with the outside world, sometimes very cruel and difficult.

Prepared by Teymuraz K. Bagration,
Cyril Galitzine and Andre Stenbock-Fermor

TKB:hy

August 23, 1984

APPENDIX III - "JVAR CONCEPT IN EUROPE"

Cable Address: [illegible]

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*Executive Committee
•As of March 3, 1982

September 2, 1982

COPY

Mr. Robert H. Funseth
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Refugee Resettlement
Bureau of Refugee Programs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Funseth:

At the last meeting of the ACVA you proposed to place on the agenda of the next meeting with you the question of opening JVARs in Europe instead of existing separate offices of voluntary agencies operating in European countries.

Since we have been on record as being opposed to this in the past, I thought that it will be fair to give you our arguments in support of our position. There might be other reasons for or against it, which promises a lively discussion.

With our best regards,

Sincerely yours,

Teymuraz K. Bagration
Executive Director and
Chief Executive Officer

TKB/jr

Encl.

The Tolstoy Foundation is a public charity. Contributions are deductible to the full extent provided by law and will be acknowledged.

Cable Address: [illegible]

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.
250 West 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10107
Telephone (212) 247-2922

September 1, 1982

ON THE EXTENSION OF THE JVAR CONCEPT TO EUROPE

by Teymuraz K. Bagration

1. A JVAR has its merits when a new refugee situation is developing and where VOLAGS have not been sufficiently represented to cope with the influx of refugees.

2. A JVAR is economic and useful for serving a homogeneous group of refugees where the United States is the country of immigration and Care & Maintenance are provided by UNHCR or the U.S.

3. Conditions in Europe do not favor a JVAR, i.e., an American VOLAG representative closely related to the US Consulate and the ACVA Refugee Center. To install a JVAR in Vienna, Rome or Munich/Frankfurt instead of the existing VOLAGS would disrupt the ties of relationship with the numerous local governmental and private services acquired during several decades by these VOLAGS in their mission of helping refugees in Europe.

4. Most of the agencies have operated in Europe since World War II and several have been there even before, i.e. for 60-70 years.

5. There are VOLAG offices in Europe maintained by their umbrella or counterpart organizations (WCC, CARITAS, YMCA), Others, as Tolstoy Foundation, have formed a local affiliate, such as the Comite de Soutien de la Fondation Tolstoy in France and the Tolstoi Hilfs-und-Kulturwerk, e.V. in Germany, which is a full fledged member of the Deutsche

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Paritatische Wohlfahrstverband, a rather powerful umbrella body for its member agencies. Thanks to its German affiliate, TF was able to contract with the German Government for assistance to refugees and has financially relieved the US Mission in Geneva in 1980 and 1981 by some $70,000 to $90,000 each year. This was applauded in Geneva as a proof of "sharing the burden" by the German Government. Also, thanks to the German and local affiliates, substantial German governmental funds are made available for the cultural benefits of refugees in Germany (some US $50,000 per annum).

6. The agencies in Europe have established a relationship of trust and mutual understanding with the local authorities at all levels from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, Labor, Interior and National Security, to local Police precincts, Border Guards and Health Offices. This relationship has been developed during long years of day-to-day cooperation and of immeasurable help in solving individual problems which the refugees bring with them when seeking asylum.

7. The agencies deal in Europe not only with the US Consulates and INS officials, but also with those of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand. Often refugees are resettled in another European country, or in the country of asylum itself. This gives an international character to the refugee assistance service, offering the refugees many other opportunities, besides those in the United States where the majority wants to go.

8. The agencies in Western Europe (list by locality attached) have each their own image and a reputation well-known for years in Eastern block countries, the USSR and the Near East. They are considered, with a degree of wishful thinking, by potential refugees as beacons of hope which they

can trust, where they can find understanding and humanitarian concern for their problems. VOLAGS counsellors speak the language of the refugee and are familiar with his needs and where to find assistance. The counsellors are not bound by restrictions of Government officials and can interpret to the refugees the reasons for regulations and restrictions, while directing them towards a reasonable solution.

9. The proposed alternative of unified, consolidated VOLAG refugee offices in major centers in Europe working with the ACVA Refugee Center will only add another barrier to filter the refugees without the capacity to protect them and to assist them with their long lists of needs in the asylum country.

10. Historically, the presence of VOLAG offices did not arrive for any other reason than to assist families and single people with their broader needs and not only with the processing of immigration.

11. The Tolstoy Foundation entered Europe in the late 1940's to fill the gap in assisting the "hard core", those people who were rejected by everybody because they were too old, too sick, were large families, or simply because they were Russians. Until 1947 the Russians did not exist in refugee terminology and were to be forcibly repatriated to the USSR. Later, it took courage and a great effort on the part of the VOLAGS to save refugees from being sent to Bolivia, Paraguay or Pakistan, where the IRO agencies were directing the "hard core" refugees. The VOLAGS helped groups left behind in refugee camps after the main migration. Thanks to UNHCR and governments in Europe and Latin America, homes for the aged were established, and TF has helped in opening Old Peoples Homes with a total of 1,200 beds in different countries. This was one of the reasons to open offices in ord

to take care of these cases.

12. To substitute the numerous existing offices of the VOLAGS by a single JVAR office will also destroy the pluralistic character of the private sector of aid to refugees and will leave the refugees to face and to queue in line without a possible choice at the door of another bureaucratic obstacle, i.e. the JVAR, to be surmounted in their search for freedom, for a new country and for a solution to numerous individual and family problems. These problems are of great importance to the refugees but will appear identical to the overwhelmed JVAR, which will try to process as many cases and numbers to be sent to INS and ACVA.

13. The JVAR proposal, we understand, is to simplify and save money. It does not consider the many necessary services provided by the VOLAGS in place, including not least, provision for care and maintenance, emergency medical and family counselling services. Simplification, while always a worthy objective, may actually over-complicate a well-working system - and the potential savings which may be achieved will be at too great a cost.

14. For these reasons we would suggest that the time-tested, well-developed current system of VOLAGS operating in Europe be continued as the most effective way to solve the needs of the refugees.

TOLSTOY FOUNDATION, INC.

APPROXIMATE LISTING OF VOLAGS IN EUROPE BY LOCALITY (1982)

Athens: CRS, CWS(WCC), TF

Brussels: CARITAS, CWS, IRC, PAIRC, TF

Frankfurt: CARITAS, CWS, TF

Munich: AFCR, CARITAS, IRC, PAIRC, TF

Paris: AFCR, CARITAS, HIAS, IRC, TF, WCC

Rome: CARITAS, HIAS, IRC, TF, WCC

Stockholm: CARITAS, ~~IRC~~, WCC

Vienna: AFCR, CARITAS, HIAS, IRC, PAIRC, RAV-TOV, TF, WCC

EXHIBIT NO. 20

STATEMENT OF
ANDREY SOROKUN
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

In connection with the investigation on the Government's handling of defectors, and being a recent Soviet defector myself, I would like to address briefly some of the problems I encountered upon my arrival in the United States.

On July 25, 1983, I requested political asylum at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, where I had been sent in October, 1982, as an exchange student of Moscow State University to perfect my knowledge of the Japanese language, literature, and history. Shortly before my departure from the U.S.S.R., I was approached in Moscow by the representatives of the K.G.B., who strongly indicated their interest in making me their informer for the period of my 10-month stay in Japan. They also promised to consider me as a possible candidate for "more serious work" in their organization upon my return to the Soviet Union and graduation from the University. This has become one of the main reasons for my defection, for I did not want to become a part of the gigantic mechanism of oppression, which the K.G.B. actually is.

Needless to say, that difficult decision to abandon my homeland and start a new life in a completely unknown country did not come to my mind all of a sudden. It was the result of several years of firsthand observation of the Soviet reality which, I found, had nothing to do with the so-called "Communist ideals" espoused by the official propaganda. But the most important event which helped me to brush off the last hesitations and go ahead with my defection plan was the testimony of the former K.G.B. Major Stanislav Levchenko, made public in the fall of 1982 and widely reported in the Japanese press exactly at the time of my arrival in that country. It is not by chance that I came to admire the moral courage of this compatriot of mine, who defected to the United States in 1979, after serving for five years as a K.G.B. officer in Tokyo. He graduated from the same Oriental Department I attended at Moscow State University, and he also majored in the Japanese language. When he was my age (at the time of my defection, I was 22), Mr. Levchenko might have hardly imagined that someday he would be drawn into the world of K.G.B. espionage, which he exposed later in his testimony. It goes without saying that any high-level Soviet Bloc intelligence officer defecting to the West is a prize catch for the Government of the United States or any other democratic power, no matter what kind of bad things he had to do (or was compelled to do) in the past.

So far as I am concerned, I decided not to wait to discover what the K.G.B. had in store for me--the work of an ordinary informer or the career of an intelligence agent. So, I came to this country with clean hands and a clear conscience. But does that mean that young people like me--who are obviously not high-level defectors and thus cannot offer a lot of valuable information to the U.S. Government--do not deserve at least a small portion of the attention and help offered to the former K.G.B. officers, diplomats, and other V.I.P.'s coming to the West? Though the start of my new life in America was not an easy one, and I cannot say that I was badly mistreated by the representatives of the U.S. Government, I do consider my present, rather comfortable situation more an exception than the rule. During the three years of my life in the United States, I have encountered several low-level defectors whose plight made me only wonder at how lucky I was to be literally rescued by the Jamestown Foundation, which helped me to move from Spanish Harlem, where I had lived since my arrival in America, working as a dishwasher in an Oriental restaurant in Manhattan. Due to the efforts of the people from the Jamestown Foundation, I got a job as a Russian-Japanese-English language translator in the Washington, D.C., area, where I live at present, combining my work with research for a book about the life of young people in the Soviet Union, which I am going to write in the near future.

Some people in the West attribute the failure of many Soviet Bloc defectors to start a new life on their own to the lack of private initiative and marketable skills; language problems; and their misunderstanding of the power of the state, which has obvious limits in a society based on free enterprise. In my case, however, this was only partially true. I've been studying English since the age of eight at the specialized English language secondary school in the U.S.S.R., and the Japanese language for five years (four in Moscow and one in Japan), so, by the time of my arrival in this country, I did not face any language problem. On the other hand, I did not have any diploma or other credentials verifying my education, because I was supposed to study in Moscow one more year upon my return from Japan before graduating from the University. Nevertheless, while hunting for a job, I discovered that in many cases it was not the lack of formal education that prevented me from being accepted but the lack of a proper visa. Given my proficiency in three languages, some companies and firms were willing to provide their own job-training program, had I had the so-called "green card" (resident alien registration card, I.N.S. Form I-551). I found out that a one-year working visa (I.N.S. Form I-94), issued to me upon my arrival in the U.S.A., was not honored in fact by the majority of possible employers. They either did not have the slightest idea about it, or did not have the time and desire to verify whether such a visa really provides for the legal employment of its possessor. I could not even join the U.S. Army without a "green card" and wound up washing dishes in a restaurant, working six days a week and, sometimes, up to 12 hours a day. But even that work I got only with the help of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), a private, non-profit organization, which rendered me some basic assistance during the first months of my life in this country. However, within half a year of such work, I developed varicose veins in my legs, and my health had deteriorated to such an extent that, by the time I received the "green card," joining the U.S. Army was out of the question. In fact, the doctors strongly recommended that I quit the job at the restaurant, as well. Otherwise, I was told to face the necessity of an operation, for which I did not have money anyway. On the other hand, I could not quit the job, because at that time it was the only way to sustain my existence.

I also tried to inquire about the possibility of studying at Columbia University, well known for its high level of education in the fields of both Japanese and Russian area studies. But I went to the interview at Columbia, kindly arranged for me by the I.R.C., only to discover complete indifference among the scholars from the Averell Harriman Institute for the Advanced Study of the Soviet Union toward the plight of a young Soviet defector. The people at the Russian and Oriental Departments were equally reluctant to promise any help or friendly advice. My impression was that they were afraid to jeopardize Columbia's extensive scientific exchange program with the U.S.S.R. by pledging any support for a Soviet defector. At any rate, their attitude discouraged me from making similar inquiries in other universities. In the meantime, in March, 1985, I moved down to Washington, D.C., where I got not only a new job, but got acquainted with some people who are concerned with the plight of the Soviet Bloc defectors and are trying to publicize it among the American public. By courtesy of Accuracy in Media (AIM), a Washington-based, non-profit organization, I was given an opportunity to speak about my personal experience as a defector and about life in the U.S.S.R. at some university campuses in Virginia, Maryland, D.C., Delaware, and Utah. I discovered that many ordinary Americans show considerable interest in the real life behind the Iron Curtain and are glad to talk to a real Russian who is free to tell the truth--unlike the so-called "real Russians," who frequently come to this country as members of all sorts of friendship, scientific, and cultural delegations and are instructed by the Party how to tell "the truth."

On the basis of my experience as a defector, I would like to propose the following:

1. To introduce an amendment to the existing legislation that would allow the U.S. Government to grant the Soviet Bloc defectors the right to reside and work permanently in this country immediately upon their arrival, not after one year of staying in the U.S.A., as is customary at present. This would not only enhance their opportunities to find a better job, but would also psychologically provide these people with a feeling of certain security. The first years in the new country are usually the most difficult ones in terms of adjustment, and it is very important not to make defectors feel that they left the whole

world behind and now are stranded empty handed in the middle of nowhere.

2. To reduce the minimum time of residence in this country necessary, to apply for U.S. citizenship, from 10 years (for former Communist Party members) and five years (for those who were not Party members) to three years. It does not seem to make much sense to impose "the penalty" of an extra five years on the Party members. After all, the fact of their defection to a democratic country (in case their bona fides are established) can be considered as a clear indication of defectors' desire to break with the past. Besides, reducing the time to three years would not only provide these people with necessary legal protection from the U.S. Government in a relatively short period of time, but would also allow them to travel safely to other democratic countries in the West in order to share their experiences and knowledge of the Communist system with a broader audience outside the United States.

3. To establish special sholarships or grants, to be awarded to those young Soviet Bloc defectors who have demonstrated their desire and ability to pursue an academic career and whose knowledge and experience in the field of their particular interests can be further enhanced through study at American universities, for the ultimate benefit of American society.

4. To provide those low-level Soviet Bloc defectors who are not proficient in English with one year of language training or the funds for such training.

5. To provide the I.N.S. personnel who might deal with possible Soviet defectors, like the Ukrainian sailor Miroslav Medvid, with a special Russian language booklet, briefly explaining for someone who does not speak English the legal procedures of applying for political asylum in the U.S.A. This could prevent such tragic incidents from being repeated, and not to give ignorant officials an excuse to claim that the interpreter was coaching the man in question over the phone on asking the asylum. In fact, it looks like many officials of the I.N.S. and other Government agencies dealing with the defectors need some kind of regular briefings on the situation behind the Iron Curtain, possibly conducted by the defectors themselves, so that these bureaucrats next time can possibly use some human approach to such sensitive problems instead of merely following instructions in the book with complete disregard to the life of such unfortunate human beings.

I do understand that my suggestions are incomplete to encompass all the aspects of the problem of handling defectors by the U.S. Government. However, I hope that my experience and proposals which I shared with you in this letter would in some small measure ease the plight of future defectors who, I think, will undoubtedly be coming to this Land of Freedom.

EXHIBIT NO. 21

STATEMENT OF
MARK WYATT
BEFORE THE
U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
HEARINGS ON
U.S. GOVERNMENT'S HANDLING OF
SOVIET AND COMMUNIST BLOC DEFECTORS

My interest in the important issue before this committee stems from a career of over thirty years as a staff officer of the Operations Directorate of the CIA. The majority of these years were spent abroad and included positions as Chief of Base and Chief of Station. I joined the Agency in its earliest years after a wartime stint as an U.S. Naval Officer. Since my retirement from CIA in 1978 one of my principal interests has been the welfare of defectors from the USSR and its satellites. Consequently I wish to commend the Chairman and this committee for devoting time and attention to this important issue.

From my experience, Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that, in the interest of the nation's security, it is essential that we maintain the climate for defection open and viable in the United States. We must make it clear to would-be defectors that they are welcome, that they will be safe, and that we will provide friendly protection, sound resettlement counsel, sensible citizenship regulations, and a valid type of support mechanism.

In the CIA that I knew, from General Bedell Smith, through Allen Dulles, John McCone, Richard Helms, and to George Bush, the Directors were revered and the working atmosphere was open and frank. I worked for and with a group of prudent, operationally oriented men and women. This climate also fostered some extravagant, exotic personalities; they too, were drawn to the great game of intelligence, and they too, were concerned with U.S. national security. In large part Agency personnel rose above the pettiness often found in government bureaucracies. It made a career there endlessly fascinating.

Looking back on those years, I know of no more fascinating or challenging experience than those rare occasions abroad that sometime began as follows: a call from a marine guard, a receptionist, or a secretary saying that someone had just entered the building, in a nervous and agitated state, speaking only broken English perhaps with a heavy (Slavic) accent, saying that he wants to see an American official immediately on a sensitive political matter. For the American case officer it is an exhilarating moment, perhaps the beginning of a demanding and complex process. He knows the matter must be given the highest priority and commands the most delicate cautious action. It portends a serious defeat for the Soviet world. That nervous arrival may be the bearer of intention-level intelligence, perhaps a gain more important than the product of a network of agents. It may outweigh what is learned from any esoteric technical device. The case officer knows from defector history that this walk-in may know the identity of a Soviet illegal in the United States or have a lead to a "mole" in Western Intelligence. The case officer also knows that the new arrival may represent a Soviet provocation with possibly serious consequences.

American installations abroad have approaches of all kinds--fabricators, mercenaries, deranged nitwits, or asylum seekers of no intelligence interest. But when an official of a Communist country who has significant intelligence puts his life at stake for political cause, we have an event that we must capitalize on. For this phenomenon is the manifestation of a key advantage we have over our principal adversary.

Even if the possible defector should prove to be a plant attempting to disinform or to discredit a valid defector, and, if it can be established that he is lying, that fact constitutes intelligence. In a walk-in situation harried thoughts flash through the case officer's mind. Above all he must assure the agitated defector that he has come to the right place and that the United States is prepared to stand behind him. The case officer must produce timely answers to many critical questions and he must assemble as much checkable information in the time available to verify bona fides. "What excuse does the would-be defector have for his deviation from his normal routine? Does anyone know of his plans? Who saw him enter the American installation? What is the person's true motivation?" Of paramount importance "can he return to his regular position as an agent-in-place for the United States?" The case officer has strong support from headquarters, but at this delicate moment, the ball is clearly in his court; how he proceeds is critical. We know that many times the initial handling of "walk-ins" has been bungled. Two of the most important agents-in-place that the United States ever had, made repeated attempts to secure contact with American intelligence officials before succeeding. And now, in this era of terrorism, with United States installations abroad reinforced like great fortresses, it is doubly difficult for a disaffected Soviet or Bloc official to establish contact. Would that we could say "the door is always open-please drop in!"

I believe that any case officer who has had this experience, dealing with a possible defection in its earliest stages, will have strong feelings about the psychology of defector handling. This person has made the most important decision of his life; it is irreversible; his psychological needs will have to be closely considered for a long period of time. His moods, fears and general culture shock must be addressed. He must be helped to adjust to life in this country. The transition is not easy.

Although I realize that the Committee is particularly interested in the handling of defectors after their initial contact, I emphasize these earliest relationships with the operational case officer because it is at this stage that the human factor is absolutely essential. Building rapport is critical to building motivation and building a foundation for the verification of bona fides. Confidence, trust and frank mutual understanding are vital. In intelligence work we must never minimize the human factor. Any intelligent defector would have to be an utter fool to risk his life for a faceless organization; but when a situation of total confidence has been established, linking the defector and the case officer, it is a different ball game. By and large, the operational case officers that have been on the scene at the time of the defector's approach have established this spirit of trust, and they have given the defector the proper assurances and commitments, consistent with headquarter's authority. In dealing with a number of defectors, it is my experience that in most every case there has been, in the early stages at least one outstanding American case officer; a sensitive, understanding person with whom the defector has a genuine sense of trust.

Unfortunately, however, as the defector enters the important later stages, i.e. interrogation, debriefing, and long-delayed discussions on resettlement, the trusted case officer fades from the scene and the great intelligence organization becomes, if not a faceless organization, a many-faced bureaucracy. Understandably, debriefing entails a great number of diverse experts, analysts etc. At long last when questions of resettlement are approached the defector has ceased to be an operational concern but simply an administrative matter. It is at this point that inadequate attention is paid to the need for a lasting and trustful relationship between the newcomer and the Agency. New faces appear and they are frequently rotated. The new contact personnel are simply not of a sufficiently high caliber to deal with the trauma of a person who is leaving all behind for an unknown future. It is my experience that the domestic contact people do not have the broad-mindedness, the education, the consideration, the tolerance or the sensitivity required; Agency employees working in resettlement are in largely dead-end assignments. They lack the motivation and skill to do their delicate jobs properly.

Many resettlement personnel have a simplistic view of what they are dealing with; often misgivings stem from the unfortunate word defector--literally a person who abandons loyalty, duty and principle. However, I have found that defectors do not think they have been disloyal to their country. They still love their native land, but most Russians and East Europeans have no difficulty in drawing the line to separate themselves from the regime now in power. In most cases it is a question of the bosses and the bossed.

The lack of understanding on the part of the resettlement personnel has often had a very unfortunate result; at times the commitments and guarantees made by the original operational case officer have not been honored later on or have been adversely altered by the bureaucratic resettlement personnel.

In light of the above, when it comes time for resettlement, there has been a tendency to try to place defectors in positions for which they are not suited and which have little appeal to their talents and aims. Defectors, by and large, hope to continue working according to their specialization. Since they have become disillusioned with the Soviet system, they would like to make some impact by explaining the faults and weaknesses of the Soviet system to Americans in government, private business sector, or in the academic world. America has some excellent Sovietologists and Kremlinologists, but could not former members of the Soviet system play roles in the think tanks and academic institutions of this country?

The importance of proper reception and long-term handling of defectors is emphasized because it is a critical factor in the intelligence/espionage struggle between the USSR and the USA. In this great battle of wits, essentially between the KGB and the CIA, most everyone would admit that the KGB has built-in advantages over the CIA. The Soviet Union is a police state; this makes acquisition of high level intelligence extremely difficult for the CIA; yet the KGB operative can work virtually with impunity in our free society. Also the KGB rests directly at the source of all power in the Soviet Union. Thus it has no problems with numbers of personnel, recruitment of the most gifted, priority access to funds etc. Yet the CIA is subject to many controls and restraints from many quarters in our democratic system. The consolidation of the KGB's dominance of the

POLITBURO, the Central Committee, and the military correctly labels the KGB as the "Engine of Soviet Power."

But there is, at least, one area where we in the West have an advantage in piercing the secrets behind the Communist bloc. We don't always have to go to the target. The target often comes to us, through people who know it well. If those who freely come over to us belong to the Soviet hierarchy, then they are in a position to know the strengths and weaknesses of the regime, its factions, its inefficiencies, its vulnerabilities, its corruption. Furthermore, we realize that there are many dissatisfied persons (whom we do not know) who are today considering defection. Some of them hesitate to take the final step, not because they have qualms about forsaking an unsatisfying way of life, but because they are afraid of the unknowns that await them here. They are given little comfort by the way the Soviet press has dramatized the stories of two relatively recent re-defectors, Vitali Yurchenko and Oleg Bitov, who stated in emotional press conferences after re-defecting that they had been forcibly held, drugged and beaten by Western Intelligence before escaping to the USSR.

We must respond to this blatant disinformation. Secretary Gorbachev's agenda of decentralization, liberalization, democratization for the USSR has already resulted in liberalization of the Soviet media and increased ability for Western information to enter the Soviet Union.

The tremendous value of information we receive from defectors is well known to the Soviet Union. Truly, defectors are the Soviet "Achilles Heel." Our adversaries know that some of the very best intention-level intelligence has been given to the U.S. by defectors, including identification of Soviet "illegals" working in the U.S. and key leads to "moles" operating in Western Intelligence and Security organizations. In the USSR there is a devastating feeling of defeat when defectors with professional experience in the government, party or military affairs reject the regime. (These privileged Soviets who are allowed to travel abroad are the ones that have the best opportunity to defect. Certainly they are also the ones with the best insight into the Soviet system.) Beyond this human loss to the USSR is the very important ideological one. The Soviet Union has expended an enormous effort in propaganda and disinformation to convince the world that their country is a land that loves peace. Their fine leaders, they maintain, are the ones that cherish human rights. We know that they have achieved success in such propaganda particularly in the Third World. But when a defector comes our way it constitutes a severe puncture to the Soviet ideological balloon. The disinformation of the glorious "worker's paradise" is reduced to reality by the solid information revealed by the defector.

There is an unfortunate notion that the defector's knowledge of Soviet plans and stratagems stops with his defection and the value of the defector ceases when debriefing is over. This has been proven to be untrue by a number of defectors. The most important part of our foreign relations today is the United States relations with the USSR. The best guide we have to help us in the understanding of our adversary is the defector.

There are those who feel that these defectors, members of a privileged class, who, without permission, abandon allegiance to a former country, in order to come over to our free society, do not require or deserve help in establishing themselves. This is part of an ambiguous attitude toward defectors in our country, even though they have fled from repressive regimes and are paying us the compliment of preferring to live in the West at considerable psychological expense to themselves and their families. They have abandoned their homes, friends, careers, and often their families (now held hostage) in pursuing what they believe is right and necessary. Their action, in the view of many, involves betraying a trust of their native country. Yet, like the soldier who kills in war, the justification of their actions is in the moral worth of the cause they represent. Often we fail to recognize the heroism of their action. We have this conception that our great land of freedom will be a "piece of cake" for a newcomer from a totalitarian country. But what is it really like for one who comes from a structured, ordered society where everything has been done for them -- acquisition of their apartment, their schooling, their career? Upon entering our country they go from a life as a member of the intelligence entity, military, diplomatic corps, or as part of the governing elite into our system of individual initiative and free enterprise.

Defectors often find that they must start at the bottom in our society. Contrary to their native land, where there are no choices to make, here they find they have to fend for themselves and make the decisions on their own which are important to their basic welfare. They do not know how to make a loan, make a deposit at the bank, buy a car on credit, arrange for medical insurance, or weigh the merits of renting or trying to buy a place to live. All of these matters are important in resettlement, but the most important is the question of job security. In their previous society where everybody is employed this has not been a factor. To be unemployed in the USSR or Communist Eastern Europe is tantamount to being a criminal. It is against the law not to have employment. Thus if job security is not achieved in this country after their arrival, that works a tremendous emotional strain upon the defector.

We can all cite cases of very successful resettlement of defectors. It has been my experience, however, that some of the most successful resettlements have been due to the efforts of individual Americans; many of them are former intelligence and foreign service officers who have taken on this important responsibility on a private personal basis. But I wonder if we can rely upon this "above and beyond the call" action by a few highly motivated individuals to improve the climate for defection in the United States?

Last September the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Lee Hamilton, appeared on a panel with former DCI William Colby and ex-defector Vladimir Sahkarov sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace. This was held on the occasion of the premiere of a film on the defection case of Yuri Nosenko; the timing, only shortly after the re-defection of Vitali Yurchenko. In general, Congressman Hamilton was very hard on the CIA on the question of defector handling. At one point he suggested that the average American "does not trust the CIA." This did not please many of us "old intelligence hands" who are proud of our service with the Agency. I have, however, high praise for Congressman Hamilton's wise and splendid statements on defector handling. I select one brief quote: "I think we, as a country, have an obligation to these people. This is a real test of America; how you handle a defector." The full text of this splendid forum has been recorded by C-SPAN; it includes very prudent statements pertinent to the subject of this hearing made both by Dr. Sakharov and Director Colby. I suggest that the Committee include the text in the record.

As a former Senior Advisor to the Jamestown Foundation, I would also recommend that the Committee pay serious attention to the brilliant work of Etienne Huygens, former Research Director of the Jamestown Foundation. It is the opinion of at least half dozen of the leading Soviet experts in this country that his research work on the phenomenon of defection (which includes important facts and figures) is a most important study. It is still incomplete and given the dynamic state of defections, redefections, effect of detente negotiations on motivations, etc., more work needs to be done. Huygens' study reveals the magnitude of the phenomenon and the range of people who "choose freedom: by taking this extreme step. For those of us who work privately to assist in defector handling, it has been a severe blow that Huygens was released by Jamestown. It is a shame that he does not have adequate support to complete this significant work properly. The United States public needs to be educated about the causes of defection, its extent and the problems (financial, psychological and emotional) that defectors face. A member of one of the most distinguished "defector families" in the United States, with a background of significant academic achievement at prominent European and U.S. universities, Huygens is uniquely qualified to carry on this work.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to summarize my recommendations for Defectors:

1) Provide a support mechanism at the very outset of resettlement. This could be in the form of a set GS salary consistent with the level of the position held before defecting.

This would continue at least until complete adjustment into our society has been achieved. This should include medical benefits.

2) Provide job security. Meaningful employment consistent with skills and aims.

3) Citizenship. Prompt as possible.

4) Some form of recognition of their action. This is most important if their intelligence contribution has been significant or if they have served as a double agent before coming to this country.

5) Hold a second debriefing of defectors a couple of years or so after resettlement has started so that we can learn of impediments they faced, how it could have been better, etc.

General:

1) Utilize operationally oriented, sensitive, understanding case officers as contacts throughout the resettlement phase--folow up regularly. Consider putting all phases of defector handling under one senior CIA executive.

2) Establish one experienced case officer who has a relationship of trust with the defector as a permanent contact with the defector through all phases of defector handling.

3) Direct the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) to give priority attention to reforms of defector handling.

4) Encourage academic institutions, think tanks, American-International corporations to utilize the unique qualifications of defectors.

5) Establish a joint State-Defense-CIA Committee to improve defector handling and walk-in procedures at U.S. installations abroad.

6) Form a small group of retired motivated intelligence officers with operational background to act as "big brothers" to individual defectors. Members of the group would take responsibility for individual defectors after resettlement. They would provide advice and monitor the defector's progress.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank you and the Committee for requesting my views on this important subject.

EXHIBIT NO. 22

STATEMENT OF KARL D. ZUKERMAN, EXECUTIVE V.P.
OF HIAS
BEFORE THE
SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE
ON INVESTIGATIONS

I am pleased to have this opportunity to offer comments to the members of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations regarding the Government's handling of defectors and emigres to the United States. The organization I represent, the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), has for 105 years been the refugee and migration agency of the organized Jewish community in the United States. In addition, we provide extensive immigration counseling services in New York as well as advice and training in this area for our affiliates around the country.

Our philosophy of resettlement has developed out of our considerable experience in refugee resettlement and family reunification. In communities throughout the United States, HIAS works in close affiliation with a national network of professional Jewish community social service agencies who provide us with expert, professionally informed information and feedback on the progress of each refugee resettlement. This network enables us to provide comprehensive case management services under the supervision of trained social workers who are familiar with local resources and ensure newcomers a smooth transition as they enter their new communities.

HIAS' structure and system are particularly suited to the migration and absorption of Jewish refugees; nevertheless, as experienced resettlement professionals, HIAS has taken part over the years in almost every major refugee migration to this country, without regard to ethnic background. In the resettlement of both Jewish and non-Jewish clients, HIAS uses the facilities provided by Jewish Federations around the country and their direct service agencies, such as Jewish Family Services, Jewish Vocational Services and Jewish Community Centers in almost every city across the country. In New York, we use the services of the United Jewish Appeal. In national resettlement efforts, we work closely with the Council of Jewish Federations in the United States and Canada. In our resettlement programs, wherever possible, the refugee becomes the responsibility of the organized Jewish community and is delivered services by a team of qualified, trained professionals who have as their major priority the successful resettlement of refugees. While emphasizing professionalized, coordinated case management, the program does not fail to utilize resources such as the refugee's stateside family and volunteers.

HIAS monitors the progress of resettlement programs and individual communities very carefully and conducts nationwide meetings on resettlement issues. HIAS field representatives travel to resettlement sites to access local needs and to ensure a consistently high level of

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service appropriate to local conditions. Thus, flexibility and diversity of services are maintained from community to community. Although clients are placed by our New York office in a community of resettlement primarily on the basis of relative reunion, work potential and job markets are also taken into account. Consequently, the types of programs developed in individual communities can vary. The differences in programming can involve not only the type and extent of English language training but also consider the income potential of clients, their ability to develop self-help groups, housing requirement, size of families and many other issues.

Philosophically and programmatically, HIAS resettlement programs are structured around two essential elements: reunion with relatives whenever advisable, and dignified and appropriate employment as soon as possible. These principles can be translated basically into the interrelated goals of emotional adjustment and financial integration. By emphasizing relative reunion and the earliest possible appropriate job placement, we try to build upon the refugee's sense of independence and avoid fostering reliance upon private and public institutions. In terms of early-as-possible job placement, it is clear that changes in culture, economic system and separation from familiar surroundings can cause feelings of insecurity. Therefore, we find that even if a job found initially is below the level indicated by the client's qualification, early job placement is important, not only for financial but for therapeutic reasons. Once the client has become socially and economically productive, he can improve his English after work and can gradually improve his level of employment.

The philosophical basis of our refugee resettlement program informs our views about the Government's handling of political defectors to the U.S. We recognize the unique circumstances of defectors which may tend to isolate and alienate them from their indigenous communities in this country as well as from the population at large.

In additon, many of them carry the twin burdens of guilt and fear--guilt for having switched their loyalities and fear of reprisal against themselves and their families, here or abroad. For these reasons, defectors would seem to require special security arrangements as well as adjustment counseling which would take into account their unique circumstances. Vocational counseling and language skills training should also be made available to help in the mainstreaming process as they are to refugees under the current system.

For a certain group of defectors with highly developed skills and experiences, our government might want to consider providing employment readiness training programs coupled with high powered job search and development services so that defectors with special skills will be able to employ them profitably. We would be uncomfortable with the notion of providing employment for these people in universities, think tanks and the like, in jobs that are set aside specially for them, outside of the competitive market place. Such placements would further

continued....

isolate the defector and risk alienating him from his community of peers, which would be counterproductive to the purposes of such a program. In our view, all assistance to defectors should be geared to helping them to achieve economic self-sufficiency and social integration. Programs offered to them must be facilitative of these ends.

Refugees and immigrants from totalitarian regimes have grown up in systems that tend to discourage individual initiative, a characteristic that is highly valued and necessary for success in the United States. It is important to emphasize that the very act of leaving their country and risking their lives and livelihoods for an uncertain future in an unknown environment is a courageous act of self initiative, distinguishing the emigres from those remaining behind. Nevertheless, services offered to such people should and do, in practice, take into account their prior socializing circumstances in helping emigres from totalitarian countries to adjust to their new environment. The voluntary agencies engaged in resettlement gear their counseling and other service delivery programs to the different nationality groups, in order to best acquaint them to their new culture and value system.

Refugees and asylees (defectors may fall in either category) differ from immigrants in that they must meet a test under the law that they have a "well founded fear of persecution" on account of their politics, race, religion or social group.

In addition, refugees are eligible for federally sponsored cash and medical assistance, specifically targeted to that group, which are not available to immigrants. Moreover, immigrants under most circumstances are barred from other forms of public assistance for a period of three years. This proscription does not apply to refugees or asylees.

Assistance to all groups must reflect the different circumstances of their flight. Yet, all of these people have demonstrated personal courage and individual initiative. They come to these shores with an amazing reservoir of strength and resiliance. What is required of Government is assistance that stimulates and nurtures their natural talents so they may live productive lives integrated into the community at large and contribute, in turn, to their new land as have countless others before them.

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9/10/87

The San Diego Union
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EXHIBIT NO. 25

A Soviet defector tells why she left

First of three articles

By Alexandra Costa

"Why did you defect?"

I've heard this question so many times. Among some 80 radio and television shows that I participated in, there wasn't a single one where I wasn't asked this question. In the beginning, in the middle, in the end — sooner or later the host would ask: "Why did you defect?"

There is no simple answer. There is no short answer, either. How can you explain in 30 seconds, or a few minutes, why someone would decide to leave one's entire way of life, one's past, one's identity and jump into an unknown and uncertain future?

There is always a reason, and there are as many different reasons as there are defectors. But there is also something, a common thread, in every defector's tale. They all say in the end: "I wanted to be free." It's almost a cliche, or it sounds like one to most Americans, for a very simple reason — most people in this country don't know what it is not to be free.

My own journey down the road to this personal liberation was as unique as every person's life is, and yet remarkably similar to what most would-be defectors go through before they arrive at that final decision. I came to the United States in 1975 as a wife of a first secretary of the Soviet embassy in Washington. I also was assigned to work with my husband in the newly opened Soviet copyright office in Washington.

Alexandra Costa (a.k.a. Yelena Mitrokhina) is a former Soviet citizen who in 1978 became the only person to defect from the Soviet embassy in Washington since World War II. She was born and grew up in Leningrad, later moving to Moscow, where she married Lev Mitrokhin, a political scientist and a deputy director of the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. Costa currently lives in Virginia with her two children, working as a computer consultant, writer and lecturer. Her autobiography, Stepping Down from the Star, *published last October by G.P. Putnam's Sons, also was reprinted by* Reader's Digest *condensed books and by Literary Guild Book Club.*

Until then, my life had been comfortable and smooth. I grew up in a well-to-do family. My father was an air force colonel attached to the Air Force Academy in Leningrad. My mother was

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Special to The San Diego Union/Jennifer Hewitson

Costa: A Soviet defector explains

Continued from C-1

a journalist. I had an undergraduate degree in foreign languages from the prestigious University of Leningrad and a graduate degree in sociology.

For two years before our assignment to the United States I was teaching Marxist philosophy in a school for foreign communists in Moscow, and I was married to a deputy director of a major social research institute. In short, both by material standard of living and intellectual milieu, I belonged to the upper stratum of the Soviet society.

I was looking forward to our stay in Washington. I've always had considerable interest in the West, its culture and literature, and its way of life. My work as a translator had brought me into contact with people from Western Europe and the United States — first tourists, then visiting scientists and dignitaries. Our house was filled with books in English — a result of my husband's frequent travel abroad and my own contacts with foreigners. So the opportunity to go and actually live in another country was very exciting. I thought I already knew enough about life in the United States from books; this was just an additional bonus of experiencing it firsthand.

I couldn't have been more wrong. My encounter with the United States turned out to be nothing less than a cultural shock. In fact, in the two years after our arrival here I experienced three distinct shock waves, and each of them deserves some attention on its own.

The first and the most obvious shock was the encounter with the everyday reality of American life. Of course, I knew that the standard of living in the Soviet Union was far below that in the developed countries of the West. I had lived through periodic shortages of basic items and rationing of such basic necessities as flour and sugar. What I did not know, though, was the extent of the gap in the standard of living.

So I spent the first two weeks getting over the shock of going to the supermarket and not recognizing 50 percent of the items in the produce department — how can you recognize something you've never seen before? — or not knowing what 50 percent of the items in the household goods department were for.

I have received many letters from readers of my books, both men and women, and most of them mentioned that one of the most vivid descriptions in my book was my first encounter with a dishwasher. I am not surprised that the readers picked up this detail, because it was a highly emotional experience for me that transcended the mere fact of getting acquainted with another new appliance.

The Soviet society is segregated in a very peculiar sense — by a supply level assigned to various jobs and belonging to certain organizations. There is a fair amount of racial and ethnic prejudice, and women are not exactly equal to men, especially in positions of power, but there is a certain degree of crossover. The line that is most difficult to cross is the supply line.

It is not a matter of purchasing power; it is a matter of access. Many organizations such as the Central Committee of the Communist Party, or the KGB — the Committee for State Security — have their own chains of stores, both food and general merchandise. In the school where I was teaching there was a small food shop where I could buy gourmet things that were never available in regular stores, or just good cuts of meat that otherwise would be purchased at exorbitant prices on the farmers' market. There was also a small general store that was stocked with Western goods that are available to average citizens only at the black market — at black market prices. Our medical needs were covered by a special department of the Ministry of Health, with its state-of-the-art imported diagnostic equipment and pharmaceuticals, not the local clinic with overworked doctors, endless lines and antiquated equipment.

In short, I had the best Soviet society could offer. And yet, in Moscow I spent hours and hours every week washing clothes in the bathtub, hanging them out to dry on the clotheslines in the kitchen, ironing, doing dishes, preparing food from scratch — not by choice, but because all the wonderful time- and labor-saving appliances that are standard in American homes, ready-to-eat cereals and frozen dinners, are simply unknown in the Soviet Union. No money or access could buy them there. The fact that I had not recognized the dishwasher for what it was brought home two painful truths: an intellectual one — how technologically backward my country was, despite all its military might and space achievements — and an emotional one — that I had wasted a good part of my life doing needless, back-breaking chores because of this technological gap.

Profound as it was, this first shock wave wore off very quickly, in a matter of weeks. It's easy to get used to good things in life, and I was no exception. Besides, at that time I was not ready to go one step further and ponder more serious philosophical and political implications of my discovery.

It was only later that I realized that the technological gap was not accidental, that the Soviet Union possessed, or could purchase, the technology to make the appliances and to produce consumer goods. The reason these things are lacking in the Soviet society is a political one. The country's resources are directed at the military complex and the needs of the power elite first, and people's needs always come last. People do not matter. They are just little pegs in the machinery that keeps the state, and its power elite, going.

The second shock wave took longer to arrive, several months, but when it did it hit me with full force. It was the information shock wave.

It is well known that Soviet media are state-controlled, which means that only the material that is in compliance with the official position may be published. However, when I lived there I was under the impression that at least what was published, doctored as it was in propaganda, was essentially correct: That the Americans were warmongers bent on destroying the Soviet Union at the first opportunity. That the good life in America was the privilege of "fat cats," the "capitalists," and the working class was oppressed and striving for liberation. That the blacks in America don't have any rights. And that the American media were nothing but the faithful servants of power brokers.

It was a revelation to read the *Washington Post* and to find out that there were no people the media were more happy to lash out at than power brokers. And to find out the only liberation the "struggling working masses" of America were fighting for was from high taxes. And to discover, to my utter astonishment, as I was driving along Riggs Road in northeast Washington and looking at blocks and blocks of small row houses, with late model cars parked in front of them, that I was in a black neighborhood.

I realized the full impact of being spoiled by the daily flow of factual, accurate information when I went to Moscow on a short trip after a six-month stay in Washington. One item I missed sorely during my stay there was the *Washington Post*. I brought all the necessities with me: a supply of diapers and baby food for my daughter and enough coffee and instant soups to last me for three weeks. But after a week of meetings with my friends and endless talk about backbiting and bickering at their work, the shortages in the stores and the outrageous prices on the black market, I wanted to know what was happening in the world. And all I had was Soviet newspapers full of stories about heroic workers overfulfilling their production quotas, and, on the international page, how bad life was for the "oppressed masses of the capitalist West."

Special to The San Diego Union/Jennifer Hewitson

I returned to Washington from Moscow quite depressed and complained to a friend of mine in the embassy about the difficulty of finding common topics of conversation with my friends of some 20 years. [illegible] languages," I said.

"Welcome to the club," he laughed. "You have just joined an exclusive fraternity called Soviet Americans. Your perspective changed because of the exposure to life here, and because of all the information you have access to.

"It's a permanent transition. You'll go back to Moscow and there you'll continue to socialize with people whom you've met here, at the embassy, because they are the only ones who'll understand what you are talking about."

There was more. Not only my perspective on many things changed. There also was the reverse cultural shock of seeing the drabness of Soviet life after being away for six months. And the recurrent question that kept coming back was: Why does it have to be that way? The Soviet Union has immense natural and human resources. Why is one country so rich and another so poor?

My transition through the first two shock waves didn't make me a potential defector, though. The thought had not occurred to me, even once. Sure, I liked living in Washington. But I loved my country. I was very patriotic, as most Soviet people are. And people who love their country don't defect. It was as simple as that.

There is often a simplistic perception here: Life in the Soviet Union is so bad that if we just open the borders, 90 percent of the people would escape from there. Apparently, this perception is shared by the Soviet government that keeps those borders closed. However, this perception is not true.

Also, the perception that most people in the Soviet Union are disenchanted with their system is not true. Most of people [illegible] their government. The reason for that is that their perception of both the Soviet life and the outside world is shaped — as mine was at the time — through a very concentrated propaganda effort that begins very early in life, most likely at the age of 3, when Soviet children enter kindergarten. From that time on, a very important link is forged in people's mind: If you love your country, you love its government. The country and its government are one and the same.

And that is the link that is so difficult to dissolve that most people never get to the point of the third shock wave, the significance of which is understanding that you can love your country, but you don't have to love its government.

It takes time to arrive at that point. I've met many intelligent, even brilliant, people in the Soviet embassy in Washington. We've had conversations about those idiots in Moscow who were running country into the ground, about the party hacks who did not know how to run the economy. We hoped that some day there would be change, that there would be a sensible leadership that would right the wrong, put the country back on track of what it was meant to be by its founders. We did not see anything wrong with the system itself. We thought that the misuse of resources, the abuse of the population were a matter of the personnel at the top.

This is something that took me a long time to understand: That the country's ills were not a matter of personnel. That the system was never sidetracked from its original intent. That it is today what it was meant to be by its founder, V.I. Lenin.

We hear today the appeals to "return to Leninism" coming from the new Soviet [illegible] what Lenin intended it to be. He was the man who gave theoretical justification to the one-party, top-down rule. He was the man who invented the term "democratic centralism," where the word "democratic" is extraneous.

I came to understand that the problems in the Soviet society are not the results of isolated incidents or occasional misuses of power, and the shortages of food are not just the results of bad weather. That all of that was the result of the system, and the system itself would have to change to correct it.

I could still go back and continue doing what I've been doing all my life: saying what was expected, doing what was expected. As most people there, I was extremely adept at separating my public life from the private one. The system does reward those who are loyal to it, even if it is just a surface loyalty. That's the ultimate irony of it: Nobody really believes in the communist slogans anymore, but who would dare to challenge them, even if they don't make sense? Many people are whispering that the king is naked, but those who dare to point the finger and say it loudly are dealt with swiftly.

There was only one problem: I no longer wanted to do that. I was tired of living a life of lies, of doublespeak. All my life somebody was telling me what to do, how to live. I couldn't change the system, but I could take charge of my own life by escaping it. I no longer wanted to be just another peg in the huge machinery of the state. I wanted to be me.

Next Sunday: Why the Soviet Union is poor

The hollow Soviet promise

People must make do by doing without

Second of three articles

By Alexandra Costa

There are two new foreign words in American lexicon that jump at me every time I open my morning newspaper. These words — *glasnost* (openness, or publicity) and *perestroika* (restructuring, reorganization) — are the buzzwords for the new policies in the cultural and economic life of the Soviet Union that have been taking place there since General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985.

"What is *perestroika*?" I often am asked. "Is it a reform, a new approach, or an entirely new economic order? Why is the Soviet leader so intent on shaking up the system, all of a sudden?"

The question usually takes me all the way back to my college days. There are no courses in economics as we know them taught in Soviet colleges. There is, however, a course that is a mandatory part of practically every curriculum, together with Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the history of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. The course is called *Political Economy*.

This distinction is crucial because, by putting the word *political* first, the title of this course symbolizes the life of the Soviet economy as it is today and as it has been for 70 years, since the creation of the Soviet state. The problem is that in order to fit the realities of life into the narrow confines of the communist ideology, the economic laws either have been ignored or, worse, turned upside down. The natural incentives to work have been crushed; the market relationship of supply and demand has been abolished; and profit has been declared immoral. As a result, the Soviet Union today has an economy that is centralized to the point of being unplannable and is plagued with shortages.

Alexandra Costa (a.k.a. Yelena Mitrokhina) is a former Soviet citizen and the only person to defect from the Soviet embassy in Washington since World War II. She currently lives in Virginia with her two children, working as an independent computer consultant, writing and lecturing. Her autobiography, Stepping Down from the Star, *published last October by G.P. Putnam's Sons, also was reprinted by Reader's Digest condensed books and by Literary Guild Book Club.*

One of the greatest misnomers of our time is calling the Soviet Union a "superpower." With the exception of its military sector and the space program, which is closely related to military research, the Soviet Union is a Third World country that does not produce enough food to feed its population, where most of the roads outside the cities are still unpaved and turn into impassable mud after heavy rain. It is a country with an antiquated telephone system that requires five to ten years of waiting to obtain a private phone line, and where computers are exclusively the domain of the military and a few more advanced scientific institutions. It is a country that is at least 20 years behind the United States in technological development.

Ironically, the Soviet Union is also living proof that objective economic laws and the laws of human nature cannot be stamped out by a party decree. Where the official economy fails, the unofficial one springs into life. The human desires of individuals to better their lives, or merely to receive the satisfaction of being paid for an honest day's work, or even the necessity to fulfill the production quotas, have created a huge second economy: the black and the "gray" markets that are almost equal to the official one.

Although most of this second economy is illegal, the Soviet authorities usually look the other way, unless the transgressions of individuals reach monumental proportions. This leniency is a tacit acknowledgment that without the black market the consumer economy simply will come to a halt.

The current leadership even went one step further, and decided to legalize some parts of that second economy. To a large degree, the current economic reforms are simply aimed at bringing some of the existing "private enterprise" under government control — and government taxation.

Special to The San Diego Union/[illegible]

A well-known example of the legal "private sector" filling the void created by the official economy is agriculture. Soviet farmers are required to work full-time either at collective or state farms, but they also are permitted to cultivate small private plots and to sell the products in farmers' markets. According to official data, these private plots comprise only 4 percent of farm land in the U.S.S.R., yet they produce about one-half of all potato output and about one-third of dairy products and meat.

An example of a "gray" market is using illegal means to obtain legal goals such as fulfilling production quotas. In theory, central planning is supposed to ensure adequate supplies of materials and parts for the chain of production. In reality, centralized planning of production quotas for some 50 million items is impossible. As a result, directors of the enterprises often resort to illegal means such as bribery to procure the necessary materials. However, since the director of the enterprise does not gain personally from these activities, the cases rarely are prosecuted and the law is applied in somewhat more lenient manner.

Examples of "black markets" are abundant, from reselling scarce goods at a profit to producing and distributing goods outside of the state network. The former is a part of the daily life of most citizens and is largely uncontrollable by the state: Sales clerks in the state-owned stores consider it an entitlement that comes with the job to stash a shipment of scarce goods and to sell them to trusted customers at a profit. With straight faces, plumbers and auto mechanics tell customers that the spare parts they need are not available, but when hired to do the jobs after hours — at "private" rates — the parts miraculously appear. The latter practice involves entire manufacturing enterprises, operating outside of

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Costa: The promise is doing without

Continued from C-5

state control with illegally procured materials, and distributing their goods through state-owned stores that keep double sets of books. This is a large-scale illegal activity that can bring long jail sentences or even capital punishment.

A special form of the black market is official corruption and bribery. Money and connections can buy anything. Medical care and education are free, but a bribe will get a patient admitted to one of the better research facilities that have the best surgeons, or will get a student with below-acceptance grades into a hard-to-get-into university.

Unlike the state economy, the "second economy" operates in compliance with the basic laws of economics. The law of supply and demand makes it possible for a pair of imported jeans to be sold on the black market for an equivalent of the monthly salary of a grade school teacher. The true cost of production and distribution is reflected in the prices farmers charge for their products in the farmers' markets — usually four to five times more than the prices in state stores. The products still sell briskly because the difference in quality brings parity in prices in the final count.

Is this situation going to change now? We hear about reforms of all sorts coming from the Soviet press all the time. What is happening? Does perestroika really mean total restructuring of Soviet economy? Is the Soviet Union moving towards a free-market economy, towards democracy?

And then there is Secretary Gorbachev himself: charming, charismatic, a true "take-charge" leader. Does he really mean what he says, or is it all a public relations campaign for domestic and Western consumption?

The first word that comes to my mind when I think about Gorbachev is "pragmatic," which is the highest compliment I can pay to anybody who is in a leadership position in the Soviet Union. Pragmatism and common sense are very rare qualities there, because the rules of life are set by an ideology that often contradicts common sense.

News America Syndicate/[illegible]

Gorbachev understands that the Soviet economy is in serious trouble. It's not going to collapse: There are too many factors that prevent that, including the ability of the Soviet people to put up with deprivation. The economy has been crashing along for generations, and it will do so for the next several generations at least, even if nothing is done. But there is a potential for popular unrest because any belt-tightening always comes at the expense of the consumer economy: In the industrial city of Magnitogorsk (population 450,000) the meat ration today is 2.2 pounds and the butter ration is 14 ounces — per person, *per month*.

There is also an unpleasant consequence to losing the status of "superpower." So what Gorbachev is trying to do is to shore up the consumer economy and, through improved relations with the West, bring in more high technology that is crucial for maintaining Soviet military power. And that's about it.

The 2,000-mile Baikal-Amur Railroad (BAM) — a key factor in the development of the Soviet Far East — stands largely unused since its official completion date in 1984.

We are not talking about Western-style democracy or political freedoms. Gorbachev has stated many times that the Soviet Union is not going to deviate from its socialist path and that the Communist Party is still the leading political force in the Soviet society. In short, he is trying to make the Soviet economy more efficient without deviating from the principles of political economy that are the foundation of the Soviet system.

I would be the first to agree that it would be impossible to get the Soviet Union back on the road to capitalism, primarily because the majority of the population does believe in whatever the word socialism means, and they have come to expect certain things associated with communist ideology — subsidized housing and basic goods, full employment, free medical care, etc.

On the other hand, I do believe that without unleashing true market forces Gorbachev will come up against an insurmountable wall. True, some private enterprise is permitted under the new law, but it is permitted in an extremely limited way. Because Marxist ideology prohibits private ownership of means of production and making profit from other people's labor, the only type of private enterprise permitted now is either a cooperative, or individual labor. The fine print in the new law also says that the individual may involve family members, but at least one member of the family also must work fulltime for the state. The list of businesses falling under this category is very limited: plumbers, barbers, cobblers, auto mechanics, etc.

Only the state has a right to hire labor and make profits, which, according to the same ideology, belong to all people and then are redistributed back to them. The fact that they are redistributed in a very uneven way is beside the point.

These ideological shackles limit any private undertaking to very small-scale enterprises, practically all in the service sector and agriculture. Industries — both heavy and consumer-goods industries — remain state-run.

This would not be so bad by itself if the individual managers of state enterprises were permitted to set their own production goals and the methods of achieving them. After all, even in capitalist countries most large companies are run by professional managers, not the owners. But here comes the second stumbling block — central planning, which is still the cornerstone of the Soviet system, and, according to Gorbachev, will remain so in the foreseeable future. "Plan, the Almighty" dictates that production quotas must be met no matter what, and the factories usually are given bonuses for overfulfilling the plan. The direct result is economic stagnation.

A few typical examples of the havoc central planning wrecks on the economy:

— Imported equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars is left rusting in factory yards. If installed, the equipment would increase productivity tenfold. To install it, the factory production will have to stop temporarily. The factory director doesn't install the equipment because (a) even a few months of not meeting the quotas can cost him his job and (b) if the equipment is installed his quotas will be raised. He doesn't need the hassle.

— The production quotas for small items such as nails are measured by weight. It is easier for the factory to meet the quotas by making large, heavier nails than small ones. The result: a glut of the former, a shortage of the latter. The consumer demand is irrelevant — whether the product is ever sold or not does not affect the factory as long as it fulfills the plan.

— The 2,000-mile Baikal-Amur Railroad (BAM) — a key factor in the development of the Soviet Far East — stands largely unused since its official completion date in 1984. The problems of the $16 billion (at the official exchange rate of $1.6 to the ruble — the black market rate is four rubles to the dollar) railroad are caused by an unfinished nine-mile tunnel that the planners, to cut estimated costs and completion time, had charted to go through a geologically unstable mountain that sits atop a fault. Only a fraction of planned traffic moves through the road today, using a temporary bypass that already has been relaid twice. The cost of a permanent bypass is an additional $3 billion.

These stories may remind American readers of such Pentagon procurement horror stories as $600 toilet seats, except that in the Soviet Union it is happening on a *national* scale. There is no private sector to watch the bottom line. The whole country is one big defense department, with all the problems of waste and mismanagement typical of government operations.

How the Soviet leadership is going to reconcile their commitment to central planning with the law of supply and demand is unclear. From my point of view, it will remain one of the major obstacles to economic development.

Yet another problem has to do with people — the problem of incentives. Simply letting people earn more without giving them something to buy with their money is not going to increase productivity — there already is sufficient money circulating in the society, at least enough to support a flourishing black market. It's a Catch 22: To make people work you have to offer them something for their money, and to offer them something you first have to increase the output of the consumer sector of the economy. So where is the government going to get the goods to provide enough incentives?

One solution would be to make massive purchases of consumer goods in the West, and the technology eventually to produce these goods domestically. In order to do that, the Soviet government would need considerable trade credits and special favorable conditions. That's one of the aims of Soviet foreign policy right now, the public relations campaign directed at improving trade relations with the West.

No matter what happens at the top, this "new class" is in a position to implement or to sabotage any decision coming from the leadership. And right now the majority of its members are very unhappy with Gorbachev's reforms. . . .

But let's assume that, under the best possible circumstances, many of these obstacles could be overcome, at least to a certain degree. It would take at least a decade to turn the economy around. Will Gorbachev stay in power that long to find out if his reforms work? In other words, will he be permitted to succeed even within the narrow limits that the current ideology imposes on the economy?

There is a major misconception that I've noticed among many Americans: the idea that the general secretary of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. — a sort of a Soviet president, in the American sense — can make unilateral decisions because the Soviet Union is a totalitarian state. That may have been true during Stalin's time, when the totalitarian state was also a personal dictatorship. The head of the Soviet state today does have a constituency he has to answer to. Admittedly, his constituency is not the same as the American President's. It's not the people.

This constituency is called *nomenklatura* — the "new class" of the Soviet bureaucratic elite that really runs the country. It is a very exclusive club with lifetime membership, and belonging to that club brings a lot of privileges that are not available to ordinary members of the Soviet society. The estimated 800,000 members of the "new class" shop in special "membership-only" stores, get their medical care in special hospitals, live in spacious apartments — usually in buildings of pre-Soviet construction — and spend their leisure at special resorts. When people are expelled from this club, which occasionally happens, they lose more than their jobs. They lose their privileged lifestyle that the ordinary citizens can only recreate through the black market, with a lot of effort and enormous sums of money.

No matter what happens at the top, this "new class" is in a position to implement or to sabotage any decision coming from the leadership. And right now the majority of its members are very unhappy with Gorbachev's reforms, which have sent a few high-level officials to prison, and some even have been executed for corruption. Some have been fired from their cushy positions. The message is clear: "shape up or else."

But the danger to the "new class" at large comes not from Gorbachev himself. He is not about to shake the foundations of the system, and the "new class" *is* the system. The danger is that economic freedom breeds the desire for other freedoms. The same people who will learn to be responsible for the way their enterprises are run sooner or later will come up with the same question I did: Who says that the party hacks are qualified to run the country better than I am? What have they done to deserve that prerogative other than being able to recite party slogans? In other words, people may eventually question the legitimacy of the political power structure.

If Gorbachev's reforms are implemented, the members of the "new class" may have a hard time maintaining their place in the society and their perks. So they are fighting. They are fighting for their survival.

I am not an economist. But the reason I now live in the United States and not in my native Soviet Union is that I've seen for myself what disastrous results the policy of letting ideology run the economy brings to the people who must suffer from it. The reason I believe that giving economic decisions to the ordinary citizens can be dangerous for the current power structure is that it was exactly the path that led me to question the foundations of the Soviet system.

My exposure to the workings of the American business world during my years with the Soviet embassy in Washington convinced me that no "external factors" could account for the disparity in the economies of the countries, that the root of the problem was the Soviet system that makes individual initiative an undesirable quality and that permits a relatively small group of professional politicians, whose main qualification for the job is their loyalty to the party dogma, to make decisions for the rest of the population.

That, and the final realization that most of the problems of the Soviet society could be resolved if only they replaced *Political Economy* with *Economics 101*.

Next Sunday: Glasnost's real meaning

'Glasnost' really more a scenario

Soviet Union is only as open as needed to gain its political goals

Last of three articles

By Alexandra Costa

Alexandra Costa (a.k.a. Yelena Mitrokhina), a former Soviet citizen, defected from the Soviet embassy in Washington in 1978. Currently living in Virginia with her two children, she works as an independent computer consultant, writer and lecturer. Her autobiography, Stepping Down from the Star, was published last October by G.P.Putnam's Sons.

Imagine the following script:

"Jack and Jane have been married for many years. They have a family business, but he had squandered most of the capital through bad investments and mismanagement. Their house is badly in need of repair, and she subsists on bare necessities.

"Because Jack has control over the business, he spends on himself lavishly, being careful, however, to keep it a secret from Jane. He doesn't love her, but he doesn't want to lose her, either, because she is the one who keeps the business going, providing him with income and image.

"Sensing that she is reaching the limit of her patience, he confesses to some of his past transgressions, blames the mismanagement of the company on unscrupulous actions of several employees, whom he promptly fires. He says he has learned from past mistakes, and promises to change his ways. Hope reigns eternal — she believes him again and, with relief, looks forward to a brighter future. Fade out. . . ."

Sounds too banal even for Hollywood? Yet this script has been made into a movie successfully, even with several remakes. The title of the movie is "Soviet History."

We are watching the latest remake now, making rounds under the subtitle "Glasnost — The New Beginning." It was released almost two years ago, and it has caused considerable interest and critical acclaim. Perhaps it's time for another review. Let's look at glasnost, what it has been so far, and where it is now.

Those who have been following developments in the Soviet Union for the past two years might have noticed the evolution of usage of the word glasnost in the American media. In the beginning, the word itself was universally translated as openness, and was interpreted as a symbol of democratization of Soviet society. Now more and more publications are making careful disclaimers that seem to say: Yes, it can be translated as openness, but it really means publicity.

Both translations are almost correct, but not quite. Yes, glasnost means openness, but not in a sense of open being an antonym of closed. The Soviet society is as closed as ever in terms of tight political control, and any talk about democracy is premature, to say the least.

It also means publicity, but not in a sense of PR, although there's a great deal of that, too, going on in the Soviet Union today. What glasnost means is "taking it out into the open," or "public knowledge." In short, it means disclosure.

There certainly have been a lot of disclosures in the U.S.S.R. recently. For the first time in many years I read Soviet newspapers with interest. I see things printed there that I haven't seen in 30 years: a lot of critical articles describing waste and mismanagement, and abuse of power of the previous administration.

At the same time, there is a certain sense of deja vu, because I have seen it before. When Nikita Khrushchev came to power there was a very similar relaxation of controls. They didn't call it glasnost then, but books of previously banned authors were published, politically daring films were released. Economic reforms were attempted. And, of course, the most recurring motive in the entire script: the denunciation of the misdeeds of the now dead — or deposed, as it was the case with Khrushchev — leaders of the Soviet state.

The logical question is: Why is such a process needed? Perhaps the simplest explanation is that of a "boiler effect." When the boiler is overheated, the steam builds up. At this point, it is necessary to open the valve and let some steam out or the boiler will explode.

There is always discontent brewing among Soviet citizens with slow progress in improving the standard of living, with the arbitrariness and rudeness of the bureaucracy; and with reading constantly cheerful newspaper reports about overfulfilled production quotas while standing in line to buy even basic necessities. And what is a better time to open the valve than when the recently departed leader provides a convenient scapegoat for all the ills of the past, and the new one is still an unknown quantity and therefore capable of offering hope for the better?

The boiler valve, however, must be calibrated carefully to let out enough steam and at the same time to keep the boiler operational and under control. It is exactly this calibration process that we see with glasnost. The process is now near completion. The limits have been fairly clearly established, the opening is approaching the maximum safety margin. It may still go another inch. After that, the time will come to close the valve, or the boiler may run out of steam altogether.

Where are these limits? In the spirit of glasnost, a group of former dissidents in the Soviet Union applied for official permission to start a new magazine, appropriately named Glasnost. The permission was denied, but the group went ahead and "published" the first issue: 150 typewritten copies. A second issue was distributed a couple of months later, and this one drew an official response. The newspaper *Evening Moscow* (Vechernyaya Moskva) published a scathing criticism of the underground magazine, and the newspaper's editor, Romanovsky, gave an interview to a group of foreign journalists. The following quote is from the article by Celestine Bohlen of the *Washington Post*:

"If the process continues and goes on in depth, (said Romanovsky), what need is there for an unofficial press? There will be no need for any other *glasnost*. There will be just one: one honest, one broad, and one single *glasnost*."

In other words, there's only one truth, and there is no other.

As Bohlen continues in her article, for Grigoryants, the editor of the underground magazine, "*glasnost* has meant offering a point of view not available in the party or government press." For the editor of the official newspaper, "*glasnost* is the party line, now extended to include new subjects."

The event described in Bohlen's article is extremely interesting in more than one respect. Some of the points that deserve attention are:

First, there is certainly change for the better. Three years ago Grigoryants, the editor of the underground publication, would have been sent promptly to the labor camp from which he had recently been released after serving eight years for similar activities in the past.

Second, by choosing a local newspaper as a medium to criticize the underground publication, the government is sending a message not to take *glasnost* too far while trying to present the criticism as an independent opinion of the newspaper's editor. Publishing such an article in a national newspaper such as *Pravda* would have implied "official" disapproval — something that right now the government is trying to avoid. Sort of a warning shot.

Third is publication of the underground magazine itself, its stated goal being to cover topics not covered by official media, and the fact that such publications still are needed.

It's true that there are many things appearing in the Soviet press today that would have been unthinkable just a couple of years ago. The appalling examples of mismanagement in economy, corruption, prostitution, drugs, accounts of natural disasters and airplane crashes. Even accounts of two days of violent popular unrest in Kazakhstan after local party chief, Kunayev, had been removed and replaced by a Russian.

On the other hand, there is a conspicuous absence of certain topics that are still taboo for the Soviet press. Emigration, foreign policy, religion, the KGB, the Communist Party itself — these are still not subjects for discussion, and at least some of them probably never will be. The party, for instance. There has been considerable shakeout of personnel on rather high levels of Soviet bureaucracy, all the way up to heads of ministries. Many were fired and even prosecuted for corruption and gross incompetence. All were party members; in fact, the appointments on that level are made by the Central Committee itself.

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Somehow, this fact is conveniently overlooked — that the bureaucracy that runs the country *is* the party. But when it comes to placing the blame, it is always laid at the feet of individuals. It's easy to say now that Leonid Brezhnev's rule led to the current disastrous state of the economy. Somehow, nobody asks where the party was during the twenty years of his rule. Maybe it's because everybody knows the answer: They were all out there singing praise to Brezhnev (or Khrushchev, or Stalin) for being such a great leader of the country.

Or the KGB. Nobody touches the KGB. Why? Because the agency is still needed. Openness or not, the KGB — the Committee for State Security — is still the most influential force in the Soviet Union, and it is its task to see that whatever sensational news is published by the official press does not go beyond certain topics. That whoever gets fired is the showcase; it does not affect the vital foundations of the Soviet system. The system must be protected.

And party leader Mikhail Gorbachev is not shy about this himself. He has said more than once: "We are not going to challenge the role of the party, which remains a leading force in the Soviet society." Or the role of its faithful watchdog, the KGB.

Glasnost or not, the distribution of information is still a matter of national security in the U.S.S.R. You still need a "need-to-know" clearance to read *Time* magazine in the library. The photocopying machines, few as they are, are still under lock and key. You can listen to BBC now, but Radio Liberty is still jammed. And just a few days ago the Soviet authorities confiscated about 30 books brought by American publishers participating in the Moscow International Book Fair because of "unsuitable contents." What kind of books? Pornography? No, just some novels published in the West by exiled Soviet writers such as Vassily Aksyonov, and books about the Soviet Union and Soviet history.

[illegible]

Because information is a weapon, it is dangerous. Give people too much information and they start asking questions. If they start asking questions, the government is in trouble. So, quite obviously, the easiest way to control the problem is to deprive people of access to truthful information in the first place.

The majority of Soviet population know only what they read in Soviet newspapers. Yes, there are several million who listen to Western broadcasts, but you go into the provinces and the only sources of information are Soviet newspapers and television. Both are state-controlled, which means that everything goes through a censor's office. Large newspapers have resident censors to speed things up. And the censors always know which topics are currently approved and which are not.

So why have *glasnost* at all? Because right now it serves a very important function. Domestically, it provides that badly needed boiler valve effect. But even more importantly, it serves as an excellent public relations tool, designed for Western consumption. Political freedoms and the freedom of expression — or, rather, the lack thereof — have always been major point of criticism leveled at the Soviet system by Western democracies. *Glasnost* paves the way for improved trade relations, builds up good will, and influences Western public opinion in favor of the Soviet Union.

It is no coincidence that the beginning of *glasnost* also opened an unprecedented wave of slick, well-packaged Soviet spokesmen showing up on American television. And they do a very believable job. They are eagerly invited to American news programs and talk shows, where they chat amicably about the merits of the Dodgers vs. the Yankees, readily admit that there have been plenty of mistakes in the Soviet policy in the past, point out — quite truthfully — the less than perfect nature of American society, and offer the "new line of thinking" and the latest Soviet proposals.

More often than not, they are introduced as Soviet journalists, although some of their American hosts point out that these people are the spokesmen for Soviet policy. Unfortunately, this message often gets obscured by these spokesmen's charm, perfect English, and frequent use of the phrase "in my personal opinion."

It would be useful to keep in mind that these people are indeed the spokesmen for the Soviet government. They are not journalists in the sense American journalists are. In this country, "journalism" implies independent opinion. In the Soviet Union, people who work in the media are state employees. They are free to offer their personal opinions as long as these opinions do not deviate from official policy. The current policy is *glasnost*, and so we see a little more candor and a little less unwillingness to discuss touchy topics.

Should Soviet policy reverse tomorrow, it will be the same "journalists" who will go on the same television shows and accuse Gorbachev of "excessive attention to the dark side of the Soviet life and deliberate downgrading of the heroic achievements of the Soviet people."

Right now, however, the main thrust of the Soviet propaganda towards the West is to soften Soviet image, to appeal directly to the public in the Free World countries and to create support for Soviet efforts to improve trade relations. The Soviet Union has little chance for economic recovery without massive transfer of high technology from the West, which is impossible without trade credits and most-favored-nation status.

I am not advocating that we should shut the door to cultural and trade exchanges. We should encourage such exchanges — as long as we enter into them with open eyes and at least minimal knowledge of the workings of the Soviet system.

Steady components of such lack of knowledge are the "citizen summits," "space bridges" and other undertakings based on the precept that "the more we get to know the Russians on a one-to-one basis, the better chance we have to understand each other and to prevent a military confrontation."

To begin with, people who attend such summits from the Soviet side are never just ordinary Soviet citizens. Obtaining permission to visit any Western country, as a member of cultural or scientific delegation or even as part of a tourist group (the Soviets do not permit individual tourism to the West), is a lengthy process that takes several months of background checks and interviews in order to establish the applicant's ideological reliability and the "right" way of thinking. Each delegation is accompanied by cover KGB officers, who see to it that members of the group do not deviate from prescribed behavior or — the worst of sins — defect. To prevent the latter, there are always "hostages" left back home: husbands, wives, children.

Even if the Soviet citizens coming to such summits were representative enough of their society, the policy of "getting to know each other" misses the main point. We don't have to convince the Soviet people that peace is good and war is bad. They don't want the war; they've lived through enough of them already. The point is that we can send thousands of emissaries of good will, make friends there, and it still won't change the outcome, because what the Soviet people think is irrelevant. It's what their government thinks that matters.

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Unlike the situation in the United States, where people can start a public campaign, write letters to their congressmen, and ultimately make themselves heard in policy matters, the Soviet people do not have an opportunity to influence their government, because it is not an elected government and therefore it is not answerable to its own people. And the fact of life is that it still is the government that represents communist ideology — the ideology that preaches that it is a scientific law of history that socialism will win and capitalism will die. The ideology that sees nothing wrong in speeding up this inevitable demise of capitalism by whatever means — short of nuclear holocaust, because ideology or not, the messengers of the bright socialist future don't want to perish together with the "doomed" capitalist remnants of the past.

We need to talk to the Soviets, but we have to do it from a background of knowledge of what their political system is, what it represents, and what the goals of the Soviet government are.

Yes, there are some changes. That is inevitable. No system is completely static, although some evolve more slowly than others. There is a new generation of Soviet leaders today: younger, more vigorous, better educated, and in many ways more savvy and sophisticated in their methods and in their use of public relations. But just the fact that the movie is now in color instead of black and white, that there are some special effects, and that Clint Eastwood replaced Clark Gable in the title role, doesn't make it all that different. It's still a remake of the old script about Jack and Jane that is playing in the movie theater near you.

EXHIBIT NO. 26

The Washington Times — FRIDAY, JULY 10, 1987 / PAGE A5

Soldier's execution triggered defection

Wash Times 7/10/87 p.A5

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A former Soviet soldier said yesterday that the execution of a fellow recruit by a Soviet army officer in Afghanistan led him to defect to the mujahideen guerrillas.

Vladislav Naumov, a 24-year-old former paratrooper from Volgograd, said in an interview that most Soviet citizens remain unaware of the Afghan war that began with the 1979 invasion by Soviet forces.

"Our major source of information was the returning soldiers," said Mr. Naumov, who now lives in Canada. "They told us there was a good chance we would be killed, we would not come home, and that it was a real war since the mujahideen were resisting."

A merchant seaman drafted into the army in 1982, Mr. Naumov still believed Soviet troops were being sent to Afghanistan for humanitarian purposes — to build schools and hospitals.

But all that changed with the first taste of combat, which Mr. Naumov said was launched against innocent Afghan villagers.

Mr. Naumov described his first war experience as a major Soviet "combat training operation" against the village of Kama near the Jalalabad garrison where he was posted in 1983.

The assault followed a sequence of attacks including dawn airstrikes with MiG jet fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships followed by heavy artillery bombardment.

Following the artillery attacks, helicopters then dropped cluster bombs and anti-personnel mines aimed against fleeing villagers seeking refuge in the Afghan hills.

"After that, it was our part. Infantry and paratroop assault units were sent into the village," Mr. Naumov said. "As we were dropped from helicopters into the village, we could see the villagers escaping into the mountains and how their bodies were being blown apart by the mines."

The troops were ordered to gather all villagers together in a group and shoot any that tried to flee. Soviet military intelligence officers from the army's "special department" then began questioning the Afghans for intelligence data on the resistance.

Three Afghans were executed during the interrogations by the Soviet intelligence officers, he said. And after questioning other villagers, one Soviet lieutenant then ordered a Russian private to execute a villager singled out by the officer.

"The young man just couldn't do it — he dropped his automatic weapon," Mr. Naumov said. "Then the officer took his pistol from his holster and shot the Soviet soldier in the head, and then he shot the Afghan."

The officer then explained that the soldier was killed for disobeying an order.

"We were all shocked by the fact that our own guy was killed by one of our own officers," he said. "This was a very important moment for me and other soliders because we were told we were being sent to Afghanistan to help the Afghan people. But after this operation, I realized we had been deceived."

Five months later, Mr. Naumov escaped and joined the Afghan rebels. He helped set up field hospitals and fought against communist troops loyal to the Kabul regime.

Russian-language books sent to him by Freedom House, a New York-based human rights organization that helped Mr. Naumov reach the West last November, changed his outlook on Soviet communism, Mr. Naumov said.

Mr. Naumov said the most important book he read in Afghanistan was Alexander Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago," a chronicle of Soviet communist labor camp practices.

The late Russian author Varlam Shalamov, whose expose "Kolyma Tales" described life in a Arctic prison camp, also influenced Mr. Naumov's turn away from communism.

"What shook me up most of all about Solzhenitsyn was the fact that I was born in the country he described," Mr. Naumov said. "When I was living there, I did hear something about prisoners, and I was aware of the fact that there were political prisoners in camps. But it didn't really hit me, I didn't really understand what that meant until I read the book."

EXHIBIT NO. 27

10/8/87

Red Army defector denounces Afghan war

By Bill Gertz
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

A former Red Army sergeant denounced the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan yesterday and urged the U.S. government to admit other soldiers who have defected during the eight-year war.

"The reason why I left the Soviet army is that I did not wish to take part in a terrible war in Afghanistan and in the cruel annihilation of the Afghan people," Soviet defector Nikolay Movchan told a congressional panel.

Mr. Movchan, 24, described morale among the estimated 115,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan as "very low" and said in some cases enlisted men had resorted to shooting senior enlisted men or throwing grenades into their tents or under the wheels of their vehicles.

"No one wants to serve in Afghanistan, even Soviet officers," he said. "One time I heard an officer screaming: 'Why are we here? What are we doing here?' "

A Ukrainian now employed with a publishing house in New Jersey, Mr. Movchan made the remarks at a hearing of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, a bipartisan group of congressmen set up in 1985 to support the Afghan resistance.

Sen. Gordon Humphrey, task force co-chairman, said the hearing was called to examine human rights in Afghanistan under a recent program of "national reconciliation" put forth by the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul.

"We now know much more about the ongoing slaughter taking place in Afghanistan than we did just two years ago," he said.

Mr. Humphrey criticized the State Department for not sending any representative to testify yesterday.

"It is insulting to our witnesses that despite a long-standing invitation, the State Department has refused to send a witness for today's hearing," he said.

Mr. Movchan spent 13 months with the Afghan rebels after defecting in June 1983.

He was among only four Soviet Army deserters allowed into the United States from Afghanistan since the war began with the Soviet invasion in December 1979. Other defectors have been resettled in Canada and Western Europe.

"I hope that the United States and other Western countries will change their attitude toward Soviet army deserters from Afghanistan," Mr. Movchan said. "That is, I hope that these soldiers will be accepted by the Western countries more systematically."

He urged granting asylum to the defectors as a humanitarian gesture, and also to reduce the burden on the Afghan rebels who must guard the soldiers from the Soviets "who literally hunt for the POWs and usually bomb the area where they are held. . . . The presence of these young men in the West can help in the fight to liberate Afghanistan."

Mr. Movchan said the Soviets are carrying out "scorched earth" policies in Afghanistan aimed at defeating the mujahideen rebels.

"By destroying the harvests and villages, the Soviet forces are depriving the Afghan resistance of the support that Afghan villagers were giving them," he said. "And thus the Afghan people were forced either to flee to Pakistan and become refugees or to go to big cities where they could be under the watchful eye of the communist government."

EXHIBIT NO. 31

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

The tale of a Washington witch hunt

By Vladimir Sakharov 12-2-86

They came to a conference in the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, an imposing residue from "The Shining," just as grotesquely ostentatious as any old wealthy establishment. It was Oct. 21, 10 days before the Halloween night, I thought, and they had already begun a witch hunt. They were the Washington Times, the Republican lawyers, Clarence McKee and three innocent defectors, plus an assorted audience. I was curious, puzzled and hesitant. I wondered if it was the devil who made me come or if it was my public responsibility to fulfill a commitment to the Jamestown Foundation and share the conference panel. As the events progressed I decided it was the devil.

The Colonial Room was downstairs. I figured they must still hide their colonial past. They stood by a large table well stocked with liquor. They murmured under dimmed chandeliers. They moved about the room slowly, looking intensely and quietly at me as I stepped in. Just as quietly, McKee, a big black man, who seemed to be in charge of them, invited me to a table in the corner and introduced me to three others. They were Tadeusz Kucharski, former commercial attache in the Polish embassy in Luanda, Angola, from 1976 until his defection in 1983; Juan Benemelis, a Cuban diplomat and scholar who received asylum in the United States in 1980; and Kidano-Mariam Betrou, who resigned his post as Ethiopia's ambassador to Egypt, stepping down from a distinguished diplomatic career to make his home in America. I joined them to hear what was being said.

What I heard was McKee coach them what to speak about. "Of course, I am not coaching you, you understand," he said, and then he proceeded about how important it was to expose Rev. Jesse Jackson as an individual duped by Soviet disinformation who plays on the hand of Soviet-Cuban communist expansion in Africa. I smelled a rat and picked up a media release from a stack on the table. I glanced at the text: "Republican National Lawyers Association . . . Clarence McKee, chairman of the Washington chapter . . . Panel on Soviet Involvement in Africa." I wondered: Why this co-ordination from McKee, who was not by any means an expert on Soviet politics? Why did he call the conference "Soviet Expansionism, Racism and Disinformation in Africa"? What was he driving at by distributing speaking subjects among the panelists, who were the real experts, each in his own right? What was the meaning of the staged performance?

One thing I knew for sure: The term "disinformation" has become a sort of McCarthyite word. I had become a modern-day tool in witch hunting. Whatever certain circles in Washington do not want to hear for political reasons, they call it "disinformation"—Soviet, Cuban or whatever. And with whomever they would want to settle a score, all it takes is to apply a "disinformation" label.

I noticed equipment to videotape the panel was being installed by the stage. "Just so we can have a tape and show it to our friends," McKee said. I immediately doubted somehow that his friends were necessarily my friends. I went to look for a wash room. Once in its safety I felt a strong urge to leave, to get on a plane to Tucson, not to go back to the gaudy, dim Colonial Room. I hated to be told what to talk about. The name of the conference did not agree with me. However, obligations came first. McKee's chapter was footing mine and the other panelists' air fare and a service fee was committed to each. I went back.

McKee sat by me at the table on the stage, evidently uncomfortable. "Oh, about the air fare and the fee," he said, "we don't have it yet, but we may when we sell the tape. A friend of ours is coming from South Africa on Friday. He'll do it." I thought that must have been the spirit of Halloween and my hearing was influenced by ghosts of the olden days in the Colonial Room. I was wrong. McKee was still sitting right beside me in a bright stage light. It was too late for me to jump off the stage and blow the joint. Very uncivilized. And so I prepared to listen.

Ambassador Betrou, a very kind, intelligent man sitting on my right, told me quietly he was not really comfortable with public speaking. I understood and nodded. The only thing I could think of was how not to get suckered in whatever McKee's personal political angle was. I wished the rest would understand, too. But it was already too late.

The panel, as I expected, began blasting the Soviets in Africa just like the spirit of the conference required. I knew what was coming next—blasting Jesse Jackson—and that's what happened. The real purpose was to escalate a political, anti-Jackson campaign by using politically naive defectors who knew very little about cut-throat American politics.

I decided the whole affair was obscene. When my turn came I knew I could not be a part of it. So I spoke about freedom of expression in America and how we don't learn much about the outside world and how our education system has failed to bring up a young generation versed in foreign languages and knowledgeable about the world. Not a word about Jackson, I determined, even if they'd torture me in one of the dark corners of the Colonial Room.

While the rest were elaborating on the evils of Soviet designs for Africa, I was the only one who knew that they would not get paid. My anger in seeing these defectors being used was mixed with the sadness of realizing that I was financially much better off than all three. I was thinking what would happen when this prolific Cuban finds out he has been ripped off. Of course, they might get paid and reimbursed for their travel some day soon. I just hoped they would also realize they were used for the political purposes of a right-wing organization. I wondered how long the sour ethical aftertaste would bite their tongues.

As for me, the eerie Colonial Room, the hotel, the dimmed lights and the murmuring procession of ghosts—it all came together. I knew all this was nothing but a reincarnation of mean spirits from the past, maybe from the McCarthy era, or maybe from the days of Stalin's purges. Next morning, instead of flying directly back to Tucson, I took a train to New England. The trees along the way displayed their golden, red and purple colors, a magnificent scene which I was privileged to enjoy. This was the world without the McKees, the Washington Times, the Jamestown Foundation and the Republican lawyers. How bright it was!

Vladimir Sakharov, a KGB agent in the Middle East before defecting to the U.S. in 1971, is now a visiting professor at the University of Arizona.